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Symposium
Children, Families and the Law
Foreword
In the spring of 1991, the Executive Board of the Nova Law Re-
view decided to produce a symposium dealing with the rights and rela-
tionships of children and families under the law. This topic was chosen,
in part, because of a humanistic interest in the laws affecting the areas
of personal life and privacy closest to where most of us live: within the
family setting. The authors and students who have contributed to this
issue of the Review offer an eclectic mix of issues ranging from child
custody concerns to the psychological effects of divorce; from the tragic
issue of child abuse to concerns about the children who kill; and also
whether society is now ready to accept the same-gender marriage and
family situation.
Professor John Batt of the University of Kentucky examines the
contemporary rationale behind child custody determinations and pro-
vides a thorough and insightful commentary of the theories which drive
these types of determinations by the courts.' Professor Batt explains
and critiques the best interests of the child model-or para-
digm--which was articulated by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and
Albert Solnit and has found widespread favor among a great many ju-
rists, attorneys, and other professionals involved in the arena of child
custody and placement. Professor Batt also addresses a more recent
model based on the work of Erik Erikson, the psychoanalytic humanist,
whose ideas have gained favor among some commentators and others.
Professor Batt's analysis melds the critical commentary regarding these
influential paradigms with his own practical perspectives and suggests
continuing critical review of the way we, as a society, approach the
issues of child custody.
Josephine A. Bulkley, of the American Bar Association's Center
1. John Batt, Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Best Interests Para-
digm: A Contemporary Assessment of the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit Position and the
Group's Painter v. Bannister Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REV. 621 (1992).
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on Children and the Law, offers a current perspective on the sensitive
issues involving child abuse prosecutions.' Bulkley, one of the better-
known commentators in this area of the law, examines recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court which continue to reinforce alter-
natives to the in-court and confrontational testimony of a child who has
been abused. Ms. Bulkley's article addresses the use of closed circuit
television and other exceptions which allow a child's testimony to be
used as evidence, without a face-to-face confrontation in the courtroom
setting.
As the Director of The Children's Law Project at Nova Univer-
sity's Shepard Broad Law Center, Nancy Schleifer also provides com-
mentary on child abuse cases and the Confrontation Clause.' Her arti-
cle addresses the child's perspective in the family court setting, as
opposed to a criminal proceeding. It also provides guidance and recom-
mendations for the development of a child protection case to practition-
ers who may represent the interests of abused children.
Gerald P. Koocher, an associate professor at Harvard Medical
School and Chief Psychologist at Boston's Children's Hospital, offers a
different perspective on children's rights and the role of the legal sys-
tem in evaluating those rights." In essence, he exhorts the legal scholar,
jurist, or practitioner to "step into the shoes," as it were, of the health
care professional in order to see the effect of legal or governmental
proceedings on children. His article focuses on matters which relate to
decision-making for, and by, children.
Memphis State University's Janet Leach Richards provides a
thoughtful commentary on the need to balance the scales in child cus-
tody determinations between a natural parent and an interested third
party holding a significant relationship with the child.8 Her article ex-
amines the natural parent preference, its underpinnings, and continued
viability; it suggests recognition of a third party who has acted in a
parental role and seeks a balancing of the competing interests so that,
2. Josephine A. Bulkley, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Ease Child Abuse
Prosecutions: Use of Closed-Circuit Television and Children's Statements of Abuse
Under the Confrontation Clause, 16 NOVA L. REV. 687 (1992).
3. Nancy Schleifer, Might Versus Fright: The Confrontation Clause and the
Search for "Truth" in the Child Abuse Family Court Case, 16 NOVA L. REV. 783
(1992).
4. Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711 (1992).
5. Janet Leach Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties:
Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. REv. 733 (1992).
618 [Vol. 16
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Foreword
ultimately, the best interests of the child are served.
Three lawyer-activists connected with Hofstra Univer-
sity-Andrew Schepard, Joan Atwood, and Stephen W. Schlis-
sel--contribute an article which draws attention to the problems cre-
ated for children when parents divorce, and urges measures to ease the
potential trauma.6 Using an educational program they developed as an
example, the authors encourage the adoption of programs which would
counsel divorcing parents on the problems encountered by their chil-
dren, reduce the use of the children as a weapon or pawn in the break-
up, and help to provide positive assurance to children of their place in
the family setting. The recommendations of the authors further extend
to professionals practicing in the field of matrimonial law and seek new
standards of ethics to govern conduct in the field.
Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, of Boston College's School of Law, writes
regarding the societal problems of children who kill others.' Her essay
reviews Charles Patrick Ewing's When Children Kill: The Dynamics of
Juvenile Homicide. It explores the response of the judicial system in
treating children as adults or as minors and goes on to suggest several
courses of action in dealing with this serious and emerging problem.
On a much different slant, authors Michael L. Closen and Carol
R. Heise suggest that it may be time for American society, through its
legislative and judicial units, to recognize same-sex marriages.' These
unions have found acceptance in other parts of the word, explain the
authors, and a public policy of reducing the spread of AIDS combined
with a more rational and accepting attitude towards same gender rela-
tionships is sought. Employing an analysis which draws heavily on his-
torical perspective and the evolution of American marriage laws, the
authors argue that, much in the same way as society and the law have
evolved in matters concerning women's rights and slaves' emancipation,
the law will come to recognize same-sex marriages.
The symposium also contains four student works. Kelly Bennison
examines the problems occurring when adopting parents discover the
6. Andrew Schepard et al., Preventing Trauma for the Children of Divorce
Through Education and Professional Responsibility, 16 NOVA L. REV. 767 (1992).
7. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, A Wake-Up Call for American Society or Have "The
Chickens Just Come Home to Roost?" - Essay Review of Charles Patrick Ewing's
When Children Kill: The Dynamics of Juvenile Homicide, 16 NOVA L. REV. 847
(1992).
8. Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-Traditional
Family: The Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-
Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L. REV. 809 (1992).
1992]
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adopted child is not as represented and seek redress.9 David L. Fergu-
son evaluates a recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court in which
one divorced mother's First Amendment rights were burdened in order
to reinforce the relationship between her children and the father. 10 Su-
san Yoffe Slaton addresses a children-related immigration issue, the
availability of asylum protection for aliens, like the Chinese, who op-
pose population control policies." Finally, Camille L. Worsnop writes
of the unconstitutionality of the Florida statute which prohibits adop-
tion by homosexuals.' 2 Her comment is written in light of a recent de-
cision of the circuit court in Monroe County, Florida in which the court
struck down the statute on privacy and equal protection grounds.
Each of the student works is reflective of emerging modern
problems in the law as affecting family life. As we continue to find new
and innovative ways to consider, and deal with, these types of
problems, no one should lose track of the common strain of humanity
and care that sounds in issues involving children or the family.
The Review staff is most grateful to the authors and contributors
to this edition for their enthusiasm and support throughout the writing
and production process.
9. Kelly Bennison, Comment, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma,
16 NOVA L. REV. 909 (1992).
10. David L. Ferguson, Comment, Schutz v. Schutz: More Than a Mere "Inci-
dental" Burden on First Amendment Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 937 (1992).
11. Susan Yoffe Slaton, Note, Hard Decisions: Asylum Protection as Applied to
Aliens Opposing Population Control Policies, 16 NOVA L. REV. 955 (1992).
12. Camille L. Worsnop, Comment, Florida Statute Prohibiting Adoption by
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Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Best
Interests Paradigm: A Contemporary Assessment of
the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit Position and the Group's
Painter v. Bannister Jurisprudence
John Batt*
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jurisprudential paradigm functions ideally as a guide to re-
search, policy creation, norm construction, proof presentation, and deci-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, B.A., Johns Hopkins University,
J.D., William and Mary; LL.M, Yale University. The author is a Professor of Law at
the University of Kentucky College of Law and a member of the Association for Ap-
plied Psychoanalysis.
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sion-making in specific cases.' More often than not, such a paradigm is
an amalgam which is the product of observation, conceptualization,
and imagination. Of course, no such paradigm is ever free of value per-
meation. Furthermore, such a jurisprudential paradigm is a model
which provides us with a vision of a particular reality. It is my purpose
to explicate, in some detail, two specific jurisprudential paradigms. It is
stressed that both are relevant to the everyday court handling of child
custody disputes. These are models directed at lawyer action, and not
simply at scholarly interaction.
Child custody decision-making focuses on the best interests of the
child.2 The best interests test is a general proposition which articulates
a fundamental value position8 - a preference for the child's well-being.
Best interests analysis can focus on economic well-being, physical
health, family setting, or on a great number of things. But under the
law, the aspirational position of our legal system is that the child's wel-
fare is always paramount. Within the context of marital dissolution or
separation, it is the judge's duty to promote the well-being position of
the child. In this article, we deal with a very critical dimension of the
child's best interests, that is, the child's psychological well-being. Our
goal is to see how the abstract best interest legal standard can be im-
plemented to produce more appropriate outcomes in child custody
cases. It is my contention that better decisions can be produced through
the use of models which give sufficient guidance in concrete cases to
lawyers, judges and expert witnesses. The two decision-making para-
digms discussed in this article have been created to assist those persons
who participate in the process of deciding child custody cases. Addi-
1. The classic example of a comprehensive, imaginatively conceived and most
useful jurisprudential paradigm is the law, science and policy "decision process" fo-
cused "quantum intellectual physics" of Myers S. McDougal and Harold D. Laswell.
See generally, MYERS S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1980) (for the best introduction to their paradigm-in-action); see also FRITSOF
CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE SOCIETY AND THE RISING CULTURE (1982)
(for useful material on the role of paradigms in decision-making); THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed. 1970, 6th Impress. 1975) (for
informative background reading focusing on the role of paradigms in scientific
revolutions).
2. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 719-24 (2nd ed.
1983).
3. The term "value position" refers to one's stand on a preference for a particu-
lar value. Examples of fundamental values critical in decision-making are security,
wealth, respect, enlightenment, well-being, affection and skill. See generally, MYERS S.
McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 15-36 (1960).
[Vol. 16
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tionally, it is anticipated that a discussion of the two models will be of
value to professors, scholars and law students.
The first model we will examine is known as the beyond the best
interest of the child theory. This paradigm" has been widely dissemi-
nated and has had a very substantial impact on family law decision-
making. Created by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit,8
this model has helped to revolutionize thinking and action regarding
child placement decisions,' and it has sensitized a great number of
judges, practitioners, law professors, mental health providers and lay-
men to the important psychological dimensions of child custody cases.
The other model discussed is the psycho-social developmental best in-
terests model. This model is based on, but is not limited by, the work of
the psychoanalytic humanist, Erik Erikson. Erikson is a very well re-
garded clinician, theorist and social commentator. 7 This model has
been examined in several law journal articles and the model has at-
tracted the attention of a number of persons interested in child custody
issues.8
4. In their widely used casebook, Professors Homer H. Clark and Carol Glowin-
sky call the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit model an influential treatment of the child custody
dispute problem. HOMER H. CLARK & CAROL GLOWINSKY, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 1066 (4th ed. 1990). This particular paradigm was created by
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BE-
YOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973) [Hereinafter BBI (1973)]; JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (2nd ed. (1979)[Here-
inafter BBI (1979)]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(1986).
5. Their interdisciplinary effort draws upon the materials of law, psychoanalysis
and psychiatry.
6. Although all do not agree with Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, no one ignores
their views. They surely have forced others to re-think the whole child custody matter.
See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 752-55. Law Professor Louise Graham and Judge
James Keller describe the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit work as seminal and of influence on
the national level. LOUISE GRAHAM & JAMES KELLER, KENTUCKY DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS, 404 (1988). In addition they discuss this author's criticism of the Goldstein/
Freud/Solnit paradigm. Id.
7. See ERIK ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED (1982) (for an introduction
to the author's thought process). Erikson is certainly Western culture's foremost stu-
dent of human development.
8. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Development-Psychological Ap-
proach To Proof And Decision-Making, 12 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 491 (1976); John
Batt, The Child's Right To A Best Interest Psychological Development Under The
Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Policy Science Reflections On International
Batt
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The first model, articulated by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, pro-
vides guidelines for legal decision-making.9 Yet only an artless exam-
iner could fail to perceive the paradigmatic nature of this jurispruden-
tial effort. It is no exaggeration to say that they have created a truly
influential paradigm. Their work has had an extraordinary impact on
the thinking and action of those who concern themselves with issues of
child placement, such as, the resolution of private child custody dis-
putes. 10 Through their publications and appearances testifying as ex-
Law, Psychological Well-Being and World Peace, 2 HUM. RTS. ANN. 19 (1984).
Over the years, this author has worked at creating a paradigm useful in making
child-custody decisions. This work has received attention from others seriously con-
cerned about how we decide child custody cases. See, e.g., N. Repucci, The Wisdom of
Solomon: Issues in Child Custody Determination, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH
AND THE LAW (N. Repucci, et al., eds. 1984). In this work Dr. Repucci, of the Univer-
sity of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, after discussing the
work of The Colorado Children's Diagnostic Center writes:
The C.C.C.'s philosophical basis for criteria is essentially derived from
Goldstein et.al.'s (1973) proposed criteria. . . . In contrast John Batt...
advocates a procedure that focuses on the child's developmental stage, as-
sessing his or her relevant needs. Then the parents are evaluated in terms
of practical and theoretical considerations - time, devotion, attitudes to-
ward the child as well as intentions, objectives and goals. On the basis of
these criteria, the goal is to determine who will best serve the child's needs
and interests relative to his or her development stage.
Id. at 70-71.
The New Jersey Superior Court, after referring to the work of Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit, states: "another approach is that of John Batt, who approaches child cus-
tody questions 'from a psychologically oriented child development standpoint' . . .
[and] proposes that the court take into account five phases of development of the
human child before making a custody placement." Mayer v. Mayer, 376 A.2d 214,217
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
In the present article, the author has refined and added to the developmental para-
digm referred to in the above works. A large number of circuit judges and Master
Commissioners dealing with custody cases in various parts of the State of Kentucky
have made extensive use of this work.
9. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 31.
10. See Richard E. Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L. Q. 49 (1979-80) (in this work,
Crouch skillfully summarizes representative reactions from lawyers, psychiatrists, pol-
icy scientists, law professors, social workers and judges and gives one a "feel" for the
impact of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's work); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN & ALBERT
SOLNIT, DIVORCE AND YOUR CHILD (1984) (providing a basic description of the
model). The language used by the authors of this publication makes the BBI Model
intelligible to experts and laymen alike. Essentially, the work is a popularization of the
BBI model. See id.
[Vol. 16
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pert witnesses, they have widely circulated their model." Judges, law-
yers, law professors, law students, mental health professionals, social
scientists and concerned laymen have been very affected by their
message. 12
In this article, I shall describe the Goldstein, Freud, Solnit model,
de-code it, analyze it and provide an assessment of it.'" The model will
be referred to as the BBI paradigm. This language derives from the
title of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's best selling book, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child.'4 In performing the above outlined intellectual
tasks, we will limit ourselves to the evaluation of their model and to its
everyday use in deciding private child custody disputes. 15 Placement
decisions arising out of cases involving physical child abuse, sexual
abuse, physical neglect of children, emotional neglect of children, etc.
occur under institutional, psychological, social and legal conditions that
are different from private child custody disputes.'0 An attempt to assess
the BBI model in relation to these other child placement decisions
11. See, e.g., Pierce v. Yerkovick, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1974);
Faria v. Faria, 456 A.2d 1205 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982); J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON FAMILY LAW 511-23 (1982) (this casebook contains excerpts from a case tried
in the state of Washington consisting mainly of the testimony of Professor Goldstein).
12. In my home city of Lexington, Kentucky, law clerks are urged by a number
of judges and lawyers to attend to the wisdom of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit. A num-
ber of psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and social workers in the community rely
on the wvisdom of these three researchers. Many of the behavioral professionals appear
as expert witnesses in child custody disputes, and other child focused cases, and rely
heavily on the BBI canon. It should be kept in mind that I reside in a relatively isolated
southern metropolitan area with a population of approximately 200,000. We are not
Atlanta, Baltimore, Miami, Nashville or Richmond and surely we are not Chicago, San
Francisco, Boston or New York. Reasoning from our local experiences and the substan-
tial attention given to their work in the legal literature, I am compelled to conclude
that the influence of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit is extremely widespread.
13. My approach is very much influenced by the work of Harvard psychiatrist
Robert Coles. See generally ROBERT COLES, PRIVILEGED ONES: THE WELL-OFF AND
THE RICH IN AMERICA (1977); ROBERT COLES, WALKER PERCY, AN AMERICAN
SEARCH (1978). Equally influential is the existential method of Walker Percy. See,
e.g., WALKER PERCY, LOST IN THE COSMOS (1983); CONVERSATIONS WITH WALKER
PERCY (Lewis A. Lawson & Victor A. Kramer ed. 1985).
14. BBI (1973), supra note 4.
15. Limiting the scope of the paper so as to cover only such cases serves to in-
crease the intensity of focus and permits us to produce a complete critique which will
be of true functional utility.
16. It is my contention that other paradigms must be developed to deal with
these cases. See, e.g., AREEN, supra note 11, at 959-1126.
Batt
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would not produce a clearly focused evaluation of the BBI model.
Analysis of the model within the private child custody dispute situation
will enhance our understanding of this critical model. It is my opinion
that a comprehensive analysis of the BBI paradigm has not been pro-
vided for those persons working in the private child custody field. This
article seeks to overcome that failure of scholarship.
As already stated, two jurisprudential paradigms will be examined
in this paper. The bulk of my effort will be devoted to an assessment of
the BBI paradigm; however, I shall also offer my thoughts on an alter-
native model. 17 Before beginning my assessment of the BBI paradigm,
I add one final introductory comment. In assessing the BBI model, my
first task will be to articulate its major sustaining ideas and elements,
make reference to practical considerations, provide comments on par-
ticular implications and fully elaborate my critique. The reader should
keep in mind that my essential position is that the creation and study of
legal reality directed decision-making models is the first step toward
intelligent decision-making in concrete cases.' 8 Without models of util-
ity to guide us, real world decision-making is devoid of enlightened
intelligence.
II. THE BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS PARADIGM REVEALED
It is important to recognize that the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit model
is firmly rooted in psychoanalysis. This means that their work is deriva-
tive of a psychoanalytic view of existence. 19 Understanding the para-
digm is enhanced if one remembers that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
work is the product of the institutional ties established between the
Yale Law School and the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic.20 This re-
lationship began in 1962. Psychoanalysis has been a part of Yale Law
School's interdisciplinary program of legal studies for decades.2
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. See Richard Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Pros-
pects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975).
19. See Joseph Goldstein, The Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic and Legal Ed-
ucation, in STUDIES IN CHILD PSYCHOANALYSIS: PURE AND APPLIED: THE SCIENTIFIC
PROCEEDING OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE HAMPSTEAD CHILD-
THERAPY COURSE AND CLINIC BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF 15 (1975).
20. Id.
21. See J. KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967)(an
early classic demonstrating the high quality of the work produced by the Yale pro-
gram). The more recent publications of the BBI group are evidence of the continued
[Vol. 16
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The first fundamental idea in this model is that the psychological
well-being of the child is a paramount interest which must be promoted
in the child custody decision-making process. 2 Both judicial and legis-
lative decision-makers have failed to understand the fundamental im-
portance of the child's emotional needs." Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
model of psychoanalytic perspective allows them to comprehend the
importance of the child's psychological needs.
The model establishes that in order to protect the child's psycho-
logical best interests, the law must assure that each child will be a
member of a family. Specifically, the family environment is an essential
zone of privacy which serves as the protective surrounding, making pos-
sible a positive developmental experience.24 Further, the model estab-
lishes that the law must act to maximize the child's opportunity to be
in a family where he or she is wanted, receives affection on a continu-
ing basis, learns how to give affection and is taught to cope with his or
her aggressive impulses.25 The BBI decision-making paradigm places
great emphasis on the child's need for continuity of relationship with
people who act to humanize the child. 6 Disruptions of continuity of
relationships are perceived as being very detrimental to the child's psy-
chological development.27 The damage done by these disruptions of
continuity of relationships vary according to the age of the child. 8 The
younger the child, the more the child is at risk. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit contend that the young child who suffers from some substantial
disrupt:ion of continuity of relationship will grow up to be less than
psychologically normal.29 The authors of the paradigm stress the signif-
icance of disturbances of continuity; even periodic court-ordered visita-
tion is detrimental to continuity of relationship which exists between
child and custodian.3 0 This position is grounded in a particular psycho-
logical reason: "Children have difficulty in relating to, profiting from
and maintaining contact with two psychological parents who are not in
success of the Yale based interdisciplinary effort.
22. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 31-32.
27. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 32-33.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. at 38.
Batt
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positive contact with each other." 3'
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit concluded that the law must evaluate
the importance of this psychological reality. They believed that the law
should act to insure that a custodian determined visitation, as the cus-
todian saw fit. The visiting parent, according to the creators of the BBI
paradigm, has "little chance to serve as a true object for love, trust and
identification since this role is based on being available on an uninter-
rupted day-to-day basis."'3 2 The day-to-day custodian is the person who
promotes the child's psychological development. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit call the day-to-day facilitator of emotional development the
"psychological parent."3 3 Testifying as an expert witness for the de-
fendant father in a custody case, Professor Goldstein provided us with
an interesting introduction to the BBI paradigm in action." In explain-
ing "psychological parent" to the court, he stated:
By 'psychological parent,' we're talking about a person who has
assumed responsibility and continuity of care on a daily basis. That
doesn't mean on an hour-to-hour or minute-by-minute basis, but it
means someone to whom the child can turn in times of need and
frustration, someone whom the child can find a source of affection
and a source of control.3 5
This concept of "psychological parent" is fundamental to the BBI
system. It is a concept which stresses attachment presence.36 Attach-
ment is viewed as essential to normal psychological development. 37 One
may have the status of biological parent, but if physically absent, one
cannot be a psychological parent. Instead, this person tends to fall into
the logical, psychological, and legal class of stranger.3 8 For Goldstein,
31. Compare id. at 38 (joint or shared court decreed custody is not discussed in
any detail in this work) with Joseph Goldstein, In Whose Interests, in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 47 (Jay Folberg ed. 1984)(joint court decreed custody is dis-
cussed at length in this work). Professor Goldstein's application of the BBI paradigm to
joint legal custody will be discussed fully in a later section of this paper. For now, it is
adequate information to know that Goldstein believes that under certain specific condi-
tions joint custody can be highly disruptive in terms of the continuity of relationship.
32. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 38.
33. Id. at 17.
34. See AREEN, supra note 11, at 511-23.
35. Id. at 514.
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Freud and Solnit, the relationship between child and "psychological
parent" is paramount, and its integrity should be preserved by law."
Ruptures in the relationship between the "psychological parent" and
the child are viewed as producing failures in emotional development
and resulting psychological symptoms.'" The results of such ruptures
are people who become mentally ill, dependent on society or engage in
criminal conduct. Like the continuity concept, the "psychological par-
ent" concept has been widely accepted by the courts."1
Ellenwood and Ellenwood42 is a representative opinion which ana-
lyzed the "continuity" and "psychological parent" principles. Factu-
ally, Ellenwood is fairly typical: the parties had a stormy marriage,
gave birth to children, associated with paramours, displayed instability,
separated and then sought dissolution.48 The trial judge awarded cus-
tody of the minor daughters to the mother. The husband appealed;
however, the trial judge's decision was affirmed. The appellate court
quotes heavily from Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's Beyond the Best In-
terests.44 It is clear that the appellate court relied primarily on the BBI
paradigm in reaching its decision.
The appellate court placed great importance on the continuity of
relationship of the children with the psychological parent. The court,
with the BBI model substantially influencing the logic of its analysis,
stated:
I. [the trial court] gave substantial weight to the fact that the chil-
dren always have been in the wife's care. Their psychological at-
tachment to her as the only continuous parent figure they have
known is a strong reason for the trial court's decision, and after
balancing the applicable factors, we come to the same conclusion
the trial court did. . . . What registers in [children's] minds are
the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take care of them
and who, on the strength of these, become the parent figures to
whom they are attached.45
39. This is clearly the ultimate juridical point made by the BBI group.
40. Id. at 18.
41. See Crouch, supra note 10, at 80-103.
42. In re Ellenwood, 532 P.2d 259 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
43. Id. at 260.
44. The appellate court's opinion would be improved by a change in the ratio of
original language of analysis to the language of approved authority.
45. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 262. In many of the cases in which the courts
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Another concept fundamental to the BBI model is the idea that
custody decisions should reflect the child's sense of time."6 This sense of
time depends upon where the child is in the process of psychological
development.' 7
Children, according to Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, do not experi-
ence time as adults experience it. Instead, they experience time in rela-
tionship to "subjective feelings of impatience and frustration."' 8 The
child's sense of time is viewed by the creators of the model as an "inte-
gral part of the continuity concept," even though it is treated sepa-
rately.' 9 However, any ruptures of continuity must be viewed from the
vantage of the child's sense of time. The BBI model makes it clear that
those who work in law must recognize the seriousness of the separation
of a child from a parent, and must see breaks in continuity from the
child's subjective perspective. It is believed that once they achieve this
view, they will realize that the law's delay in deciding cases is not in
the child's best psychological interests.
The child's sense-of-time guidelines would require decision makers
to act with 'all deliberate speed' to maximize each child's opportu-
nity either to restore stability to an existing relationship or to facili-
tate the establishment of new relationships to 'replace' old ones.50
Under this view, the decision process should never extend beyond "the
time that the child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty."' 1
Court decisions must be made in line with the urgency which is deriva-
tive of the child's subjective sense of time. Thus, whenever there is a
dispute as to who is to be the custodian, placement must be considered
an emergency matter. 2 Decision makers are urged to act quickly so as
to prevent "irreparable psychological injury.""3 Courts, for this reason,
should give child custody cases priority,"' and appellate review should
be greatly accelerated so that the child's interest is promoted.5
46. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 40.
47. Id. at 40-41.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 40.
50. Id. at 41.
51. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 41.
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id.
54. Even the most vigorous critics of the work of the BBI group would agree with
this position.
55. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 45.
[Vol. 16
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Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that the child's sense of time
"guideline" requires that particular action be taken in child custody
disputes derivative of divorce or separation proceedings.5 The custody
question should be decided in a separate proceeding. Custody decisions
must be made as quickly as possible. These decisions should not have to
await the court's decision on divorce, separation, maintenance, property
division or any other matter. The creators of the BBI paradigm vigor-
ously propound the idea that time is a critical element in the making of
final custody decisions. Informed by the findings of classical clinical
psychoanalysis, they argue that not to be sensitive to the time issue is
to act with disregard for the psychological needs of the child.
A third component in what Goldstein, Freud and Solnit have
termed. their "guidelines" 57 for legal decision-making relates to the in-
herent limitations of the law. The authors of the paradigm contend that
the law is functionally unable to supervise interpersonal relationships
and is, in addition, unable to make long-range predictions in regard to
many person to person situations." The law must take these things into
account. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that experience with child
placement cases makes it clear that the law can do little more than
recognize or destructure relationships.59 The law is not able to control
the on-going interaction between child and parent. Moreover, as psy-
choanalytically informed professionals, they have come to the conclu-
sion that the law does not have the "capacity to predict future events
and needs, which would justify or make workable over the long run any
specific conditions it might impose concerning, for example, education,
visitation, health care, or religious up-bringing." 60 However, Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit allow for the making of certain predictions, based on
the elements of their paradigm "[a]s the continuity and child's-sense-
of-time guideline suggest, placement decisions can be based on certain
generally applicable and useful predictions." 1 They state that it is pos-
sible to identify the adult individual involved in the custody dispute
who is the "psychological parent" or who has the capacity to become a
successful psychological parent."' Further, they state that it can be pre-
56. Id. at 47.
57. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6
(1979).
58. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 49.
59. Id. at 49-50.
60. Id. at 50.
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dicted that the person most suited to the role of the custodian is the one
with whom the child has already had continuing affectionate attach-
ment. This person should be preferred over the person who has not had
such a continuing relationship, even though the other person has equal
or a greater potential for being successful as a "psychological par-
ent."6 The authors also believe that greater damage can be predicted
to the child's psychological well-being when the child is young and the
period of separation is protracted or uncertain." Many future events
and experiences are beyond the reach of the legal and psychoanalytic
"sciences". Moreover, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that no one
can "predict in detail how the unfolding development of the child and
his family will be reflected in the long run in the child's personality and
character formation."65 As a consequence of the preceding limitations,
the law does not act to promote the child's interest when it attempts to
predict the future and sets special conditions for the care of the child.16
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit reason that the imposition of conditions
only leads to uncertainty, and this uncertainty creates a threat of dis-
continuity because the placement decision is subject to modification
due to changing conditions.6 " If one accepts the BBI view, non-custo-
dian visitation and modification based on change of circumstances are
disallowed.6 8 To many scholars, law practitioners and judges, this posi-
tion is astounding. Visitation and modification are traditionally viewed
as vehicles for promoting the child's best interests.
The most important element of the model is a substitute for the
traditional "best interests of the child" test.69 Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit created a replacement for the traditional legal test: an over-arch-
ing standard to be used in the child custody decision-making process.
This standard is "the least detrimental alternative for safeguarding the
child's growth and development test."'70 This standard encompasses
63. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 51.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id.
68. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 598-
601 (1968) (for a discussion of visitation and modification).
69. See generally, supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also HOMER H.
CLARK, supra note 68, at 584-589 (for additional material relevant to an understand-
ing of the best interests test); MORRIS PLESCOWE, ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 879-932 (2d. ed. 1972).
70. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 53-64.
632 [Vol. 16
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continuity, including the "psychological parent" concept, the child's
sense of time, and the "prediction" element. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit explain this standard as
[t]he least detrimental alternative, then, is that specific placement
and procedure for placement which maximizes in accord with the
child's sense of time and on the basis of short-term predictions
given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being
wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship
with at least one adult who is or will become his psychological
parent.71
The architects of this model prefer this standard for several rea-
sons. First, the new standard is more realistic and less "grandiose." 2
Child custody decisions are simply "making do" under a very bad set
of circumstances. The child's "best interests" cannot be served, given
the reality of family break-up. Second, the traditional "best interests"
standard does not emphasize the fact that the children of separation
and dissolution-disrupted families are "victims," and are at psychologi-
cal risk.73 Third, the "best interests" of the child standard has been
overused by courts: often undercutting the child's interests and elevat-
ing those of involved adults.74 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that
the "least detrimental alternative" standard will remind those who
make custody and other placement decisions that all these types of de-
cisions are inherently unsatisfactory. 75 Finally, the "least detrimental
alternative" standard makes everyone face the fact that dispositional
choices in custody cases are limited.7
If the choice, as it may often be in separation and divorce proceed-
ings, is between two psychological parents and if each parent is
equally suitable in terms of the child's most immediate predictable
developmental needs, the least detrimental standard would dictate
a quick, final, and unconditional disposition to either of the com-
peting parents. 77
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id, at 63.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id.
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Having performed the basic intellectual task of depiction,7 8 we are
ready to involve ourselves in the systematic assessment of the BBI
model. Let us begin in a traditional manner. We shall initiate our as-
sessment by analyzing a particular case. Our specimen for evaluation is
that heartland classic of custody law Painter v. Bannister.7 9 This case
will be viewed first from the BBI perspective and then scrutinized from
a second, alternative, vantage point.80 In examining the Painter case,8
we will focus intensively on the "continuity" and "psychological par-
ent" elements of the BBI paradigm. We approach the paradigm
through the medium of the particular because it is my belief that a
phenomenologically82 significant actual custody case will orient us to
the paradigm "in-action." 8 Such an approach is necessary if we are to
talk meaningfully about the reality of decision-making in child custody
cases. To maximize our intellectual gain, Painter v. Bannister84 will be
treated in some significant depth."
III. PAINTER V. BANNISTER: SPECIMEN FOR ANALYSIS
The Painter case involved a custody dispute between a thirty year
old father, Harold Painter, and the child's maternal grandparents,
78. Depiction (description in requisite detail) - this author believes - is the first
intellectual task of the critic. All too often critical evaluation is marked by a failure to
truly confront the work which is the target of focus. Consequently, much criticism lives
a life unrelated to the reality of the work being criticized. Surely, the work reduced to
its essence is an appropriate beginning point. See generally HOMER H. LASWELL, A
PREVIEW OF POLICY SCIENCE (1971).
79. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
80. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The alternative vantage point will
be that established by the author of this current article.
81. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
82. The focus on the exemplar, the case instance, clears away trance inducing
abstractions. The phenomenon, the case, facilitates movement toward meaningful para-
digms. Of course, the case itself never takes us far enough. Again, my effort draws
upon the work of Walker Percy. See generally ROBERT COLES, WALKER PERCY, AN
AMERICAN SEARCH (1978).
83. It is contended that the validity of the paradigm cannot be tested by tradi-
tional logic, but only by attempted "holistic" application to legal events.
84. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
85. Depth here is provided by immersion in the factual aspects of the case.
Rather than emphasizing legal theory alone, I have drawn material from the trial tran-
script as well as from the appellate opinion. See In Re Painter v. Bannister, No. 24981
Trial Trans. (Dist. Ct. Iowa, Stony County, July 12, 1965) (providing background in-
formation concerning the case at the trial level).
[Vol. 16
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Margaret and Dwight Bannister, both in their sixties. The child, Mark
Painter, was seven years old at the time of the appellate decision by the
Supreme Court of Iowa. In December of 1962, Mark's mother and his
young sister were killed in a car accident. Harold Painter, severely de-
pressed"6 by the family tragedy, placed Mark with non-relatives. The
arrangement was not successful and Mark went to Iowa to stay with
the maternal grandparents. Harold Painter did not relinquish his pa-
rental rights.87 Moreover, in her will, Mark's mother had named Har-
old as the child's legal guardian. 88 When Mark arrived at the Bannister
home, he seemed to be very affected by his mother's and sister's deaths,
and by the separation from his father.8 9 In November, 1964, Harold
Painter remarried. He contacted the Bannisters and informed them
that he wanted Mark to live with him and his new wife. The Bannisters
refused to return Mark to his father. In June 1965, Harold Painter
brought a habeas corpus action. After a hearing on the custody issue,
the trial judge awarded custody to Harold Painter. From July, 1965
until the time of the Supreme Court of Iowa decision in 1966, Mark
remained in the custody of the Bannisters under a Supreme Court or-
der. This order stayed the execution of the judgment of the trial court
until the appellate court decided the appeal. In 1966, the Iowa Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court.9" The court discusses several soci-
etal factors, including the fact that American family life styles were in
transition.9' It is clear from the court's opinion that the Bannisters and
the Painters have vastly different life-styles. The court profiles the Ban-
nister's home as traditional. Specifically, the court states
86. See generally HAROLD PAINTER, MARK I LOVE You 85 (1969) (for back-
ground information concerning Harold Painter's depression).
87. Painter, apparently under the burden of a depression, derived from the fam-
ily tragedy and apparently realizing that his condition impaired his parenting capacity
did what he perceived to be in his son's best interest.
88. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
89. Id. (the court's description of his problem is consistent with a child's reaction
to such a tragedy). In regard to the matter of depression, see J. BOWLBY, 3 ATTACH-
MENT AND Loss, Loss SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 7-37 (1980).
90. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 152. In 1969, Mark visited his father in California.
His father obtained a custody order in a California court. The grandparents did not
oppose the shift in custody. See generally HOMER H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 745
(1983).
91. In fact, a "new nation" was beginning to emerge. See generally A. TOFFLER,
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His [the child's] mother was born, raised and educated in rural
Iowa. Her parents are college graduates. Her father is agricultural
information editor for the Iowa State University Extension Service.
The Bannister home is in the Gilbert community and is well kept,
roomy and comfortable. The Bannisters are highly respected mem-
bers of the community. Mr. Bannister has served on the school
board and regularly teaches a Sunday school class at the Gilbert
Congregational Church. Mark's mother graduated from Grinnell
College. She then went to work for a newspaper in Anchorage,
Alaska where she met Harold Painter.92
Further, the court states that the Bannister home "provides Mark
with a stable, dependable, conventional, middleclass, middlewest back-
ground. . . .[;] It provides a solid foundation and secure
atmosphere."" 3
In discussing Mark's father, the court paints a different picture.94
Mark's father was born in California. His parents were divorced, and
he went into a foster home. Harold Painter viewed the foster parents as
his family. He was not successful academically, and flunked out of
school because of lack of interest. After service in the navy, he obtained
a high school diploma by examination and then attended college for
two and one-half years under the G.I. bill. He left college and took a
job on a newspaper in the state of Washington. Within less than a year,
he went to work for an Alaskan newspaper which employed Jeanne
Bannister, Mark's mother.
The court's description of the father's life clearly illustrated that it
considers it to be a non-traditional life style. Harold Painter is depicted
as one who has a Bohemian approach to life and money. Moreover, he
is a political liberal. 95 He is not interested in traditional employment,
but prefers life as a free lance artistic type. 6 He writes and has pub-
lished, but does not make a great deal of money. He is described as
changing jobs frequently and is a reader of Zen Buddhism." It is
pointed out that at the time of the trial, Mr. Painter was considering a
move to Berkeley, California.98
92. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 153-54.
93. Id. at 154.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 154-55.
96. Id. at 155.
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The, court admits that the child, Mark, would be allowed more
freedom of thought and action in the Painter home environment. The
court, however, emphasized that although life would be more exciting
and challenging with Harold Painter, it would also be impractical, un-
stable and romantic. 99
The; court also considered expert testimony. It gave great weight to
the testimony of Dr. Glenn Hawks, a child psychologist who testified at
the trial.1"' Dr. Hawks, who did not examine Harold Painter, testified
that Dwight Bannister was the "father figure."101 It is clear from Dr.
Hawks' testimony that he saw Mr. Bannister as the child's "psychologi-
cal parent." 02 Dr. Hawks described Mrs. Bannister as the "mother fig-
ure"108 and a "psychological parent."'10 In his testimony, Dr. Hawks
told the trial court that his concern was with the welfare of the child.
He made it clear that he believed that Mark was at a very critical
development point in his life, but that if he were four or five years
younger, he would not be as much at risk.'05 He further testified that if
custody were not continued with the Bannisters, there was a high
probability that Mark would become anti-social. 06 The doctor hinted
at juvenile delinquency and aggressive acts against others. As an alter-
native, Dr. Hawks suggested that there might be significant "with-
drawal"'0 7 by Mark, such as a schizoid or schizophrenic reaction. 0 8
A careful reading of Dr. Hawks' testimony makes it clear that he
is talking about what Goldstein, Freud and Solnit refer to as "con-
99. Id. at 156.
100. In re Painter v. Bannister, No. 24981 Trial Trans. at 2-43 (Dist. Ct. Iowa,
Stony County, July 12, 1965).
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id. At the trial level, Dr. Hawks testified that the "psychological father of
the child . . . is the most important. . . . Now the father figure is a figure that the
child sees as an authority figure . . . and one who typifies maleness and stands as a
male as far as the child is concerned." (emphasis added); see also supra page 8 (for a
discussion of the "psychological parent").
103. In re Painter, No. 24981 at 30.
104. See supra note 8.
105. In re Painter, No. 24981, at 31.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id.
108. Schizoid conditions and schizophrenia are serious mental disorders. See gen-
erally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 301.20 at 310 (3rd ed. 1980) (for background reading on
schizoid personality disorders); P. O'BRIEN, THE DISORDERED MIND: WHAT WE KNOW
ABOUT SCHIZOPHRENIA (1978) (for background reading on Schizophrenia).
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tinuity of relationship" with the "psychological parent(s)." Dr. Hawks,
like Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, believed that disruptions in continuity
are very likely to produce extraordinarily, undesirable psychological
outcomes, either severe mental disorder or criminal and anti-social con-
duct. It is beyond question that the Iowa Supreme Court reacted favor-
ably to the ideas and conclusions put forth by Dr. Hawks. 10 9 The court
viewed continuity of relationship between Mark and the Bannisters as
being in the seven year old boy's best interests.
The Iowa Supreme Court, reversing the trial judge, took the posi-
tion that Mark and Mr. Bannister had a relationship which Mark had
not had with his natural father. This relationship was an important
psychological one. The court stated that it was in Mark's best interest
to be in the stable situation provided by the Bannister home. The court
concluded that Mark should not be shifted to his father "in the face of
the dire warnings from an eminent child psychologist. .. .
Goldstein approves of the decision in Painter v. Bannister."' He
characterizes the case as one in which a court was asked to disrupt a
"satisfactory on-going 'parent-figure' 
- child relationship and make an
abrupt change without any plan for transition to allow for the gradual
re-establishment of a relationship between natural father and son. '"112
In his article, he outlines the court's adjective-oriented comparison of
the contending parties; 1 but, he offers no critique of this comparison.
Goldstein applauds the court for its decision to avoid making judg-
ments based on the choice of competing life styles. He asserts that the
choice in this case was between parties who were all fit custodians.
Goldstein indicates that the court's unwillingness to simply support the
preference in law for the biological parent was proper. Finally, he
states "[e]valuated in the light of Anna Freud's need-for-continuity
formulation, the decision can be understood as a determination made in
accord with the overall mandate of the state - the child's best
interests."""
A careful reading of Goldstein's article makes it clear that he sup-
ports the Iowa Supreme Court's decision because it stresses the impor-
tance of the "continuity of relationship" and "psychological parent"
109. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
110. Id.
111. 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
112. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 475-76.
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concepts.'" 8 The language in his article relating to a planned transition
so that custody could be transferred to the father is of no relevance to
the Painter case."16 The basic question for decision in Painter", was
which of the contending parties was entitled to here-and-now "full" le-
gal custody. Goldstein's opinion would be that the court made the right
decision in protecting the child's continuity.
At the time of the appellate court decision, Mark was seven years
old and functioning well. He was at a psychological state of develop-
ment which is termed "latency."' 8 Latency is generally viewed as "ex-
isting" between approximately ages six and thirteen. 1 9 According to
psychoanalysts, by the time the child reaches the latency phase of psy-
chological development, the executive psychological apparatus, the
ego, 120 is well-evolved and the aggressive and affectional - erotic urges
(instincts)' are controlled by the child. By the latency phase of psy-
chological development, the child has achieved substantial psychologi-
cal maturity.
As Anna Freud, one of the creators of the BBI placement para-
digm writes:
In the course of a few years the situation alters. The latency period
sets in, with a physiologically conditioned decline in the strength of
the instincts and a truce is called in the defensive warfare waged
by the ego. It now has leisure to devote itself to other tasks and it
acquires fresh contents, knowledge and capacities. At the same
time it becomes stronger in relation to the outside world; it is less
helpless and submissive and does not regard the world as quite so
omnipotent as heretofore. Its whole attitude to external objects
[people] gradually changes as it surmounts the Oedipus situation.
Complete dependence on the parents cease ... .
115. Id.
116. Id. at 475-76.
117. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 153.
118. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 86 (2d. ed. 1963).
119. A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 292 (Rev. ed. 1978).
120. The ego is in actuality a brain system network (neurochemical, etc.) which
acts to balance the interests of the desiring self, one's moral conscience and social real-
ity. See JEAN LAPLANCHE & JEAN-BERTRAND PONTALIS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 130-43 (1973) for a condensed discussion of the ego and its operation.
121. Id. at 214-16. Those who prefer an orthodox psychoanalytic approach view
instincts as pressures which create tensions. Normally it is stated that human beings
seek to reduce these tensions via interactions with other persons.
122. ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 157 (1946); see
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Ms. Freud makes the following points in her statement: first, by
the latency phase, the child's psychological life has settled down to a
very significant extent; second, the executive apparatus of the psyche,
the ego, has things relatively well in hand; third, a state of stability has
been achieved; fourth, the child is ready for an extensive real world
education; and fifth, the parents are no longer as psychologically as
important as they were in the past. The well-established fact is that the
latency child, called middle years child by some, "characteristically
turns his attention away from family involvements and outward to the
world at large."'23 Our culture, though its system of education, pro-
motes this development."2 4
Mark, at age seven, is capable of significant self control. In addi-
tion, he has attained substantial cognitive capacity. He has become
more naturalistic, more objective, has developed the ability to classify,
and is becoming versed in the use of numbers. Further, he is acquiring
a fund of general knowledge and is learning to think and reason in a
manner similar to adults. In addition, the psychologically normal child
is capable of making age appropriate moral judgments. All in all, the
child is quite different from the being he or she was three or four years
earlier.' 25 A latency stage child is, in sum, a competent human being.
For these reasons, it was improper for the Court to fail to return
Mark to the custody of his father. This return would not have put
Mark at risk. At age seven and functioning well within the normal
range, Mark cannot be seen as extremely vulnerable. Furthermore,
Harold Painter was examined by a psychiatrist and was found to be
psychiatrically fit.' There was no evidence which indicated that Har-
old Painter was legally unfit in any way. The normal seven year old is
psychologically capable of handling the shift from the grandparents to
the father. His adaptive capacity is significant. 27 This does not mean
that there will not be problems; however, problems can be solved.
also ANNA FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR TEACHERS AND PARENTS (Beacon Press ed.
7th prtg 1971).
123. L. JOSEPH STONE & JOSEPH CHURCH, CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 388
(3d ed. 1973).
124. In a complex modern society, this is a matter of necessity. The family sim-
ply cannot prepare one for life in the broader environment of modern existence. Educa-
tional specialists must perform the task of preparation.
125. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 388-400.
126. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 154-55.
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Goldstein and those who adhere to the BBI paradigm are overly
apprehensive. For them, the custody conflict is an event which is a
jeopardy situation of the highest order. This position cannot be sup-
ported; and in fact, there exists significant findings which cast doubt on
it. For example, the Berkeley, California study conducted by Joan
MacFarlane and her associates1"8 contains findings which support this
position. The study covers a period of thirty years; thus, it is a long
range study with findings that are directly relevant to our discussion.
The study illustrates that .those who place a great emphasis on the
link between trauma in childhood and resulting psychopathology in
later years may well be in error. Arlene Skolnick, reporting on the
Berkeley study, wrote:
Foremost, the researchers tended to over-estimate the damaging ef-
fects of early troubles of various kinds. Most personality theory has
been derived from observations of troubled people in therapy. The
pathology of adult neurotics and psychotics was traced back to dis-
turbances in childhood-poor parent-child relations, chronic school
difficulties, and so forth. Consequently, theories of personality
based on clinical observation tended to define adult psychological
problems as socialization failures. But the psychiatrist sees only
disturbed people, he does not encounter 'normal' individuals who
may experience childhood difficulties, but who do not grow into
troubled adults. The Berkeley method, however, called for studying
such people. Data on the experience of these subjects demonstrated
the error of assuming that similar childhood conditions affect every
child the same way. 129
All of this applies to many psychoanalytic clinicians, psychoana-
lytic researchers, and makers of psychoanalytic jurisprudence. 130 One
must keep in mind that psychoanalytic theory derives from very special
clinical circumstances. Sigmund Freud worked almost exclusively with
adults - including himself as analysand. 31 He built his theory by recon-
128. JOAN MACFARLANE, ET AL., A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF THE BEHAVIOR
PROBLEMS OF NORMAL CHILDREN BETWEEN TWENTY-ONE MONTHS AND FOURTEEN
YEARS (1954).
129. ARLENE SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT, EXPLORING MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY 379 (1973).
130. E.g., J. KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967) (an
interesting work of this sort which is an important early contribution to psychoanalytic
jurisprudence).
131. Freud's self-analysis was certainly essential to the building of his theoretical
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structing the psychological lines of those who sought treatment. Anna
Freud, one of the creators of the BBI model, spent much of her career
working within the model constructed by her father.1"2 She is the first
lady of orthodox psychoanalysis, and the BBI paradigm is definitely
rooted in orthodox psychoanalysis. Orthodox psychoanalysis, because
its theory is primarily a product of the historical reconstruction of the
lives of the psychological dysfunctional and because it over-predicts
psychological dysfunction, does not produce a model which has the ap-
propriate level of judicial decision-making reliability. Other workers in
psychology, especially non-orthodox psychoanalysts, have suggested
more appropriate models for use in the legal system. The theory, the
clinical practice, and the isolation of orthodox psychoanalysis from the
current of social, historical, political, economic and cultural aspects of
existence all combine to lead orthodox psychoanalytic observers and
practitioners to overreact when confronted with the phenomenon of the
child custody dispute.133
However, for those who are less focused on clinical psychoanalysis
and classical, orthodox, psychoanalytic theory, things are viewed differ-
ently. 1 4 Not every child of divorce or of a custody dispute is a victim
proximate to his or her psychic undoing. Life is as it is. Existential
realities are within the coping capacity of many, children and adults. 38
Divorce has become commonplace in our society. Parents are often sep-
arated from their children; they fall ill, they die, they go off to serve in
the military, they hire surrogate caretakers, or they go through signifi-
cant personal changes. Children lose their friends, they leave behind
their favorite teacher, they move to a new community. 36 Loss is a ba-
sic experience in life - things do not stay the same. How a child fares,
psychologically, ethically, and morally, depends to a very significant ex-
and clinical edifice. See PAUL ROAZEN, FREUD AND His FOLLOWERS 82-88 (1975).
132. Id. at 436-60.
133. See generally M. EAGLE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1984) (for alternatives to orthodox psychoanalysis).
134. See e.g., Jerome Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child
Development and Social Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38 (1975) (for an out-
standing article on this point).
135. See e.g., KURT VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1968);
WILLARD GAYLIN, FEELINGS: OUR VITAL SIGNS (1979); KARL MENNINGER ET AL.,
THE VITAL BALANCE (1963).
136. This is the reality of existence. See HERMAN HESSE, SIDDARTHA (New Di-
rections ed. 1957) (perhaps the best text on the "true" conditions of existence).
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tent on what happens to the child after the loss or trauma.'37 For ex-
ample, some children may lose someone who was a satisfactory custo-
dian, but gain another who is even more life-enhancing. Other children
may lose a parent who was, in fact, a negative force - that child is
liberated by the separation. The life outcome depends on the people one
meets and attaches to outside of the family. The shape of our life de-
pends upon the vicissitudes of social history. Children need psychologi-
cal attachment; however, not every disruption of continuity of relation-
ship is going to cause serious long term damage to a child. Children are
resilient. 8 Judges and lawyers must understand this reality.
The Painter case' 39 did not involve an adoption. Further, the case
is not a termination of parental rights case; Mark's father was never
charged with parental neglect. Harold Painter was the biological father
of Mark. Mark did not begin living with the Bannisters until he was
five years old.' 4 ' The bulk of Mark's first five years of life were spent
with his father, Harold Painter. Consequently, Harold was not a psy-
chological stranger to his son. Thus, it is clear that, during Mark's
early formative years, Harold was a "psychological parent" and his in-
teractions with Mark were very important in building Mark's personal-
ity and intellectual capacity. It is well known that psychological struc-
ture and intellectual, or cognitive, development in these formative years
is very dependent on mimetic operations within the context of the
child-parent interaction.'' The child learns by imitating the parents.
Finally, psychological attachment, in these especially formative years,
is the foundation of developmental progress. 4" The Iowa Supreme
Court overlooked this reality of this basic process and its significance in
its decision. The Court accepted the fact that Mark was psychologi-
cally healthy and intelligent. 4 8 Dr. Hawks had testified to this fact.44
137. See generally H. DERossis & V. PELLOGRINO, THE BOOK OF HOPE (1976)
(for an interesting work on this matter).
138. Lloyd DeMause, The Evolution Childhood, I HIST. OF CHILDHOOD Q: THE
J. PSYCHOHISTORY 503-75 (1974).
139. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152.
140. Id. at 156.
141. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 72-73; see also S. FRAIBERG,
THE MAGIC YEARS (1959).
142. See JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969); see also JOHN
BOWLBY, THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF AFFECTIONAL BONDS (1979).
143. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
144. In Re Painter, No. 24981, at 17-18 (trial transcript containing the testi-
mony of Dr. Hawks).
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Since the Iowa Supreme Court portrayed Harold Painter as a fit fa-
ther, it is reasonable to infer that he had been involved with his son and
had played an important role in the child's early psychological and cog-
nitive development. 45
Despite the fact that Harold Painter had been physically out of
Mark's life as a parent, during Harold's life crisis time-out, he was still
Mark's "psychological parent" and was therefore psychically engraved
in Mark's mind. Psychological parents are encoded in a child's brain
system." A "psychological parent" exists within the mind and influ-
ences thought, emotion and behavior. Furthermore, Freud's work on
the parent-derived super-ego makes this abundantly clear.'47 Moral
conscience is derived from interaction with the parents. The BBI theory
does not instruct child custody decision makers on this most important
psychological fact. Even Professor Goldstein fails to discuss this psychic
reality when he comments on the decision in the Painter case.
The psychological situation in the Painter case was that between
the ages of five and seven, Mark's image of Harold, a "psychological
parent," was not expunged. Memories, emotions, images, ideas and
fantasies relating to his father continued to exist in Mark's mind. In a
psychological and brain-content sense, his father lived within him. This
basic fact makes the Painter case quite different from one involving
adoption by a stranger or custody to a third party who has not been in
psychological attachment to the child. The Iowa Supreme Court failed
to see these differences. Harold Painter was not without attachments to
his son. A very strong attachment between Mark and Harold already
existed. Harold Painter had been a "psychological parent" in Mark's
critical first five years of development. This intense psychological at-
tachment still existed in the minds of Mark and Harold. Because of
Mark's internalized image of Harold as his "psychological parent," a
shift in custody from the Bannisters to Harold Painter did not present
145. The designation of a parent's fitness is a result of the court's evaluation of
the "relevant factors" which, of course, relate to the individual's capacity to parent.
"Relevant factors" would include mental health, physical health, moral character, in-
telligence, economic position, etc.
146. The most accessible material on this reality can be found in the following
works: see ERIC BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY 23-28 (1964); JONATHAN WINSON,
BRAIN AND PSYCHE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (1985) (a much more com-
plex, but very enlightening discussion of the relationship between/among life experi-
ence, brain function and psychic contents).
147. See 21 STANDARD EDITION OF COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 62 (James Strachey ed. 1964).
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the at-risk situation the Iowa Supreme Court and Professor Goldstein
found to exist. The psychological relationship was a pre-existing infra-
structure which could "smooth" the transition of custody from the Ban-
nister's to Harold. Certainly, there would be a period of adjustment;
however, given the existence of the earlier attachment, the opportunity
for a successful change of custody would be much enhanced.
Due to the existence of an antecedent attachment, and the fact
that Mark was of school age and relatively resilient, it can be con-
cluded that Professor Goldstein's support for the Painter decision is
open to criticism. 4 8 Professor Goldstein placed too much emphasis on
the utility of the pure continuity approach. Specifically, a psychosocial
"best interest" approach to the Painter case should be preferred to the
orthodox psychoanalytic approach."" The term "psychosocial" is used
to emphasize the relationship between the psychological structure of
the individual and his or her surrounding social world. The crux of this
approach is to examine how the individual exists within the social eco-
sphere of his historical time.
It is inherent in the positions of the Iowa Supreme Court and Pro-
fessor Goldstein that Mark Painter needed continuity of relationship
with his maternal grandparents. This emphasis on continuity does not
do justice to the human complexity which is the true context of the
custody decision. To determine the best interests position of the child in
the Painter case, and in many other cases, the limited approach re-
quired by a guideline as basic as the continuity concept must be es-
chewed. The child's needs must be analyzed by looking to the totality
of relevant psychosocial circumstances. This approach requires the de-
cision-makers to scrutinize the child's best interests situation by deter-
mining where the child stands developmentally, assessing what her or
his needs are in relationship to developmental status, and determining
who out of those seeking custody has the capacity to best promote the
child's interests. In the simplest terms, the court must determine who is
most fit.
Erikson's model contains eight life stages.10  Three of the stages
relate to adulthood and are not relevant to child custody disputes. The
five stages relevant to the child custody matters are:'5 1
148. See MAcFARLANE et al., supra note 128; DEMAUSE, supra note 138.
149. On this matter of psychosocial emphasis I am greatly influenced by the
work of Erik Erikson. See supra, note 7.
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(1) Stage I - (approximately the first year of life). During this
developmental phase, the child has the opportunity to achieve a positive
life view called basic trust. Basic trust develops when the child is well
cared for, psychologically and phyfically, by an adult or adults of at-
tachment. An appropriate experience in attachment during this stage of
development prepares one for human intimacy and social interaction in
later stages.
(2) Stage II - (about the second and third year of life). The child
seeks to develop personal autonomy and begins to explore the home
environment.
(3) Stage III - (about age four and five). The child starts to take a
serious interest in life outside of the home. The child is learning
through play. Attachments to people outside of the home are made.
(4) Stage IV - (approximately the sixth through the eleventh
year). The child becomes immersed in the outside culture. The acquisi-
tion of culturally approved skills and knowledge is the major task of
this stage. This is the stage of essential learning.
(5) Stage V - (about the twelfth through eighteenth year). The
child is in the process of consolidating the emerging self. Cultural and
gender identities are worked out.
Evaluating the Erikson model in light of the Painter case, it is
clear that Mark was in Stage IV at the time of the trial and appellate
decisions. He was seven years of age. Mark had already become ac-
tively involved outside of the home. Trial testimony illustrated that he
was relating to children and adults outside of the family setting.152
During this phase of active learning, the child is interested in imitating
the behavior of adults in the outside world. The male child becomes
interested in the social role activities of firemen, truck drivers, musi-
cians, athletes, sales people, policemen and other grown-ups engaged in
vocation and avocation. 153 Further, school is a focal point of the child
during this stage of psychosocial development, and learning from the
electronic media is also an important experience. The school experience
is instrumental in the development of a child. Culture makes itself
known to the child in the form of the school and its teachers. The
teacher, the transmitters of the cognitive technology and the values of
culture, inhabits the school environment and passes on the culture fund
to the child. Moreover, the child is surrounded by a large number of
peers who come from "other" homes - homes with norms, values and
152. In Re Painter, No. 24981, at 17.
153. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY YOUTH AND CRISIS 112 (1968).
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ways of doing things that differ from those of her or his own parents. In
addition, older students will also influence the child. At this stage of
psychosocial development, the child will go through the process of ad-
justing to a great variety of personality types and will experience a
diversity of folkways. Very significant cognitive, social, aesthetic and
moral - ethical development is occurring during this developmental
stage.
At school, the child is being prepared to function in a complex
society which holds organization to be an important value. Our educa-
tional institutions make the child aware of the fact that our culture
requires that people learn to structure time. In addition, the child dis-
covers that the formal curriculum is structured. Planning, as a socially
approved behavior, is also modeled by the teachers. The school places
great emphasis on culturally valued work and citizenship values. The
child has left the world of play behind, and is learning fundamentals
which will prepare the child to take his or her place in the material
economy. There is an emphasis on productivity. The child is learning to
work cognitively on his or her own and to work socially with other peo-
ple. The child has moved from the "womb" of the family into the sur-
rounds of school and the larger world.
Through the school experience, the child learns to take pride in
culturally approved production. This ability to be productive is impor-
tant in helping the child ward off feelings of incapacity and inade-
quacy. Doing becomes an important part of being. 54 If things go well,
the child begins to feel that he or she can succeed in the world outside
of the family. This experience is critical to the process of becoming
fully "grown-up." However, not all learning goes on in school: it occurs
on the playground after school, in the neighborhood, on trips around
town, city, county, region, country and the world. Children learn out of
school from peers, older children, adults and electronic media. This
learning: is cognitive, affective and social.
The child is also going through a phase of moral/ethical evolu-
tion. 155 The swirl of life outside of the home provides standards, models
and examples which impact heavily on the moral/ethical development
of the child. The ethical and moral standards of the child's particular
154. Id. at 87-93. The author acknowledges the possibility that all school, includ-
ing homework, and no play may endanger the child. A programmed compulsive work
ethic will not benefit the child. A sense of proportion is critical in promoting healthy
development.
155. See ROBERT COLEs, THE MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (1986).
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family are compared to those available in the environs of the non-fa-
milial world. Freedom, equality, justice, injustice, law, order, authority,
power, prestige, privilege, oppression, license, loyalty, treachery, and
pride are matters on the existential agenda of the learning stage child.
During this stage of psychosocial development, the child is moving
along cognitive, social, moral and ethical lines of development. How-
ever, another critical line of development is called the affectional and
erotic line of development. This line of development is essential to the
acquisition of psychological health. Professor Goldstein, the BBI group,
and the Iowa Supreme Court have failed to appropriately treat the fun-
damental aspects of the child's learning stage. They have also failed to
emphasize the best interests importance of the affectional and erotic
development stage in the "latency" child (Stage IV). Professor Gold-
stein makes this mistake because of his preference for orthodox psycho-
analysis. This preference causes him to ignore the affectional and erotic
development in the child's latency age. L. Joseph Stone and Joseph
Church agree with this theory:
Freud's original notion of latency as an asexual time out has had to
be modified in the light of what we now know about sexuality in
the middle years (Stage IV). Sexual interest and play are not snuf-
fed out. . . . It is worth noting that whereas Freud had to combat
the popular belief that there was no infantile sexuality to become
latent, the post-Freudians have to combat Freud's idea that there is
a gap in the chain of overt psychosexual development.1 56
Prior to the 1960's, when the Painter case was decided, 1 5 the la-
tency theory of psychosexuality had been greatly criticized. Stage IV
children are very interested in sexuality and these children form affec-
tional and erotic attachments. Affectional and erotic issues do not sim-
ply appear out of the blue in adolescence. A failure to focus attention
on this line of development makes a best interests analysis incomplete.
An appropriate custodian can deal affectively with affectional and
erotic matters, and Judges must be aware of this reality.
In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court made reference to the topic
of college education. The Bannisters were described as "college gradu-
ates". 158 Jeanne Painter, Mark's mother, was described as a graduate
of Grinnell College, and Jeanne's three sisters received college educa-
156. STONE & CHURCH, supra note 123, at 381.
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tions and married college men. The Court stated that "if placed in the
custody of the Bannisters, Mark would have an opportunity for a col-
lege education and a profession ...."159 On the other hand, Harold
Painter was described as having gone to college on the G.I. Bill for two
and one half years, and quit college to take a job on a small newspaper.
It is clear from this comparison that the court placed great value on
education. The court stressed the fact that higher learning had played a
great role in Bannister family history. Further, the court suggested that
Harold, as drop-out and potential custodian, did not have the "correct"
view of the matter of higher learning.
When the Painter court discussed college education, it was not
evaluating the experience or quality of cognitive, aesthetic, social,
moral and ethical learning. It was simply accepting that certain classes
required steps to gain traditional social status. The court's inquiry into
the social levels of each of the parties revealed that the court was more
interested in status than the quality of the mind. The court's emphasis
on the conventional, the middle class, and the stable, demonstrated that
"traditional" social status, represented by the Barristers, was a value
which the court emphasized. Education was viewed by the court as a
way one took his or her place in a social/economic hierarchy. The al-
ternative view, that education is an experience which can maximize the
growth of the cognitive, social, aesthetic and moral/ethical self, was
not addressed by the court. The court's failure to address these issues
flaws the Painter decision.
In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that if Mark were to
be placed in the custody of his father, he would have more "freedom of
conduct and thought."16 Moreover, the court admitted that life in the
Painter household would be more "intellectually stimulating." 1 1 How-
ever, the court failed to give the proper weight to this information or
facts. From a psychosocial developmental perspective, the Painter home
was the intellectually stimulating environment of choice. This home
setting would promote the development of Mark's cognitive processes,
and these processes are critical to Mark's future state of being.
From a best interests perspective Harold Painter would have been
a great custodian for Mark's learning stage (Stage IV). Harold Painter
was a widely travelled man, who had met people from all walks of life.
He had served in the U.S. Navy and had experienced life within the
159. Id. at 154.
160. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
161. Id. at 156.
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structure of the military. He had flunked out of high school because "of
a lack of interest in academic subjects, rather than any lack of abil-
ity.""' He had attended a trade school and had spent two and one half
years in college. Furthermore, he had worked as a newspaperman in
the states of Washington and Alaska. In addition, he had held a num-
ber of other kinds of jobs. Overall, Harold Painter had done and exper-
ienced a great deal and had a life perspective. He had proved himself
to be a skilled writer, one who could effectively use the language of his
culture, and a serious photographer. At the time of the custody hear-
ing, Harold Painter was planning a move to Berkeley, California.
Berkeley, home of a major university center, has been known as a com-
munity devoted to arts, humanities, sciences, politics and moral and
ethical issues of human history. A large number of creative, intelligent
and concerned people are always members of the Berkeley community,
and Berkeley has historically been an ideal environment for those inter-
ested in focused learning.
At the time of the original custody hearing, Mark's father was a
young, energetic individual with a self-actualizing attitude toward
learning. He sought to learn, not simply to earn a living, but also to
enrich his self and his interactions with others in society. On the other
hand, the Bannisters were over sixty years old at the time of the cus-
tody dispute. They were educated in the World War I era, and before
the Great Depression. Their cognitive styles and value sets were more
congruent with a culture on the wane than with the emerging modern
culture. The gap between the Bannisters and the new culture was just
too great, and they could not have maximized Mark's developmental
position. Moreover, Harold Painter's age was a factor which supported
his custody claim. All in all, a father in his thirties would possess more
psychic and physical energy than the grandparents in their sixties.
These varieties of energy are vital in the parent's task of promoting
best interests psycho-social development of the child. Further, Harold
Painter's new young wife was also capable of substantially supporting
Mark's intellectual, social, and aesthetic experience. She was an intelli-
gent, well educated woman, with a masters degree from the University
of California. Her specialty field was cinema design, an area of work
which surely requires cognitive and aesthetic capacity. 163 According to
the Court, Marilyn Painter liked children and had been in a position to
162. Id. at 154.
163. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 155.
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have "considerable contact" with them."' Harold and his new wife
clearly formed a dyad which was possessed of those capacities which
would promote Mark's development best interests.
In its opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court made it clear that stability
and security were more important for Mark than intellectual stimula-
tion. This position, of course, meant that custody be awared to the
grandparents. However, the court stated that Harold Painter was a fit
father, and it is clear that the case involved a learning age ("latency")
child. The court did not understand the process of child development in
our culture. It was not informed to what cognitive, aesthetic, moral/
ethical and social learning "in culture" meant in the process of self
formation. The court was unable to conceptualize the particular
psychosocial needs of the learning stage child in our modernized
culture.
Placement with Harold and his new wife, Marilyn, would have
been the appropriate best interests disposition. The intellectually and
aesthetically stimulating environment which they were able to provide
was exactly what Mark needed in order to prepare him for life in a
Toffleresque world. In such a world the ability to continue to learn was
extremely important. By 1965, the "old" approach to learning and the
"old" curriculum - the one that the Bannisters had experienced - was
clearly of diminished applicability. With the advent of the age of infor-
mation, communications and high technology, it should be clear that
Harold Painter was a fit parent and would provide a learning environ-
ment for Mark that would favor optimal best interests psycho-social
development. Harold Painter had pursued a life of learning, free ex-
pression and creativity. He had mastered the craft of writing and like
many aspiring writers had worked as a newspaperman. He had devel-
oped a "sense of purpose;165 he had intentions, objectives and life goals.
He operated as an open, expanding self system, preferring the study of
Zen Buddhism to less demanding activities. He was a Western man
who was willing to search the wisdom of the East for insights into be-
ing. Today it is not uncommon for seasoned corporate managers to seek
to learn from the philosophers of the Orient. Harold Painter, a man in
his thirties, was deeply involved in learning relevant to the emerging
new American culture, and he was a man of development.
As indicated earlier, the learning age child is undergoing moral
and ethical development, as well as cognitive, social, emotional, and
164. Id.
165. See ERIK ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 120-22 (1964).
Batt
37
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
aesthetic development. Harold Painter, as portrayed in the Iowa Su-
preme Court's opinion, is a politically involved person. He is described
as a political liberal and a supporter of the activities of the American
Civil Liberties Union.' 66 He engaged in the political debates of his
time, and he had long been concerned about matters of right and
wrong, justice and injustice, the legitimacy of authority and the distri-
bution of values among the citizens of his country. Harold Painter was
an appropriate model of moral and ethical values for a learning age
child in a nation which keeps alive the ideology of democratic values.
Of course, the Bannisters moral and ethical perspective was typical of
those of their age and life stage. However, their vision of moral and
ethical life was such that they were not the persons who should have
received custody. Generationally and psychosocially, they appear to
have been too far removed from the moral and ethical milieu of Mark's
present and future.
Further, the court and Professor Goldstein failed to discuss age
appropriate sexuality (affectional/erotic behavior) and gender iden-
tity.16 7 Viewed from a psycho-social vantage point, this promotes an
incomplete best interests analysis. Mark would be entering adolescence
in the near future. 6 8 Sexuality and gender identity are critical issues at
that time, and had already become important issues in the learning
stage.
Dr. Hawks, the Bannister's expert witness, testified:
He is sensitive about sex, which one would expect of a seven year
old. Again, he has some questions and some anxieties about male-
ness. And the anxieties do show up. Mark is not free in his own
mind to discuss some of these anxieties about this, but he is con-
cerned about maleness, femaleness at this time.169
Learning age children are existentially engaged in an effort to orient
themselves on the issue of gender identity. They are attempting to de-
166. Id.
167. See generally ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (Hildegard Hannun
& Hunter Hannun trans. 1983); ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE (Hilde-
gard Hannun & Hunter Hannun trans. 1984); ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILD-
HOOD (Ruth Ward trans. 1981) (these works provide one with real insight into the
psychology of the self).
168. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 156, at 421-25.
169. In Re Painter, No. 24921, at 21 (Dr. Hawks, amazingly, goes on to state
that this material is dangerous and should not be discussed).
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termine what the gender standards of being and action are in our cul-
ture. Moreover, there is an age appropriate interest in sexuality. Dr.
Hawks, testified that Mark was involved in the process of dealing with
these very fundamental matters. It can be inferred that Mark's difficul-
ties in regard to communicating his feelings about these matters
stemmed from his experience with the Bannisters. Their views on sexu-
ality and gender identity were old fashioned and, given that fact, it was
highly likely that they did not deal in "modern style" with questions of
sexuality and gender identity. Their personal ethic dictated that Mark
be shielded from direct, age appropriate handling of these fundamental
issues. In addition, it would be reasonable to surmise that they were
overly repressive in regard to the sexual interest and action of children.
Mark's father, on the other hand, was a free thinker and free spirit: a
person open to the process of cultural change. It is unlikely that he
would be responsible for the creation of Mark's anxiety and sensitivity.
Harold Painter, and his wife Marilyn, appeared to have been a
young., energetic couple. Harold had been able to achieve affectional
and erotic intimacy during his life.' 7 ' He had formed a family and had
fathered children. His life history indicated that he was attuned to con-
temporary models of masculinity and femininity.' 7 ' Both he and
Marilyn are capable of providing the appropriate environment for
Mark's development of culture-acceptable gender identity and sexual
behavior orientation. Parents, and custodians, who provide such a de-
velopmental setting during the learning stage are normally capable of
coping well with gender identity and sexuality issues which are
presented during adolescence. 17 Speaking comparatively, Mark's self
development along gender identity and sexuality lines would have been
most effectively enhanced by placement with his father and his father's
new wife.
Further, Mark would be moving into adolescence. In our culture,
adolescence is a very special phase of psycho-social development. 73 To
appropriately decide a child custody case involving a learning stage
child, one must think not only about the parents, but must engage in a
170. See ERICKSON, supra note 7, at 70-72.
171. See generally IVAN ILLICH, GENDER (1982) (an excellent work on gender
identity); see also P. SLATER, FOOTHOLDS (1977) (also containing valuable information
on gender identity).
172. See generally E. FRIED, THE EGO IN LOVE AND SEXUALITY (1966) (on the
importance of love and sexuality in the adult years).
173. See STONE & CHURCH, supra note 156, at 425-32.
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prospective analysis which considers the psycho-social situation of the
child in adolescence. Both the court and Professor Goldstein fail to fo-
cus on this best interest consideration.
Adolescence is a time of biological maturation, rite of passage,
strong sexual emphasis and finding one's way. 17 ' There is certainly a
great deal going on in this phase of development (Erikson's Stage V).
However, the complexity of legal decision-making in regard to this
stage of development can be dealt with if we organize our thinking
around a very fundamental idea. Developmentally, adolescence is char-
acterized by the young person's search for an authentic "sense of iden-
tity."'1 75 Identity, as used here, refers to one's sense of individual con-
tinuity. Consolidating a sense of identity at this stage means
integrating the self so that one is prepared to move into young
adulthood.
Lawyers and judges must keep in mind that the quest for identity
is an essential task of adolescence. Identity cannot be assigned to the
adolescent by parents, court, or society. The "sense of identity" must
be acquired over protracted time through individual interaction with
others in our culture who are available as identity models. Experimen-
tation and choice are critical in the acquisition of this fundamental
sense of self. The very way in which a young person acquires her or his
identity gives adolescence a variable, protean quality. Out of psycholog-
ical necessity, adolescents are shape shifters, they appear in different
forms at different times. Self experimentation is the science of adoles-
cent identity research. Ideologies, styles, behaviors, and perspectives
are donned and doffed. Revisionism is the rule and the process of revi-
sion is critical to psycho-social development. In our culture, this process
is essential in developing a "sense of identity." The adolescent may de-
velop an authentic "sense of identity," drift on the sea of "identity con-
fusion" or develop a "negative identity." ' The preferred result is the
construction of an authentic "sense of identity." "Identity confusion" is
not a positive outcome because it leaves one prey to anxiety and insecu-
rity. A "negative identity," for example, that of "delinquent," ".addict"
or "criminal," jeopardizes one's opportunity for a life free of legal
stigma and social and psychological deprivation. Both the Iowa Su-
174. Id. at 419-77.
175. ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
176. See ERIKSON, supra note 163 and accompanying text. "Identity confusion"
and "negative identity" are not positive outcomes. One's life will not be enhanced by
one's achieving one or the other.
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preme Court and Professor Goldstein failed to consider the relationship
between a best interest decision and the task of adolescence.
Recall that the Bannisters were in their sixties at the time of the
appellate decision. By the time Mark graduated from high school they
would have been past age seventy. Given their ages, their philosophy of
life, and their life style, it was not in Mark's best interests for the Ban-
nisters to be awarded custody. The Bannisters were not best suited to
deal with the vicissitudes of adolescence. In comparison to Harold
Painter, they had much less of the flexibility required to deal with the
emerging adolescent identity models of the 1960's and early 1970's.
The "fit" required between Mark, the culture and the grandparents did
not exist. Harold Painter's life history indicated that he had worked
hard at. achieving a culture-appropriate authentic "sense of identity." It
is a fair inference from the facts, that he searched, revised, experi-
mented. and achieved identity continuity. Moreover, given his openness
and vitality, he appeared to be a person who would be able to accept
the shape shifting and revisionism of Mark's adolescent stage of devel-
opment. Further, his adolescence would be historically "closer" to
Mark's than the adolescent periods of Mr. and Mrs. Bannister. In addi-
tion, his wife Marilyn's age and social experience also made her well-
equipped to participate in Mark's coming of age.
The Iowa Supreme Court's and Professor Goldstein's emphasis on
continuity of relationship does not make it possible to arrive at a true
best interests decision. There is no room for the complexities of adoles-
cence within the monism of the continuity concept. A best interests
decision can be reached only if psychosocial reality is comprehensively
considered.
The preceding particularized discussion of Painter v. Bannister,17
from the psychosocial best interests perspective, clearly demonstrates
that the zealous judicial application of the continuity concept, and the
psychological parent model, may well result in child custody decisions
which are more reflexive than wise.
IV. THE CRITIQUE EXTENDED
As indicated, the BBI approach may produce decision outcomes
which do not meet the child's psycho-social best interests, however, the
strict application of the model may beget monsters of jurisprudential
injustice. Consider the following question and testimony from Hoy v.
177. 140 N.W.2d 152.
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Willis.17 8 On cross-examination the testifying expert, Dr. Hollander, a
proponent of continuity was asked:
If a couple kidnapped an infant, kept it for four years and within
that four years they became the psychological parents of the child
and if both the parents and the kidnappers were equal in all re-
spects would it be in the best interests of the child to continue cus-
tody with the kidnappers?17 9
The expert said "yes."' 80 Such a decision would surely be wild justice.
The application of the continuity and psychological parent concepts to
such a fact pattern could only be the product of a professional scotoma
which impairs one's capacity to see the full array of values our culture
apply to such a case.
How Goldstein or Solnit would evaluate the preceding case is un-
known. 81 However, on cross-examination in a custody case, Goldstein
was asked to assume that a non-custodial parent had kidnapped a child
from the custodial parent. It was hypothesized that several months had
passed before the child was located. Goldstein was then asked to as-
sume that the child had developed a real psychological attachment to
the "kidnapping" parent. Goldstein was asked whether the court ought
to leave the child with the parent who abducted the child. In offering
his opinion, Professor Goldstein characterized the act as kidnapping
but went on to say:
If a new and meaningful relationship had developed over a suffi-
cient period of time, I would be very reluctant, from the child's
point of view, to move that child, and I think I am responding to
your question, because to move that child in order to protect the
State's policy with regard to kidnapping is to use the child as a
chattel, which is what we are moving away from. . . .My answer
is if the child is thriving, and a substantial period of time has gone
by where the old ties have begun to dissolve or break down, and
new meaningful ties have developed, that I would, from the child's
vantage point, I would leave him there.9 2
178. 398 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
179. id. at 111.
180. Id.
181. I omit Ms. Freud from the matter as she died approximately five years ago.
182. See JUDITH AREEN, CASES & MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 518-19 (1982).
This quote is taken from the case styled, Rose v. Rose, however, the parties names have
been changed by Professor Areen to protect their privacy.
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Certainly, a "kidnapping" by a parent differs from kidnapping by
a stranger. In the case of the abduction by the parent, there normally
exists a prior affectional and psycho-social relationship. Thus, the tak-
ing is certainly not as reprehensible as the taking by the stranger. It is
highly unlikely that a stranger who abducts a child would be a fit
psycho-social parent. However, it seems that to ignore community ideas
about justice and the law and to adhere strictly to the BBI paradigm
view of the case is to accept a jurisprudential vision which inhibits our
ability to do substantial justice in complex cases.
It must be kept in mind that the family law perspective is only one
of many perspectives. We must recognize that there are a number of
interests, values, and systems perspectives which ought to be considered
in decisions at an interface.18 Children's psychological interests are
very important but there are other rights and interests to be considered.
Certainly when we are confronted with unusual cases such as the kid-
napping cases, we must remember that they are not examples of the
custody cases we normally encounter. Such unusual cases exist as a
special class of cases which are best examined from the vantage points
of constitutional law, criminal justice policy-making, the policy under-
pinnings of family law jurisprudence, and our moral/ethical vision. The
kidnapping cases are hybrids which analytically cannot be contained by
a model constructed for application in child placement disputes. Dr.
Hollander and Professor Goldstein are consistent given their theoretical
starting point, however, the complexity of reality calls for outcomes
which do not reward the wrongdoers and deprive the custodians.
We turn now to a consideration of the BBI paradigm in relation to
the time-honored practice of courts granting visitation rights. In Pierce
v. Yerkovich,8 Professor Solnit testified as a expert witness. The case
involved an effort by the acknowledged father of a five-year old child to
have his right of visitation recognized and enforced against a mother
who denied him access to the child. The Court, in deciding Pierce,
summarized Professor Solnit's basic position in these words:
In short, the professor's thesis, although variously stated is that it
serves the best interests of the child with the least detriment to
have his custodial parent, the one with whom the child lives, rather
than a court, make the determination as to when and under what
183. See M. McDOUGAL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1980).
184. 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974).
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circumstance, if at all, the noncustodial parent should be permitted
visitation with their child. 188
The Court then made the following comment:
This is indeed, a novel and startling doctrine, and if accepted liter-
ally as Professor Solnit and his co-authors Goldstein and Freud se-
riously urge, would leave the court shorn of much of its traditional
role as parens patriae and guardian of the child's best interest.
Quite frankly, I do not believe that the law of this state would
tolerate this court, charged as it is with a responsibility for the wel-
fare of children so supinely and abjectly abdicating its function to
any parent, however well intentioned. 186
Rejecting the BBI approach, the court held that the custodian
mother did not have the right to determine whether or not the noncus-
todial father should be permitted visitation. That decision belonged to
the court. The court pointed out that a child has two parents and the
fact that the parents do not live together cannot negate the existence of
the two parent situation. The court concluded that it was in the child's
best interests to have contact with the father. The Pierce case demon-
strates the reality of the advocacy of the BBI paradigm in the arena of
everyday decision-making.
The basic BBI position on court ordered visitation is that it may in
fact be a "source of discontinuity. ' 187 The non-custodian, visiting par-
ent is perceived as being a potential threat to the continuity of relation-
ship which exists between the child and custodian. The emphasis is
again on continuity. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud reason that the child
has a difficult time relating to "two psychological parents who are not
in positive contact with each other."'188 They state that conflicts in re-
gard to loyalty can destroy the child's relationship with both of the
parents. Further, they argue that the non-custodial parent will have
little opportunity to promote the child's psychological position, because
that can only be done by one who is available on a continual and unin-
terrupted basis. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit assert a child traumatized
by separation or divorce is appropriately protected only if the child is
permitted to "settle down in the privacy of their reorganized family
185. Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. BBI (1979), supra note 4.
188. Id. at 209.
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with one person in authority upon whom they can rely for answers to
their questions and for protection from external influence."1 89 The BBI
group's belief is that by ordering visitation, a court undercuts the
child's trust in the parent, the parent's authority and the capacity of
the custodian to parent.
I dissent strongly from this view. Granting the custodial parent the
authority to determine visitation rights is not in the child's best inter-
ests. On the contrary, it promotes the child's best interests for decision-
makers to act in accord with a checks and balances "philosophy." A
decision-maker approach which emphasizes feedback carries with it the
opportunity to prevent runaway.1 90 A valid best interests model must fit
the reality of human life. The truth is that custodians are not always
perfect people. The best of them have their ups and downs. All too
often they can manifest very real psychopathology which can cause
them to do emotional and/or physical harm to the child. Alice Miller, a
Swiss "non-orthodox" psychoanalyst has made this clear in her recent
landmark publications.19" ' Miller's clinical work demonstrates that par-
ents often use their children to fulfill their egoistic wishes. The results
for the child are confusion, depression, alienation, pathological grandi-
osity, contempt for self and/or others and the inability to achieve inti-
macy. No one parent should be permitted to wall off a child from con-
cerned others. What we have learned about the physical and sexual
abuse of children in our culture should make us wary of totalistic au-
thority systems from which concerned adults are excluded."'
The psychoanalyst, Bruno Bettelheim, who has written' 93 on chil-
dren growing up in the multiple caretaker environment, a kibbutz in
Israel, stated: "[i]n the kibbutz, things can never get as bad as they
may between a lone mother [or father] and her infant, because there is
more than one person taking care of the infant."' 94 The preceding re-
quires us to oppose the BBI group's stand on court ordered visitation.
Single parent totalism is not in the best interests of the young.
The BBI approach is objectionable for other important reasons.
After divorce the psychological ties between the child and the non-cus-
189. Id. at 117.
190. See generally GREGORY BATESON, MIND AND NATURE: A NECESSARY
UNITY (paperback ed. 1980).
191. See MILLER, supra note 167.
192. See, e.g., FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN (1981); RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978).
193. BRUNO BETTELHEIM, CHILDREN OF THE DREAM (1978).
194. Id. at 137.
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todian continue to exist.195 Both the child and the non-custodian have
important relational interests which deserve protection. It is obvious
that people need not live together in order to have on-going relation-
ships. Furthermore, it may be quite important for both child and non-
custodial parent to continue to have contact. For example, a young
male child may have his psychological best interests served by main-
taining contact with a non-custodian father who has been serving as a
gender identity model. To disrupt this relationship might well be an act
against the child's best interests. The BBI group errs when they state
that a child cannot relate affirmatively to two parents who have made
the decision to end the marriage. 9" There is evidence to the contrary.
One can use counselling, mediation and the power of the court to pro-
mote rational interaction. 197
Parents can learn to grow beyond the old domestic conflicts and
come to terms with a new way of co-existence which benefits the child.
After divorce, life need not be an eternal cold war between the parents.
Turning to modification of custody decrees, the law is that custody
orders can be modified if a change of circumstances can be demon-
strated to the court.'98 The kind of change of circumstances contem-
plated by the law is that which substantially effects the child's best
interests.'99 Historically, it has been our collective public policy prefer-
ence that cases can be reviewed to determine whether or not a child's
best interests are being protected.
The BBI group rejects the traditional rule of law. They argue that
the law of modification invites judicial challenge by non-custodian and
consequently is a threat to continuity of relationship. For this reason,
they contend that custody decrees should be final and not subject to
modification.200 Again, their emphasis on continuity stands in the way
of a true best interests analysis.
Let us consider a simple illustrative example. A custodian mother
195. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK UP:
How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 311 (1980) (giving details relat-
ing to this point).
196. See Susan Steinman, What We Know, What We Have Yet To Learn, and
the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739, 743 (1983)
(refuting this BBI position).
197. See CIJI WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFTER DIVORCE 11-13 (Bantam
ed. 1984).
198. See CLARK, supra note 68, at 598.
199. Id. at 600.
200. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 37.
660 [Vol. 16
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
1992]
may have done a satisfactory job of raising a boy up to age eight. How-
ever, the facts may indicate that at the learning stage of development,
the mother is failing to do a best interests job of optimizing his cogni-
tive, social, and moral and ethical development. In fact, to a neutral
observer it appears that she has lost interest in the boy. This is not an
uncommon situation. Custodian parents, fathers or mothers, can grow
psychologically distant from their children. Assume that the facts
demonstrate that the father is highly motivated and well qualified to
promote the boy's best interests development. Given such a case, it is
wise public policy to maintain a legal standard which authorizes the
court to modify the custody arrangement. Substantial changes in cir-
cumstances will often impact on the best interests situation. Children's
lives are important and must have the protection of the law. A policy
preference which places the child at the total mercy of one parent until
the end of adolescence can do very little to insure justice for the young.
Given the preceding and the BBI group position, it should come as
no surprise that the creators of the paradigm view court ordered joint
custody20 1 as another significant threat to continuity of relationship.
Professor Goldstein made this clear2 02 when he stated that the author-
ity of the law should not be used to require an objecting parent to par-
ticipate in a joint custody arrangement. 03 Court ordered joint custody,
according to Professor Goldstein, undermines the process of psychologi-
cal bonding between the child and parent because the parents in such
cases are in conflict."" He holds that this state of conflict will produce
discontinuity.
It is the BBI position that if the parents cannot reach an agree-
ment on joint custody, they reveal themselves as "unfit to decide cus-
tody." 0 Professor Goldstein declares that the court should quickly
award custody to the parent of attachment.2 06 Mediation, negotiation,
counselling, and arbitration are not perceived as being as applicable
201. See Carolyn S. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Kv. L. 271 (1978) (for an excel-
lent "pioneer work" on joint custody).
202. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 47.
203. Id. at 46. Professor Goldstein indicates that joint custody determined by
agreement of the parties is satisfactory; however, if agreement cannot be reached ini-
tially or maintained once reached then there can be no joint custody because the mat-
ter must be submitted to the court and according to Professor Goldstein the above
situation serves to place continuity of relationship in jeopardy.
204. Id. at 48.




: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
alternative approaches. A failure to agree on joint custody is held to be
a crisis situation. The child is seen as being in jeopardy. The BBI judg-
ment is that the child's psychological interest can be protected only if
the child is placed immediately in the custody of one person with full
authority.207
A close reading of Professor Goldstein's 1984 article reveals that
he is, in truth, no friend of any type of, agreed or ordered, joint cus-
tody. He writes "[w]hen the fad for joint custody agreements fades, we
will begin to realize how costly it, like other magic formulas, has been
to children."208
Note that he refers to joint custody agreements as a "fad" and as
"magic formulas." This is certainly strong labelling. The implication is
that those who support joint custody have not truly engaged in the req-
uisite reflection and analysis. Although the BBI group favors contact
between the non-custodian and the child, Professor Goldstein states
"[e]ven if requested by both parents we would object to courts making
a visitation or joint custody agreement a part of a decree. "209
Note that an acceptance of this notion in regard to joint custody
would mean that the agreement would in reality have no authoritative
significance. People are invited to act capriciously. Under this ap-
proach, no one has any legally protected rights. 10
In discussing joint custody, Professor Goldstein states that he and
his co-workers "reasoned from the child's point of view .... " 12 This
position is not supportable. Judith Wallerstein, a psychologist trained in
psychoanalysis, who conducted a long-term psychosocial study of one
hundred and ninety-one children from families of divorce wrote
"[t]here is considerable evidence that the relationship between the
207. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
208. Id. at 54.
209. Id. at 53.
210. Further, it should be noted that the footnotes to Professor Goldstein's article
contain not one source from the legal, and sociological literature on joint custody. And,
in fact, his only citation to the psychological literature is to a paper published in 1926
by Sigmund Freud. 20 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 87-174 (James Strachey ed. 1959). Freud, of course,
never evaluated joint custody from a clinical or a theoretical psychoanalytic perspec-
tive. There was no joint custody phenomenon to be studied during Freud's time. More-
over, orthodox psychoanalysts practicing in the years since Freud's death have not sys-
tematically studied joint custody. Further, it is clear that there is an unwillingness to
directly counter the findings of those whose work indicates that joint custody can at
times well serve the best interests of the child.
211. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
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child in the divorced family and both of his or her parents does not
diminish in emotional importance within the post-divorce family. 2 12
Wallerstein's work is important because it is, in a very real sense,
"in context" field work. Wallerstein evaluated the children at home and
in the school setting, not simply in an office clinical setting. Her re-
search leads her to believe that in many cases joint custody can, under
certain situations, promote the emotional best interests of the child.
She is aware that a child under the sole control of a lonely, post-divorce
emotionally dysfunctional parent is likely to suffer.13 Wallerstein
knows that joint custody can act to neutralize the negative effects of
interaction with a psychologically dysfunctional parent. The results of
Wallerstein's work indicate that, in some cases, people are not able to
overcome their hostility.214 As a consequence they may not able to act
responsibly, and joint custody will not work in these cases. It is clear
that her work demonstrates that joint custody in a number of cases is a
viable alternative to sole custody.
Susan Steinman, another social science researcher writing for a
law journal audience, in referring to a group of joint custody children
she studied stated:
These children clearly had two psychological parents to whom they
were positively attached and loyal, despite the marital split. This
does not support the assumption in Freud, Solnit and Goldstein's,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child that children cannot relate
well to two separated parents who are not in positive relation to one
another. 21 5
Steinman's view is strikingly different from the position put forward by
the BBI group. As Steinman perceives it, the Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit view is no more than an assumption. It is not the product of solid
in-the-environment research. My participant/observer experience and
my reading of the relevant research work causes me to support the
212. Judith Wallerstein, The Child In The Divorcing Family, in THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 106 (J. Henning ed. 1982). Dr.
Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee state that the custody arrangement itself does not
determine the child's future. It is the experience with people which is crucial. JUDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 271 (1989).
213. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 212, at 108.
214. Id. at 109.
215. See Steinman, supra note 196, at 747.
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Steinman view.
Psychologist Joan B. Kelly points out that parents who divorce
usually have not been in conflict about the approach to child rearing.2 16
This is an important finding. The non-existence of a conflict in regard
to parenting smooths the way to workable joint custody. In addition,
Kelly's research indicates that children do better psychologically when
there is contact with both parents. 17 Once again, the research results
refute the BBI position.
The BBI group has failed to recognize certain realities which lim-
its their understanding in joint custody matters. The juridical and so-
cial situation is that, in approximately ninety percent of all cases, it is
the mother who becomes the custodian.2 18 About eighty percent of di-
vorced mothers with custody work outside the home 21  and their in-
comes are notoriously low. 220 In addition, child support is all too often
not paid by obligors.2 21 The majority of mothers in our culture are not
able to remain at home and perform the "traditional" mother's role.
Today's mothers must rely on babysitters, relatives, day care, kinder-
garten, and the schools to support them in parenthood.
It is only at the end of a long day of work that most mothers come
home to act as parent. One could forcefully argue that a sole custodian
mother is the victim of Kafkaesque form of punishment.22 Her second
stint of "compulsory" labor for the day begins when she arrives home.
Often she returns to the domestic scene physically fatigued and emo-
tionally overloaded or drained. Quite often while a mother-in-custody is
trying to cope with employment and the task of child care, she is en-
deavoring to restructure her own life line. The woman finds that, in
addition to working and taking care of the parenting task, she must
chart and navigate the new culture of divorce. The reality is that very
few mothers are able to sit at home all day in continuity of relationship
with their children. In the evening, after a full day on the job, these
women often are unable to put forth a psychological best interests ef-
216. See Joan B. Kelly, Further Observations On Joint Custody, 16 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 762 (1983).
217. Id. at 764-65.
218. See MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 23
(1978).
219. See WARE, supra note 197, at 44.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Kafkaesque means nightmarishly strange, mystifying, and bizarre. THE
RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 729 (revised ed. 1980).
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fort. These women need and deserve all the help they can get. Respon-
sibility ought to be shared. Joint (shared) custody can do much to re-
lieve the mother (or father) custodian of an excessive psychological
(and physical) burden which derives from social and economic realities.
The sharing of responsibility and contact with the child will reduce the
stress on any one parent and can dramatically enrich the child's life.
Furthermore, in today's world of accelerated social and psychological
change, a shared custody arrangement can greatly increase the child's
exposure to evolving forms of human attachment and relationships. The
greater the number of fit and concerned caretakers, including signifi-
cant others available, and the more diverse the child's social contacts,
the more likely it is that the child's psychological and social develop-
ment will be enhanced . 2 8 The continuity concept is simply not compre-
hensive enough to be useful in dealing with the dynamics of legal and
human reality.
In order to fully understand the BBI position on joint custody, it is
necessary to examine the concept of "family" and "authority". Beneath
the verbal structure of the BBI paradigm exists a psychological and
social commitment to a particular concept of the "family". This family
of preference might well be labelled the family-of-privacy.2 It is most
often known as the traditional or nuclear family. This type of family is
rooted in the Western middle class family structure which came into
prominence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 25 The context
of its creation was the culture of the industrializing nations of Western
Europe. This family-of-privacy was the product of particular social, ec-
onomic and historical forces. 22 6 This new family structure was a "cre-
ated" form; it did not derive from biological compulsion. It is virtually
a law of history that cultural ideology in large measure determines the
idealized family form of a particular period of history. However, it is
here pointed out that not everyone in the Western world has grown up
in a family-of-privacy. The poor generally have not been able to afford
to live in this manner. 27 And, in fact, those children who have lived in
this "traditional" family have been subjected to isolation, instruction in
individualization and competition, and split off from life in the broader
223. See BETTELHEIM, supra note 193, at 137.
224. BBI (1979) supra note 204, at 7.
225. See PHILLIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD, 365-404 (1962).
226. Id.
227. See JOEL KOVEL, THE AGE OF DESIRE 108-33 (1981). Perhaps the family-
of-privacy has been more a fantasy than a reality.
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community. 2 8 This family-of-privacy does much to make the child ex-
ceedingly dependent on the parents. Further, it is arguable that the
family-of-privacy and its social alienation inducing tendencies have
contributed to the absence of genuine community in our time." 9 Psy-
choanalysts and other therapists have treated enormous numbers of
people who were victims of this family structure.280 This is not to say
that privacy-in-itself is valueless. Traditional families are as important
as any other form of family. However, privacy has been overstressed in
Western culture. The truth is that in our time the family-of-privacy is
simply one living style among many. Our culture has changed dramati-
cally and will continue to change.
The perfect traditional family of today is an experience most peo-
ple will not have. It is clear that the nuclear family with strictly as-
signed "traditional" sex roles is on the wane. It is well known that sin-
gle-parent families and blended families are common. Certainly the
line between the family and the broader culture of day care center,
school, media, and recreational life, has been blurred and new forms of
relationships between family members and "outsiders" have come into
being.231 The family-of-privacy is not the only reality which one sees in
the world, Reality is other than the proponents of orthodox psychoanal-
ysis would have us believe, and a theory-determined preference for the
family-of-privacy, or traditional family, can do little to help us fashion
sound legal policy to produce realistic court custody decisions. We are
best advised to study things as they truly are. Continuity of relationship
with a psychological parent in a family-of-privacy is an image too re-
moved from contemporary realities to guide legal decision-making.
According to the BBI originators, the family-of-privacy has "one
person in authority."' 32 This person protects the child from outsiders
and acts as the fount of all wisdom. This monotheism is a hangover
from older patriarchal times. 3 The patriarchal era is coming to an
end, but the predeliction of some for mono-authority survives. One
should not be concerned that in the BBI post-divorce and post-separa-
tion family, the new single authority is most frequently the mother.
228. Id.
229. See Bruno Bettelheim, Some Comments on Privacy, in SURVIVING AND
OTHER ESSAYS 399-411 (1979).
230. See R. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: A STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS
(1960).
231. See WARE, supra note 197.
232. BBI (1979), supra note 204, at 117.
233. See generally ERIK FROMM, THE CRISIS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 110-35 (1976).
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The determinative logic is not of gender, but structural form. The
"placing" of authority in one pre-eminent being is what is important.
This position on authority and the family is directly derivative of the
patriarchal cultural origins and the mono-authority bias of psychoanal-
ysis. It is certainly fair to state that Freud was a very powerful mono-
authority who dominated orthodox psychoanalysis. 34 In addition, psy-
choanalytic treatment with the analyst in charge and the analysand
("patient") in Transference'" is a very "private" little dyadic "family"
situation. The person receiving analysis is the child and the analyst is
the parent (authority figure). The preference for authority and privacy
displayed in the work of the BBI group appears to be rooted in the
history and method of psychoanalysis. We cannot, however, allow ideas
which fit the history of psychoanalysis and the treatment of people in
analysis to be implemented in legal reality if they do not "fit." In our
time, authority for the child comes from many sources, in many forms.
It comes from two parents, one parent, a grandmother, uncles, aunts,
other relatives, day care workers, babysitters, television, peers, older
children, teachers, and other unrelated adults. The elements of author-
ity can be combined into a multiplicity of possible configurations. Tele-
vision, by itself, has radically reworked the topography of authority.
Today norms and values are electronically projected. Authority, to a
very great extent, is imaged up on the 525 "lines" of the television
screen.
In passing judgment on the sharing of responsibility for the child
through joint custody and visitation, we are best advised to accept so-
cial reality and avoid the BBI preference for mono-authority. Joint cus-
tody can, in many cases, do much to promote the child's psychological
best interests. Outdated views on authority can serve as no significant
support for the continuity of relationship concept.
To this point, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the
continuity concept (and the related idea of the psychological parent)
because it is the quintessence of the legal and psychological BBI para-
digm. It is clear that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's views on custody
dispute outcomes, visitation, modification of custody and joint custody
234. See 0. MANNONI, FREUD 108 (Vintage 1st ed. 1974). My basic contention
is that Freud, as the leader of an "outcast" movement, felt it necessary to set himself
up as the authority. He, like Moses, became the "law-giver."
235. In transference the analysand-driven by the unconscious-is psychologically




: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
are overwhelmingly determined by their penchant for the continuity
concept. In fact, a dedicated reductionist might argue that beyond the
continuity concept, all is but tautology. Logic supports such a view.
The truth is that all other formal elements of the BBI paradigm are
derivative of the continuity concept. The paradigm is, in fact, a logic
loop. This is, of course, why this article has devoted so much effort to
an extensive explication of this central concept. All other BBI para-
digm ideas are simply secondary. For this reason only a relatively small
part of this article will now be devoted to a discussion of "the child's
sense of time,"2 6 the law's inability to make predictions, "237 and "the
least detrimental alternative"2 8 test.
The BBI group has stated that "the child's sense of time" is an
integral part of the continuity concept. 3 ' They argue that custody
cases are potentially quite destructive of continuity, and therefore, must
be heard quickly and decided with dispatch, keeping the continuity
concept in mind. Because a rapid movement to finality of decision is
necessary to protect the child's psychological interests, the appellate
process must also be accelerated. Basically, the task of the court is to
determine quickly with whom the child is in continuity.240 The funda-
mental issue, put another way, is: who is the psychological parent? This
person, if fit, becomes the sole legal custodian. While I agree that final
decisions in these cases are too often needlessly delayed, I cannot fully
accept this position. It is clear that the sense of time concept is inextri-
cably tied to the continuity concept. "[T]he child's sense of time" idea,
can rise intellectually no higher than the whole continuity concept. The
continuity concept clearly does not take into account such fundamental
matters as the child's particular needs, the adult's fitness in regard to
these needs, and the benefit of contact with both parents, etc. In the
abstract, most would agree that it is important to decide custody cases
as quickly as is reasonably possible. It is best to decide on arrange-
ments, work out the necessary plans and get people going in a new life
pattern. However, the BBI approach would appear to be a rush to cus-
tody. To rush to finality is to commit judicial errors. It takes a signifi-
cant period of time to gather the relevant best interest facts, analyze
them and place them before the judge. Further, the court should al-
236. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 40-49.
237. Id. at 49-52.
238. Id. at 53-64.
239. Id. at 40.
240. Id. at 42-43.
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ways carefully evaluate the material presented by counsel, parties, wit-
nesses, etc. Mediation, counseling and negotiation, all recognized as-
pects of our system, take time if we are truly to further the child's best
interests.. In addition, appropriate appellate review takes time. We can
expedite, but a bullet train process will not serve the child's best
interests.
In summary, the "child's sense of time" idea is of very limited
utility for two reasons: first, because it is bound to the flawed continuity
concept; second, because it does not take into account the time realities
of gathering and fairly evaluating the information necessary to the
court's making of best interests decisions.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit believe that the law is but a crude
"instrument" 24 for dealing with that legal problem which we call the
child custody case. The BBI group argues that the law can recognize
relationships and allow them to evolve. In addition, Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit stress their belief that the law does not have the resources to
monitor relationships on a day to day basis. 2 It is their view that the
law cannot predict a child's future needs and future events which im-
pact upon that child.24 3 Because of this perceived defect in the legal
process, the BBI group states that no conditions should be imposed on
the custodian.2 ' Private ordering should prevail. 24 15 However, Gold-
stein, Freud and Solnit do believe that there is enough knowledge avail-
able to judges so that a limited number of things can be done with
some assurance. It is possible, according to the BBI proponents, for the
judge to identify which person among those contending for custody is a
psychological parent or has the capacity to be such a parent. 46 They
state that it is possible to predict that the person most suited to be
custodian is the person with whom the child has had a relatively long
term, continuous psychological attachment.247 Finally, we are told that
separation from the psychological parent and uncertainty in regard to
placement will do significant psychological damage to the child. 8
Admittedly, the law cannot determine life on a day-to-day basis.
This is self evident. Furthermore, it is not possible for decision-makers
241. BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 49-50.
242. Id. at 50.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 52.
245. Id. at 50.
246. Id. at 51.
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to predict exactly what the future has in store for a child. The great
majority of judges do not strive to act as supervisors who seek to med-
dle in the on-going everyday life of the family. Professor Goldstein has
the impression that the judiciary is overly concerned with the control of
family life." 9 My view is that in the bulk of the cases, judges make a
sincere effort to insure that best interests decisions are implemented. 25 0
Intervention is relatively limited. Questions of visitation and support do
come to court, but there is no day-to-day "supervision," and most
judges are not interested in performing such monitoring. As to the
law's capacity to predict and impose conditions, visitation is the condi-
tion which most concerns the BBI group.2 5' Generally, they oppose it.
Although visitation is a "condition," in a sense, a visitation decision is
not an attempt to "predict" the future. A visitation decision is primar-
ily an "in the present" effort to adjudicate rights in the best interests of
the child. The same is true of a decision regarding shared custody. I
doubt that the judicial assumption is that scientific forecasts of the fu-
ture are being made. However, the law does make special provisions for
the future. Under prevailing norms, the courts have the power to mod-
ify decrees in order to protect the child's best interests. 52 Every exper-
ienced judge is aware that things can change and that it may be neces-
sary, in the future, to change arrangements regarding custody,
visitation, etc.
The fundamental position the courts take is: "Let us try to make
the best decision we can now, hopefully it will hold up in the future."
The law's view is that if things change substantially, the new situation
will be dealt with through a change in custody or some other appropri-
ate remedy.
The BBI position on prediction and conditions is in large part an
extension of their preference for a private ordering. 53 This preference
would appear to derive from their positions on familial mono-authority.
As a result of this orientation it is arguable that they wish to limit the
law's jurisdiction. The BBI group leaves to the judge the task of deter-
mining who is the psychological parent in continuity. This, of course, is
249. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 52.
250. See MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN 52-71 (1981). My partici-
pant/observer field research gives me a high degree of confidence in the view expressed
in the text.
251. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 37-38.
252. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 847-62 (3rd
ed. 1990).
253. See BBI (1973), supra note 4, at 50.
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a rather simple task. It comes down to who cares for the child most of
the time? Note that the judge is not to concern herself or himself with
the child's full range of best interests needs. The BBI group desires not
only to prevent the courts from making decisions pointed at the future,
but wishes to deny the courts the right to impose any conditions, such
as visitation, which undercut the authority of the parent-in-custody.
The BBI group undoubtedly takes this stand because they wish to sup-
port the continuity concept from all conceivable directions.
Finally, the BBI idea that we can predict that children will be
harmed by separation from the psychological parent and damaged by
uncertainty produced in cases which are not disposed of rapidly, does
not take us far enough. It, at first glance, engages our sympathy, but it
seems evident that a rush to judgment is not in the child's long term
best interests. Substantial justice only can be done by a comprehensive
best interests, psychosocial, analysis.
At this juncture, we turn to the ultimate element in the BBI para-
digm: the least detrimental alternative. 2 ' It is the BBI's groups substi-
tution for the time-honored best interest test. This element, when care-
fully analyzed, turns out to be a specific custody placement and
procedure for placement which is made in accordance with the BBI
groups views on continuity, the child's sense of time, and the law's limi-
tation in regard to prediction. The fact is that the least detrimental
alternative idea is but the final "legal test" element in the great logic
loop which makes up the paradigm. Aptly translated, least deteri-
mental alternative means that cases are to be decided in accordance
with the three preceding main elements of the Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit model. Reduced to operational reality it means that all decisions
must be based on the continuity concept.
The BBI group states that the least detrimental alternative stan-
dard is to be preferred because it emphasizes the fact that the children
of divorce and custody disputes are victims who are at risk.2 55 From
their point of view, a custody decision is just a matter of making the
best of a. bad bargain. 56 I cannot share this extraordinarily pessimistic
outlook. Divorce, separation, and the necessity of making custody de-
terminations are cultural and historical realities. Life changes and loss
of relationships are something human beings learn to deal with.25 7 If
254. Id. at 53-64.
255. Id. at 54.
256. Id. at 63.
257. See BOWLBY, supra note 89.
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things are done in the right spirit and with social support, things can
work out. It is certainly possible that, in many cases, the child's post-
divorce life can turn out to be better than the child's pre-divorce life.
The BBI "legal test" seems to be the product of Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit's inability to see family break-up in the light of modern real-
ity.258 The rearrangement of the life configuration over time is part of
the normal passage through existence in our era.2 59 We need not see
things so "darkly." What we must do is develop institutions, programs
and procedures which promote the child's best interests under contem-
porary conditions. Keep in mind that divorce and conflict over custody
does not condemn all involved to life in a depressing Ingmar Bergman
film. Perhaps the orthodox psychoanalytic view inclines its followers to-
ward the Bergmanesque. A theory built on ideas such as the death in-
stinct, the repetition compulsion, sadomasochism etc. certainly might
dispose one to the "tragic sense of life."260 My opinion is that the least
detrimental alternative standard is a manifestation of the impulse to
overreact to perceived crises. The traditional best interests test is more
in keeping with an active, life-affirming approach to the custody issue.
Having completed my explanation and critical evaluation of each
element of the paradigm, I now offer some miscellaneous, but relevant,
thoughts on the work of the BBI group.
In his 1968 essay "Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence"2 61 Professor
Goldstein announced something which should be of great interest to us.
He stated that "[s]ince dispositions are frequently rendered in divorce
proceedings without presenting the decision makers with adequate data
about the child and the available alternative custodians, a presumption
should be established to favor relatively long-standing and continuous
relationships." '262 This pronouncement has escaped the attention of
those who have criticized the work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit. This
statement does much to undercut the authoritative nature of the BBI
paradigm. Keep in mind that the paradigm is essentially the continuity
concept. The general rule is that custody goes to the person who has
spent the most time with the child. Professor Goldstein's words indicate
258. The orthodox psychoanalytic perspective appears to isolate the BBI advo-
cates from the interpersonal process dimensions of modern culture.
259. See, e.g., DANIEL LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE. (Ballentine
paperback 1979).
260. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (W. W. Norton
paperback ed. 1961)(detailing this "tragic sense of life").
261. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19.
262. Id. at 475.
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that the continuity concept is in essence a makeshift. The professor's
statement indicates that what is truly needed in all cases is adequate
data. This author agrees. Further, our discussion of Painter63 makes it
clear that there exists a useful basic model which can guide us in gath-
ering and evaluating the important facts. It is a great mistake to raise a
stopgap formula to the level of decision-making paradigm. This is sim-
ply not the way to promote the psychological best interests of the child.
The way to produce appropriate decisions is to conscientiously apply
ourselves to the acquisition and evaluation of the relevant facts.264
The psychoanalytic infrastructure of the BBI paradigm makes it
clear that the type of psychoanalysis embraced by the BBI group is the
orthodox psychoanalysis long-championed by Anna Freud. As Paul
Roazen, a scholarly commentator on psychoanalysis, wrote in 1975,
"Anna Freud remains today one of the most outspoken defenders of
psychoanalysis. ' 63 It is clear from the context of Roazen's statement
that he was referring to orthodox psychoanalysis. However, it must be
stated that the orthodox theory is simply outdated. The classical theory
is too much of a product of Freud's immersion in the "work-machinery
image of his time. '266 His psychodynamic model was in large measure
determined by the concepts current in the nineteenth century world of
physical science. Freud's language and preferred metaphors plainly re-
veal his affinity for the concepts of mechanics, work and energies.2 67
For example, the "ego" of Freud's psychoanalysis acts as a machine
which converts the energy of the "id," the reservoir of sexuality and
263. Painter, 140 N.W.2d 152 at 156.
264. In order to do this most effectively, those of us in legal education must
continue to make law students aware of the models useful in advocating and deciding
such cases, expose them to appropriate fact gathering processes, teach them how to
evaluate the facts, demonstrate how the facts should be presented to the trier and sensi-
tize them to the human dimensions of child custody cases. Over the last decade legal
education has done much to prepare students to operate in the modern custody milieu.
We surely must do more. Moreover, continuing legal education programs have enlight-
ened man) who did not have the benefit of the new curriculum. Many individual social
workers, psychologists, human development specialists, legal scholars and psychiatrists
have done a great deal to educate judges, law professors and practitioners. Creative and
concerned law practitioners have instructed many of us on this matter of deciding best
interests custody cases. All of us must continue to raise the collective level of the law's
best interests awareness. We should not allow ourselves to be enthralled by the skill of
those who have mastered the art of Occam's razor.
265. PAUL ROAZEN, FREUD AND His FOLLOWERS 458 (1975).
266. See EDGAR LEVENSON, THE FALLACY OF UNDERSTANDING 58 (1972).
267. Id. at 59.
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aggression, into a force which can be used in socially acceptable
ways.2 68 Drive, cathexis and libido are all concepts derived from
energics. 269 Repression is a concept derived from hydraulics.27 The or-
thodox psychoanalytic model has very definite bio-mechanical qualities.
It is this model which has so greatly influenced Anna Freud and her
BBI colleagues. Anna Freud, in fact, has discussed the possibility of
refining ego functions so that they become "more and more objective
and independent of the emotions until they become as accurate and
reliable as a mechanical apparatus. 21
Today, other models are available for those who are working in
family law which will prove to be far more useful than the nineteenth
century rooted paradigm of orthodox psychoanalysis which has very
definite bio-mechanical qualities. The following models, briefly dis-
cussed, are firmly rooted in the twentieth century experience of human
beings. Erik Erikson's model' introduced in the context of the analy-
sis of Painter,"' is one which has great potential utility. Erikson's theo-
retical model which is soundly rooted in clinical observation has been
built over the last thirty years. He certainly owes a very real debt to
Freud, but his work is substantially informed by modern anthropology,
history, developmental psychology, ethics/morals, politics, literature,
etc. Erikson's model is far less reductionistic, closed and negativistic
than that of orthodox psychoanalysis. Robert J. Lifton, a psychiatrist,
has certainly drawn on Freud's pioneering work but he too offers a new
paradigm."" ' He has created a new model by mending a revisionist psy-
choanalysis and the lessons of modern history.275 Lloyd DeMause has
also joined history and psychoanalysis to teach about the psychology of
children and adults. 276 Gregory Bateson, an eclectic scholar, has com-




271. PAUL ROAZEN AND ERIK ERIKSON, THE POWER AND LIMITS OF A VISION
22 (1976). Scrutiny of Anna Freud's work reveals that it, like her father's, is rooted in
nineteenth century concepts of physical science. Her most widely read publication is
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, 2 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD (1967).
272. See ERIKSON, supra note 7.
273. See LASWELL, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
274. See R. LIFTON, THE LIFE OF THE SELF (1976).
275. See R. LIFTON, DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA (1969); R. LIF-
TON, HOME FROM THE WAR (1973); R. LIFTON, THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1979).
276. See DEMAUSE, supra note 138.
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give a new perspective on family life.2 7 Heinz Kohut, 218 a psychoana-
lyst, has authored a new self-psychology which emphasizes interper-
sonal phenomenon and the development of the individual's narcissistic
life line. Finally, Alice Miller, a Swiss psychoanalyst, has created a
revisionist psychoanalytic model focusing on failures in parental empa-
thy and the resulting impact on the child's psychological
development.27 9
In summary, there is much modern work available to us which
incorporates certain psychoanalytic ideas of current utility and brings
us a great deal of the relevant wisdom of our time. Ultimately, we live
in our own historical era. The legal problems of our time are best un-
derstood when we employ models relevant to our condition. The Victo-
rian era is dead. It is simply fact that orthodox psychoanalysis was not
formulated by people who understood the contemporary "culture of di-
vorce." Further, we live in a new, electronic, information, economic,
political and social environment - we are "new" people. We must turn
to the "new" psychology and other up-dated disciplines to aid our quest
for human justice. Thus, the BBI paradigm takes parents, children and
the law out of the context of modern relevancy. There is more to par-
ent-child life in these days than the family-of-privacy. Day care, baby
sitters, single parent life styles, single parent family structure, the un-
wed mother phenomenon, latch-key life, joint (shared) custody, blended
family existence, media impact on children and parents etc. have
worked enormous changes in the way children and their parents live.
We cannot deny the existence of a recently evolved and complex
reality.
Anna Freud's orthodox psychoanalysis is objectionable for another
fundamental reason. The theory is essentially a psychology of social
adjustment.2 80 This theory assumes that the child is primarily a being
of impulse which must be tamed. Ms. Freud, in commenting negatively
on freedom-oriented progressive schools, stated "[i]nstead of forcing
the child to fit into the environment, they aim at fitting a flexible envi-
ronment to the needs of the individual child, so as to give the pupil's
abilities the widest possible scope for expression. 281 She opposes such
277. See G. BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF THE MIND 271-78 (1972).
278. See generally HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF SELF (1971); HEINZ
KOHUT, THE RESTORATION OF SELF (1977) for an overview of Kohut's work.
279. See MILLER, supra note 167.
280. See, e.g., 4 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 1945-1956, 75-94 (1968).
281. Id. at 84.
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progressive schooling because "the result is a lack of adjustment to cur-
rent reality."2 82 This preference for social adjustment is made manifest
in the academic and expert witness work of the BBI group.283
Certainly, one must be able to act in an adaptive manner. An indi-
vidual must understand the social context in which he or she lives and
be able to take this context into consideration when making private or
public decisions. That flexibility is desirable. Social reality is always a
process of change. By forcing an "adjustment" from the child we, in
fact, deprive her or him of not only autonomy but the capacity to adapt
to social change.
If a child is to have a full measure of individual best interests op-
portunity, something else is needed. To succeed over the life span the
child must be permitted to become protean enough to adapt to cultural
change. 24 In other words, we should seek to give children the power to
self-actualize. One must "adapt" to his or her personal self and loved
ones as well as to society. To know only the norms current as injunc-
tions and exhortations during one's childhood is not in one's best inter-
ests. There is no overall social advantage in such a situation because it
does not prepare the young to meet the future.
Edgar A. Levenson, in discussing the move to a new psychoana-
lytic paradigm, wrote that "[f]amilies in our present society, although
in rapid flux, are quite differently organized [from the family of pri-
vacy]. They tend to be nonauthoritarian, matriarchal, relatively un-
structured. . ". ."I  The psychoanalytic model which underlies the BBI
paradigm is the product of a social order which no longer exists. Ad-
justment, authoritarian structure, patriarchal control and "traditional"
family life styles are no longer "dominant" phenomena. A new "best
interests test" focused decision-making model built on a contemporary
human science, is required in order to have informed child custody ad-
judication in a culture of change.
V. CODA
This coda is affixed to the criticism of the BBI paradigm in order
to suggest that there is an alternative approach to the resolution of
282. Id.
283. See BBI (1979), supra note 4, at 16 (using the term "social adaptation").
284. See LIFTON, supra note 275 (the body of Lifton's works both describe and
analyze this "protean quality").
285. EDGAR LEVENSON, THE FAILURE OF UNDERSTANDING 113 (1972).
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child custody disputes. Although the construction of a critique has been
my primary endeavor, I believe that an obligation exists to describe, in
short form, a manner in which lawyers, judges and psychological ex-
perts might better approach the matter of the child's psychological best
interests 86
It is emphasized that a true best interests approach must empha-
size the child's psycho-social needs rather than a developmental per-
spective. Any serious best interests analysis must be retrospective, fo-
cused in the present, and at the same time, prospective. The essence of
the best interests paradigm, presented here, derives from the work of
Erik Erikson a non-medical psychoanalyst, field researcher, and devel-
opmental theorist.28 7 I have taken certain necessary terminological lib-
erties with Erikson's model so that his work is more easily understood;
however, the essential integrity of Erikson's vision is preserved. Keep in
mind that the elements of Erikson's model presented at this point serve
to enhance our best interests perspective as it relates to the resolution
of child custody disputes.
For those working in the child custody arena, the first five stages
of Erikson's model are relevant. These five stages cover the child's
psychosocial development from birth through adolescence 288 and will be
discussed in some detail. 89 In order to provide additional data which
sheds light on the best interests decision in Painter, I further elaborate
on the brief outline of the Erikson model.
A. Stage I: The Age of Attachment, Reciprocity, and the For-
mation of Basic Trust during the first year of life
In this first phase of psycho-social development, the child needs
very significant physical and emotional input. The child needs attention
and stimulation. This is a time period during which the child seeks very
close attachment to a custodian who will provide nurturing. Any custo-
286. An earlier version of this alternative paradigm has been discussed in a prior
publication. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological
Approach to Proof and Decision-Making, 12 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 491 (1976).
287. Erikson is a Pulitzer Prize winner and a leading American humanist as well
as a clinician/theoretician. For a most personal and readable perspective on the man
and his work, see R. EVANS, DIALOGUE WITH ERIK EPIKSON (1964).
288. See ERIKSON, supra note 7.
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dian must be capable of giving a responsive human reaction' " and a
best interests legal analysis must focus on this development reality. It is
requisite for appropriate development that the custodian and child
must form a relatively close personal bond. The child's psychosocial
development requires a relationship based on close reciprocal interac-
tion. In order for the child's best interests to be promoted there must be
a commitment by the custodian to adapt to the child's need for attach-
ment and psychological and physical stimulation. The custodian must
learn to adjust to the child's internal bio-psychological clock. Time-
scheduled mechanical parenting will not meet the child's needs. More-
over, the child's best interests require that any person acting in a custo-
dial capacity must share substantial periods of time with the child con-
cerned. Close human contact with the child is absolutely essential for
appropriate development.
The psychological consequences of appropriate child and custodian
interaction during this period are significant. A positive first phase ex-
perience produces "a sense of basic trust." 91 This "sense of basic
trust" allows a child to feel confidence in those who nurture and in the
child's immediate environment. Over time, this form of trust general-
izes to other persons and other environmental settings. This feeling of
basic trust allows children to bond with and show concern for people
outside of the family. In addition, it promotes communal combinations
and social interaction. A just society based on equality before the law
must draw on a social structure derivative of this "sense of basic trust."
Further, the development of this condition of trust gives rise to a sense
of hope.2 92 This sense of hope gives one faith in a future of possibilities.
All this serves as a defense against the inevitable set-backs, disappoint-
ments and tragedies of real life. Only a custodian who can be deeply
engaged with the child during this stage of development can give the
child what she or he needs. Finally, a best interests custody court dispo-
sition will be one which favors a potential custodian who can meet the
very special needs of the Stage I child.
290. See Erik Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, in I PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES
63 (1959)(for a discussion of this requisite).
291. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 96-97.
292. See ERIKSON, supra note 7, at 79.
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B. Stage II: The Quest for Autonomy during the second and
third years of life
During this stage of development the child is much less dependent
than he or she was in the first phase of development. There is a signifi-
cant increase in motor behavior. There is also a concomitant need to
assert the self.29 The child is actively exploring the world in which he
or she lives. The "I", often in the form of "me", begins to assert itself.
The child is initiating the development of an independent existence. Of
course, the child still needs the custodian, but the relationship is in the
process of changing. The child seeks an age appropriate sense of libera-
tion, a feeling of autonomy. She or he starts to manifest a personal
sense of will.
In this developmental phase the child insists on doing things for
himself/herself. Furthermore, the phase two child can be rebellious and
"no" saying. Negation becomes a way of asserting the burgeoning self.
This kind of self expression can frustrate the custodian, but an appro-
priate custodian is one who is able to accept this situation as a natural
part of the child's psychological development.2 94 Too much "law and
order" will break the child's spirit and undercut his or her authentic
autonomy.2 The proper custodian for the child in this stage of devel-
opment is the person who can accept the fact that the child is no longer
as dependent as he or she was in stage one. The best custodian for the
child, in this time of the child's life, is one who is not disturbed by the
child's movement along the autonomy line. A custodian who institutes
repressive measures during this developmental phase does no act in the
child's best interests. A best interests custodian must be tolerant and
capable of using reasonable restraints in a manner suited to the child's
development.
C. Stage III: The Phase of Expansion between ages of four
and five
At this time, the child ventures away from the family and enters
the greater social realm. Play with children from other homes gives the
child new experiences. Additionally, the child begins to see that grown-
ups work in stores, as police officers, truck drivers, office workers, and
293. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 107.
294. Id. at 109.
295. Id. at 113.
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other jobs. The child's social awareness increases dramatically.
Through play, the child explores some of our culture's available socio-
economic roles. Phase III is one of energetic activity. Aggressively curi-
ous, physically active, and verbally invasive, the child is at times ap-
proaching a "run-away" state. 29 6 However, the custodian must
understand that this is normal from the child's perspective. Again a
best-interests stance dictates that the custodian act in a manner which
provides reasonable protection for and restraint of the child. On the
other hand, there must be a reasonable opportunity for self expression
in deed, thought, and word.
A successful phase three child has learned to exercise initiative.297
However, during this period of development the child also begins to
learn that one's personal initiative must be channeled. Culture requires
the child to become concerned about intention, objective and result.
Our culture expects the child to develop a "sense of purpose. '298 In
addition, the child must learn to relate to social groups made up of
non-family as well as family members. The child must come to learn
that life requires harmonious social interaction with those beyond the
family enclave. Finally, it is well documented that phase three is a time
when sexual identity is beginning to become strongly established. 9' A
gender style is being derived from the child's experience in family and
culture. Given this information, it is certain that this phase of develop-
ment is a lively one.
The best interests custodian under law for the phase three child
will have the following orientation:
1. prefer age-appropriate, independent behavior, not tether the
child to the family
2. be encouraging of and supportive of purposeful activity
3. be able to model and support culture appropriate gender identity
development
4. will not be threatened by the child's movement away from the
custodian and into the world of others
296. Id. at 115.
297. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, 255-58 (2d ed. 1983).
298. See ERIK ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 120-22 (1964).
299. For a well-written explanation of the gender making process, see H.
NUNBERG, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 69-70 (1955).
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D. Stage IV. The Learning Age from approximately the sixth
through the eleventh year
In discussing Painter,300 much information about this phase has
been put forth. Thus, a short description is presented here. In this
phase of psycho-social development the child is transported by culture
into the environment of school.801 The child is now engaged in learning
fundamentals which are relevant to taking a place in the society and
economy of his generation. This is a time of rapid intellectual growth
promoted by adults situated outside of the home. This does not mean
that parents have no role to play. They can play a significant part in
introducing the child to the broader culture and its fund of knowledge
and values. However, at this time, the adult agents of culture operating
in the school environment will play a major role in the child's develop-
ment. The child is now caught up in the task of working to master the
operations and values deemed important by our culture. Mastery and
competency are fundamental matters. Given this psycho-social reality,
the preferred best interests custodian under law is one who can act to
support the child in the educational setting.
E. Stage V. Adolescence and the Struggle for Identity between
age twelve through age eighteen
The crucial task of adolescence is to fashion an individual sense of
self. Erikson uses the term "existential identity."302  Earlier
psychosocial experiences are integrated and the young person is pre-
pared to move into adulthood. Acquiring an authentic "sense of iden-
tity" 303 is no simple matter. The process of identity acquisition is, at
times, quite chaotic. The adolescent changes styles, ideologies, roles
and behavior with great frequency. She is a revisionist-in-action. To the
adult, it may appear that the adolescent is adrift on the sea of exis-
tence. But the adolescent's efforts are purposeful. The process has its
own validity. The adolescent is trying to answer the question: "Who am
I?"
Viewed from an outcome perspective, adolescence holds three pos-
300. See LASWELL, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
301. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 122-28.
302. On the matter of "existential identity" see ERIKSON, supra note 7, at 73.
303. See ERIKSON, supra note 153, at 128-135; see also ERIK ERIKSON, Toys
AND REASONS 106-110 (1977).
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sible fates. The adolescent can develop an authentic, sustaining self,
flounder in "identity confusion,''804 or accept a "negative identity."305
Of course, the coming into being of an authentic identity is the desired
result. "Identity confusion" means that the person will be
psychosocially impaired and, if things are not corrected, will experience
vitality eroding psychological symptoms throughout his or her lifetime.
If the outcome is a "negative identity" one suffers throughout life as an
outcast, beyond integration into our culture. Delinquency, crime and
severe mental illness may become the lifeline of such a person. The best
interests custodian for a young person on this identity quest is the adult
who can be empathically involved in the journey, but still keep in mind
that, as an adult, one is in a different phase of the life cycle. The com-
petent custodian will not be a person who returns to adolescence. The
best interests custodian must be one who can act out of adult wisdom
to facilitate best interests development. Further, it is important that the
custodian not be authoritarian, negativistic or highly punitive. An effec-
tive custodian will be one who understands that adolescent experimen-
tation is necessary. However, the effective custodian is able to recog-
nize when the young person is in real trouble and intervene, if
necessary. The best interests caretaker is the person who can accept the
protean style of adolescence, avoid promoting negative identity or iden-
tity confusion, provide wise counsel and act to promote a positive
identity.
Thus, the Eriksonian paradigm has very significant potential for
use in the child-custody decision process. The use of the paradigm by
attorneys, psychological experts and judges can do much to produce an
appropriate best interests result. The above discussed paradigm is of
more use to those involved in the child custody arena than that model
put forth by the BBI group.
Used by itself, the Erikson derived paradigm has great utility.
However, certain rather recent developments in modern psychoanalysis
have provided us with important concepts which ought to be affixed to
the Eriksonian paradigm. For example, non-orthodox psychoanalystic
clinicians and theoreticians, Heinz Kohut3 06 and Alice Miller3 07 have
developed empathy-centered approaches to psychotherapy. Both of
304. For a discussion of identity confusion, see ERIKsoN, supra note 153, at 131.
305. For a discussion of the concept of negative identity, see ERIKSON, supra
note 7, at 73.
306. See KOHUT, supra note 278.
307. See MILLER, supra note 167.
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these psychoanalysts focus on so-called object relations and the self.
The technical term "object relations" refers to relationships between
people. Kohut and Miller stress empathic interpersonal attachments
and their relationship to the child's development of a positive sense of
self. Both of these free-thinking psychoanalysts eschew the nineteenth
century vocabulary and models of orthodox psychoanalysis. Alice
Miller's work is especially accessible to those who have little experience
with psychoanalytic or psychological concepts.
Heinz Kohut stresses the importance of the empathic situation.308
The custodian must be psychologically in tune with the child's needs.
In order for successful parenting to occur the adult, through identifica-
tion with the child must be able to "experience" the feelings, thoughts,
wishes, anxieties, etc. of the child. Empathy allows the custodian to
"read" and then respond in line with the "information" received
through the empathic experience. Kohut who is certainly the pioneer of
the "science of empathy", states:
Empathy is, I am convinced not just a poor relation of those other
forms of cognition that we hold in high esteem because we consider
them functions of our prized intellect. Empathic modes of perceiv-
ing ourselves and our surroundings exist from the beginning of our
lives side by side with other, nonempathic, modes of perception. 09
Kohut's clinical work indicates that the lack of an empathic response
from the parent weakens the child's sense of self and undermines psy-
chological stability. 310 Such a result is, of course, not in the psychologi-
cal best interests of the child. On the other hand, an empathic response
called mirroring, which shows the child that in the parent's eyes she or
he is a valuable person, is the key to the development of a stable sense
of self and a basic sense of security. 1
Alice Miller also stresses the need for an empathic relationship
between custodian and child.312 Miller's clinical work has persuaded
her thait empathic nurturing is necessary for successful psychological
development. The empathic custodian is one who can allow the child to
308. See HEINZ KOHUT. THE RESTORATION OF SELF 85 (1977).
309. The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut 1950-1978 678
(P.H. Ornstein ed. 1980).
310. See KOHUT, supra note 308, at 77-79.
311. See HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF SELF 105-199 (1971).
312. ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD 62 (1983).
Batt
69
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
have or express his or her real emotions. " ' The child is free to be
happy, sad, angry as well as other emotions. The empathic parent does
not teach the child to make a social impression. Moreover, the child is
not used to satisfy the needs and the ambitions of the parent. 14 Like
Kohut, Miller concludes that the empathic parent is one who is capable
of giving adequate "mirroring." ' 5 In mirroring, a custodian looks upon
the child with a fundamental sense of approval.3" Mirroring is a mani-
festation of a healthy parental pride directed toward the being of the
child. Miller also holds that the empathic parent gives respect and at-
tention as well as providing mirroring. 317 Such a parent does not humil-
iate, ridicule, deceive or manipulate the child. Miller states that it is
only through a satisfactory relationship with a relatively empathic par-
ent that a child comes to have a true self. The true self allows one to
connect honestly with his or her emotions and with a life which pro-
motes the well-being of the self.
My opinion is that Alice Miller and Heinz Kohut provide us with
clinically based insights important in the making of best interests child
custody determinations. Although Erikson's psycho-social paradigm is
the core of a very useful approach to child custody dispute resolution, I
would contend that Kohut and Miller's findings in regard to empathy
and mirroring can be used to "perfect" the decision-making process.
Miller and Kohut's emphasis on the empathy-mirroring role of the par-
ent serves to complement Erikson's focus on the vital matter of psycho-
social needs. The empathy-mirroring response is most critical in the
earlier years of childhood; however, a best interests custodian must pro-
vide empathy and mirroring at all stages of development. How the par-
ent provides empathy and mirroring should be a function of what the
child requires at particular Eriksonian stages of development. The
needs of adolescents, of course, differ from the needs of children in
earlier stages.
Combining the approaches of Miller, Kohut and Erikson the pro-
posed decision-making perspective can be summarized in the following
way. Custody under the law should be awarded to the person who is
313. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981).
314. Id. at 34.
315. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981); see also ALICE
MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEYS 47-68 (1990); HEINZ KOHUT, How DOES ANALYSIS
CURE 143 (1984).
316. See ALICE MILLER, PRISONERS OF CHILDHOOD 16 (1981).
317. Id. at 14-21.
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comparatively the most capable of providing appropriate empathy/mir-
roring and the most capable of meeting the psycho-social developmen-
tal needs of the child. In a sense what is required is a totality of
psycho-social circumstances best interests analysis. The term
psychosocial is here expanded to encompass the empathy/mirroring re-
lationship between child and custodian. In addition, lawyers, psycholog-
ical experts and judges must keep in mind that any informed custody
decision requires that there be a retrospective analysis of the relevant
material, an "in the present" analysis and a prospective analysis. A
future projection is required. It cannot be avoided. Past and present
data are fundamental in making future-casts. In particular cases, it
might be appropriate to modify the custody decree as the child moves
from one stage to another stage. Realistically speaking, given our cur-
rent orientation, this would seldom be done. But courts should not hesi-
tate to change custody, at any time, if a shift would maximize the best
interests position of the child. It should be emphasized that the above
stated approach involves in part an evaluation of the comparative
"parenting" fitness of the contesting custodians. Comparative fitness is
certainly a general concept familiar to those who focus on the resolu-
tion of child custody disputes.
Finally, it is a fundamental contention of this writer that the BBI
"presumption" with its focus on continuity can only serve to blur our
best interests focus of attention. Reality is far too complex to be evalu-
ated from the continuity position. True best interests decisions require
that we evolve a decision centered paradigm of relevance - one which
allows insight into the complexities of a best interests existence. The
reader is, of course, reminded that a paradigm expresses an ideal and it
must be used with that knowledge in mind. However, the suggested
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, many state legislatures and courts have
changed their laws and procedures to improve prosecution of child sex-
ual abuse cases, eliminate evidentiary barriers, and reduce trauma to
child victims in the legal system. These innovative or reform laws have
been in response to two major problems in the criminal justice system's
handling of child sexual abuse cases. First, many cases of child sexual
abuse were not prosecuted due to a lack of physical evidence or eyewit-
nesses and because the sole witness was a child, often considered to be
incompetent or lacking credibility. Second, many began to observe that
* J.D., Antioch School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan. Member of the
Professional Staff of the Center on Children and the Law, American Bar Association,
Washington, D.C.
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children were traumatized by the criminal justice system.
Legal reforms and innovative approaches adopted in the 1980s in-
clude: 1) interdisciplinary teams; 2) a special advocate for the child; 3)
special child abuse prosecution units; 4) elimination of mandatory com-
petency requirements for children; 5) closed-circuit television or vide-
otaping of a child's testimony; 6) expert testimony on the typical be-
haviors of child sexual abuse victims; and 7) special child abuse
hearsay exceptions.
As this law reform movement swept the .country, however, some
questioned their basic need or efficacy, citing a lack of empirical re-
search given the drastic changes in basic trial and legal rights.' Per-
haps the major challenge has been that these innovations, particularly
those involving rules of evidence and trial procedure, violated various
constitutional guarantees, particularly the Sixth Amendment rights of
defendants in criminal trials.2
Most critical analysis and court decisions have addressed whether
the defendant's Sixth Amendment "right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him" (including the right to cross-examination and phys-
ical confrontation at trial) has been violated by the prosecution's use of
closed-circuit television of a child's testimony outside the defendant's
presence and a child's hearsay statements when the child is not a wit-
ness at trial.' Several of these state court decisions have reached the
United States Supreme Court.4 This article discusses recent Supreme
1. Josephine A. Bulkley, The Impact of New Child Witness Research on Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 212-13 (S. Ceci, D.
Ross & M. Toglia eds. 1989); Gary B. Melton & Ross A. Thompson, Getting Out of a
Rut: Detours to Less Traveled Paths in Child-Witness Research, in CHILDREN'S EYE-
WITNESS MEMORY, 207, 222 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
2. Josephine A. Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms, and Emerging Issues in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 6 BEHAV. SC. & L. J. 153 (1988) [hereinafter Bulkley,
Legal Proceedings]; Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter Graham, The Confrontation Clause]; Josephine A.
Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging
Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645 (1985) [hereinafter
Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends]; Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Relia-
bility and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prose-
cutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985) [hereinafter Graham, Indicia of Reliability].
3. See supra note 2; see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND
PRACTICE (1987 & Supp. 1991).
4. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139
(1990); Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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Court decisions dealing with the constitutionality of admitting chil-
dren's hearsay statements of abuse and closed-circuit television of a
child's testimony under the Confrontation Clause.
II. ADMISSION OF CHILDREN'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS OF
ABUSE UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A child's out-of-court statement of abuse often is the most compel-
ling evidence of sexual abuse besides the child's story on the witness
stand. Such statements often contain more detail than in-court testi-
mony because they were made closer to the abuse experience, are more
spontaneous and have an unrehearsed quality. Because such statements
are hearsay, prosecutors routinely seek to admit children's statements
of abuse under various hearsay exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The rule against hearsay is intended to prevent admission of out-
of-court statements where: 1) there is no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant whose statement is offered by a witness; 2) the statement
was not made under oath; and 3) there was no opportunity for the trier
of fact to observe the declarant's demeanor.' States have adopted nu-
merous hearsay exceptions, however, for admitting statements deemed
to be especially reliable because the declarant is considered to be likely
to be telling the truth.
Hearsay exceptions commonly used in child abuse cases include
the excited utterances or spontaneous declarations exception, exception
for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment,
the residual exception, and the special child abuse exceptions. Approxi-
mately half of the states have adopted a special statutory hearsay ex-
ception for children's out-of-court statements of abuse. The provisions
of most statutes are similar because they were drafted to comply with
the confrontation requirements set forth in Ohio v. Roberts7 and the
constitutionality of statutes with these requirements have been upheld
by state appellate courts.8
5. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 (1972).
6. Debra Whitcomb, When the Victim Is a Child: Issues for Judges and Prose-
cutors (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2d ed. 1992) (forthcoming);
Ross Eatman & Josephine A. Bulkley, Protecting Child/Victim Witnesses: Sample
Laws and Materials 13-15, 53 (A.B.A. 1986).
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
923 (1989); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); State v. Wright,
751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1985); State
1992]
74
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
The original purpose of the child abuse exceptions was to provide a
means of admitting a child's statement of abuse that did not fit the
strict or narrow requirements of existing hearsay exceptions., A num-
ber of state courts have broadly interpreted the excited utterances ex-
ception beyond its purpose by allowing, for example, statements to be
v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (en banc).
Several state supreme courts have held that their statutory child abuse exceptions
violate the doctrine of separation of powers in that the legislature has adopted a rule of
evidence that, under the state constitution, is a power delegated to the judiciary. See,
e.g., Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990); Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d
1338 (Miss. 1989); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc). For exam-
ple, this was the holding in Drumm v. Commonwealth in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court found that because the Kentucky Constitution vests the judiciary with the power
to adopt rules of practice and procedure for the courts, the statute creating a child
abuse hearsay exception is "an unconstitutional exercise of rule-making power by the
General Assembly." 783 S.W.2d at 382. The court further held that,
we will not extend comity to this statute because it fails the test of a 'stat-
utorily acceptable' substitute for current judicially mandated procedures.
Fundamental guarantees to the criminally accused of due process and con-
frontation, established by both the United States and Kentucky Constitu-
tions, are transgressed by a statute purporting to permit conviction based
on hearsay where no traditionally acceptable and applicable reasons for
exceptions apply.
Id.
Most child abuse hearsay exceptions provide that a statement may be admitted if
the child testifies, or in cases where the child does not testify, the prosecution has
demonstrated that the child is "unavailable to testify," and the statement possesses
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness (some require trustworthiness only if the
child does not testify, while others require it both when the child testifies and does not
testify). Whitcomb, supra note 6, cites Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Kansas and New York in a chart with statutory citations as not requiring an unavaila-
bility showing if the child is not produced to testify, however.
Some statutes require an additional showing of corroborative evidence of the abuse
when the child does not testify. Whitcomb cites ten states that require corroboration.
Some legislation sets out factors the court may consider in deciding whether a state-
ment is trustworthy. According to Whitcomb, supra note 6, at least three states list
reliability factors.
At least one state statute requires that expert testimony support an unavailability
finding based upon emotional trauma to the child. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6
(1984) (as cited in Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2, at 649-
57).
9. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2, at 649-57;
Josephine A. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court
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admitted that had been made days, weeks, or even months after the
sexually abusive event. 10 Other courts, however, have excluded reliable
statements of children because more than a few minutes or hours had
elapsed since the statement had been made.11
The medical diagnosis and treatment exception is also available
and has been liberally interpreted by some courts to encompass chil-
dren's statements of sexual abuse to mental health professionals as well
as medical doctors. 12 Too often, however, courts have found that its
requirements are not satisfied, thus preventing admission into evidence
many statements children make to doctors or mental health
professionals."3
Some states have adopted the "residual exception," an exception
also included in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 14 Considered a "catch-
all" exception, it permits statements to be admitted that do not fit the
requirements of a traditional exception, but nonetheless possess circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to traditional excep-
tions. Other requirements must also be met.
The residual exception serves the same purpose as the child abuse
exceptions by permitting admission of statements that do not fit the
strict requirements of traditional hearsay exceptions. Some have argued
that as a legal policy matter, the residual exception is preferable to the
child abuse exceptions, because it has broader application and does not
carve out an exception for a narrow class of statements while including
virtually the same requirements as the residual exception.'6 A number
of courts have admitted child abuse statements under this exception,
although some courts, including the United States Supreme Court in
Idaho v. Wright,'6 have found that the child's statement did not possess
such guarantees of trustworthiness.
10. Id.; MYERS, supra note 3, John E.B. Myers, Hearsay Statements by the
Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 776, 863-65 (1986).
!i. Id.
12. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Pur-
pose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989); MYERS, supra
note 3, at 360-72 (1987), 198-204 (Supp. 1991).
13. Id.
14. MYERS, supra note 3, at 360-62. See generally Bulkley, supra note 9; Whit-
comb, supra note 6.
15. See Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories supra note 9.
16. 110 S. Ct. at 3141.
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III. ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS WHEN THE CHILD DOES NOT
TESTIFY AT TRIAL
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been in-
terpreted as a rule of preference for "face-to-face confrontation at
trial," requiring the "personal presence of the witness at trial, enabling
the trier to observe his demeanor as an aid in evaluating his credibility
and making false accusations more unlikely because of the presence of
the accused and the solemnity of the occasion. '"17
When a prosecutor offers into evidence a child's statement and the
child testifies, no confrontation problem is presented, since the defend-
ant has an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the child about
his or her out-of-court statements. When the child is not a witness,
however, admission of the child's out-of-court statement has been chal-
lenged as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion rights.
Under Supreme Court decisions prior to 1986, if the child was not
a witness at trial, even if his or her out-of-court statement of abuse
satisfied the requirements of a hearsay exception, its admissibility
under the Confrontation Clause was not certain. Under recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the admission of hearsay and the Confron-
tation Clause, however, it appears that if a statement satisfies a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it also satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
There are five relevant Supreme Court decisions since 1980 dealing
with hearsay and the Confrontation Clause: White v. Ilinois,8 Idaho
v. Wright,' 9 Bourjaily v. United States,2" Inadi v. United States," and
Ohio v. Roberts.22
Idaho v. Wright was a 1990 decision dealing with a young child's
statements of sexual abuse to a physician under the residual exception.
The Court summarized the relationship it long has described between
the hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause, as well as two requirements
many believed were constitutional prerequisites to the admission of any
hearsay:
Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Con-
17. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252, at 606 (1972).
18. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
19. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
20. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
21. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
22. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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frontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,
we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's
prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of
hearsay statements. The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars
the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In Ohio v. Roberts, we set forth "a general approach" for de-
termining when incriminating statements admissible under an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule meet the requirements of the Confron-
tation Clause . . . . First, in conformance with the Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment es-
tablishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case . . ., the prosecution
must either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the de-
clarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Relia-
bility can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness. 8
A. The Unavailability Requirement
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts,
which involved an absent witness' preliminary hearing testimony, held:
"In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he
is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate indicia of reliability."24
Despite this language which was reiterated by the Court ten years
later in Idaho v. Wright, it was not certain that the Court intended to
require a showing of unavailability for all exceptions, since most do not
expressly include such a requirement.25 Indeed, in 1986 United States
23. 110 S. Ct. at 3146 (citations omitted).
24. 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
25. Graham, Indicia of Reliability, supra note 2, at 53-55. Graham states that
after Roberts,
[tlaken literally, almost every hearsay statement that meets an exception
in Rule 803 . . .would seem to require either production of the declarant,
or a showing of unavailability before the statement can be received in evi-
dence against the accused.
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v. Inadi was decided, in which the Supreme Court held that the general
requirement of unavailability does not apply to out-of-court statements
made by a non-testifying co-conspirator.2 6 Although Idaho v. Wright
indicated the Court has "applied the general approach articulated in
Roberts to subsequent cases raising Confrontation and hearsay is-
sues," 27 Inadi (as well as a footnote in Roberts itself) makes it clear
that the Supreme Court did not mean to impose an unavailability re-
quirement for all hearsay exceptions. 8
Inadi noted that if the Roberts requirements applied to all hear-
say, "no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a showing
of unavailability . . . . Roberts, however, does not stand for such a
wholesale revision of the law of evidence . The Court further
stated:
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered,
the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these indicate that
Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule . . . . that applies
[an] unavailability analysis to prior testimony. Roberts cannot
fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-
court statement can be introduced by the government without a
showing that the declarant is unavailable."
Because state courts were unsure after Inadi whether unavailabil-
ity applied to other exceptions, decisions went both ways.3 1 The effect
Several factors, however, indicate that the Supreme Court did not
contemplate such radical change in practice.
Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
26. 475 U.S. at 393-94.
27. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
29. 475 U.S. at 392.
30. Id. at 394.
31. Some courts have not required unavailability in a child abuse cases. See Nel-
son v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark.
1987); People v. Lusk, 267 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); People v. White, 555
N.E.2d 1241 (I11. Ct. App. 1990), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); State v. Borland, 786
P.2d 810 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 793 P.2d 974 (1990).
Courts that have required a showing of unavailability in a child abuse case in-
clude: People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); State v. Allen, 755
P.2d 1153 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc); In re Tina K., 568 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989);
State v. Sorenson, 449 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
In some child abuse cases, courts holding that unavailability is not required have
focused on the first Inadi factor with little or no attention to the other factors. These
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of Inadi was articulated by the concurring opinion in Nelson v. Farrey,
which indicated:
The Inadi decision has created an unfortunate vacuum in the Con-
frontation Clause realm, for at present it is not clear if a showing
of unavailability is required for most types of hearsay statements.
Given its broadest construction, Inadi stands for the proposition
that the unavailability of the declarant is a relevant constitutional
factor only when the hearsay statements involve testimony given at
a preliminary hearing. In my view, however, Inadi does not re-
present a repudiation of Roberts' unavailability discussion. Rather,
...Inadi merely reaffirms and applies the Roberts principle that a
showing of unavailability is not required in all situations (citations
omitted). Thus, . . . Inadi represents a directive to lower courts to
carefully analyze the facts of a given situation before concluding
that a showing of unavailability is constitutionally required. 2
After Inadi, Professor Graham noted that just as Roberts does not
mean that an unavailability showing is required for all hearsay excep-
tions, Inadi probably does not mean that an unavailability showing is
never required.," Citing the Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Green,' Graham states: "If the right of confrontation never compels
the prosecution to provide available witnesses, it cannot serve its histor-
ical function of preventing 'flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accus-
ers, and absentee witnesses.' ""
Nevertheless, in January, 1992, the Supreme Court decided White
v. Illinois,6 holding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by
admission of a four-year old's statements of sexual abuse, although the
child did not testify at trial. The defendant was convicted based solely
on testimony from the child's mother, babysitter, a doctor, a nurse and
decisions reasoned that the child's out-of-court statements, like a co-conspirator's out-
of-court statement, are likely to be very different from the child's trial testimony, and
the statement therefore constitutes irreplaceable evidence. For example, Johnson v.
State involved admission of a child's statement of sexual abuse under a child abuse
exception that does not contain an unavailability requirement. 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark.
1987). The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that a child sexual abuse victim may later
recant, indicating a strong possibility that a child's earlier statement will be different
from her trial testimony. Id. at 823.
32. 874 F.2d at 1231.
33. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 579.
34. 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970).
35. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583.
36. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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a police officer who described what the child told them about the abuse.
The statements were admitted under the state's spontaneous declara-
tions and medical diagnosis and treatment exceptions. Although it is
not known why, the prosecution did not offer the child as a witness, and
the court did not hold a hearing or make a finding that she was un-
available to testify (and the child apparently was in the courtroom).
In White, the Court essentially followed its reasoning in Inadi.
The Court reiterated three major reasons for not imposing an unavaila-
bility requirement for the spontaneous declarations and medical diag-
nosis exceptions.3 7 First, unlike former testimony, which is a weaker
form of live testimony, statements under these exceptions have indepen-
dent evidentiary significance, are made in a context very different from
trial, and like co-conspirator statements, "are usually irreplaceable as
substantive evidence." 38 Moreover, in White, the Court indicated that
spontaneous declarations and medical diagnosis statements are made in
"contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their
trustworthiness. "3
Second, the Court indicated in Inadi and White that there is little
benefit to the unavailability rule, since the statements are admissible
whether the declarant is unavailable, or available and produced by the
prosecution. Inadi stated that nothing is excluded "unless the prosecu-
tion makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available wit-
ness." 40 Inadi further noted that the unavailability rule is not particu-
larly useful because it is not likely to produce much testimony that
adds to the truth-determining process, "[since] presumably only those
declarants that neither side believes will be particularly helpful will not
have been subpoenaed as witnesses."' 1 Both White and Inadi stated
that the defendant can subpoena those witnesses not called by the state.
Third, White and Inadi found that the unavailability rule places signifi-
cant and additional burdens on the criminal justice system and fact-
finding process. 2
Most importantly, the White opinion indicated: "[W]here prof-
fered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to come
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception to the hearsay rule, the Con-
37. Id. at 738.
38. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
39. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
40. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
41. Id. at 397.
42. Id. at 398.
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frontation Clause is satisfied." 3 This statement is significant, because
as noted above, the Court has previously refused to equate the Con-
frontation Clause with the hearsay rule, indicating that some evidence
admissible under a hearsay exception is excluded by the Confrontation
Clause. Yet White signifies the end of this principle for firmly rooted
exceptions. Idaho v. Wright made it clear that if a statement satisfies a
firmly rooted exception, the reliability requirement is satisfied; after
White, if a statement satisfies a firmly rooted exception, the Confronta-
tion Clause is satisfied. For exceptions that are not firmly rooted, how-
ever, such as the residual and child abuse exceptions, White leaves open
whether unavailability would be required by the Confrontation Clause.
As noted above, some child abuse exceptions do not require unavaila-
bility 44 and the residual exception does not have an unavailability
requirement.
Although the White case settles an uncertain constitutional issue,
its practical impact may not be great. First, there are few cases in
which the prosecution would not want a child to testify unless she was
in fact "unavailable" (for example due to severe trauma, absolute re-
fusal to testify, or incompetency). Most prosecutors believe that a
child's live testimony is critical to obtaining a conviction. Indeed, in the
past, courts' failure to find children competent as witnesses frequently
resulted in cases that were dismissed or not prosecuted.
Second, even in cases where a child may be traumatized or refuse
to testify, prosecutors are likely to attempt options such as closed-cir-
cuit television or excluding the public from the courtroom to enable the
child to testify outside the presence of the defendant or public. The
Supreme Court has indicated such approaches are not unconstitutional
if necessity for their use (for example, due to emotional distress of the
child) is shown on a case-by-case basis.45 The use of these innovations
is preferred to having no witness at all.
The effect of White generally will be to relieve the state from prov-
ing that a child who is unable to testify is "unavailable." There also
may be occasions where prosecutors seek to admit a child's out-of-court
statements without having the child testify, but be unable to prove the
child is "unavailable to testify." It is in these situations that the un-
availability rule would prevent admission of a child's out-of-court state-
43. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
44. See supra note 8.
45. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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ments unless the child is called by the prosecution to testify. Without
either the child as a witness or his or her out-of-court statements, the
prosecution would likely fail.
One such situation is where parents do not allow their child to
testify because of fear of causing the child emotional distress, although
there would be insufficient evidence of emotional trauma to satisfy the
unavailability requirement. A recent California case allowed the admis-
sion of a child's hearsay statements without requiring a showing of un-
availability, where the child was not a witness because his father would
not allow him to testify.46
A second situation is where a prosecutor has a case with excellent
testimony from several adults as to what the child told them (as in
White v. Illinois) and perhaps other evidence of sexual abuse. The
child witness, although competent and not likely to be severely trauma-
tized by testifying, may not be a credible or sympathetic witness, par-
ticularly if the case involves a very young child and a good defense
attorney likely to impeach the child's credibility because of his or her
young age. The prosecution may prefer not to have the child testify for
fear of hurting its case.
Lastly, although in most jurisdictions it may not be difficult to es-
tablish emotional trauma to satisfy the unavailability requirement,
some courts may require very high thresholds for demonstrating emo-
tional distress. For example, on remand to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v.
Craig, the Maryland court reaffirmed its first holding in Craig v. Mary-
land"7 establishing a strict standard for a finding of emotional distress.
It should be emphasized that White does not mean that the prose-
cution can prevent an available child from testifying, since the defend-
ant can call the child for cross-examination. If the child is truly availa-
ble, the state should be required to produce the child; if the child is not
produced, the prosecution then should be required to show that the
child was unavailable (e.g., due to incompetency, trauma or refusal to
communicate). Whether defendants will exercise their right to call the
child to testify remains to be seen. Defendants may hesitate for fear of
alienating the jury by forcing the child to testify and causing him or
her distress and creating hostility toward the defendant.
Indeed, in some states, under a statute allowing admission of a
child's videotaped statement, prosecutors routinely have offered a
46. Lusk, 267 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1990).
47. 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
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child's videotaped statement in lieu of the child's direct testimony,
making the child available for cross-examination. Most courts have
held that this procedure does not violate the defendant's confrontation
rights a; long as the child is made available for cross-examination (al-
though others have held that the Confrontation Clause is violated by
failing to allow cross-examination at the time the statement was
taken)." ' Often, defendants have not called the child to testify for fear
of creating sympathy for the child."'
Indeed, in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in United States v.
Inadi, he noted that the defendant's right to call the declarant himself
does not satisfy confrontation since "the Confrontation Clause gives a
defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, not
merely an opportunity to seek out witnesses on his own."'50 Justice
48. Cases holding that confrontation is not violated by admission of a videotaped
statement in lieu of the child's direct testimony as long as the child is available for
cross-examination include: State v. Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 976 (1992); State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 461 N.W.2d 444 (1990); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind.
1987); State v. Feazell, 486 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Johnson, 729
P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1986).
Both Texas and Tennessee courts have found that their statutes violated the Con-
frontation Clause. State v. Pilkey, 776 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). Texas' highest court in criminal cases in 1987 held that the
Confrontation Clause is violated by admission of a videotaped interview without the
prosecution offering the child for direct and cross-examination, or not allowing for
cross-examination at the time the interview is given. Long, 742 S.W.2d at 320. The
court indicated: "The courts of this state and country have never had to confront and
review a trial procedure that requires the defendant to call as a witness his accuser if
he wants to question the witness." Id. at 320. A more recent case, however, held that
the Texas statute was not, on its face, unconstitutional, but that it must be constitution-
ally applied as set forth in Long; i.e., requiring the state to call the child to testify on
direct examination.) See Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
49. See, e.g., Schaal, 806 S.W.2d at 663-64; Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d at 589;
Long, 742 S.W.2d at 315; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583-
84. Steven Chaney, Videotaped Interviews with Child Abuse Victims, Papers from a
National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases (A.B.A.
1985); Ross Eatman, Videotaping Interviews with Child Sexual Offense Victims, 7
CHILDRErN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 13 (1986).
50. 475 U. S. at 406. Marshall first indicated that: "Roberts consciously sought
to lay down an analytical framework applicable to all out-of-court declarations intro-
duced by the prosecution for the truth they contain." Id. at 402-03. This point is sup-
ported by language in Idaho v. Wright which cites Roberts in setting out both the
unavailability and reliability requirements. Second, Marshall pointed out that extraju-
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Marshall further stated that requiring the defendant to call declarants
as his witnesses "may deny the defendant certain tactical advantages
vouchsafed him by the Confrontation Clause. ' 51
Graham noted that Inadi represented a departure from the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions (including Dutton v. Evans and Ohio v.
Roberts) that indicate confrontation requires the prosecution to call an
available witness whose testimony is crucial or devastating at trial for
examination and cross-examination by the defense. 2 White appears to
represent an even further erosion of this confrontation requirement. Be-
cause the child victim's testimony is so important, it seems hard to im-
agine that the prosecution constitutionally may present the accusatory
hearsay statements of an available yet non-testifying child declarant,
leaving it to the defendant to call the child for cross-examination.
In conclusion, hopefully White will not create the specter of prose-
cutors routinely deciding not to call a child, the primary accusatory
witness, despite his or her ability to testify, instead relying on other
evidence of the abuse, and defendants not calling the child for fear of
alienating the jury. On the other hand, lack of an unavailability rule
may benefit children by permitting some prosecutions that otherwise
could not go forward, without significantly abridging defendant's con-
frontation rights. It is hoped that White simply makes it unnecessary
for the state to prove a child is unavailable when he or she is actually
unable to testify, since prosecutors generally need the child as a wit-
ness. In those few cases where the prosecutor fails to produce a child
who may be available to testify, defendants hopefully will exercise their
right to call the child.
B. The Reliability Requirement
The Court held in Bourjaily v. United States583 that because the
co-conspirator exception is firmly rooted, an independent inquiry into
the reliability of a co-conspirator's statement is not required."' Af-
firming its holding in Roberts and Bourjaily, Idaho v. Wright in 1990
stated: "Admission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the
dicial statements may still be admitted if, in good faith, the prosecution is unable to
produce the declarant. Id. at 406.
51. Id. at 408.
52. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583.
53. 483 U.S. 171 (1990).
54. Id. at 183.
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constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded
longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trust-
worthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements."55
If a statement does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, how-
ever, the Court has found that it is presumptively unreliable, but never-
theless may be admitted if supported by a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."'56 In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme
Court held that the residual exception is not firmly rooted. Moreover,
the child abuse exceptions also would not be considered firmly rooted.
Therefore, under the residual and child abuse exceptions, the prosecu-
tion must demonstrate a statement's trustworthiness.
In assessing the trustworthiness of the statements in Wright, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the Idaho Supreme Court's "ap-
parently dispositive weight . . . on the lack of procedural safeguards at
the interview, 57 which included the doctor's failure to videotape the
interview, use of leading questions and preconceived idea of the child's
disclosures. The Court refused to "read into the Confrontation Clause a
preconceived and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of
professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements
against a defendant."58
Numerous courts have found that a child's statement of abuse was
sufficiently trustworthy to meet the requirements of both the particular
hearsay exception involved as well as the Confrontation Clause.5 9
Wright cited a number of federal and state cases which the Court indi-
cated identify factors that "properly relate to whether hearsay state-
ments made by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are relia-
ble."60 Wright indicated that it would not "endorse a mechanical test
for determining 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Rather,
the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child
was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was
made." 61 The Court upheld the approach of determining the trustwor-
thiness of a particular statement by examining "the totality of the cir-
55. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147.
56. Id. at 3152.
57. Id. at 3148.
58. Id.
59. See the cases cited in Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. See also MYERS,
supra note 3, at 362-71 (1987), 207-14 (Supp. 1991), for a list of factors and cases
regarding reliability.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
cumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render
the declarant particularly worthy of belief."62
Nevertheless, Idaho v. Wright found that the two and half year
old's statements to a physician did not possess particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The Court
noted: "Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
younger daughter's responses to Dr. Jambura's questions, we find no
special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were
particularly trustworthy. ' 63 Concerned with the suggestive manner of
the doctor's interview, the Court also indicated that the statement was
not made in circumstances of reliability similar to those required for
excited utterances or statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. The
Court held:
Given the presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory hear-
say statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, we agree with the court below that the state failed to
show that the younger daughter's incriminating statements to the
pediatrician possessed sufficient 'particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness under the Confrontation Clause to overcome that
presumption."' 4
In conclusion, after Wright, a statement that falls within a firmly
rooted exception is presumed reliable for confrontation purposes. For
exceptions that are not firmly rooted, a statement's trustworthiness
must be proven. While many statements may satisfy a hearsay excep-
tion or the Confrontation Clause trustworthiness requirement, some, as
in Wright, may not.
IV. CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION OR VIDEOTAPING OF A
CHILD'S TESTIMONY OUTSIDE THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
As noted earlier, over the last decade, more than half the states
have adopted legislation permitting alternative testimonial procedures,
primarily in criminal proceedings for child abuse victims.66 Most stat-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3152.
64. Id. at 3152-53.
65. DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS (Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, Office of Develop-
ment, Testing, and Dissemination 1985); Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 6. Brief of
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utes permit a child to testify in another room outside the presence of
the defendant, judge, jury and public, and to have her testimony either
televised into the courtroom during trial or videotaped prior to trial.66
Since the mid-1980s, however, numerous court decisions have ad-
dressed the question of whether the use of "one-way" television or vide-
otaping, in which the child testifies outside the physical presence of the
defendant, violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confron-
tation. 17 These laws also have been challenged as violating other consti-
tutional guarantees, including the defendant's right to a public and a
jury trial, Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial and right to
self-representation, and due process rights.6 8
It was not until 1990, in a case called Maryland v. Craig,6 9 that
the United States Supreme Court finally decided that the Confronta-
tion Clause does not preclude the elimination of a face-to-face meeting
between the child and defendant as long as it is necessary to achieve an
important public policy such as protecting a child witness from the
trauma of testifying in the defendant's presence. In 1988, in an earlier
case that reached the Supreme Court, Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court
declined to decide whether face-to-face confrontation could give way to
protecting a child witness in a case involving use of a screen in the
courtroom to prevent the child from having to view the defendant dur-
ing her testimony. 70
In Coy, the Court did not reach the face-to-face confrontation is-
sue because it found the defendant's confrontation right had been vio-
lated by an Iowa statute that failed to require a threshold finding that
the screen was "necessary to further an important public policy. ' 71
Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); INVES-
TIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSECU-
TION OF CHILD ABUSE, AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (P. Toth & M.
Whalen eds. 1987).
66. See supra note 65.
67. MYERS, supra note 3.
68. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2; Josephine A.
Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Review of Child Sexual Abuse Law Reforms
in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5 (1985); MYERS, supra note 3, at 245-50.
69. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
70. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
71. Like the Iowa statute, some state statutes do not require a finding of neces-
sity. Although some courts have found such statutes unconstitutional, see, e.g., State v.
Murphy, 542 So.2d 1373 (La. 1989), others have made a determination that use of
such procedures may be permitted as long as the court finds it necessary to protect a
particular child witness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky.
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Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that face-to-face confrontation
constituted the irreducible, literal meaning of the clause, and that if it
could be abridged, it could only be done after individualized findings by
the Court that a particular witness needs protection.
Following the Coy decision, state courts were still left with the
unanswered question of whether physical confrontation could be elimi-
nated if a showing of necessity were made. Many state appellate courts
followed the O'Connor and White concurring opinion in Coy,72 (later
adopted by the Craig majority), indicating that protection of child wit-
nesses is an important public policy, and procedures for protecting a
child from the trauma of testifying in court or the defendant's presence
may be used if the trial court makes a case-specific finding of necessity.
Even before Coy, this was the holding of most state court decisions.73
In Maryland v. Craig, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices, led by Justice O'Connor, held that protection of a child witness
constitutes an important public policy which, upon a proper showing of
necessity, justifies an exception to face-to-face confrontation. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-
being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh,
at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court. '7 The Court held:
[I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying
in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to tes-
tify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face con-
1986) (decided in 1986 before both Coy and Craig).
72. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 777 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1989); State v. Conklin, 444
N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989); State v. Tafoya, 765 P.2d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). See
MYERS, supra note 3, at 238-40, for a list of cases.
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); State v.
Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1987); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941 (La. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Turner v. State, 716
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984); see also Josephine A. Bulkley, After Coy v. Iowa: The Status of
Videotaping, Closed-Circuit Television and Other Methods for Taking A Child's Tes-
timony Outside the Defendant's Presence, in The Fourth National Conference on Chil-
dren and the Law, National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection
292 (A.B.A. 1988); Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 1, at 56-60.
74. 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
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frontation with the defendant.7 5
Furthermore, the Craig case set forth broad guidelines for a show-
ing of necessity. Coy did not elaborate on "individualized findings of
necessity." Before Craig, some decisions required a finding of trauma
to the child specifically caused by the defendant's presence, 76 although
many state court decisions suggested that a finding of trauma to the
child from testifying in open court was sufficient. Many decisions prior
to Craig also held that expert testimony or testimony from lay wit-
nesses, such as parents, regarding trauma to the child satisfied the ne-
cessity requirement.7 Some courts indicated that the judge should ob-
serve or question the child to determine whether she would be
traumatized.
In many cases, the child may begin testifying in the usual manner
but "freeze up" or break down on the witness stand, which courts have
cited as justification for use of videotaping or closed-circuit television.
Some courts specifically have required questioning of the child in the
defendant's presence in order to determine whether the accused's pres-
ence intimidated or traumatized the child.78 One of these cases was
Craig v. State, 9 in which the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
while there are valid exceptions to face-to-face confrontation,
a statutory inquiry which looks generally to a child's inability to
testify in open court [is] . . . too broad to satisfy the necessity re-
75. Id. at 3169.
76. Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990) (showing of impact of testify-
ing in defendant's presence required); State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150 (Ariz. 1989);
State v. Jarzbek, 554 A.2d 1094 (Conn. 1989); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268
(Minn. 1989) (statute requires determination that presence of defendant would psycho-
logically traumatize the child making her unavailable to testify); State v. Thomas, 442
N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1989) (preliminary hearing testimony of child who was unable to
communicate in defendant's presence sufficient showing of trauma); State v. Darby,
563 A.2d 710 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); State v. Albert, 778 P.2d 386 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Crandall, 555 A.2d 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (lack of finding by trial
court that child would experience distress from testifying in the defendant's presence).
See Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md. 1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990),
for other cases that mention the effect of the defendant on the child's testimony.
77. State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112 (Conn.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989);
McGuire v. State, 706 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1986).
78. Craig, 560 A.2d at 1122; Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591
(Mass. 1989); State v. Thomas, 442 N.W.2d 10 (Wis.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 867
(1989); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
79. 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), vacated 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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quirement [and] whether a child is unavailable to testify in the
Roberts sense should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in
the ordinary courtroom setting, but in the much narrower terms of
the witness' inability to testify in the presence of the accused. 80
The court indicated the child must be questioned by the judge (either
in or out of the courtroom) in the defendant's presence to determine if
she is unable to reasonably communicate because of serious emotional
distress produced by the defendant's presence. The court also required
that two-way television, a less restrictive alternative, must be attempted
prior to use of a one-way procedure.
The Supreme Court imposed three minimal requirements to satisfy
the necessity showing: 1) there must be a case-specific finding of neces-
sity; 2) the trauma to the child must be caused by the defendant's pres-
ence, not just courtroom trauma; and 3) the emotional distress must be
"more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement
or some reluctance to testify ... ."I The Supreme Court found that
the Maryland statute, which requires a finding that the child will suffer
"serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably
communicate," met constitutional standards.
The Supreme Court, in addressing how necessity must be estab-
lished, disagreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals' requirements
that the child must be questioned in the defendant's presence and two-
way television must first be attempted. The Supreme Court refused "to
establish, as a matter of federal constitutional law, any such categorical
evidentiary prerequisites for the use of one-way television procedure."82
The Court indicated that the trial court could have found that expert
testimony was sufficient to establish that the children's testimony in the
defendant's presence would result in serious emotional distress.
Craig made it clear that preserving safeguards of adverseness and
reliability, including the oath, cross-examination, and observation of
the witness' demeanor by the jury, judge and defendant, renders use of
a one-way procedure "functionally equivalent to . . . live, in-person
testimony."83 Craig noted that such assurances of reliability and ad-
verseness "are far greater than those required for admission of hearsay
80. Id. at 1126.
81. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 3171.
83. Id. at 3166.
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testimony under the Confrontation Clause."84
The effect of Craig should be to affirm the status quo, since most
state appellate courts prior to Craig had permitted use of one-way pro-
cedures for children found to be traumatized by testifying at trial. In-
deed, during the past year since Craig was decided, a number of deci-
sions have allowed one-way closed-circuit television or videotaped
depositions based on the Craig decision where the requirements were
met.85 Some courts, however, have held that the defendant's right of
confrontation was violated where specific findings of necessity were not
made or other similar requirements were not satisfied.8 In deciding
whether to request protective procedures in future cases, prosecutors
should consider carefully whether trauma to the child would be caused
specifically by the defendant's presence as opposed to testifying in
court. If it appears a child may suffer distress from testifying in the
courtroom, other alternatives where the defendant remains physically
present could be considered, such as closing the courtroom to the gen-
eral public (although other constitutional guarantees must be examined
when considering such approaches, too) or using a videotaped deposi-
tion prior to trial in which the defendant is present.
Moreover, some courts may establish stricter requirements than
Maryland v. Craig such as requiring two-way closed-circuit television
or the child to be questioned in the defendant's presence to determine if
84. Id. at 3167.
85. Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Guenther,
754 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1991); Government of V.I. v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 727
(D.V.I. 1991); United States v. Thompson, 31 M.J. 168 (C.M.A. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 956 (1991); Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); State
v. Crandall, 577 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1990); State v. Self, 564 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1990); In
re G.T., 588 A.2d 621 (Vt. 1991); State v. Lamb, 798 P.2d 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990);
In re Vanidestine, 463 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Guce, 560
N.Y.S.2d 53 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 524 (1990).
Some state courts also have held that the right of confrontation is not violated
when a child's testimony is videotaped by deposition before trial where the defendant is
present during the deposition. Although obvious, courts indicate that the defendant's
face-to-face confrontation right has not been abrogated, and they also hold that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated although the jury is unable to observe the child's
demeanor at the time she testifies. Hardy v. Wigginton, 922 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1990);
Vigil v. Tansy, 917 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 995 (1991);
People v. Schmitt, 562 N.E.2d 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d
154 (1991).
86. E.g., State v. Peters, 587 A.2d 587 (N.H. 1991); Edwards v. State, 568 So.
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she would be traumatized. In fact, some state statutes permit only
"two-way" closed-circuit television, 8 in which the child is able to see
the defendant on a monitor in the room where he or she is testifying
and another monitor televises the child's testimony in the courtroom.
The Supreme Court merely established minimum, threshold require-
ments for allowing one-way television below which state courts may not
go.
Indeed, after the Supreme Court remanded Craig to the Maryland
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier holding es-
tablishing a strict standard for a finding of emotional distress.88 The
Supreme Court remanded the case because it wanted to give the Mary-
land court an opportunity to reconsider its earlier ruling, since its first
decision was made before the Supreme Court had addressed the con-
frontation issue. The first Maryland Court of Appeals Craig decision
interpreted the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Coy v. Iowa (which
did not decide whether face-to-face confrontation was required) as es-
tablishing a "high threshold" for a finding of necessity, which the Ma-
ryland appeals court indicated the trial court had not met.
The Supreme Court stated in Maryland v. Craig that "we cannot
be certain whether the Court of Appeals would reach the same conclu-
sion in light of the legal standard we establish today."8 Nevertheless,
in the second Craig v. Maryland0 decision, the Court of Appeals again
held that the judge should question the child personally, preferably in
the defendant's presence, although indicating such an approach was
discretionary rather than mandatory. Additionally, in direct contrast to
the United States Supreme Court, the Maryland court stated that ex-
pert testimony, while permissible, was generally not sufficient to estab-
lish emotional trauma.91
Some state courts also may decide that one-way television violates
a defendant's right of confrontation under their state constitution giv-
ing defendants the right to a "face-to-face" meeting with witnesses
against them.92 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that it was
unnecessary to decide the federal confrontation question because its de-
87. Whitcomb, supra note 1.
88. Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
89. 110 S. Ct. at 3171.
90. 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
91. Id. at 332.
92. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594
A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
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cision was based on the state constitution. The court further indicated
that it never has been bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
similar federal constitutional provisions.
Both the Indiana and Pennsylvania courts stated that the words
"face-to-face" distinguish their state's Confrontation Clause from the
federal Constitution (which requires the defendant to "be confronted
with the witnesses against him""3 ). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that because the child was not unavailable or had not been subject
to cross-examination in the presence of the accused during prior testi-
mony, the defendant's state confrontation right was violated. 4
V. CONCLUSION
From Globe Newspaper in 1981 to White v. Illinois in 1992, pros-
ecutors have received favorable treatment in child sexual abuse cases.
The Craig and White decisions clearly indicate the Court is willing to
make exceptions to the defendant's confrontation rights in cases involv-
ing sexual abuse of a child. Yet these decisions are not merely indica-
tive of the Court's view of child victims, but illustrate their preference
in general for the prosecution's position in criminal cases. Moreover,
although the Court has allowed exceptions in child abuse cases, it has
not meant that defendants' confrontation rights completely have been
abrogated.
In practice, most cases of child sexual abuse never reach the trial
stage. More importantly, in such cases of abuse that go to trial, prose-
cutors want and need a live child witness. It is only in the exceptional
case when a particular child cannot testify at all or cannot testify in
open court or in front of the accused-because he or she would be too
traumatized or refuses to communicate-that evidentiary methods such
as closed-circuit television or admission of the child's out-of-court state-
ments make it possible for prosecutors to initiate or win prosecutions
that otherwise would fail.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 284-85.
19921
94
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1




I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 712
II. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................... 712
III. CHILDREN'S ABILITY TO MAKE COMPETENT
D ECISIO NS .................................... 7 14
IV. How ARE CHILDREN SPECIAL IN THIS REGARD?... 715
A . Socialization ............................. 715
B. Tim e Perspective .......................... 716
C. Concept M anipulation ..................... 716
D. Consent, Permission and Assent ............. 717
V. PROXY DECISION-MAKING ...................... 718
A. Are Parents Always the Best Decision-Makers? 719
VI. PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS .............. 720
VII. CONSISTENCY IN COURTS' APPROACH TO CHILDREN'S
C OMPETENCE ................................. 723
VIII. CHILD CUSTODY .................................. 725
A. Background Information ................... 725
]3. What are the Proper Roles for Mental Health
Professionals? ............................ 726
C. Constitutional Issues: Race ................. 727
D. Constitutional Issues: Religion .............. 727
E. Constitutional Issues: Equal Access to Health
C are .............. ..................... 728
1. Unifying Themes .......................... 729
IX. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT ........................ 729
X. FINAL OBSERVATIONS .......................... 730
* Associate Professor, Harvard Medical School; Chief Psychologist, Boston Chil-
dren's Hospital.
95
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and child mental health professionals tend to have quite
different perspectives on the rights of children. These viewpoints result
from filtering facts and issues through lenses colored by dramatic dif-
ferences in training, scholarly traditions, and practice arenas. The at-
torney is taught that truth and justice are to be sought via rigorous
cross-examination of facts in a crucible defined by centuries of legal
traditions, case law, statutes, and regulations. Reliance on well-founded
rules (i.e., the law), the wisdom of common sense (i.e., embodied in the
trier-of-fact), and fairness are supposed to yield the best decisions.
These same principles are alien to most mental health profession-
als, who are taught that principles of child development, behavioral re-
search, and the study of human interactions hold the keys to determin-
ing what is in a child's best interests. Psychology, psychiatry, and
sociology are inexact sciences, seldom yielding the clear answers or ab-
solute determinations that courts of law prefer. One cannot easily pre-
dict the long-term outcome for any given child based on a particular
custody decision, juvenile court sentence, or psychiatric hospital admis-
sion. At the same time, mental health "experts" are routinely called
upon to present evidence in the legal system so that clear decisions with
important implications for children's futures can be made. One means
of narrowing this problematic disparity is for each profession to occa-
sionally don the other's lenses. This paper presents a discussion of some
constitutional issues for consideration along those lines.
II. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Children have long been treated by the courts as valuable property
of their parents. In many societies, children have represented a means
of establishing a labor force or to provide parental support during old
age. In our own legal system, parents have been held to possess a "right
of control" over their children.1 Parents' rights of control over their
children, however, are limited by a prohibition against making "mar-
tyrs of their children." 2 This restriction was advanced not because of an
enlightened view of children's rights, but rather as an assertion of soci-
ety's interest in the socialization of children. It was actually not clear
1. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
2. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
[Vol. 16
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Koocher
until the mid-1960s that children were deemed "persons" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment which applies the Bill of
Rights to all of the states.3
This treatment had its roots in the recognition that children are
often not as competent as adults to make important life decisions, espe-
cially those decisions with financial consequences. Under common law,
children up to the age of seven were generally considered doli incapax;
i.e., the defense of infancy, and, therefore, could not be held responsible
for their actions. Older children, under the age of majority, were also
considered incompetent unless they were proved doli incapax.' Al-
though one could question the validity of this doctrine based on arbi-
trary age levels, such matters were not significant in a legal sense
before the Supreme Court's decision in Gault.' Prior to that decision,
juvenile courts were deemed to be acting in the best interests of the
children before them under the doctrine of parens patriae.6 In the
Gault decision authored by Justice Fortas, the Supreme Court criti-
cized the juvenile court as a "kangaroo court" and concluded that,
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."17
This and subsequent decisions, combined with the increasing rec-
ognition of the prevalence of social problems such as child neglect and
abuse, runaway youth, and changing child custody practices, contribute
to an increasing involvement of children in the legal system. Similarly,
the involvement and roles of mental health professionals who work with
children have changed. Such clinicians are increasingly called upon to
advise or testify on such matters, and in so doing expose themselves to
new duties and responsibilities with special obligations for which many
are not fully prepared. Such professionals tend to think of children's
rights in terms of enabling self-actualization or natural entitlements,
rather than as constitutional guarantees to be addressed in the legal
arena.
3. See GARY B. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND IN-
TERVENTION (1983); Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A problem
in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1-18 (Gary B.
Melton et al. eds. 1983).
4. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent, supra note 3, at 1-18.
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward A New Juvenile Court, 68
NEB. L. REV. 146, 168-81 (1989).
7. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
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III. CHILDREN'S ABILITY TO MAKE COMPETENT DECISIONS
This paper focuses on matters of decision-making with respect to
children's rights. The ability of children to make well-informed deci-
sions about their lives and their exercise of that ability, directly or
through proxies, is the core issue. The law, society, and many mental
health professionals generally presume that children are not able to
make major life decisions on their own. This presumption is often cor-
rect, and the rules that exist to deny children independent decision-
making authority generally serve to protect them in the long run. At
the same time, the relative dependency, vulnerability, and immaturity
of children often interact with complex family roles to create compli-
cated conflicts of interest. Courts are generally unwilling to intrude on
intra-familial conflicts unless significant thresholds are crossed, for ex-
ample when a child's welfare is clearly at risk.
Assessment of specific competency, in the case of children, or in-
competency, in the case of adults, revolves around four basic elements8
which involve psychological aspects of comprehension, assertiveness and
autonomy, rational reasoning, anticipation of future events, and judg-
ments in the face of uncertainty or contingencies. In the following
pages, relevant developmental trends are discussed in relationship to
these basic elements of competent decision making, and hence the abil-
ity to claim one's own civil rights. The points discussed here represent
an overview of the various approaches to determining competence. 9 The
matter of whether any single circumstance represents a valid exercise
of competence is linked closely to context and subjective interpretation.
There are five key elements in fully informed decision-making.
These include: information, understanding, competency, voluntariness,
and decision-making ability (i.e., reasoning). 10 Although the concepts
8. First, the person's ability to understand information that is offered about the
nature and potential consequences of the decision to be made; second, the ability to
manifest a decision; third, the manner in which the decision is made; and, fourth, the
nature of the resulting decision.
9. See S.L. Leikin, Minors' Assent or Dissent to Medical Treatment, 102 J. PE-
DIATRICS 169-76 (1983); Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts,
CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (1984); Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Ca-
pacities to Decide About Participation in Research, 5 IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1-5 (1983); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Compe-
tency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD
DEV. 1589-98 (1982).
10. In this context information refers to access to all data which might reasona-
bly be expected to influence a person's willingness to participate. Information includes
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of competency and informed consent are different, it is clear that there
are many overlapping elements. Competency is a prerequisite for in-
formed consent. An offer to provide a person with informed consent is
not meaningful unless the individual in question is fully competent to
make use of it. Across the developmental trajectory between infancy
and adulthood, there are many aspects of human development which
act to inhibit or enhance competency and the ability to give consent.
IV. HOW ARE CHILDREN SPECIAL IN THIS REGARD?
A. Socialization
It is no secret that we begin life as egocentric beings, largely una-
ware of our own capabilities and without verbally based interpersonal
relationships. We progress through developmental stages which focus
successively on interaction in the family, peer group, and ultimately in
society as a whole. Along the way we are "socialized" or taught about
various societal roles by our families and social institutions, chiefly our
schools.,
There is a substantial body of data to suggest that even after chil-
dren become capable of understanding that they have certain rights or
societal entitlements, their exercise or assertions of those rights is often
a function of their social ecology.' 2 Many children literally regard their
rights as those entitlements that adults permit them to exercise. 13
Adults' interactions with children are often framed as requests, yet
children are seldom fooled into thinking that they have a real option to
decline. 4
only what is offered or made available to the person. Competency includes the capacity
to understand, the ability to weigh potential outcomes, and also the foresight to antici-
pate the future consequences of the decision. Voluntariness is the freedom to choose to
participate or to refuse. Decision-making ability refers to the ability to render a rea-
soned choice and express it clearly. See Charles W. Lidz et al., INFORMED CONSENT: A
STUDY OF DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984).
11. That is to say, as children we are taught to do what authority figures tell us
to do.
12. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent, supra note 3, at 1-18.
13. See Gary B. Melton, Children's Concepts of Their Rights, 9 J. CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 186-90 (1980); Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psy-
chological Risks and Benefits, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21-40 (Gary
B. Melton et al. eds 1983).
14. Although a parent may say to a child, "Please pick up your toys," children as
young as three are well aware that adverse consequences will follow a failure to re-
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The "terrible twos" and "rebellious adolescent years" are well
known cliches which present the adult perspective that it is difficult to
deal with children who challenge or question authority. The point to be
made here is that the process of socialization presents considerable
pressure for children to acquiesce to adults' wishes. As a result of these
pressures, it is quite likely that offers to exercise various rights will not
be recognized or acted on by many children. Likewise, oppositional re-
sponses may sometimes occur more as a function of developmental
stage than reasoned choice.
B. Time Perspective
Ask a child, "Do you want a little candy bar today, or a big one
next week?" To the four year old for whom "next week" may seem a
decade away, immediate gratification is the obvious choice. A child's
ability to go beyond the present and conceptualize the future, including
hypothetical or potential outcomes, is closely linked to stages of cogni-
tive development. One must be mindful of this when asking children to
participate in decisions involving recognition and assessment of poten-
tial or future outcomes.
Time perspective becomes critically important whenever a decision
involves being able to weigh short versus long-term consequences. It is
also an important consideration when the developmental level predis-
poses children to choose immediate gratification, while ignoring or fail-
ing to weigh their longer-term interests. The impact of developmental
levels has been especially well documented as an issue in health-related
decision making, both with respect to pregnancy decisions 5 and more
general health attitudes. 6 The classic paradigm is the adult patient
facing major surgery who asks, "Well, doctor, what are the odds?" The
ability to weigh probabilities and to make some kind of long-term risk-
benefit analysis is crucial to making an informed decision.
C. Concept Manipulation
The ability to manipulate concepts using a developmental model of
spond. This does not suggest unfettered voluntariness in children's decision-making.
15. Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538-44 (1981).
16. Michael C. Roberts et al., Development Perspectives in Behavioral Health in
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH: A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ENHANCEMENT AND DISEASE PRE-
VENTION 56-68 (Joseph D. Matarazzo et al. eds. 1984).
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consent has been well described elsewhere. 17 The work of Jean Piaget' s
demonstrated basic reasoning shifts which occur between so-called pre-
operational, concrete-operational, and formal-operational stages of
mental development.1 9 The key point is that the ability to integrate in-
formation to make reasoned decisions is limited by the developmental
stage. This is especially true when the concepts to be manipulated and
integrated are complex or numerous.
D. Consent, Permission and Assent
With respect to the interaction of developmental stages with com-
petence to consent, a clear distinction is often made among the terms
"consent," "permission," and "assent." To give consent, a person
should be able to understand the facts and consequences relative to a
17. See Ronald B. Belter & Thomas Grisso, Children's Recognition of Rights
Violations in Counseling in 15 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 899-910 (1984); Melton,
Children's Competence to Consent, supra note 3, at 1-18.
18. A simplified summary for the non-psychologist may be found in JL. PHIL-
LIPS, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLECT: PIAGET's THEORY (1975).
19. In the pre-operational stage (approximately ages 2-6) children are limited to
their own experiences as a primary data base for decision-making. Fantasy and magical
thinking are very powerful at this stage and may carry equal weight with more valid or
reality-based data in a child's reasoning. While such children are very interested in
their environment and interpersonal relations, their perspective is self-centered. Their
understanding of other's behavior and their own experiences are interpreted chiefly in
terms of how these happenings affect them personally. When they ask questions or
observe event happening to others, such children interpret the events chiefly via projec-
tion and identification.
During the concrete-operational stage (approximately ages 7-11) the child for the
first time becomes capable of truly taking the perspective of another person and using
that data in decision-making. While observational learning and asking questions are
obvious in much younger children, the concrete-operational child is able to integrate
and reason with these data in a more logical and effective manner than was possible at
an earlier developmental level. In addition, this is the stage at which children first
become able to explore their motivation from the standpoint of another person.
With the arrival of formal operations (early adolescence onward) the child be-
comes able to use hypothetical reasoning. The way things are now is recognized as a
subset of the way things might be for the first time. Cause and effect reasoning be-
comes generalized in a manner which permits the child to extrapolate and theorize
about future events and outcomes. Likewise, the ability to understand contingencies
and consider probabilities (e.g., "there is a fifty percent chance that you will get well
without treatment . . .") will generally require the cognitive talents which do not ar-
rive prior to formal-operational thought. Such thinking is obviously critical if a child is
to make a decision regarding his or her long-term best interests.
19921
101
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
decision and manifest that decision voluntarily. Usually the adjective
"informed" precedes consent, implying that all of the data needed to
reach a reasoned decision have been offered in a manner that has been
understood. Often the person must have attained legal majority for the
decision to be considered binding.
Increasingly, consent is being defined as a decision that one can
make only for oneself. Thus, the term "proxy consent" is decreasingly
used in favor of the term "permission." Parents are usually those from
whom permission must be sought as both a legal and ethical require-
ment prior to intervening in the lives of their minor children.
Assent, a relatively new concept in this context, recognizes that
minors may not, as a function of their developmental level, be capable
of giving fully reasoned consent, but may still be capable of reaching
and expressing a preference. Assent recognizes the involvement of the
child in the decision-making process, while also indicating that the
child's level of participation is less than fully competent.
Granting assent power is essentially the same as authorizing a
veto. Obviously, veto power should not be offered to a child or other
"incompetent" when the consequences of a poorly chosen option could
be disastrous to the child in question. This is often the case when some
high-risk medical procedure offers the only hope of long term survival
or when the person in question is pre-verbal, mute on the matter, or
comatose. In such situations, a substitute or proxy is needed.
The degree to which children ought to be permitted to make bind-
ing decisions on matters involving their own welfare is a matter of
much controversy." Although the law has seldom been guided by psy-
chological principles, a growing body of psychological studies are shed-
ding new light on how children's decision-making capacities, as a func-
tion of development, interact with legal concepts."
V. PROXY DECISION-MAKING
Since the law generally regards children as incompetent per se,
who is to speak for them? When a decision is to be made on their
behalf, it is usually exercised by a parent, guardian, or other responsi-
ble party acting in loco parentis. The general assumption of the legal
20. See WALTER J. WADLINGTON ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
(1983).
21. Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the
Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445-82 (1984).
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system is that the parent or guardian is acting in the child's best inter-
ests or exercising substituted judgment.
A. Are Parents Always the Best Decision-Makers?
The concept of substituted judgment presumes a great deal. Most
notably, it assumes that the persons making the decision are willing
and able to act in this capacity on the child's best interests without a
conflict of interests. Even within the loving, intact, family unit not all
parental decisions regarding children are without conflicts of interest. 2
Although parents often subordinate their needs and preferences to what
they believe are the best interests of their children, this is not a univer-
sal phenomenon.
The courts have traditionally respected the sanctity of the family
unit, and. are quite reluctant to become involved without clear evidence
of abuse, neglect, or similar dramatic turns of events. In the vast ma-
jority of situations, such deference to parental authority is appropriate.
Unfortunately, the threshold for intervention is often set beyond the
level where psychological problems are precipitated. That is to say, er-
rors or decisions that are not in the child's best interests often do not
come to the attention of the legal system despite the fact that signifi-
cant psychological harm may be occurring.
In some cases courts have recognized parental conflicts-of-interest
and have ruled that the child's rights are to be held paramount when
parents' and children's rights conflict.2 1 In other cases involving sub-
stantive conflicts, courts have been willing to terminate parental
rights. " Such cases, however, are generally extreme exceptions. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have belied a rather naive "parents know
best" attitude.2 5 When such conflicts exist, children's needs and rights
are often lost in the struggle as adults contend with each other as advo-
cates on one side or the other.
22. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent, supra note 3, at 1-18.
23. Doe v. Doe, 408 A.2d 785 (N.H. 1979); In re Pernishek, 408 A.2d 872 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979); In re Male R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979).
24. Nebraska v. Wedige, 289 N.W.2d 538 (Neb. 1980); In re C.M.S., 609 P.2d
240 (Mont. 1979); Jewish Child Care Ass'n v. Elaine S.Y., 425 N.Y.S.2d 336 (App.
Div. 1979).
25. D.J. Rothman & S.M. Rothman, The Conflict Over Children's Rights, in 10
THE HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7-10 (1980).
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VI. PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS
One important aspect of children's constitutional rights involves
the matter of psychiatric hospital admissions. Except for brief emer-
gency commitments, adults cannot be hospitalized against their will
without a formal judicial hearing at which they are represented by
counsel. Those seeking civil involuntary commitment must show that
such persons are dangerous to themselves or others, or are unable to
care for themselves in the community.26 Because a parent may legally
consent to a minor child's admission to a psychiatric facility on a "vol-
untary" basis, the child who objects to such treatment generally has no
legal recourse. Such children have been called "reluctant volunteers. 27
The Supreme Court has ruled on such matters in the Parham de-
cisions." The Parham case was a class action which revolved around
the issue of whether minors can be involuntarily hospitalized in a psy-
chiatric facility without a court finding that such confinement is war-
ranted when "voluntarily" hospitalized by their parents.29 This Georgia
case brought the issue to the Supreme Court in the context of a "least
restrictive alternative" argument. The suit was brought on behalf of
several children who had been hospitalized at state psychiatric facilities
on the basis on the basis of their parents' or guardians' consent, and
sought their release or placement in less restrictive settings. In the
Parham case, the key legal question was whether a hearing is necessary
prior to involuntarily committing a minor to an inpatient psychiatric
facility as would be required with an adult.30
The majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger noted that
judges are ill-equipped to make such decisions, and that parents ought
to be given considerable latitude in making decisions of this sort.31 In
addition, the opinion expressed the belief that the child actually gets a
non-judicial hearing of sorts by the admitting psychiatrist who was
26. Most states and the federal jurisdiction require a clear and convincing level
of proof. Some, such as Massachusetts, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 123, § 5, n.6 (1986).
27. H.A. Beyer & J.P. Wilson, The Reluctant Volunteer: A Child's Right to
Resist Commitment, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS
133-48 (1976).
28. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, Parham v. J.R.
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
[Vol. 16
104
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Koocher
deemed a kind of neutral fact finding expert who acted in place of a
judicial one.82 The Chief Justice noted: "Although we acknowledge the
fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, we do not accept the
notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by
shifting the decision ...to an untrained judge."33 The Burger court
assumed somewhat idealistically that the parent will inevitably act to
promote: the child's welfare. In addition, the court suggested that the
medical officer at the hospital who authorizes the admission is actually
providing the child with a kind of due process hearing obviating the
need or even the wisdom of additional formal court proceedings.'
In this romanticized view of the American family, the Burger
Court asserted that "parents know best" and that they, in concert with
the hospital's admitting officer, were adequate proxies for the child.
The adolescent patients were deemed incompetent to request a hearing
or otherwise assert any legal right to make a decision regarding the
hospital admission consented to by their parents.
Although there is general agreement that the "least restrictive al-
ternative" is the most desirable, the questions "How restrictive is nec-
essary?" and "Who is best able to provide it?" remain difficult to an-
swer. This type of situation has three problematic parts, which were not
well considered in the Parham"' decision. First is the issue of the cir-
cumstances under which parents ought to be able to commit their child
to a psychiatric hospital without extra-familial legal review. Another
involves interpreting the meaning of the phrase "least restrictive alter-
native," and who ought to decide on such issues. The third part of the
problem involves potential conflicts of interest when the for-profit sector
of the mental health industry is involved.
The: issue of hospitalizing children at profit making facilities has
never been examined by the Supreme Court because all of the cases
brought to its attention have involved public psychiatric facilities. Per-
haps the: Chief Justice was correct in suggesting that this is a matter
best left to mental health experts. On the other hand, given the diver-
sity of professional opinion which may exist, it is not unreasonable to
permit opposing experts to be heard and evaluated when objections to
the necessity of hospital admission are raised. This is especially true in
light of the increasing number of proprietary psychiatric facilities oper-
32. Id. at 609.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 618.
35. Id. at 584.
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ating around the country.
This is not to imply that good psychiatric care is not possible at
facilities which are operated for a profit. Rather, it is suggested that
the admitting officer at such facilities may well have a conflict of inter-
est when a potential patient arrives and an empty bed exists. Physicians
at such proprietary hospitals are not infrequently stock-holders or par-
ticipants in incentive compensation plans intended to maximize institu-
tional profits and minimize costs. It may well be easier for the admit-
ting officer at one of these hospitals to admit a patient now and worry
about the necessity for hospitalization over the next several days. In
this case one could argue that it is "better to be safe than sorry." At
the same time, it is not unusual to find that understaffed and cost-con-
scious public sector psychiatric hospitals will decline to admit a given
patient on clinical grounds, although a private-sector proprietary hospi-
tal will admit the same patient so long as the family has sufficient fi-
nancial resources to pay the bill. All too often the children's length of
stay at a private hospitals seems to coincide with the coverage limits of
their parents' insurance policy.
In addition, some health insurance plans provide much more ex-
tensive payment for in-patient treatment than for out-patient care. In
such circumstances, a family of limited means might well have a strong
reason to prefer in-patient over out-patient care for their child.86 Re-
grettably, no arguments on the economic, conflict of interest, or social
policy data were presented to the Supreme Court when Parham3 7 was
argued.38
The potential adverse side-effects of psychiatric hospitalization of
children are many. Aside from the stresses of confinement and poten-
tial abuses of children that may occur in residential facilities, even a
brief in-patient stay can result in lingering problems for patients. The
message the child may believe is being communicated by the hospitali-
zation itself; e.g., you are too sick or too bad to be cared for in our
family, can damage a child's self-esteem. Separation from the family
and disruption of the parent-child relationship during a crisis may not
36. For example, a typical policy may provide up to $500 per year in out-patient
treatment benefits, but offer 30-60 days of in-patient coverage. Even well intentioned
parents might think that 30 days of "intensive treatment" might be better care for
their child than the few out-patient visits covered by their policy.
37. 442 U.S. at 584.
38. Lois A. Weithorn, Note, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An
Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1988).
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be constructive. The psychiatric hospital can also be a place to learn
some previously unconsidered behaviors, such as suicide attempts. Long
term adverse effects of psychiatric hospital admission are also
possible.
VII. CONSISTENCY IN COURTS' APPROACH TO CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE
Courts' views of children's competence are determined more by
specific legal context than by psychological data. This is well illustrated
by the juxtaposition of two Supreme Court decisions handed down on
the very same day in 1979. One was Parhamn0 and the other decision
was Fare v. Michael C. 1 Michael C. was sixteen-years-old, the same
age as some of the patients in the Parham case, and had been on pro-
bation to the juvenile court in Van Nuys, California since age twelve.'
He became a suspect in a murder case and was apprehended by the
police who "read him his rights" using the standard Miranda43 warn-
ings. Tape recordings of the interview tell us exactly what transpired at
about 6:30 p.m. on February 4, 1976:"
Police: "Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained
them to you?"
Michael: "Yeah."
Police: "Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent
and talk to us about this murder?"
Michael: "What murder? I don't know about no murder."
Police: "I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us
about it."'
Michael: "Yeah, I might talk to you."
Police: "Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney
39. In Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), an adolescent
was signed into a Pennsylvania psychiatric facility by his mother against his will. He
was subsequently released on per order of the Federal District Court, and the case was
never appealed further because Pennsylvania changed its law to permit judicial review
of such cases. In a personal communication from Kevin Bartley's attorney, David
Ferleger, I learned that subsequent to his release Kevin was turned down for at least
one job on the basis of his "history of psychiatric hospitalization."
40. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
41. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
42. Id.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. In re Michael C., 579 P.2d 7, 8 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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present here while we talk about it?"
Michael: "Can I have my probation officer here?"
Police: "Well, I can't get a hold of your probation officer right
now. You have the right to an attorney."
Michael: "How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and
tell me he's an attorney?"
Police: "Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen."
Michael: "Yeah."
Police: "Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight.
If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you
don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want to say something you
can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's
your right. You understand that right?"
Michael: "Yeah."
Police: "Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?"
Michael: "Yeah I want to talk to you."
Michael then answered questions incriminating himself in the
murder of Robert Yeager. Michael's attorney attempted to suppress
the evidence gleaned through this interrogation, asserting that the re-
quest for the probation officer constituted an invocation of Fifth
Amendment rights. A divided California Supreme Court agreed and
reversed the juvenile court adjudication interpreting Michael's request
as equivalent to a request to see his parents during interrogation.45 The
United States Supreme Court disagreed in a five to four decision.4 Al-
though the taped interview strongly suggests that Michael did not fully
understand his civil rights, the Court's majority nonetheless expressed
the belief that Michael, as a young man "experienced with the criminal
justice system," was competent to waive his rights and confess to mur-
der without consulting an attorney. The court was apparently not per-
suaded by Michael's apparent belief that the police would be allowed to
trick him into confessing.
Contrasting the decisions in Parham and Michael C., the Court
apparently has ruled teenagers are not competent to object to psychiat-
ric hospitalization against their will, but are competent to confess to
murder and potentially face a transfer from juvenile to criminal court
and the death penalty without first consulting a lawyer. Both of these
45. Id. at 10.
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opinions were rendered without benefit of psychological data. Further-
more, it is not at all clear that the court would have attended to perti-
nent psychological data' 8 had it been available. The "common knowl-
edge" available to the justices seems their most relied upon source in
such situations.
Through the lenses of the mental health professional these cases
might seem linked by the common feature of adolescents' competence
to make decisions, a situation in which psychological research and in-
put demands consideration. On the other hand, the lenses of the attor-
ney might suggest that the case contexts are not at all similar. One
involves civil commitment and the other a criminal prosecution.
VIII. CHILD CUSTODY
A. Background Information
Survey data suggests that ninety percent of custody decisions are
made by divorcing spouses either through bargaining or mediation. In
addition, fifty-five percent of judges who hear such cases reported that
opinions from mental health experts are presented in less than ten per-
cent of the cases they hear. A quarter of these judges indicated that
such testimony is presented in the majority of contested custody cases
in their courts.' Unfortunately, most mental health professionals have
little expertise which is directly relevant to custody disputes. Many of
the issues to be resolved in such cases, such as, "parental responsibil-
ity," are more appropriately within the purview of the judicial fact
finder, rather than the mental health clinician. There is simply no hard
scientific basis for addressing most of the questions that courts must
decide in such cases; for example, there are no rigorous studies of the
effects of various custody and visitation arrangements on children and
families.
48. For example, the research on children's understanding of such rights by as
published in THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Pro-
ceedings, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131-48 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds.
1983).
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B. What are the Proper Roles for Mental Health
Professionals?
With nearly a third of marriages in the United States ending in
divorce, it is no surprise that the number of child custody disputes be-
ing brought to probate and family courts around the country has in-
creased significantly in the past few decades. There is general agree-
ment that the two most appropriate roles for mental health
professionals in the context of child custody decision-making are those
of evaluator/investigator and mediator. Functioning as a skilled investi-
gator or evaluator, the clinician is especially valuable to the courts
when abuse or neglect has been charged. Mental health professionals
can also assist the court by pointing out what is known or not known
about psychological factors and their the effects of various custody ar-
rangements. The clinician can also perform assessments of the parties,
the home environment, extended family, etc., and report on these and
other important variables to the court. Mental health professionals are
split on the matter of whether testifying to the "legal issue" is
acceptable."
Clinicians with specialized training in dispute resolution can assist
families in the negotiation process as mediators, while helping them to
understand the needs and best interests of the child, at least to the
degree that such interests can be reasonably determined. Care must be
taken, however, to avoid switching among the roles of evaluator and
mediator. In addition, the role of psychotherapist to one of the parties
would conflict with functioning as either a mediator or evaluator.
50. An important area of controversy for clinicians who function as evaluators in
child custody disputes is the matter of whether or not they should address or testify to
"the ultimate legal issue" in their work. That is to say, whether or not the psychologist
ought to make an actual custody recommendation to the judicial decision maker. Many
psychologists think not, believing that such opinions are moral or legal matters beyond
the expertise of the mental health professional. Child custody cases rarely involve ques-
tions of actual "parental fitness" in the sense that one or more is grossly unsuited to
care for the child. Rather, the more usual issue is that of which parenting arrangement
will serve the best interests of the developing child. In such instances the term "best
interests" is a moral or legal concept, as defined by state law, not a psychological con-
cept. For a full discussion of these issues, see generally MELTON, supra note 3, and
Lois A. WEITHORN, PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWL-
EDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE (Univ. of Neb. Press 1987).
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C. Constitutional Issues: Race
Few child custody disputes reach the appellate level by raising
constitutional issues. One of the most dramatic of these cases involved
issues of both racism and poorly framed psychological testimony. 1
When Linda Sidoti Palmore and Anthony J. Sidoti, both Cauca-
sians, were divorced in Florida during the spring of 1980, custody of
their three year old daughter, Melanie, was awarded to the mother by
mutual agreement.8 2 A year and a half later Mr. Sidoti sought custody
because his ex-wife was cohabiting with a man of African-American
descent, Clarence Palmore, Jr., to whom she was married two months
later. Among the various claims at trial were psychological arguments
that little Melanie Sidoti would be vulnerable to adverse peer pressures
and social stigmatization as the result of living in a bi-racial home. The
Florida courts then awarded custody to the father, much to the public's
distress as seen in the national news broadcasts.53
Psychological testimony had been introduced at the trial in sup-
port of the father's position, and was apparently heeded by the judge to
some degree, even though it was not supported by any meaningful body
of clinical or empirical data. Fortunately, the Supreme Court saw the
issue as one of broader significance. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court noted, "Whatever problems racially-mixed house-
holds may pose for children in 1984 cannot support a denial of consti-
tutional rights. . . .""I The case was sent back to be reheard, but by
that time Mr. Sidoti had moved from Florida to Texas in violation of a
Florida court order. Nonetheless, the Florida Court of Appeals ruled
that they lacked further jurisdiction in the case, because of the change
in residence, and the matter was left to the Texas courts to decide."
D. Constitutional Issues: Religion
Another interesting case addressed the issue of religious beliefs
and child custody." Linnea and Edward Quiner were married in Los
Angeles in 1961, had a child in 1962, and separated in 1963. Edward
was awarded custody of their son at least in part on the basis of Lin-




55. Palmore v. Sidoti, 472 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1967).
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nea's religious practices. She belonged to the Plymouth Brethren, also
known as the "Exclusive Brethren." There were approximately 220
members of this group in greater Los Angeles at the time and their
beliefs dictated that they keep "separate" from all those outside of
their church. This separation included prohibitions against eating in
public, secluding oneself from schoolmates, not affiliating with any so-
cial organizations, disavowing all forms of entertainment, proscription
of all reading material except the Bible, and opposition to medical
insurance.5
Although this would seem to be a case involving a custody decision
based on religion, it is more properly regarded as based on an assess-
ment of the more global adverse impact on a child's development which
such a life style could exert. This is the sort of case in which specialists
on child development might be called upon to offer expert opinions re-
garding the long-term impact of specific child-rearing practices on the
psychological well-being of the child. Although the local court granted
custody to the father, the California Court of Appeals reversed the de-
cision.58 It was in turn nullified by the California Supreme Court at
which time the parties made an out of court settlement with the child
going to reside with the mother in exchange for certain financial con-
siderations to the father.5 9 So much for relying on the courts to protect
the best interests of the child!
E. Constitutional Issues: Equal Access to Health Care
Another important series of cases involving child custody dealt
with consent to medical procedures, rather than divorce. 0 Phillip
Becker was born on October 16, 1966, with Down's Syndrome." His
parents, Warren and Patricia Becker placed him in institutional care
shortly thereafter, and initially visited him frequently. As time went on
their visits became less frequent, and they appeared to become more
detached from him. When Phillip was three years old, a pediatrician
advised his parents that he suffered from a congenital heart problem,
ventricular septal defect, which affects significant numbers of children
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 1985).
60. In re Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983); In re Phillip B.,
156 Cal. Rptr. 48, (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
61. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
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with Down's Syndrome. The defect consisted of an opening between the
lower chambers of the heart resulting in progressive vascular dysfunc-
tion and ultimately death by age thirty. Corrective open-heart surgery
was suggested when Phillip was six, however his family took no action
to investigate or remedy the problem. In 1972, Patsy and Herbert H.
began working with Phillip as volunteers through the licensed residen-
tial faciltity where he lived. Phillip was visited and tutored by them
frequently, and was ultimately able to attend a school for the trainable
mentally retarded. As his parents became less frequent visitors, Phillip
became :increasingly attached to Patsy and Herbert H., visiting in their
home with his parents' consent. Phillip began to refer to the Patsy and
Herbert as "Mama Pat and Dada Bert." Faced with the need for medi-
cal and :surgical treatment of the cardiac defect in mid-1977, Mr. and
Mrs. Becker decided against it. They expressed the belief that they
would be unable to care for Phillip in his later years and did not wish
him to outlive them. This began a series of legal actions, including an
unsuccessful effort to force surgical consent from them.62 Ultimately,
limited guardianship was granted to Patsy and Herbert H., who au-
thorized medical care for Phillip.63
F. Unifying Themes
In each of the custody cases presented here a variety of psycholog-
ical factors were significant elements. In Palmore v. Sidoti" the psy-
chological testimony was incompetent, in Quiner v. Quiner, psychologi-
cal issues were ignored in light of the parents' settlement, and in In re
Phillip B.,6 the psychological issues were trivial compared to the medi-
cal risks the child faced. These constitutional matters were resolved
chiefly by the jockeying of adult advocates, rather than on their merits
considering the rights of the children involved.
IX. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Although most states ban corporal punishment in public schools,
this is not universal. Many states, including Florida, still permit teach-
ers to administer physical punishments as a means to promote disci-
62. Phillip, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
63. Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
64. 466 U.S. at 429.
65. 156 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
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pline. Although psychologists tend to view this practice as little more
than officially sanctioned abuse of children, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to consider school administered corporal punish-
ments as "cruel and unusual," even when the result is significant physi-
cal injury to the child.
James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews had the misfortune to
run afoul of an assistant principal at Drew Junior High School in Dade
County, Florida, during October, 1970. Because they were slow to re-
spond to teacher's instructions, James was subjected to 20 "licks" with
a half-inch thick wooden paddle across his buttocks. He suffered a he-
matoma and was out of school for several days. Roosevelt was paddled
several times and on one occasion was without the full use of his arm
for a week.
Although a federal appeals court found the punishment, "so severe
and oppressive as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
S. . ," the Supreme Court opinion 66 expressed the belief that common
law remedies, rather than Constitutional ones were sufficient in this
case. That is to say, the routine local oversight of the schools by the
school board and local court action should have resolved the matter.
The reasoning in the opinion reflected no awareness of, or interest in,
the significant body of psychological literature in both interpersonal re-
lationships and learning theory which shows that aggression tends to
breed aggressive behavior. A common rationale cited by supporters of
official corporal punishment tends to be, "It taught me a lesson when I
was their age." Of course, all that is truly taught with such techniques
is how to pass on the tradition of abuse.
X. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Legal battles over children's rights are probably more accurately
conceptualized as adults advocating their own civil liberty viewpoints
using children as surrogates. This is not necessarily inappropriate, but,
unfortunately, seldom helps specific children in the short-run. The legal
system and appellate process are ponderously slow when compared with
the more rapid pace of normal child development. For example, a cus-
tody battle that plays out over two years has taken up half the life of a
four-year-old. Similarly, by the time decisions were rendered on impor-
tant cases involving freedom of speech 67 or search and seizure abuses68
66. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
67. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des
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the issues were long since cold ones for children at the heart of the
matter. School suspensions, a botched graduation ceremony, and a strip
search in the school nurse's office are psychological indignities that can-
not be righted with a court decision years later. In the end, it remains
important for both mental health professionals and attorneys to peer
through each other's lenses every once and a while.
Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
68. Dow v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
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In custody' disputes between two natural parents, usually arising
in the course of divorce proceedings, the standard applied by the courts
to determine custody is "the best interest of the child" test. The court
awards custody to one or both parents based on the court's determina-
tion as to what is in the child's best interest. Neither parent's interest is
superior to the other in determining custody and the child's interest is
superior to either parent's interest.
A different scenario may result if one of the parties to the custody
dispute is not a natural parent. In custody disputes between a natural
parent and a third party, most courts apply a natural parent preference
or presumption to some degree. If strictly applied, this standard results
in custody automatically being awarded to the natural parent, absent a
showing of parental unfitness sufficient to overcome the presumption.
However, such a result may not be in the child's best interest. This is
particularly true where the child has been in a stable environment in
the custody of the third party over a period of years and has had virtu-
ally no contact with the natural parent. This situation is becoming
more common as the number of divorces increase, resulting in increas-
ing numbers of children who are being reared by stepparents or
grandparents.
On the other hand, there is a need to protect the sanctity of the
parent-child relationship. The natural parent preference serves that
purpose, especially where the state is seeking custody of the child. This
is also generally true where the third party has not had de facto physi-
cal custody of the child. Often, grandparents will object to their chil-
dren's lifestyles or parenting styles, particularly when the couple is in-
volved in a divorce, and will seek custody of their grandchild. Courts
should guard against attempts by a third party to obtain custody of a
child where the third party has not established a parental relationship
with the child and where the only basis for the change in custody is the
natural parent's "non-traditional" parenting or life style. The best in-
terest test does not adequately protect young parents in this situation.
As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed in Barstad v. Frazier:2
I. The scope of this article is limited to cases dealing with the issue of physical
custody as opposed to visitation rights (in which the test is more liberal) or termination
of parental rights (in which the test is more strict).
2. 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
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When a parent is young, the physical, financial and even emotional
factors may often appear to favor the grandparents. One cannot
expect young parents to compete on an equal level with their estab-
lished older relatives. So the "best interest" standard cannot be the
test. If it were we would be forced to conclude that only the more
affluent in our society should raise children. To state the proposi-
tion is to demonstrate its absurdity.'
Not only is the older relative likely to be more established financially,
but they are likely to have more free time to devote to the child and
will probably reflect more closely the same values held by the members
of the bench. Parents should not lose custody of their children simply
because someone exists who wants the child, or can be a "better par-
ent" to the child, and can offer the child greater material opportunities.
This article addresses the need to balance the competing interests
in a way that will keep the best interest of the child paramount. In
doing so, the article reviews the standards applied by various courts. It
also looks at the expanding definition of parent and suggests a new
approach for resolving custody disputes that preserves the judicial
economy of the natural parent preference, but only to the extent that it
is consistent with the child's best interest. This result is achieved by
retaining the parental preference presumption and expanding the defi-
nition of parent to include those persons who have established a paren-
tal relationship with the child.
This recommended approach involves a balancing of interests. So-
ciety's interest in judicial economy and predictability and the parent's
interest in protecting and exercising parental rights must give way to
society's and the child's interest in having the most circumspect deci-
sion making process available in this all important judgment which
dramatically affects the child's future.
Applying this approach, if a third party has functioned as a parent
toward the child, that third party would also enjoy the protection of the
natural parent preference and the standard for determining custody as
between the "third party parent" and the natural parent would be the
best interest of the child.
The parental presumption would not apply to a third party who
had not functioned as a parent toward the child but, nevertheless,
sought custody as against a natural parent. In such a case, the parent-
child relationship would be protected by the natural parent preference,
3. Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
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absent proof of parental unfitness sufficient to overcome the preference.
This approach protects a parent against well-intentioned but inter-
fering grandparents or other third parties, including a state, which dis-
approves of the parent's life style or parenting practices, where it can-
not be shown that the parent is unfit. At the same time, it would
protect a child from being uprooted from a stable, loving relationship
with a third party who has been acting as a parent, simply because a
natural parent, who is not unfit, decides to claim custody. The ap-
proach seeks to preserve the benefits of the natural parent preference,
but only to the extent that it is consistent with the best interests of the
child.
II. THE NATURAL PARENT PREFERENCE
A. Background
In all custody disputes, the standard applied is the best interest of
the child. In custody disputes between natural parents and third par-
ties, courts often employ a rebuttable presumption in favor of the natu-
ral parents. This is based on the assumption that the best interest of the
child will be served by granting custody to the natural parent over the
third party. As noted by a Pennsylvania court:
This rule is based logically upon the experience of mankind that
blood is thicker than water and that a natural parent will normally
expend greater effort and sacrifice on behalf of a child than will a
stranger or a third party, especially when the going gets rough in
times of economic, medical or other difficulty.4
Sometimes the parent's interest and the child's interest are not
compatible. When that occurs, courts are called upon to decide whether
the parental preference is grounded in the parent's rights or the child's
interests. As early as 1824, Judge Story recognized that the parental
preference should be grounded in the best interest of the child and not
"eon account of any absolute right of the father.5
4. In re Custody of Hampton, 5 Adams Co. L.J. 84, 91 (Pa. C.P. 1963); see also
Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ark. 1988).
5. United States v. Green, 3 Mason 482 (Cir. R.I. 1824). The issue of a constitu-
tional right to custody has been explored and discounted by other scholars and is
outside the scope of this article. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.6, at 527-29 (1987); Eric Salthe, Note, Would
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Most states still recognize the natural parent preference in some
form. In most instances, the presumption in favor of the natural parent
is based on a common law presumption, 6 but some states have passed
legislation codifying the natural parent preference.
7
One advantage of the presumption is judicial economy in that it
provides consistency and predictability in custody decisions and stream-
Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in Custody Disputes be in Everyone's Best
Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539 (1991); Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v.
Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA.
L. REV. 705 (1986).
6. Ex parte Terry, 494 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 1986); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985
(Alaska 1989); Clifford v. Woodford, 320 P.2d 452 (Ariz. 1957); Schuh v. Roberson,
788 S.W.2d 740 (Ark. 1990); Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117, 121 (Colo. 1962) (en banc);
In re R.L.L. and J.M.L., 373 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. 1988); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d
611 (Idaho 1989); In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. 1986); Glass v.
Bailey, 118 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1954); Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329 (Ky.
1989); Pastore v. Sharp, 567 A.2d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), cert. denied, 572
A.2d 182 (1990); Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148 (Minn. 1989); In re Guardian-
ship of J.R.G., 708 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1985); Peterson v. Peterson, 399 N.W.2d 792
(Neb. 1987); Zack v. Fiebert, 563 A.2d 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Merritt
v. Way, 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. 1983); Phillips v. Choplin, 309 S.E.2d 716 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989); Hruby v. Hruby,
748 P.2d 57 (Or. 1987) (en banc); Michael T.L. v. Marilyn J.L., 525 A.2d 414 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987); Skeadas v. Sklaroff, 122 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
988 (1956); Moore v. Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456 (S.C. 1989); Langerman v. Langerman,
336 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1983); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984);
Nielson v. Nielson, 818 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1991) (quoting Hutchinson v. Hutchin-
son, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982)); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986); Pa-
quette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1985); Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va.
1983); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1970).
7. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-331 (1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 721(e) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.12(2)(b) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-9-1 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 601(b)(2) (1991); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 633.559, 598.41(6)(West 1991); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(D) (Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4)(b)
(Michie/Bobbs- Merrill 1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 131 (West 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, §§ 28, 31 (Supp.
1991); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.25 (West Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-
5-24 (Supp. 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(4) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480
(Supp. 1991) and § 159.061 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(k) (Michie 1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 10, §
21.1(A) (West Supp. 1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01 (West Supp. 1991); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West.
Supp. 1991).
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lines the proof to be considered by the court. The presumption also
protects the sanctity of the parent-child relationship, promotes family
unity and discourages third party interference.
The natural parent preference is not conclusive. It is a rebuttable
presumption. The strength of the presumption and the grounds for its
rebuttal vary from state to state. The various grounds for overcoming
the natural parent presumption will be discussed below.
B. Rebutting The Natural Parent Preference
1. Parental Unfitness
Traditionally, the presumption in favor of the natural parent could
be overcome only by finding the natural parent unfit.' This view is still
followed in a number of states,9 and is based on a recognition of paren-
tal rights"0 rather than child rights.1 The Supreme Court of Arkansas,
in Schuh v. Roberson, reaffirmed this priority:
The law recognizes the preferential rights of parents to their chil-
8. Schuh, 788 S.W.2d. at 741; Peterson, 491 N.E.2d at 1152.
9. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(4)(D) (Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24
(Supp. 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 52.375(4) (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-4-9.1(k)
(Michie 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West. Supp. 1991); Ex parte Ma-
thews, 428 So. 2d 58 (Ala. 1983) (unfitness or voluntary forfeiture); Clifford v. Wood-
ford 320 P.2d 452 (Ariz. 1957); Schuh, 788 S.W.2d. 740; In re Guardianship of
D.A.McW., 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984); In re R.L.L. and J.M.L., 373 S.E.2d. 363
(Ga. 1988); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611 (Idaho 1989); In re Custody of Pe-
terson, 491 N.E.2d 1150; Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1989); Ross v.
Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582 (Md. 1977); Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148 (Minn. 1989);
In re Guardianship of J.R.G., 708 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1985); Nielsen v. Nielson, 296
N.W.2d 483, 488 (Neb. 1980) (unfitness or voluntary forfeiture); Brito v. Brito, 794
P.2d. 1205 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Merritt, 446 N.E.2d at 777 (surrender, abandon-
ment, unfitness, persistent neglect or other extraordinary circumstances); Skeadas v.
Sklaroff, 122 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956); Kay v. Row-
land, 331 S.E.2d 781, 782 (S.C. 1985) (once the natural parent is deemed fit, the issue
of custody is decided); Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1983); Bailes
v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986); Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1985); In
re Custody of Stell, 783 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d
253 (W. Va. 1983); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1970).
10. Durkin, 442 N.W.2d at 152-53.
11. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
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dren over relatives and strangers, and where not detrimental to the
welfare of the children, they are paramount, and will be respected,
unless special circumstances demand that such rights be ignored.
Courts are very reluctant to take from the natural parents the cus-
tody of their child, and will not do so unless the parents have mani-
fested such indifference to its welfare as indicates a lack of inten-
tion to discharge the duties imposed by the laws of nature and of
the state to their offspring suitable to their station in life."a
This subordination of child rights to parental rights is repugnant to the
underlying rationale of custody determinations, the best interest of the
child. Where the presumption in favor of natural parents is not
grounded in the best interest of the child, it should fail.
In an earlier Arkansas Supreme Court decision13 involving a step-
parent, the Chancellor granted joint custody to the mother and steppar-
ent father upon a finding that both were fit parents. The parties had
married when the child, now five, was only three months old. The par-
ties shared custody of two children of their own. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that custody could be awarded to a step-
parent only where the natural parent was shown to be unfit. The court
cited the only statutory authority on point as requiring that custody
decisions be made "solely on the basis of the welfare and best interest
of the child . " Obviously, where the chancellor found both par-
ties to be fit and where the parties shared joint custody of their two
children, it is at least plausible that it might be in the child's best inter-
est to share custody with his natural mother and his stepfather, "the
only father that [the child] had ever known .... "15
The lower court's determination that joint custody with the natu-
ral mother and stepfather was in the child's best interest was ignored
and rendered moot by the Arkansas Supreme Court's insistence on the
blind application of the natural parent preference in the absence of pa-
rental unfitness. This decision was made in the face of a statute specifi-
cally requiring custody decisions to be made based on the best interests
of the child.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in Clifford v. Woodford, 6 was
presented with similar facts and law, yet reached the opposite result,
12. Schuh, 788 S.W.2d. at 741.
13. Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1988).
14. Id. at 935 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1987)).
15. Id.
16. 320 P.2d 452 (Ariz. 1957).
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affirming custody in the stepparent. The court in Clifford affirmed the
rule that the natural parent preference could be overcome only by
showing the parent to be unfit, but held that "[t]he children have rights
that we have consistently held to be superior to even the parents, in
that, the court will always look to their best interest in determining
their custody."17 The court found that the father's conduct showed "lit-
tle, if any, love or affection for . . .[or] interest in" 8 the children over
a twelve year period, and yet the court also stated that, "[n]othing
herein in any way reflects adversely upon the character, the morals or
the fine home and family of [the father]." 9 The court clearly applied a
best interest test while articulating a parental unfitness standard:
[W]e are of the view that Clifford's lack of interest in his children,
his indifference toward them and neglect of them, was such as to
justify the trial court in finding that to tear the children away from
the only genuine father they have ever really known and from
[step-siblings] whom they love as much as they love each other and
place them in the home of Clifford in an entirely strange environ-
ment would not be for their best interest and welfare, and we agree
that it might well produce scars upon their minds and hearts which
time could never efface. 20
At least one state, Georgia, not only requires a showing of present
parental unfitness to overcome the natural parent preference, but also
requires that the proof of present unfitness be shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 2' This standard prevents a court from awarding cus-
17. Id. at 455.
18. Id. at 458.
19. Id. at 460.
20. Id. at 458. This was a 3-2 decision in the Supreme Court of Arizona. The
dissent argued:
IT]he right of a parent to the care and custody of a child cannot be taken
away merely because the court ...may believe that some third person
can give the child better care and greater protection. One of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public
policy, is the right to care and custody of a minor child, and this right can
only be taken away from or denied a parent upon proof that the parent is
unfit to have such care and custody.
Id. at 460 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
21. In re R.L.L. and J.M.L., 373 S.E.2d 363, 364 (Ga. 1988) (citing Blackburn
v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d. 821 (Ga. 1982)). Georgia statutes, however, do provide that
"parental power [over a child] shall be lost by (1) voluntary contract releasing the
right to a third party." GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1(b)(1) (Michie 1991).
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tody to a third party, even when it is shown that to do so would be in
the overwhelming best interest of the child. The "clear and convincing"
standard has been applied in Georgia" even in the face of a statute
that expressly states that the proper test is "the best interest of the
child" where a third party petitions the court upon the death of one
parent.23 The Georgia Supreme Court has justified the higher standard
based on the "[s]tate's legitimate interest in protecting the child, yet
forestall[ing] arbitrary state interference with the integrity of the fam-
ily unit"2 ' as well as the need to protect against judicial arbitrariness
that might deny parental custody based on "a few isolated instances of
unusual conduct [or] ...idiosyncratic behavior."2 5 Delaware has gone
even farther in the direction of favoring parental rights. Delaware's
statute provides that custody shall not be granted to a third party with-
out first finding that the child is dependent or neglected and that the
child should not be placed in the custody of one of the parents. 26
The above justification is reasonable when parental custody is
challenged by the state2 or even a non-custodial third party, such as
well intentioned grandparents. Absent divorce or a related proceeding,
the court cannot deprive a parent of custody of a child without first
finding the parent to be unfit or to have neglected or abandoned the
child. It would be repugnant if courts were able to remove children
from the custody of their fit parents simply because someone who
wanted custody could prove themselves "more fit" than the parents.
The natural parent preference serves a useful purpose when applied in
contests between parents and third parties who have not "parented" the
child. The test fails, however, to adequately protect the child's best in-
terest when the custody dispute is between the natural parent and a
third party who has acted as the functional equivalent of a parent to
the child.
22. Bryant v. Wigley, 269 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. 1980).
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-2 (Michie 1991) provides: "[Ulpon the death of ei-
ther parent, the survivor is entitled to custody of the child; provided, however, that the
court, upon petition, may exercise discretion as to the custody of the child, looking
solely to the child's interest and welfare."
24. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d. at 825.
25. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982)).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(e) (Supp. 1990); Martin v. Sand, 444 A.2d
309, 314 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1982).
27. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987) (unwed father
sought custody of his child as against strangers seeking to adopt with mother's ap-
proval). The court stated, "[I]f he is fit he must prevail." Id.
19921
124




Abandonment of a child can result in loss of the natural parent
preference.2" Absent clear proof, courts are generally reluctant to find
abandonment. In Milligan v. English,29 the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, found insufficient evidence of abandonment even
though the mother had consented to a transfer of guardianship to the
third party, because the mother was "young, unmarried and immature
at the time her daughter was born ... ."30 The third party assured
the mother that the guardianship was revocable at any time and the
mother continued to have almost daily contact with her child. 31 Cus-
tody in the mother was affirmed.32
The Milligan opinion does not indicate the age of the child or the
length of time spent in the home of the third party. However, this was
clearly an important consideration in Bennett v. Jeffreys,33 where a fif-
teen-year-old unwed mother, under pressure from her family, trans-
ferred custody of her newborn to a family friend. Eight years later, now
twenty-three years old and about to graduate from college, the mother
sought custody of the child."' The New York Court of Appeals held
that, although there was no abandonment, the extended disruption of
custody created an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to overcome
the parental preference.3 5 The focus should be on what is best for the
child rather than whether the parent has been guilty of sufficiently cul-
pable behavior to deprive him or her of a right to custody.
3. Positive Detriment to the Child
Some states36 provide that the presumption in favor of the natural
28. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(e) (Supp. 1991); Matson, 639 P.2d at 302;
Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611 (Idaho 1989); Merritt v. Way, 446 N.E.2d 776,
777 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983); Skeadas v. Sklaroff, 122 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1956); Bailes v.
Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986); Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (Wis.
1984).
29. 518 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
30. Id. at 498.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
34. Id. at 280.
35. Id. at 283.
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b
(West Supp. 1991); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
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parent can be overcome by showing that parental custody would be
detrimental to the child. Louisiana,"7 by statute requires a showing that
parental custody would be detrimental to the child 8 and that an award
of custody to the third party would serve the child's best interests.3 9
Although the language of the statute applies only to custody disputes
incidental to divorce or judicial separation, the appellate courts of Lou-
isiana have both used the statute as a guideline, and found it to be
applicable in other custody disputes as well.40
In Hughes v. McKenzie,"' the Louisiana Court of Appeals af-
firmed an award of custody of a four-year-old child to third parties who
had cared for her all her life. The child had been voluntarily placed
with the third party, a cousin to the natural mother, at a time when the
natural mother and her husband' were experiencing marital difficul-
ties. The child had a stable home with the third parties."3 The court
chose to apply the two-pronged statutory test even though the custody
dispute was not incidental to a divorce proceeding."" In so doing, the
§ 752 (West Supp. 1991) (no parental preference where parental custody would place
the child in jeopardy as defined in tit. 22, § 4002(6)); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
14.01(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991); In re Guardianship of D.A.McW., 460 So. 2d 368
(Fla. 1984); In re Custody of Stell, 783 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
37. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 131 (West 1991).
38. The term "detrimental to the child" has been defined as including "parental
unfitness, neglect, abuse, abandonment, and forfeiture of parental rights, and is broad
enough to include any other circumstances, such as prolonged separation of the child
from its natural parents, that would cause the child to suffer substantial harm."
Hughes v. McKenzie, 539 So. 2d 965, 970 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Mark Moreau
& Chin-Chin Ho, Child Custody Awards to NonParents Under article 146(B), 33 Loy.
L. REV. 51, 59 (1987)).
39. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 131 (West 1991).
40. Hughes, 539 So. 2d at 969-70 (citing McManus v. McManus, 528 So. 2d
696 (La. Ct. App. 1988)); Diggs v. Tyler, 525 So. 2d 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Pounders v. Rouse, 528 So. 2d. 672 (La. Ct. App. 1988); In re Bourg, 501 So. 2d 862
(La. Ct. App. 1987); In re Custody of Reed, 497 So. 2d 1084 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Earls, 464 So. 2d 463 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
41. 539 So. 2d 965 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
42. 1d. at 966. The natural mother and her husband both believed that the hus-
band was not the biological father of the child although the mother and her husband
were married when the child was conceived and born.
43. Id. at 966-67. The cousin was married to her second husband at the time she
received custody of the child, then three days old. The cousin later married her third
husband. The child had lived with the cousin and her third and current husband for
most of her life.
44. Id. at 970.
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court found that an award of custody to the parents would be detri-
mental to the child based on "the significant trauma that Sophie would
suffer upon being abruptly and permanently removed from the McKen-
zie home, coupled with the real danger of being placed in a home of
doubtful stability with parents who had not demonstrated a significant
commitment . .. ."" Although custody was given to the third parties,
the natural parents were awarded liberal visitation and the court's or-
der specifically provided that the natural parents were not precluded
from seeking custody in the future.46
Alaska also recognizes "clear detriment" to the child's welfare as
a basis for overcoming the natural parent preference. The Alaska
courts have read the requirement broadly to focus on the child's needs
rather than the parent's shortcomings. In Buness v. Gillen, 7 the Su-
preme Court of Alaska noted that "severing the bond between the psy-
chological parent and the child may well be clearly detrimental to the
child's welfare. '48 This approach represented a shift in focus from ear-
lier cases as evidenced by the court's quoting approvingly from the dis-
sent in a 1982 appellate opinion:
[H]ere, stability itself may be the most salient consideration. To
remove Shannon from the only stable home environment she has
known would sever her bond to her "psychological parent", and to
her "siblings." Such considerations are sufficient, in my view, to
establish a showing of clear detriment.' 9
This is the proper direction for the court to take. It recognizes the pa-
rental preference, but not at the expense of the child's interests.
The Texas legislature has been moving in the opposite direction.
The relevant statute previously provided that the natural parent prefer-
ence could be overcome by a showing that parental custody would not
be in the child's best interest.50 The statute was amended in 1987 to
provide that the natural parent presumption could be rebutted by show-
ing that parental custody would not be in the child's best interest "be-
cause the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical
45. Id. at 971.
46. Id.
47. 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989).
48. Id. at 989 n.8.
49. Matson v. Matson, 639 P.2d 298, 302 (Alaska 1982) (Compton, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
50. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (West 1986).
[Vol. 16
127
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Richards
health or emotional development." '51 The Supreme Court of Texas in-
terpreted this amendment as "a significant change greatly strengthen-
ing the parental presumption . "... 5 As the court stated, there may
be a number of reasons why parental custody might not be in the
child's best interest, but now only a showing of significant impairment
of the child's physical health or emotional development is sufficient to
rebut the parental presumption."
The Texas Supreme Court reversed both lower courts in Lewelling
v. Lewelling, and ordered the trial court to grant custody to the
mother. 4 The lower courts had been persuaded by the following facts:
the mother was unemployed, lived in a small house with her mother
and other family members, had previously visited the state hospital for
alleged mental problems, failed to see her child for two months after
her husband beat her and took their child to his parents' house, and
had continued to see her husband following the abuse and testified that
she might consider reconciliation if he sought counseling. 55 The su-
preme court found no evidence that parental custody would impair the
child emotionally or physically. 6 This obviously is not the same as find-
ing that parental custody would be in the child's best interest.
The Supreme Court of Florida has also interpreted the natural
parent preference narrowly to protect parental rights on the theory
that, "[t]o hold otherwise would permit improper governmental inter-
ference with the rights of natural parents who are found fit to have
custody of and raise their children."57 In In re Guardianship of
D.A.McWl, 58 the unwed father petitioned the court for custody of his
child after the mother's death. The mother and child had been living
with the :maternal grandmother who also sought custody of the child. 9
The trial court found the father to be fit but also found that the best
interest of the child would be served by giving custody to the grand-
mother who had cared for the child and in whose home the child had
always lived.60 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed custody in the
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
52. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990).
53. Id.
54. ld. at 168-69.
55. Id. at 165.
56. Id. at 167.
57. In re Guardianship of D.A.McW., 460 So. 2d at 370.
58. 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984).
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father, citing the natural parent preference rule which the court said
was "older than the common law itself."'61 Having "parented" the
child, the grandmother should have received the protection of the pa-
rental preference. If the court had adopted this rationale, it would have
determined custody according to the child's best interest, just as it
would have done had the dispute been between two natural parents.
The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals did find sufficient
evidence of detriment to the child in the case of a fourteen-year-old girl
who had lived with a woman for thirteen years after her father killed
her mother.62 The father sought custody upon his release from prison,
having cut all ties with the child while incarcerated. 63 The third party
was awarded custody and the father received reasonable visitation priv-
ileges.64 Obviously, this was not a proper case for parental custody, yet
cases should not have to be this extreme for the court to award custody
to a third party.
4. Absence of Stable and Wholesome Home
Hawaii recognizes the natural parent presumption but extends its
protection to "any person who has had de facto custody of the child."6 5
The statute further provides that the presumption may be overcome by
a showing of unfitness or by proof that the home "is not stable and
wholesome." '66 Hawaii comes closest to applying the approach advo-
cated in this article.
5. Best Interest of the Child
Other states6 7 provide that the parental presumption can be over-
61. Id. at 370.
62. Simmons v. Pinkney, 587 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Id. at 523.
64. Id. at 524-25.
65. HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(2) (1990).
66. In re Guardianship of Doe, 786 P.2d 519, 523 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990)(citing
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(l) (1990)).
67. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 28 (Supp. 1991) (may award custody to third party
if it seems expedient or for the benefit of the children); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.25 (Supp. 1991) (clear and convincing proof required); Mo. REv. STAT. §
452.375(2) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04(D)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 21.1(A)
(Supp. 1992); Durkin, 442 N.W.2d at 152-53; In re B.W.D., 725 S.W.2d 138, 139
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); In re Grover, 681 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1984); Commonwealth ex rel.
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come by a showing that parental custody is not in the child's best inter-
ests. The Supreme Court of Colorado in Root v. Allen" recognized a
presumption in favor of the natural parent but found that the presump-
tion could be overcome by a determination that the child's best inter-
ests would not be served by placing custody with the natural parent.
There was no requirement that the parent be shown to be unfit. In fact,
the father had been determined to be a fit and proper person to have
custody.'3 The court determined, however, that the best interests of the
child would be served by allowing her to remain with her stepfather
and his new wife. The court's determination was based on the fact that
the child had lived with the stepfather most of her life and that she,
"for all practical purposes, was the true daughter of [the
stepfather] .",70
Iowa recognizes a natural parent preference that is statutorily
mandated but which can be overcome by a showing that such place-
ment is not in the child's best interest.7' In Painter v. Bannister7 2 the
father left his five-year-old son with the maternal grandparents follow-
ing the death of the mother. Sixteen months later, after remarrying,
the father sought the return of his son. The grandparents were found to
provide "a stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middle-west
background and an opportunity for a college education and profession,
if [the child] desires it."17 ' The father, on the other hand, was found to
offer "more freedom of conduct and thought with an opportunity to
develop his individual talents. It would be more exciting and challeng-
Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (required convincing reasons
that child'; interest would be served); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 94 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1984); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970).
68. 377 P.2d. 117 (Co. 1962). The natural father brought this habeas corpus
proceeding to obtain custody of his daughter following the death of the natural mother.
Id. at 118.
69. Id. at 119. The trial court found that the father had faithfully paid child
support as ordered by the court, had remarried and had "an adequate and desirable
home in California". Id. On the other hand, he did not write or send birthday or
Christmas gifts and visited his daughter only once for an hour and a half, introducing
himself as a family friend. The trial court found that the father "abandoned his obliga-
tions as father . . .[e]ven if he did so in the belief that it was for the best interest of
the child". Id.
70. Id. at 121. The holding of Root v. Allen was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court of Colorado recently in Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1989).
71. IOWA STAT. §§ 633.559, 598.41(6) (Supp. 1991).
72. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
73. Id. at 154.
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ing in many respects, but romantic, impractical and unstable."'7' More-
over, the court concluded that the father's home would be "unstable,
unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulat-
ing." 7 5 The father was found to be fit, but the Supreme Court of Iowa,
nevertheless, awarded custody to the maternal grandparents upon a
finding that return of custody to the father was "likely to have a seri-
ously disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child's development. 76
Although the court articulated a fairly strict standard for overcoming
the natural parent preference, the case can be criticized as one in
which the court applied its own value system and engaged in social
engineering at the expense of the nuclear family. The case also illus-
trates the dilemma of young parents who are forced by circumstances
to call upon third parties for temporary custodial services but who do
so at the risk of losing custody of their children to those very persons
the parents turned to for help.
Later opinions from the Supreme Court of Iowa are more respon-
sive to this criticism regarding the plight of parents who need help in
caring for their children but who face possible loss of custody by ac-
cepting that help. In 1985, In re Guardianship of Stewart,7 the court
stated:
[O]ur cases have emphasized that parents should be encouraged in
time of need to look for help in caring for their children without
risking loss of custody. The presumption preferring parental cus-
tody is not overcome by a mere showing that such assistance was
obtained. Nor is it overcome by showing that those who provided
the assistance love the children and would provide them with a
good home. These circumstances are not alone sufficient to over-
come the preference .... 78
This stricter standard was easily met in Smith v. Holt,79 where the
parent was denied custody. In this case, the father was found to be an
alcoholic and never to have shown a real interest in the child. He was
twenty-nine and single at the time of trial, living with his parents after
74. Id.
75. Id. at 156.
76. Id.
77. 369 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1985).
78. Id. at 823 (quoting In re Guardianship of Sams, 256 N.W.2d. 570, 573
(Iowa 1977)); accord In re Burney, 259 N.W. 2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977).
79. 225 N.W.2d 906 (Iowa 1975).
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three marriages, publishing a "swinger" magazine and working as a
night watchman, despite having a college degree and a teaching
certificate.80
The Iowa Supreme Court in Painter and Smith seems to be apply-
ing a more stringent test for overcoming the natural parent preference
than that set forth by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Root. It was
sufficient to overcome the presumption in Root simply by showing that
the welfare of the child would not be promoted by custody with the
natural parent. In contrast, the Iowa court stated that the best interest
test would prevail over the natural parent preference "if the return of
custody to the father is likely to have a seriously disrupting and dis-
turbing effect upon the child's development .... "-81 Conversely, the
court in Root went on to state that returning custody to the natural
parent "would be extremely detrimental to the child and would likely
result in permanent damage to her personality and development." 82 As
a practical matter, the courts in Iowa and Colorado may be applying
very similar tests, although the rhetoric is different.
A Michigan statute83 provides that custody disputes will be de-
cided by the best interest standard and presumes that the best interests
of the child are served by parental custody unless the contrary is shown
by clear and convincing evidence. That burden was met in Prawdzik v.
Hiner,8" where custody was awarded to the grandparents with whom
the five-year-old child had lived since he was three months old.
6. Finding the Welfare of the Child so Requires
Although the Alaska Supreme Court recognizes a common law
preference in favor of the natural parent, it has allowed the courts to
consider the child's interests over the parents' rights in cases involving
third parties. The natural parent preference can be overcome by show-
ing that "the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive
custody."85
In Buness v. Gillen, the third party had lived with the child and
80. Id. at 909.
81. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
82. Root, 377 P.2d. at 121.
83. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.25 (Supp. 1991).
84. 454 N.W. 2d 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
85. Buness, 781 P.2d at 989 (quoting Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055
(Alaska 1975)); see also Phillips v. Choplin, 309 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(court awarded custody of children to maternal grandmother).
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his mother and had fathered the child's stepsister.8 6 The third party
had been the primary custodian of the child for most of his life and had
developed a close bond with the child over a ten year period."" The
Alaska Supreme Court, in reversing a summary judgment in favor of
the mother and remanding for further proceedings, commented as
follows:
We conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the welfare of the child requires that Tim receive custody.
There is evidence in the record in the form of a report by a school
psychologist as to a highly emotional response by Tucker upon
learning that he was to be taken out of Tim's home. This points to
the strong emotional bond that may have developed between Tim
and Tucker over the past ten years. During this period Tim has
been Tucker's primary care-giver and father figure."
The court concluded that the foregoing facts raised a genuine issue of
material fact such that the case should not have been resolved on sum-
mary judgment. 89
7. Voluntary Forfeiture
Some states recognize voluntary forfeiture as one of the limited
grounds for overcoming the natural parent preference.90 Nebraska has
read a forfeiture provision into a statute that purports only to apply a
best interest standard. The Nebraska statute dealing with custody of
minors in divorce actions states that the appropriate test to be applied
is the best interest of the child.91 The Supreme Court of Nebraska,
however, has interpreted the best interest test to include "due regard
86. Buness, 781 P.2d at 986.
87. Id. at 989. The third party also contributed 99% of the financial support for
both children. Id. at 986.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992); Ex parte Mathews,
428 So. 2d 58 (Ala. 1983); Glass v. Bailey, 118 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1954); Peterson v.
Peterson, 399 N.W.2d 792 (Neb. 1987); Merritt v. Way, 446 N.E.2d 776 (N.Y. 1983);
Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986); Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d 253, 255 (W. Va.
1983) (where parent has "waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has perma-
nently transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody").
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1)(1988).
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for superior rights of a fit, proper and suitable parent."" The Supreme
Court of Nebraska has determined that proper recognition of the supe-
rior rights of parents prohibits courts from depriving the natural parent
of custody absent a showing of unfitness or forfeiture of parental
rights." Such interpretation is certainly not mandated by the statute
which mentions only a best interest standard. In fact, the requirement
that a court must give custody to the parent absent a showing of unfit-
ness or forfeiture, might prevent the court from acting in the child's
best interest in a given case. For example, as was pointed out in the
dissent in Nielsen v. Nielsen, it is conceivable that it would be in the
child's best interest not to be placed in the custody of a terminally ill
parent who is unable fully to parent. Yet, under the court's test, cus-
tody could not be denied without first finding the dying parent to be
",unfit."9
'
8. Absence of Parental Characteristics
In Utah, the natural parent preference is based on:
[t]he common experience of mankind, which teaches that parent
and child normally share a strong attachment or bond for each
other, that a natural parent will normally sacrifice personal interest
and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is
normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to
win the confidence and love of the child than anyone else.95
The presumption cannot be rebutted merely by showing that the
third party would be a better custodian. Instead, the third party must
show that the parent presently lacks all three characteristics which
form the basis of the presumption, i.e., "that no strong mutual bond
exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice
his or her own interest and welfare for the child's and that the parent
lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is charac-
92. Peterson, 399 N.W.2d at 797 (quoting Nielsen v. Nielsen, 296 N.W.2d at
488).
93. Peterson, 399 N.W. 2d at 797; see also Ex parte Mathews, 428 So. 2d 58
(Ala. 1983) (unfitness or voluntary forfeiture).
94. 296 N.W.2d 483, 489 (Neb. 1980) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part, and
dissenting in part).
95. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) (quoting Walton v. Coffman, 169
P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1946)).
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teristic of parents generally." 9 If the presumption is rebutted, the stan-
dard to be applied to the custody determination is the best interest
test.97
9. Inability to Care For Child
Wisconsin statutes provide that the natural parent is entitled to
custody unless the parent is unable to care for the child.98 In Barstad v.
Frazier,99 the mother was sixteen-years-old and living with her father
when the child was born. 100 The trial court awarded custody to the
grandmother, based in part on several periods of separation between
mother and child. 10' The supreme court reversed finding that the peri-
ods of separation reflected not neglect of parental responsibilities or
lack of interest in the child's welfare, but rather "the efforts of a very
young mother to establish her own home which included her son."102
10. Loss of Physical Custody in Parent
The natural parent preference may be lost by surrendering physi-
cal custody to a non-parent in those jurisdictions 0 3 that have adopted
96. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 41; see also Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479
(Wis. 1984) (persistent neglect of parental responsibilities).
97. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 41.
98. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West Supp. 1991). "[P]arents have a pre-
eminent right to the custody of their children absent a finding of unfitness, inability or
compelling reasons due to dissolution of the parent-child relationship or dereliction of
parental responsibilities." Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 487.
99. 348 N.W. 2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
100. Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 489, n.10.
101. Id. at 489.
102. Id.
103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-331(B)(2) (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
123(l)(b) (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 601(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1991); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-4-211(4)(b) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp. 1991) (Although
statute mandates application of the best interest test where the child is not in the physi-
cal custody of a parent or where there is an allegation of parental unfitness, the court
interpreted this to mean that the parent has a right to custody of the child unless the
parent is shown to be unfit or it is shown that placement with the parent would be
detrimental to the child's growth and development. Stell, 783 P.2d at 619). See also
Stockwell, 775 P.2d at 614 (child had been in the custody of a third party for an
appreciable period of time and thereby developed a bond with that person); Barstad,
348 N.W.2d at 489 (extended disruption of parental custody).
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section .401(d)(2) the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).0
The UMDA at section 402 provides that all determinations of custody
under the act will be made pursuant to the best interest of the child
standard.10 5 The natural parent preference is preserved in divorce ac-
tions under the UMDA by virtue of section 401 which provides that
only parents have standing to bring a custody petition, unless the child
"is not in the physical custody of one of his parents."10 6 Thus, the court
must give custody to a parent under the best interest analysis, so long
as the child is in the physical custody of a fit parent.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has narrowly construed the defini-
tion of "physical custody" in order to protect the natural parent prefer-
ence. In In re Custody of Peterson,"'0 the parents and their child had
lived with the maternal grandparents prior to their divorce. Thereafter,
the mother and the child returned to the home of the maternal grand-
parents where the child remained until the mother's death. 08 The ma-
ternal grandparents refused to release the child to the father who lived
on the same block, regularly exercised visitation and was found to be a
fit parent in the divorce proceedings. 0 9 The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the standing requirement "should not turn on who is in physi-
cal possession, so to speak, of the child at the moment of filing the
petition for custody. To hold differently would be to encourage abduc-
tion of minors in order to satisfy the literal terms of the standing re-
quirement . ".... 11 In Peterson, the mother had legal custody of the
child and remained with the child in the grandparents' home until her
death and, thus, the court held, never lost physical custody of the
child."' Consequently, there was not a loss of physical custody suffi-
cient to overcome the natural parent preference. The father thus pre-
vailed in the custody dispute against the maternal grandparents and the
court never reached the question of what would be in the child's best
interests.
Arizona's Supreme Court has also construed the UMDA to pro-
tect the natural parent preference by holding that where the child is in
104. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
105. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
106. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 147
(1987).
107. 491 N.E.2d 1150 (Il1. 1986).
108. Id. at 1151.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1152-53.
Ill. Id. at 1153.
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the physical custody of a parent, the court may not grant custody to a
third party, even where the petition for a change in custody is properly
brought by the other parent. In Marshall v. Superior Court,12 the di-
vorce decree gave custody to the mother. When the mother later filed
for permission to leave the jurisdiction, the father sought a change in
custody. The trial court gave custody to the paternal grandmother on
the theory that a third party could be granted custody under the best
interest test if the petition was initially filed by a parent."' The Su-
preme Court of Arizona reversed, noting the difference between the
custody provisions contained in the domestic relations laws and those
found in the juvenile code, stating that:
[t]he domestic relations provisions are concerned primarily with
custody disputes between parents, or disputes involving other per-
sons where there is no longer a custodial parent. The juvenile code,
however, deals with the narrower issues of neglect and abuse and
involves the interests of the state in the well being and welfare of
children."'
The court thus concluded that while the petition for change of custody
was properly brought by one parent, the court was not free to deter-
mine custody on a best interest basis between the mother and the third
party, so long as the mother had custody of the child.
The UMDA standard addresses most situations in which a third
party has acted as a parent toward the child because generally the par-
ent will have surrendered physical custody. This would not be true,
however, in the case of a stepparent third party, living with the child
and parent, prior to divorce from or death of the custodial parent. The
UMDA standard has an additional weakness in that the "loss of physi-
cal custody" in the natural parent required by the act, can be narrowly
construed by the court to preserve the natural parent preference in
cases where the child has been in the actual physical care of a third
person but the court finds that physical custody remains in the parent.
11. Extraordinary Circumstances or Omnibus Clauses
Some states'" have a catch all phrase for rebutting the parental
112. 701 P.2d 567 (Ariz. 1985).
113. Id. at 570.
114. Id. at 569.
115. Ross v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582 (Md. 1977) (exceptional circumstances as
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preference that gives the court a great deal more latitude. New York
uses the phrase, "other extraordinary circumstance."' 16 An extraordi-
nary circumstance was found to exist in Bennett v. Jeffreys,'1 7 based on
disrupted custody over the eight year life of the child. The court em-
phasized, however, that a finding of extraordinary circumstance did
not, alone, justify awarding custody to the third party; it merely rebut-
ted the parental preference. " 8 The court must now determine what
custody arrangement would best serve the child's interests.11 9
North Dakota's statute concerning custody determination declares
the best interest test to be applicable in all cases.120 The supreme court,
however, has construed best interests to include a presumption in favor
of the natural parent, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. 121
The cou:rt cannot award custody to a third party under the best interest
test unless the court first finds "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to
trigger the best interest test.122 In Worden, 23 the trial court awarded
the stepfather custody of his child and the wife's daughter, who was not
his natural child. Exceptional circumstances were found to exist based
on the mother's unstable lifestyle in that she:
[i]s currently unemployed and relies primarily on public assistance
for her source of income. She has had four separate residences
since the separation; an apartment that was condemned, a mobile
home from which she was evicted for failure to pay rent, and a
residence which she shared with eleven other persons, including her
children and a boyfriend. [The mother] now resides alone with her
make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child); Merritt, 446 N.E. at
777 (extraordinary circumstance); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989)
(extraordinary circumstance); Hruby v. Hruby, 748 P.2d 57 (Or. 1987) (en banc)
(compelling or cogent reasons to the contrary); Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d
at 670 (extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child); Bailes v. Sours,
340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986) (special facts and circumstances [that] constitute extraordi-
nary reasons to take the child from the parents); Paquette, 499 A.2d at 30 ("[I]f a
stepparent stands in loco parentis to a child . . . custody . . . may be awarded to the
stepparent if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circum-
stances exist to warrant such . . . and that it is in the best interests of the child.").
116. Merritt, 446 N.E.2d at 777.
117. 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
118. Id. at 283.
119. Id.
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1991).
121. Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989).
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two children in a one-bedroom apartment." '
The stepfather, on the other hand, "has a more stable lifestyle . . . and
he has the facilities and resources, such as a home, a motor vehicle, and
employment, suitable for providing care for minor children.' 25
In reversing the trial court and awarding custody to the mother,
the supreme court noted that, "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances the
natural parent is entitled to custody of the child even though the third
party may be able to offer more amenities." '126 The real issue, however,
was whether exceptional circumstances existed here.
The supreme court opined that it had not tried to define "excep-
tional circumstances" narrowly in prior cases, but that in those cases
where such were found, there had also existed a psychological parent
relationship between the child and the third party.127 None was found
to exist here in that the child was four-years-old when the parties mar-
ried and she was not yet six when they separated. 28 She had, with
minor exceptions, always been in the care and custody of her mother. 12
Whether there were sufficient circumstances present to warrant a juve-
nile court proceeding regarding the mother's fitness, the court held was
an issue not properly before the court. 30
A review of the foregoing eleven bases for overcoming the natural
parent preference in custody disputes involving third parties illustrates
the difficulties faced by the courts, litigants, attorneys and legislatures.
Some state legislatures have passed best interests standards, only to
have those interpreted as strict parental preference standards. Other
courts have articulated a strict parental standard, only to find it rebut-
ted by a minimal showing of unfitness. These manipulations are often
attempts to protect the best interests of the child, but this is not univer-
sally true. It would better serve the interests of the child and of society
if the courts and legislatures would address the issue directly and allow
the court to make a custody determination based on the child's best
interest where the third party has acted as a parent to the child.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342.
127. Id. at 342-43.
128. Id. at 342.
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III. THE STANDING ISSUE
A decision that the third party lacks standing precludes considera-
tion of the proper standard to be applied in custody disputes between
natural parents and third parties. The lack of standing argument seems
to have found the most success in cases involving lesbian partners 8'
and third parties who have not had physical custody of the child.' 32
Some courts 38 have held that the third party lacks standing to
petition the court for custody because he or she does not meet the stat-
utory definition of parent. Some courts have recognized standing in
grandparents134 and stepparents, based on their status as stepparents
and their statutory duty of support.' Other courts allow third parties
to bring custody petitions, but only where the child is not in the physi-
cal custody of a parent, 3 6 or where the parent has been found unfit.' 37
Still other courts allow suit to be brought by any non-parent who has a
significant connection with the child, 8' and some states recognize
standing in any third party." 9
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) advocates al-
lowing third parties to bring custody petitions only where the child is
131. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1990) (based on
the state's version of the Uniform Parentage Act); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (seeking visitation only).
132. In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. 1986).
133. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520.
134. Guma v. Guma, 518 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Barstad v. Fra-
zier, 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
135. NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.044(1) (1986); Fisher v. Fisher, 670 P.2d 572 (Nev.
1983); In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 716 (Utah 1990) (holding the stepparent is not
entitled to the benefit of the natural parent presumption).
136. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-331(B)(2) (1991); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
123(1)(b) (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 601(2) (Smith-Hurd 1991); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.420(4)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
211(4)(b) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp. 1991).
137. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(4)(3)(b) (1991). See Knight v. Fulton, 773
S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Grandmother had no standing to intervene absent
finding that both parents were unfit, unsuitable or unable to be a custodian, or that the
welfare o' the child required placement with third party, relying on Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.375(4)(3)(a) (1991)); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp. 1991) (requires
only an allegation that neither parent is a suitable custodian).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1991).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-57 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
558A.10 (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.156(b) (West Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(20) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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not in the physical custody of a parent.140 This approach preserves the
natural parent preference where the child is in the physical custody of
a parent. Any third party attempting to obtain custody would have to
overcome the presumption in favor of the natural parent. If the child is
not in the physical custody of a parent, a third party may be considered
for custody as against the parent under the best interest standard."'
Otherwise, the Act suggests that third party "must commence proceed-
ings under the far more stringent standards for intervention provided in
the typical Juvenile Court Act." 1 2
The approach advocated in this article modifies the UMDA posi-
tion by adding a definition of parent that includes, in addition to the
biological parents, any person who, without pay, becomes a psychologi-
cal parent to the child. This approach excludes paid caretakers, but
includes all others who have developed a strong parental bond with a
child.
Recognizing standing in third parties serves the interests of judi-
cial economy, since the third parties would otherwise have to bring a
separate proceeding in those cases where the parental skills fall below
legal standards for retaining custody of one's child."43
IV. THE BEST INTEREST TEST
It has been argued that "courts should not favor one prospective
custodian solely because that person is the biological parent of the child
• . . [but should] . . . resolve the question of custody in every case
with a determination of the child's best interests.""' Courts and legis-
lators have resisted that advice for good reason. In fact, every state
recognizes a natural parent presumption to some degree. The problem
140. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550
(1991).
141. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1991).
142. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 401 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 550
(1991); see also Marshall v. Superior Court, 701 P.2d. 567, 570 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc)
(Even though petition for change of custody was properly commenced by the father,
court could not then award custody to third party under the best interest standard.
Third party seeking custody would have to petition the juvenile court for custody and
meet its more stringent tests.); In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150 (I11. 1986)
(grandparents' assistance in caring for child in their home while the mother was ill did
not constitute loss of physical custody in the mother).
143. Guma v. Guma, 518 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
144. Eric Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in
Custody Disputes be in Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539 (1991).
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is one of balancing the presumption against the best interest test in a
way that truly will best serve the child's interest.
Some statutes14 5 mandate application of a best interest standard in
custody disputes between third parties and natural parents. Some
courts,1"6 however, have continued to apply the natural parent prefer-
ence under the guise of interpreting the best interest standard. The
Washington legislature recently passed a comprehensive statute1 7 deal-
ing with custody actions between natural parents and third parties. The
statute provides that petitions may be brought by third parties "if the
child is not in the physical custody of one of its parents or if the peti-
tioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian."'1 48 The stat-
ute clearly states that "[t]he court shall determine custody in accor-
dance with the best interests of the child."' 4 The appellate court
interpreted "best interest of the child" to mean that the parent has a
right to custody of the child unless the parent is shown to be unfit or it
is shown that placement with the parent would be detrimental to the
child's growth and development. 50
The Tennessee statute provides that in a divorce or related pro-
ceeding, the court may award custody to either or both of the parties or
to "some suitable person, as the welfare and interest of the child or
children may demand".'' The statute appears on its face to adopt the
best interest test in lieu of the natural parent preference. The Tennes-
see Court of Appeal, however, has held, despite the statutory language,
that a grant of custody to a third party is improper, absent a showing
that neither parent is a suitable custodian. 52
Although the natural parent preference has its shortcomings, it
does have some advantages that are lost by eliminating it altogether
and simply adopting the best interest test. Among the advantages are
judicial economy and judicial restraint.
145. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1)
(Supp. 1991).
146. In re Guardianship of J.R.G., 708 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1985); Moore v. Moore,
386 S.E.2d 456 (S.C. 1989); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); In
re Custody of Steil, 783 P.2d 615 (Wash. 1989).
147. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.010 - .913 (Supp. 1991).
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp. 1991).
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.100 (Supp. 1991).
150. Stell, 783 P.2d at 619.
151. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (1991).
152. Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
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The best interest approach lacks the advantages of judicial econ-
omy, predictability, and consistency that result from the use of a pre-
sumption. A wide open best interest test would allow petitions by third
parties who have not parented the child but who simply disapprove of
the parent's lifestyle or parenting skills or who think they can better
provide for the child. Under a best interest test, no attorney can predict
with any accuracy what the outcome will be in any given case. Every
case must be given a full hearing on the merits with no presumption in
favor of any party. Such a rule would make settlements almost impossi-
ble and would likely overwhelm the courts with litigation, a result that
is, itself, probably not in the child's best interest.
No two custody cases are alike. Courts can and must exercise a
great deal of discretion in making custody decisions. The natural par-
ent preference serves to curtail that discretion to some extent. That can
run counter to the child's interests as has already been demonstrated.
But, the presumption can also serve to protect the child's interest by
restraining the court from making social policy decisions that deprive a
parent of custody based only on the court's disapproval of a parent's
nontraditional life style or values or based on a misguided attempt to
place a child in a "better home" provided by third parties.
The best interest test and the natural parent preference both pur-
port to protect the child's interests. Yet, each may, in some circum-
stances, fail to do so by being overly broad as in the case of the best
interest test, and by being overly restrictive as in the case of the natural
parent preference. The approach suggested below attempts to combine
the advantages of both the best interest test and the natural parent
preference, to the extent that each is consistent with the child's best
interest.
V. A NEW APPROACH
The natural parent preference is not without its advantages. As
noted earlier, it protects the sanctity of the parent-child relationship,
and, like all presumptions, promotes judicial economy. Generally, the
natural parent preference and the best interest of the child test coin-
cide. Problems arise when someone, not a biological parent, establishes
a parental relationship with the child. A strict application of the natu-
ral parent preference in such a case might run counter to the child's
best interests. The approach suggested here simply expands the defini-
tion of parent and, thus, the application of the parental preference to
anyone who has a parental relationship with the child. Each "parent"
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would enjoy a rebuttable presumption that granting custody to them
would be in the best interest of the child. If more than one person
meets the definition of parent, the preference would not be determina-
tive, and the court would then award custody based on the best interest
of the child, as between the two or more "parents".
To date, only one court has adopted this approach. The Superior
Court of New Jersey, in Zack v. Fiebert,53 involved a dispute between
the maternal grandparents and the stepfather who had adopted the
children while married to their mother, who later died. The court first
determined that the supreme court had not yet "enunciated a standard
to be applied in custody actions other than those involving both natural
parents." 5 " Faced with a case of first impression, the appellate court
reviewed other decisions in the state and determined that "the standard
to be applied depends upon the status of the third party vis a vis the
natural parent and the child."1 55 Usually a custody petition brought by
a third party is more like a termination proceeding in that it "destroys
any pretense of a normal parent-child relationship and eliminates
nearly all of the natural incidents of parenthood including the everyday
care and nurturing which are part and parcel of the bond between a
parent and child."' 5 Thus, the standard to be applied should be one of
unfitness.1 57 The court held, however, that where the third party
"stands in the shoes of a parent to the child . . . he or she should be
accorded the status of a natural parent.' 58 In such case the standard
would be a best interest test.159
It could be argued that the natural parent preference is necessary
to protect and preserve the sanctity of the parent-child relationship and
to prevent court abuses such as denying custody to a parent with an
alternate life style or nontraditional parenting ideas. In fact, the natu-
ral parent preference, arguably, has not served this purpose, even in
those states that strongly adhere to the preference, rebutted only by
proof of abandonment or parental unfitness. 60
153. 563 A.2d 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id. at 63.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Zack, 563 A.2d at 63.
159. Id. The grandparents did not have a parent-child relationship with the chil-
dren and so were subject to the unfitness standard. The father was awarded custody.
160. 'White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990). Trial court found les-
bian mother unfit. Mississippi Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether mother's
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Absent some justification for terminating parental rights, the court
in awarding physical custody to the third party should consider award-
ing liberal visitation to the natural parent in order to allow the parent-
child bond to develop and grow. An award of custody to a third party
does not preclude a later change of custody to the natural parent. Such
award simply allows the court to make a determination that is consis-
tent with the child's best interests, at present. 161
By retaining jurisdiction to review the custody determination con-
sistent with the child's best interest, rather than first requiring changed
circumstances, the court is better able to serve the child's need to have
both present stability in the home of a third party and an ongoing rela-
tionship with one's natural parent. Custody could then be changed to
the natural parent in the future when circumstances warrant. This ap-
proach is particularly helpful where the parent has to call on others to
care for a child because of temporary conditions that cause the parent
to be unable to fulfill their parental duties. It may not be in the child's
best interest to change custody back to the parent simply because the
parent is now fit and wants the child. The child's best interests may be
served by continuing custody in the third party with liberal visitation to
the parent and a later review by the court. The child's welfare may be
promoted by changing custody to the natural parent at a later point
when the parent-child bond has developed and the parent has demon-
sexual preference alone supported a finding of unfitness by holding that evidence of her
neglect of the children was sufficient to show unfitness. Id. The dissent argued that
there was evidence of neglect but no more than would be expected. Id. at 1185.
[W]here a twenty-four year old mother with but a high school diploma
and no independent means has been in effect deserted by a drunken hus-
band who has provided not a penny in support. The poor are much with us,
and sadly many of these are young women with children and without sup-
port. I had not thought heretofore we regarded this grounds for taking
these children from their mothers. If the neglect found here is to become
the standard, I dare say few of our economically disadvantaged citizens
will find their children secure from grandparents who engage skilled
counsel.
In point of fact [the mother's] "neglect" played little, if any, part in
motivating [the grandparents] to bring this action. Their concern was their
objection to [mother's] lesbian relationship.
Id. at 1185 (Robertson, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
161. The trial court in Hughes v. McKenzie indicated in the decree that "the
judgment . . . does not preclude the [natural parents] from later gaining custody of
[the child]." 539 So. 2d 965, 971 (La. Ct. App. 1989). "The custody plan developed by
the judge provides for continuing contact between [the child] and her parents, to allow
bonds to develop between them." Id.
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strated his or her fitness.162 The emphasis always should be on the
child's needs - for both stability and strong bonds to the natural par-
ents. The court should not be forced or allowed to choose between these
goals.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina articulated four factors to
be considered in making custody determinations when a natural parent
seeks to reclaim custody of his child:
1) The parent must prove that he is a fit parent, able to properly
care for the child and provide a good home.
2) The amount of contact, in the form of visits, financial support or
both, which the parent had with the child while it was in the care
of a third party.
3) The circumstances under which temporary relinquishment
occurred.
4) The degree of attachment between the child and the temporary
custodian. 6
These factors attempt to balance the competing interests discussed
above in a way that continues to protect the child's needs.
VI. WHO PARENTS?
Perhaps the most difficult issue in articulating this new approach is
deciding where and how to draw the line between third parties who are
entitled to the parental preference and those that are not. Persons who
are paid custodians, clearly, should be eliminated. It is conceivable that
a paid caretaker could have such complete responsibility for a child
that a parental relationship could develop. The caretaker should not,
however, be considered for custody on that basis alone. Otherwise, par-
ents would risk loss of custody if their child developed a close relation-
ship with the caretaker. Likewise, parties who are not custodians
should not qualify. These parties have not developed a parental rela-
tionship with the child. This will eliminate claims by relatives of a de-
ceased spouse who have not had custody of the child but who seek cus-
tody in order to protect their access to the child or because of their
disapproval of the surviving spouse. These non-custodial third parties
would have to rebut the natural parent preference by some showing of
parental unfitness of the surviving spouse in order to obtain custody.
162. Moore, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
163. Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
1992]
146
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
Third parties who have had physical custody of the child pursuant
to a court order should qualify for the parental preference. Kansas has
long held that the natural parent preference can be overcome only by a
showing of unfitness. 164 This rule has been codified as well.16 5 Yet, the
parental preference had been held inapplicable where the third party
obtained custody of the children pursuant to a court order.166 In In re
Criqui, the Kansas Court of Appeal held that the parental preference
doctrine "entitles a fit parent, who is willing and able to care for his or
her child, to custody of the child as against others who have no perma-
nent or legal right to custody.' 6 7 Thus, the doctrine was not control-
ling in a suit brought by the mother to regain custody of her children
who had been voluntarily placed in the custody of third parties, pursu-
ant to a court order. Instead the standard to be applied by the court
was whether a change of custody would materially promote the child's
welfare.'68
A more difficult question arises as to custodians who lack parental
permission or may even act in direct defiance of a court order. Cer-
tainly this type of behavior should not be encouraged or condoned.
However, if the critical question to be resolved is the child's best inter-
est, then the court should not be unduly hampered by restrictions that
work at cross purposes with that goal. For that reason, the court should
be free to give custody to a party who has illegally retained custody of
a child, if the circumstances are such that the court determines that
such order serves the child's best interests. The court would, of course,
be free to and should grant liberal visitation rights to the party legally
entitled to custody with a view toward changing custody when doing so
would be consistent with the child's best interest, if at all.
Wisconsin, by statute, limits third party custody to relatives of the
child. 69 Relative is defined broadly to include stepparents"" which
gives the court greater latitude to protect the child's best interests. The
court would be precluded, however, from granting custody to a family
friend in the rare case where it might be appropriate to do so. The class
of third parties eligible for custody should be limited not by their status
164. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981); Christlieb v. Christlieb,
295 P.2d 658 (Kan. 1956); In re Criqui, 798 P.2d 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(D) (Supp. 1991).
166. In re Criqui, 798 P.2d 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
167. Id. at 71.
168. Id. at 73.
169. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West Supp. 1991).
170. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(15) (West 1987).
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vis-a-vis the child but by their relationship vis a' vis the child. Only
those parties who have established an ongoing parental relationship
with the child should be considered for custody on a par with the natu-
ral parents under the best interest analysis. Of course, other relatives
and family friends should be considered next if a proper custodian can-
not be found in the first group.
Hawaii, without defining the person as a parent, extends the natu-
ral parent preference to "any person who has had de facto custody of
the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper per-
son." 17' This is a much better test, but should be broadened at least to
include anyone who has shared de facto custody.
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The following proposed legislation172 incorporates the approach de-
scribed above. Legislators are urged to consider adoption of this or a
similar statute in order to protect more fully the interests and rights of
their minor constituents and to empower the courts with the flexibility
needed to arrive at decisions that are based solely on the best interests
of the person most directly affected by that decision-the child.
Child Custody Standards
In actions for divorce, separation, annulment, separate mainte-
nance, or any other proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to
the custody of a minor child, the court, during the pendency of the
action, at the final hearing, or at any time during the minority of the
child, may make an order for the custody of the minor child as may
seem necessary or proper. In awarding the custody, the court shall be
guided by the following standards, considerations, and procedures:
A. Custody should be awarded to either parent or to both parents
according to the best interests of the child;
B. For purposes of determining custody, "parent" includes natural
parents, adoptive parents and other persons who have acted as a parent
to the child and who have established a parent-child bond. Persons re-
ceiving money for their services to the child may not be considered
parents.
171. -lAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Supp. 1991).
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C. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason, so as to
form an intelligent preference, the child's wishes as to custody shall be
considered and be given due weight by the court;
D. Where custody is contested, the court must make detailed find-
ings of the factors considered by the court and how the factors led to
its conclusions and to the determination of the best interests of the
child. 7
E. Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to parents, grand-
parents, and any person interested in the welfare of the child in the
discretion of the court, unless it is shown that rights of visitation are
detrimental to the best interests of the child;
F. If a child is placed in the physical custody of a person other
than a natural parent, the court will order reasonable visitation and a
further review of the custody decision with the goal of reuniting the
child and natural parent, unless the court determines that such goal
would not be in the child's best interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This approach involves a balancing of interests. Society's interest
in judicial economy, predictability and the parent's interest in protect-
ing and exercising parental rights must give way to society's and the
child's interest in having the most circumspect decision making possible
in this all important judgment that cannot help but dramatically affect
the child's future. Mr. Justice Black recognized the custody determina-
tion as "vital to a child's happiness and well-being."' 74 A decision of
this magnitude should not be determined by concerns for judicial econ-
omy and parental rights where these interests are in conflict with a
determination of the child's best interests.
173. Adapted from MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1991).
174. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
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Divorce is one of the greatest challenges that American children
face. The numbers affected are enormous. In 1951, a rate of 6.1 chil-
dren per thousand were involved in a divorce. In 1981, the rate reached
18.7 children per thousand. Since then, the rate has fallen back some-
what to 16.8 children per thousand in 1986, the last year for which
statistics are available.' This number translates to about 1.2 million
children each year who experience the divorce of their parents. If cur-
rent rates of divorce continue, we can expect that a significant percent-
age of all American children will become children of divorce by age
eighteen.2
All children of divorce experience difficult transitions: dissolution
of the image of a "normal" family; absence of one parent and, in many
cases, grandparents and other extended family; 3 loss of traditions; loss
of socio-economic status;' divided loyalties;5 and the emotions associ-
ated with these losses.'
For some percentage of the children of divorce, however, the risks
are greater. Prolonged sadness and deep depression are relatively com-
mon. 7 So is serious educational decline.8 There is also evidence of in-
1. See IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 203 (1991).
2. Jane E. Brody, Personal Health: Easing the Impact of Divorce on Children,
N.Y TIMES, July 24, 1991, at CIO; Jane E. Brody, Children of Divorce: Steps to Help
Can Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at Cl.
3. See Joanne L. Pedro-Carroll & Emory L. Cowen, The Children of Divorce
Intervention Program: Implementation and Evaluation of a Time Limited Group Ap-
proach, in 4 ADVANCES IN FAM. INTERVENTION, ASSESSMENT & THEORY 282 (JAI
Press Inc. 1987).
4. The Census Bureau has reported that children are almost twice as likely to
live in poverty after parental divorce or separation than before dissolution. Jason
DeParle, Child Poverty Twice as Likely After Family Split, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
March 1, 1991, at A8. After a breakup, family income declined by 37 percent, which
equates to a 26 percent drop in per capita income. Id. Within four months of a separa-
tion or divorce, the percentage of children living in poverty jumped to 36 percent from
19 percent. Id. After 16 months, the initial income drop declined to 29 percent as
women made up some of the difference through additional work and improved collec-
tion methods from absent fathers. Id.
5. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 49 (1980).
6. See id. at 45-51, 169-73, 177, 232-33.
7. Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly, in their landmark study of the effects of
divorce on the family, report that the possible effects of parental separation on children
include deep depression. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5 at 169-73, 232-33. This
[Vol. 16
151
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Schepard
creased risk of teenage suicide, 9 drug use and criminal involvement. 10 It
has been suggested that some percentage of these children of divorce
have difficulty forming long-term relationships and attachments with
the opposite sex." Overall, children of divorce tend to be much less
optimistic about their capacities to master life's opportunities and
problems, a state of mind that tends to reduce their capacities for
achievement and physical and mental health.' 2
Divorce is not, however, inevitably an insurmountable crisis of
childhood. In fact, some percentage of children may emerge stronger
after divorce than before it.' 3 Research is accumulating that indicates
depression was sometimes associated with a decreased capacity to function in school,
difficulties in social adjustment, and involvement in delinquent behaviors. Id. at 177.
Anger, apparently related to underlying depression, was reflected in drug involvement
and delinquent behavior, including arson, stealing, and breaking and entering. Id. at
232-33.
8. Id. at 177. A 1980 study conducted by the National Association of Elemen-
tary School Principals (NAESP) compared the academic achievement of children in
one- and two-parent households. NAESP Staff Report, One-Parent Families and their
Children, 61) PRINCIPAL 31 (1980). In the surveyed elementary schools, 23 percent of
two-parent children and 38 percent of one-parent children were classified as low
achievers. Only 17 percent of the children from one-parent households were classified
as high achievers, while 30 percent of the children from two-parent households held
that distinction. These patterns were similarly reflected in the secondary schools. Id. at
33. A national study of children in the schools , conducted by Guidubaldi et al., reports
that children from divorced families scored more poorly than those from intact families
in reading and math test scores and class grades. Children from divorced families
tended to be absent from school more often, and were more likely to be placed in
special reading classes. Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on
Children: A Review, in 30:3 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 349, 356
(1991).
9. Divorce has been reported to be a seemingly major factor in youth suicide,
"the second leading cause of death in the 15-to-24 year old age group." Nicholas Da-
vidson, Life Without Father, 51 POL'Y REV. 40, 41 (1990).
10. WALLERSTEIN AND KELLY, supra note 5 at 232-33. A UCLA study pub-
lished in 1987 reports that children of an inadequate family structure are more likely to
resort to drug use as a means of coping with their depression and anxiety. Davidson,
supra note 9, at 43.
II. Ten years after their parents' divorce, a significant number of young adults
studied by Vallerstein and Kelly confronted issues of love, marriage, and commitment
with anxiety. In response, many young men were likely to avoid relationships with the
opposite sex, and young women were likely to engage in short-lived sexual relation-
ships. Wallerstein, supra note 8, at 353.
12. MARTIN SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM 145-49 (1991).
13. Some children are fortunate in that after the initial period of instability, the
post-divorce family provides the same supports as those of the intact family. Children
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that responsible parenting, a sensitive court system, family therapy and
school-based intervention programs can significantly help children to
deal with divorce-related problems.' 4
II. PREVENTIVE PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Experience suggests that divorce-related risks to children are in-
creased if parents engage in a protracted custody dispute. Normal di-
vorce-related adjustment problems are magnified by ongoing parental
conflict.' 5 Divorce alone for children is traumatic; a custody dispute is
potentially devastating.
Adversarial courtroom combat and the indeterminate, unpredict-
able legal standard of the "best interests of the child," however, en-
courage custody fights.' Warring goes on endlessly, with final resolu-
tion often emotionally elusive and expensive (it is not unknown for a
parent to spend several years of potential college tuition on a custody
lawyer).1 The adversarial process encourages parents to degrade each
other rather than cooperate around the essential tasks of childrearing.
of such families are able to forge "ahead under these conditions, strengthened by their
ordeal during the separation and their pride in their own capacity to weather the acute
crisis." WALLERSTEIN AND KELLY, supra note 5, at 217. Evidence shows that children
exposed to open conflict are less well adjusted than children from divorced families,
because "[a] divorce undertaken thoughtfully and realistically can teach children how
to confront serious life problems with compassion, wisdom, and appropriate action."
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 305 (1989). Many children are able to
master their fears of repeating their parents' mistakes, "to choose better and to resolve
the unresolved issues of a childhood that included the trauma of divorce." Id. at 14-15.
14. See Pedro-Carroll & Cowen, supra note 3, at 286-87, 300-03.
15. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 37.
16. The adversarial process works against the best interests of the child by en-
couraging delay in settlement, increasing antagonism between parents, and stressing
the child's loyalties to each parent. The present system encourages settlement negotia-
tions to link custody and money issues, and encourages parents to put their financial
interests ahead of the child's interest in a healthy relationship with both parents. The
antagonism generated tends to decrease the degree of parental cooperation in the
child's post-divorce future. The process is in the hands of the parents' lawyers, who are
trained in adversarial combat, and may have a questionable commitment to the welfare
of the child. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Coopera-
tive Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 726-28, 736-39 (1985).
17. The authors have note done a survey of custody case fees. The statement is
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Embattled parents demand, and sometimes seek to buy, the loyalty of
their hopelessly torn children. 18
Efforts to improve the legal standards by which custody disputes
are decided and the procedures for adversarial combat are important,
but to some extent represent misplaced priorities. They can intensify
the negative impact of divorce on children, not contain it. A principle
aim of reform should be to prevent as many child custody cases from
reaching the courtroom as possible by promoting voluntary parental
settlements and responsible parenting. Reform pointed towards promot-
ing parental settlement has an additional salutary benefit. It reinforces
the truly basic value that parents, not the state, are responsible for
making important decisions about their children,19 even after divorce.
The less state intrusion in family life that divorce causes, the better and
the more functional the reorganized, post-divorce family will be in
parenting children.
Reams of law review articles have been written about how adver-
sarial court procedures can be reformed to encourage parental settle-
ment for custody cases already filed.2 0 That debate is important and
18. Parents are aware the child's views may be important in the custody determi-
nation and may attempt to influence what the child says to the judge. The general rule
is that the child's preference may be considered by the judge, but is not dispositive. See
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765 (1982). For an empirical study of judi-
cial attitudes in interviewing children in custody cases, see Fredericka K. Lombard,
Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empirical and Analytical
Study 17 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 807 (1984).
19. In an intact family, parental decisions regarding child-rearing are given a
large measure of autonomy from state interference. "The history and culture of West-
ern civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and up-
bringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that Amish parents have a right
under the First Amendment to keep their children out of the public schools after the
eighth grade, despite the state's interest in universal compulsory education); see, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to choose
schools where their children will be educated); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents and
teachers to instruct children in a foreign language).
20. See, e.g., Schepard, supra note 16 at 743-70; Recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission to the 1985 Legislature: Relating to the Child Custody Deci-
sion-Making Process, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 105, 121-128 (1985) [hereinafter
Recommendation]; see also Note, Lawyering for the Child. Principles of Representa-
tion in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126
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should continue. The purpose of this article, however, is to suggest
three relatively cost-free measures that the lawyers and legal system of
each state can take that might help custody disputes from becoming a
judicially cognizable "dispute" requiring resolution by adversarial pro-
cedure. They are: (1) creating a mandatory program of education for
parents involved in a custody dispute; (2) supporting school-based in-
tervention programs for children experiencing parental divorce and cus-
tody problems; and (3) amending the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility or Model Rules of Professional Conduct to require lawyers to
advise parents in a custody dispute of the harm they are doing to their
children and of conflict resolution methods to reduce that harm.
III. THE MANDATORY PRE-DIVORCE PARENTAL EDUCATION
PROGRAM
It is possible for parents to mitigate the effects of divorce on their
children by assuring them that the divorce is a rational response to
conflict between the spouses for which the children are not to blame.2'
Children need to be assured that a relationship with both parents will
continue after one physically leaves the house. Loyalty battles can be
avoided. Parents need not bad mouth each other. Parents can cooperate
in decision making about their children. Visits with the parent with
whom the child does not primarily reside can be non-conflicted and
provide the foundation for a meaningful parent-child relationship.
Therapy and support groups can help the child of divorce adjust, as can
sympathetic teachers and adult figures. Child support can be paid regu-
larly. In short, parents can create a post-divorce environment which
holds out hope for better outcomes for children. What they need to be
advised of is how and why.
Research and common sense suggests that early intervention to re-
duce conflict and educate parents is essential to prevent harm to chil-
dren. The earlier in the divorce process that the parents understand the
harm that a protracted custody dispute can do to their children and
them, and steps they can take to reduce that harm, the more likely it is
that they will minimize conflict and coexist as parents.
(1978) (advocating the need for separate legal representation for children).
21. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 13, at 286.
22. See Carol Lawson, Requiring Classes in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, January 23,
1992, at Cl; see also Recommendation, supra note 20, at 123-28 (mediation as an
effective process for the resolution of child custody disputes).
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Several states (California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota and
Texas are examples) have supported this proposition by instituting edu-
cational programs for divorcing parents.2 By alerting parents to the
negative consequences their children will face as the result of a spiteful
custody light and how the child's post-divorce environment can be
strengthened, these programs attempt to educate parents so that their
children need not become one of the casualties of a failed marriage."'
It might be helpful to describe a parental educational program to
provide a concrete idea about its content and functioning. Based on the
models of other states, Hofstra University Law School, the Marriage
and Family Counseling Program of the Hofstra School of Education
and the Interdisciplinary Forum on Mental Health and Family Law,
an umbrella organization of representatives from leading legal and
mental health organizations, have designed a three-part educational
program for divorcing parents in New York State given the acronym
PEACE--Parent Education And Custody Effectiveness.
The PEACE program consists of three sessions, all of which in-
clude an educational component and group discussion for processing
the information. The first session, led by a judge, a lawyer, or both,
informs parents about what process (e.g., preliminary hearings, forensic
evaluations, possible appointment of a lawyer for the child) the legal
system will use to decide their dispute if they do not settle the problems
themselves and how long the process may take. The first session also
describes the substantive standards which will be applied by the judges
to determine contested custody disputes. The second session, led by a
mental health professional, focuses on the emotional aspects of the di-
vorce experience for parents. The final session, also led by a mental
health professional, looks at the problems of divorce from the perspec-
tive of the child and describes methods of parental interaction that fa-
cilitate positive outcomes for children.
PEACE is entirely an educational program; no discussion is al-
lowed of 'how the participants' individual cases can be settled. PEACE
is thus distinguishable from a mediation or arbitration program. In ad-
dition, PEACE is not therapy; common emotional patterns and
problems are presented, not explored in individual cases.
23. See CAL. R. APP. Div. I J. ADMIN. § 26(b); Super. Ct. Cobb County, Ga.,
Seminar for Divorcing Parents, Order 8850845-99 (August 17, 1988); see also Law-
son, supra note 22, at CI (Cobb County, Georgia requires participation in a four-hour
seminar for divorcing parents).
24. See Lawson, supra note 22, at C1.
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The content of the PEACE program is determined by an advisory
board of lawyers and mental health professionals to ensure that the
material presented is neutral and based on the best research available.
Presenters receive a detailed PEACE curriculum and training sessions.
All presenters are unpaid volunteers. Professionals who lead PEACE
sessions cannot take referrals from participants. Participation is
confidential.
PEACE participants are referred by judges from court dockets,
and by lawyers and mental health professionals knowledgeable about
the program. 25 At present, participation is voluntary.
However, in other states, such as Georgia, participation is
mandatory for custody litigants.26 Court rules authorize and implement
the educational program, as well as require litigant participation.27 In
such mandatory programs, participants pay an affordable fee graded on
ability to pay to cover program costs.2 8
A strong case can be made for a mandatory parent educational
program on both philosophical and practical levels. If a driver violates
speeding laws too often, he or she can be required to take a mandatory
driver's education course as a condition of maintaining the privilege of
a license to drive. 29 Like the license to drive a car, divorce is not a
constitutional right. Liberal divorce laws give parents with children the
privilege of divorce and the legislature can restrict that privilege rea-
sonably.30 Indeed, some commentators have even proposed that parents
with children not be permitted to divorce during the children's minor-
25. A strong case can be made that parents thinking about divorce should attend
a program like PEACE before any filings are made with a divorce court. By the time
pleadings are filed, parental positions have hardened and child-oriented compromise is
more difficult to promote. Educational programs for mental health professionals, educa-
tors and lawyers should promote such pre-filing parent participation.
26. Super. Ct., Cobb County, Ga., Seminar for Divorcing Parents, Order
8850845-99 (August 17, 1988); see also Lawson, supra note 22, at Cl.
27. Super. Ct., Cobb County, Ga., Seminar for Divorcing Parents, Order
8850845-99 (August 17, 1988).
28. Id. (Participants pay a $30.00 fee, which is waived if the party meets indi-
gency criteria).
29. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAFFIC LAW § 530(1) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (allowing
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to require a driver whose license has been suspended
or reduced to "attend a driver rehabilitation program specified by the Commissioner").
30. "The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the
marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it
may be dissolved." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (quoting Penoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878)).
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ity.3 1 Certainly, the best interests of children, the fundamental aim of
state intervention in the post-divorce family, can support the require-
ment that parents, at this most stressful and emotional time of their
lives, learn about ways to minimize harm to their children as a condi-
tion to divorce.
In this sense, a required educational program for divorcing parents
is a moral statement to parents about the state's priorities in resolving
their family problems. Just as the driver who drinks or speeds puts lives
at risk, parents who divorce put their children at emotional risk. Both
should learn how to prevent harm to others from reoccurring before
being granted a privilege by the state.
On a more practical level, a mandatory parent education program
is justified to reduce the tension that often exists between divorce law-
yers and parent clients. Every sensible lawyer who has participated in
or witnessed a custody dispute knows that in the great percentage of
cases parental settlement is far preferable to a court-imposed solution
(excepting those cases involving child or spousal abuse or neglect).3
Yet the lawyer for the parents must often accommodate his or her cli-
ent's desire to punish the other parent by using the children as a pawn
in a custody dispute at the risk of losing the client. In addition, the
lawyer for one spouse may be worried in counseling restraint that the
lawyer for the other spouse is not providing the same sort of advice.
Making an education program mandatory will thus reduce the
conflicting messages parents receive from lawyers, therapists and others
whose opinion they value. The educational program will simply rein-
force the advice a sensible lawyer should give a client anyway. Clients
who do not receive such advice, and instead are advised to contest cus-
tody vigorously, will be reminded by a mandatory parental educational
31. See Judith Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demor-
alization, Together With Criticisms and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
45, 90 (1981); cf Davidson, supra note 9, at 44 (advocating return to fault divorce for
children's benefit). The rationale of a "marriage for minor children" is that the diffi-
culty of obtaining divorce may encourage parents to reconcile. However, the children
may not benefit if their parents are forced to remain married. The child's best interests
may be better served if parents divorce quickly, rather than prolong parental conflict in
the household. Furthermore, the problems of collusion and evasion that plague fault
divorce laws would also plague the "marriage for minor children" concept. Schepard,
supra note 16, at 744-45.
32. A custody plan resulting from self-determination may be more creative, flexi-
ble, and enduring than a plan imposed by the court. Costs are reduced to the extent
that lengthy custody litigation is avoided. Recommendation, supra note 20, at 124.
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program of the childhood that may be lost as a result.
Despite its attractions, parental education is not a panacea. It will
not transform deeply embittered parents into models of cooperation,
nor will it cure severe psychological problems which may be the cause
of some custodial disputes.8 More intensive, structured, programs are
needed for these purposes. An education program can, however, help
such troubled parents by advising them of the availability of more in-
tensive programs and encouraging participation. Nor will an education
program clear crowded court dockets of custody cases. It can, however,
be an efficient beginning to a coordinated program that could funnel
custody disputes into appropriate forms of alternate dispute resolution
that diverts these cases from adversarial combat. 8
Mandatory parental education, then, is a modest but important be-
ginning toward setting the proper tone for a custodial dispute, which
should always be focused on the needs of the children rather than the
"rights" or "grievances" of the parents. It encourages some parents to
settle their differences through presentation of accurate information.
For those who do not settle, mandatory education is a moral statement
of the importance of responsible parenting, a value in and of itself. Fur-
thermore, like an introductory lecture at the beginning of a college
course, parental education can serve as the foundation for more inten-
sive interventions and referrals to community services for the divorcing
family.
IV. CHILDREN OF DIVORCE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS
Educational programs such as PEACE are directed at parents.
The problem is that children caught in the emotional maelstrom of pa-
rental divorce and custody problems need a program sensitive to their
needs as well.
Many primary schools have appropriately recognized this need.
This is not surprising, since parental divorce and separation is often
associated with serious educational decline in children.38 The children's
educational progress often deteriorates in proportion to their emotional
33. See Judith Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child. Some Long-Term Conse-
quences of Divorce, 19 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 165, 177-79 (1985).
34. See Schepard, supra note 16, at 753-80 (describing a system of judicial ad-
ministration that maximizes cooperative parenting after divorce); see generally Recom-
mendation, supra note 20. (New York State Law Revision Commission Report with
proposed Legislation).
35. See supra note 8.
[Vol. 16
159
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Schepard
condition. Parents in crisis have difficulty providing support for their
children's educational efforts.
A number of school-based intervention programs have been devel-
oped to help children of divorce cope with their time of turmoil. An
example is the twelve-session Children of Divorce Intervention Project,
whose curriculum was created at the University of Rochester. The cur-
riculum addresses common issues and concerns of children of divorce in
early adolescence and uses a variety of innovative teaching techniques
such as journals and children-produced simulated television programs.8 6
Empirical research has demonstrated the effectiveness of such pro-
grams in helping children cope with the divorcing process.
37
These programs need to be made more widely available. Lawyers
who represent parents have a special responsibility to become knowl-
edgeable about them, and to encourage parent/clients to refer their
children to them. Also, lawyers---especially the family law bar organi-
zations-must take some responsibility for lobbying education officials
to promote these programs and fund them.
If children of divorce intervention programs exist in a community,
a mandatory parent education program would be an excellent opportu-
nity to advise parents of that fact and to encourage them to let their
children participate. Assuming wide-spread availability of divorce in-
tervention programs, one could, conceivably, envision a day when par-
ents must certify that their children have been enrolled in a school-
based intervention program and that they have attended educational
seminars like PEACE before a divorce is granted. This educational ap-
proach is consistent with society's desire to give adults the power to
terminate an unhappy marriage while still insuring that they give ap-
propriate consideration to the needs of the child. It promotes parental
autonomy and responsibility and is preferable to an approach which
would make parental divorce more difficult to obtain. 8
V. AMENDING THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROMOTE SENSITIVITY TO CHILDREN
Requiring parents to be educated about the effects of divorce on
their children is not, however, enough. As mentioned above, parents
often do not want to hear sensible advice to reduce conflict over their
36. Pedro-Carroll & Cowen, supra note 3, at 287-89.
37. See id. at 286-87.
38. See supra note 30.
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children from their lawyers. And some lawyers do not provide such ad-
vice. Even a small number of "bomber" lawyers who use children as a
weapon to extract financial concessions could undermine the message
which the mandatory education program tries to promote. So can law-
yers who advise clients that the parent education program is simply a
formality to be endured and completed as quickly as possible, rather
than an important learning experience to be participated in seriously
for the benefit of children.
To combat these problems, the requirement that lawyers advise
parents of the effects prolonged custody conflict can have on their chil-
dren should be made a requirement of professional responsibility. Law-
yers who give child-sensitive advice to parents who do not wish to hear
it will find their inclinations reinforced by specific provisions of the law-
yer's code; lawyers who do not give such advice will face appropriate
professional censure if they do not.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) has
already adopted such child-oriented provisions in their recently ap-
proved Bounds of Advocacy, a supplementary code of aspirational stan-
dards for divorce law specialists. 9 The Academy is to be commended
for its recognition of the harm that custody litigation can do to chil-
dren. The inclusion of these provisions in the AAML Bounds is the first
institutional recognition by the family law bar of this inescapable fact.
However, the general rules regulating professional responsibility of
all lawyers should be expanded to include the concepts in the AAML
Bounds. First, many lawyers who handle custody disputes do not be-
long to the AAML (a voluntary and selective national organization of
divorce specialists) and are not bound by its aspirational guidelines. In
most jurisdictions any lawyer, without any special training or experi-
ence, can represent a parent in a divorce. The same child-protective
ethical standards should be applicable to all lawyers who represent par-
ents in child custody disputes. 0 More importantly, the AAML ethical
39. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS STANDARDS OF CON-
DUCT 2.23 (1991) (an attorney should consider the welfare of the children in his repre-
sentation of the parent); AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT 2.14 cmt. (1991) (the attorney should advise the client of the effects of a
meritless custody claim to the child and should withdraw if the client persists in assert-
ing the claim).
40. The Code of Professional Responsibility already contains provisions concern-
ing divorce law or other specialized fields of practice. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1986) (disfavoring contingent fees in domestic rela-
tions cases); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-17 (1986)
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standards do not carry the force of the state-created machinery (such
as continuing education requirements, disciplinary sanctions and poten-
tial malpractice liability) to enforce the professional responsibility obli-
gations of counsel. If lawyers are to make money from representing
parents, the lawyer's ethical code and its enforcement mechanisms
should recognize the unique interests the children have in the lawyer's
advice.
Thus, a state where lawyer conduct is regulated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility might add the following ethical considera-
tions under Canon 7 (Zealous Representation) under a subheading
"Duty of the Lawyer in A Child Custody Action." The proposed new
ethical considerations would supplement Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A)(1), which prohibits a lawyer from "assert[ing] a position, con-
duct[ing] a defense, delay[ing] a trial, or tak[ing] other action on be-
half of the client when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that such
action will serve merely to harass or to maliciously injure another. 1"
The commentary is provided for states which follow the Model Rules
format for their regulation of a lawyer's professional responsibility.
(Other minor adaptations of these proposals will no doubt be required
for Model Rules states).
A. Proposed EC 7-40
An attorney representing a client in an action against the other
parent concerning their child shall advise the client of the potential
harm a protracted custody battle will have on the client's child.
B. Comment
Divorce is a traumatic situation for the involved spouses. Evidence,
however, has mounted in recent years that children are the most signifi-
cant casualties of divorce and custody battles. Parental separation and
divorce is traumatic in and of itself, but when accompanied by an acri-
monious and prolonged custody dispute the damage to the children is
especially severe. The evidence shows that children who experience
such events can suffer developmental problems, serious emotional dis-
tress and scholastic setbacks. Any attorney involved in a custody pro-
(representation of multiple defendants in a criminal case or co-plaintiffs in a tort
action).
41. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1986).
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ceeding has an ethical obligation to inform the client as to how such a
proceeding will affect the client's children. The attorney must keep the
children's best interests in mind while advising the client how to
proceed.
C. Proposed EC 7-41
An attorney representing a client in an action against the other
parent concerning the children shall not contest child custody for pur-
poses of financial leverage or vindictiveness.
D. Comment
Ethical Consideration 7-41 goes hand in hand with Ethical Con-
sideration 7-40. Initiating a custody contest to hurt the other party in-
variably hurts the children more by placing them in the middle of the
conflict like pawns on a chessboard. Genuine issues of custody should,
of course, be resolved, but custody contests begun for malicious reasons
must be discouraged. The attorney has an ethical obligation to attempt
to dissuade the client from pursuing such a course of action, and if the
client is unpersuaded, may withdraw from representation.
E. Proposed EC 7-42
An attorney representing a client in an action against the other
parent concerning their children should encourage settlement of cus-
tody disputes through referrals for mental health therapy, negotiation,
mediation or arbitration,42 except where domestic violence or child
abuse is involved. In those instances, an attorney should seek consulta-
42. Colorado is apparently considering an amendment to its Code of Professional
Responsibility which would require lawyers "in a matter involving, or expected to in-
volve litigation, [to] . . . advise the client of an alternative forms of dispute resolution
which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute, or to reach
the legal objective sought." Letter from Frederick K. Conover II, President, Colorado
Bar Association, to Chief Justice Luis D. Rovira, Colorado Supreme Court, June 18,
1991 (on file with the authors). Such general provisions mandating consideration or
alternate dispute resolution by lawyers may well be desirable, and could supplement
the specific child custody provisions proposed here. However, if a jurisdiction were not
inclined to adopt a general mandate for ADR-oriented advice in all litigations, it
should still adopt the narrower child custody provisions proposed here. While consider-
ation of ADR may be good for all clients, it is essential for a parent who will
foreseeably damage a child if he or she pursues litigation.
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tion with appropriate experts in the area as to how to proceed.
F. Comment
In divorce and custody matters, prolonged litigation is financially
and emotionally draining for the parties. The highly charged atmo-
sphere and potential for emotional harm makes efficient resolution that
encourages parental post-divorce cooperation concerning children a pri-
ority. Children placed in the middle of an acrimonious divorce are at
risk of serious emotional, developmental and scholastic damage which
may be alleviated by alternative dispute resolution methods as opposed
to litigation. Additionally, there is evidence that parties to a voluntary,
mutually arrived at agreement are more willing to abide by such an
agreement than an agreement imposed by a court following litigation.
It is the responsibility of the attorney involved to make the client aware
of all options available in addition to, or in lieu of, litigation.
Domestic violence and child abuse present special circumstances
which may make alternative dispute resolution inappropriate, because
such processes may encourage continued interaction with the abusive
spouse. lIn cases involving these elements, the attorney should seek ad-
vice from appropriate experts as to how best to protect the child's
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandating parental education, expanding school-based children of
divorce intervention programs, and amending the lawyers' rules of pro-
fessional responsibility are part of an overall preventive services pro-
gram that recognizes the effects of divorce and parental separation for
what it is-a major public health problem facing many of our children.
This is not to say that parents should not divorce, or that divorce is
inevitably a catastrophic event for children. What is important, how-
ever, is that parents recognize that divorce and separation put their
children at risk and that the state create procedures and a social cli-
mate to help parents define responsible behavior and to conduct them-
selves accordingly.
Millions of children are affected by divorce in this country annu-
ally. The effects of divorce on them are well documented. Mandatory
parental divorce education, school-based intervention programs for the
children of divorce and changes in the lawyers' rules of professional
conduct are appropriate and socially symbolic recognitions of the po-
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tential harm parents do to children when they divorce. Creating such a
coordinated program of preventive services can be the beginning of a
large-scale effort-among judges, lawyers, mental health professionals
and others concerned with the welfare of children-to redefine the re-
sponsibilities of parents and to reassert the authority and competence
of the family in the modern era.
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1. FACE TO FACE: ABUSED CHILDREN AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witness against him.'
* J.D., University of Miami; B.A., Florida International University. Director,
The Children's Law Project, Nova Civil Law Clinic, Nova University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend VI (The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.).
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This article is about finding the "truth" in a child abuse case in a
non-criminal forum. Throughout the ages, Anglo-American law has
been based upon the theory that the right of confrontation is "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth."2 Our
entire system of jurisprudence is based upon that principle. The pres-
ence of the accused in the courtroom, the face to face presentation of
witnesses, and the exclusion of hearsay have emerged from the theory
that a defendant has a right to confront the accuser.
What happens, however, when eye-to-eye confrontation fails to
achieve this noble purpose? What happens when eye-to-eye confronta-
tion actually prevents the trier of fact from hearing the truth? What
happens when the Confrontation Clause falls apart?
Contrary to the venerable Anglo-American legal notion that the
Confrontation Clause leads to the discovery of truth, the Confrontation
Clause more often prevents the truth when a child has been abused by
a parent or custodian. Child advocates know in their hearts, and from
their court experiences, that children-especially in domestic situa-
tions-will rarely tell the truth about their abuse when they are forced
to confront their abuser face to face. 3
Imagine being one of these children (the names are imaginary, the
cases are real):
#1 Nelly:
Nelly's mother frequently abandoned Nelly and left her with
relatives, but for about two years, when Nelly was under the age of
six, Nelly lived with her mother. During this period, a number of
her mother's boyfriends sexually abused Nelly in her mother's
presence. Nelly's mother occasionally laughed at or participated in
this activity. Nelly's mother threatened to cut off Nelly's head if
she ever told anybody about these activities.
Months and years later, Nelly was able to disclose some of her
2. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990).
3. Indeed, studies show children rarely make false reports of sexual abuse, and
that children are much more likely to falsely recant true reports of sexual abuse. See
Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Children as Witnesses: What do they Remem-
ber? in HANDBOOK ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 110 (Lenore E.A. Walker ed.
1988). In support of this statement, Goodman and Hegalson cite to works by Jones et
al., Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Child Sexual Abuse, in J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 2, 27-45 (1987); SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR. M.A., UNDER-
STANDING THE RAPE VICTIM, (N.Y., Wiley 1979); L. Berliner & M. K. Barbieri, The
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nightmare to interviewers, her guardian ad litem, and her relative
custodians, although her chronology was not always consistent and
her details were often somewhat confused. The rape treatment
center reports corroborated the probability of sexual abuse. Nelly
also drew a picture of an object that was used upon
her-unmistakably a vibrator. She vividly wrote in a few mis-
spelled childlike words how she was sodomized by this instrument,
which she called an "electric knife."
While the dependency action was pending, her mother left
Nelly a vivid reminder of her former threats. Nelly's mother de-
capitated Nelly's pet rabbit.
#2 Donna:
Donna had been taken into custody when she was four because
her mother committed lewd and lascivious acts with the child. At
the time she was taken into custody with her younger sister, the
house was neglected to the point that it was a significant health
hazard.
Donna's mother participated in some of the programs the state
offered her. Donna and her sister were returned to the mother
under state supervision. During this time the state provided house-
keeping services two times a week to the mother, and all seemed
well. The state then terminated its supervision over this family.
Within a month of the date that the mother was free of state
supervision, Donna came to school with a black eye. Her child pro-
tection team examination revealed recent evidence of severe and
continuous abuse-old and new loop marks and lash marks too nu-
merous to count all over Donna's body. Her sister also wore the
signs of old and new whipping. Her baby sister was severely ne-
glected. Donna stated to the doctors and counselors to whom she
talked informally, that her mother beat her and her sisters with an
extension cord. The most recent beating occurred because Donna
(now aged seven) "used too much soap powder when washing her
baby sister."
Donna was placed with relatives. During one psychological
evaluation, Donna revealed that her mother had telephoned that
week and told Donna to lie to the court about the incidents of phys-
ical abuse.
Donna always stated that she loved her mother. Donna also
revealed that she had been severely beaten while in foster care
when she was taken from her mother the first time.
Now imagine that you (Nelly or Donna) are required to go into a court
with a judge in a black robe, a big policeman-like bailiff, a clerk of the
court, two or three attorneys, and your mother who stares intently and
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meaningfully at you. You are being asked questions about situations
which make you very uncomfortable. Some of these questions are asked
by an attorney you have either never met or who you met in a very
unpleasant deposition where you feel you were threatened, disbelieved,
and accused. Your mother's stare is invariably either a threatening or
an imploring non-verbal statement. Would you (an eight or nine year
old child) tell the truth?
The child who is a victim of abuse within the family, faces special
problems. The abuser has had absolute control over the child during
the abuse. The abuser may have significant control over the child dur-
ing the proceedings unless visitation and contact has been eliminated or
severely restricted. Most often, the abuser has verbally threatened the
child with some form of retaliation if the child discloses the abuse.
Even without the verbal threat, ongoing physical abuse is a non-verbal
threat of retaliation. Typically, abused children also carry the burden
of an incredible array of emotional hardware which prevents them from
disclosure or forces them into recantation. As discussed in an excellent
sexual-abuse survivor's manual:
The first time you tried to talk about your abuse, you may still
have been a child. Under ideal circumstances, you would have been
believed, protected, and assured that the abuse wasn't your fault.
You would have been given age-appropriate counseling, and placed
in a support group with other children. If the abuser was a family
member, he would have been sent away, not you.
Unfortunately, this was probably not the response you got. More
likely, you were threatened, blamed, or called a liar. You were ac-
cused of "asking for it" or were called "a little whore." You may
have been warned not to tell during the abuse itself: "It would kill
your mother if she knew," or "I'll kill you if you tell."
If your case was taken to court, you may have been subjected to
brutal testimony procedures, grilled by insensitive defense attor-
neys, or repeatedly forced to face your abuser.
If your mother divorced your father because he was abusing you,
you may have felt guilty for breaking up the marriage, for separat-
ing your family, or for ruining a "happy home."
Children not slapped with an actively cruel response are often met
with devastating silence or told never to speak of it again. Families
often go on as if nothing happened, never mentioning it. In that
case, children get the message that their experience is too horrible
for words. And, by implication, that they are too horrible.
In this way, children learn there is no one they can trust, that shar-
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ing leads not to help but to harm or neglect, that it's not safe to tell
the truth. In other words, they learn shame, secrecy, and silence."
Although research in the area of child sexual abuse and child vic-
tim witnesses is still in its infancy, studies reveal that most children are
very cautious about revealing their sexual abuse and that children who
do reveal their abuse will often recant. As the United States District
Court for the Fourth Circuit noted, "[i]n two-thirds of child abuse
cases, the incident is never even reported. Even when the incident is
reported, prosecution is difficult, and convictions few."'5 According to a
recent article in CHILD WELFARE:
Although there are few statistics on the frequency of recantation in
child sexual abuse cases, the phenomenon is not uncommon. In one
review of 630 cases of alleged sexual abuse, recantation occurred in
22% of the cases [Sorensen and Snow 1991] Russell [1986] con-
ducted a study in which a random sample of more than 900 women
were questioned regarding sexual abuse experiences. She found
that 16% of the women had been incestuously abused as children.
Two percent of those cases were reported to the police; what hap-
pened in the other 98% of the incest cases? Russell's subjects re-
ported numerous reasons they never told anyone about the abuse:
they were afraid, they didn't think anybody would believe them,
they didn't want the abuser to go to jail. Stories were recounted in
which the child did tell someone, and that person, or a person in a
position of responsibility did not believe the child.6
It is no wonder that children who are sexually abused or seriously
physically abused are most likely to refuse to talk about abuse until
they are in a situation where they feel that; 1) they are safe, 2) they
are with someone they can trust, and 3) they will be protected from
future retaliation by their abuser. Thus, children are more likely to re-
veal abuse to teachers, counsellors, foster parents, and other adults who
will listen and not blame. Children are least likely to talk when they
feel threatened and when they feel they are speaking to a person who
will not believe what they say. Few children will reveal their sexual
abuse in a timely fashion. The common delay in telling anyone about
4. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 92-93 (1988).
5. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988).
6. Margaret Reiser, Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in CHILD WEL-
FARE, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 6.
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the sexual abuse ranges from days to years. Is it any wonder that few
children will make any disclosures when facing their abusers and being
confounded, confused, attacked, and disbelieved by a person who is
utilizing customary techniques of cross-examination? The central pre-
mise of the Confrontation Clause fails miserably when applied to chil-
dren who are subjected to domestic abuse.
II. PROTECTING THE CHILD FROM ABUSE BY THE "JUSTICE"
SYSTEM
The child faces many perils in the court as a victim or witness.
First there are multiple interviews by the police, medical doctors, rape
treatment centers, child protection teams, state attorney's offices, detec-
tives, social service counsellors, guardians, and psychologists. "It is not
uncommon for child victims of sexual assault to be interviewed numer-
ous (e.g. 20) times during their involvement in the legal process." 8 Sec-
ond, there may be multiple depositions especially where the child is
placed in the dependency system and the parent or custodian is being
simultaneously prosecuted in a criminal case. After this often unpleas-
ant introduction to the court system, the child may be subjected to tes-
tifying-either in camera, before the abuser, or by a videotaped deposi-
tion or closed circuit television, or facing the abuser eye-to-eye.
Attorneys advocating for children must try to shield children from
unnecessary exposure to traditional face-to-face confrontation. The
child advocate must attempt to utilize the method of child testimony
that is the least damaging to the child, while still assuring that the
testimony will be admitted to establish the guilt of the abuser. Such
protections include:
1. Limiting the number of interviews and assuring that the inter-
viewers are appropriately trained at using non-leading questions in lan-
guage that the child can understand.
2. Utilizing hearsay testimony rather than any form of live
testimony.
3. Requesting in camera hearings where the child talks to the
court with or without the presence of attorneys.
7. Mary de Young, A Conceptual Model for Judging the Truthfulness of a
Young Child's Allegation of Sexual Abuse, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 550 (1988).
8. Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 3 (citing DEBRA WHITCOMB et al., When
the Victim is a Child: Issues for Judges and Prosecutors (Washington, D.C., National
Institute of Justice, Office of Development, Testing, and Dissemination).
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4. Videotaping interviews between the child and a competent child
victim interviewer.
5. Using videotaped depositions in lieu of live testimony.
6. Having the child testify by means of two-way cameras or tele-
vised testimony.
7. Protecting the child with a screen to keep the child from seeing
the abuser during courtroom testimony.
Many states have passed child victim and witness protection stat-
utes and many courts have passed local rules for dealing more hu-
manely with the child. Nevertheless, these laws may not protect the
child when attacked by a Confrontation Clause analysis. The right to
confrontation is the most difficult and heavily litigated issue facing
child victims and witnesses today. The ability to protect child witnesses
through the use of in camera proceedings, two way mirror or televised
testimony, video deposition testimony, and hearsay testimony have been
challenged successfully in criminal cases by the accused based upon
Confrontation Clause analysis.
The child advocate must know the law concerning child testimony
and must be able to navigate through the narrow channels of that law
to protect the child from unnecessary face-to-face testimony against the
abuser, and to thoroughly prepare the child if the child is required to
face the abuser. In the family court, the child advocate must be able to
successfully distinguish the rigorous criminal case construction that
often bars the use of the child witness protection laws in criminal cases.
III. THE CRIMINALLY ACCUSED VERSUS PROTECTION OF THE
CHILD ABUSED: CRIMINAL CASE LAW ANALYSIS
Issues concerning any constitutional protection have normally been
raised in criminal settings by a person accused of a crime. Constitu-
tional analysis has rarely been applied to victims. Where children are
victims, especially in a family situation, the child may be continuously
suffering a deprivation of safety, happiness, well-being, and even liberty
at the hands of the abuser. Yet because the wrongdoer is the subject of
a proceeding which threatens incarceration (loss of freedom in a crimi-
nal case) or loss of the child (the parent's property in a dependency
case), it is the wrongdoer, not the child, who has traditionally been
accorded constitutional protections.
Because traditional constitutional analysis focuses upon the right
of the accused criminal and has traditionally ignored the victim, chil-
dren are often deprived of their constitutional rights of happiness, se-
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curity, and freedom from abuse. The right of "confrontation" often
means the right of "intimidation" in child abuse cases. "Court rules are
adult rules which protect adults, not children.'' 9
In the last several years the United States Supreme Court has is-
sued several decisions analyzing the child's right to protection from
face-to-face confrontation. Most of these cases arose in a criminal con-
text. In Coy v. Iowa' ° the Supreme Court analyzed the validity of a
statute which permitted the court to confine a defendant to an adjacent
room or behind a screen or mirror that would permit the defendant to
see and hear a child's testimony, but would not permit the child to see
or hear the defendant. The Supreme Court opinion in Coy is opulent
with memorable quotations. The Supreme Court states that the right to
confrontation "comes to us on faded parchment."" The majority opin-
ion cites Roman law, and English kings. It waxes poetic, citing Shake-
speare's lines from Richard the Second: "Then call them to our pres-
ence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the
accuser and the accused freely speak."12 The majority opinion also ten-
ders a brief, harsh, and somewhat insipid comment about children:
That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful
rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound
and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malev-
olent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have
costs. 3
While constitutional protections do have their costs, it is somewhat un-
settling that the highest court of the land failed to even pay lip-service
to minimizing the trauma endured by children in the court system. In
Coy, the children victim/witnesses were allegedly accosted by the de-
fendant, who, garbed with a stocking over his head, entered their tent
while they were camping out in the back yard and sexually assaulted
them.
Interestingly, the authored "majority" opinion was a very narrow
majority consisting of Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
9. Honorable Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000
A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?", 17 OHIo N.U. L. REV.
553 (1991).
10. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
11. Id. at 2800.
12. id.
13. Id. at 2802.
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Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice White
joined, stating: "While I agree with the Court that the Confrontation
Clause was violated in this case, I wish to make clear that nothing in
today's decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to
protect child witnesses." '
Justice Blackmun issued the dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined. The dissenting opinion focused upon the
needs of the child:
The prosecution of these child sex-abuse cases poses substan-
tial difficulties because of the emotional trauma frequently suffered
by child witnesses who must testify about the sexual assaults they
have suffered . . . . Although research in this area is still in its
early stages, studies of children who have testified in court indicate
that such testimony is "associated with increased behavioral distur-
bance in children.' 5
Thus, the fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony
in front of the defendant has two serious identifiable consequences:
It may cause psychological injury to the child, and it may so over-
whelm the child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony,
thereby undermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself."
Two years after deciding the Coy case, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed a similar child witness protection statute in Maryland v. Craig.7
The United States Supreme Court scrutinized a Maryland statute that
permits a judge to receive, by one-way closed circuit television, the tes-
timony of a child witness who is alleged to be a victim of child abuse.
Prior to utilizing the one-way closed circuit television technique, the
Maryland statute requires the trial court to determine whether the
child victim would suffer "serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate" if the child was forced to testify in
open court. In the trial court proceeding, the children did not testify in
the preliminary hearing and the trial court judge did not personally
14. Id. at 2804.
15. Coy, 110 S. Ct. at 2809 (citing GOODMAN, et. al., The Emotional Effects of
Criminal Court Testimony on Child Sexual Assault Victims, Proceedings from the In-
ternational Conference on Child Witnesses: Do the Courts Abuse Children?, (British
Psychological Association, in press); see also Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Poten-
tial for Second Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); S. SGROI, HANDBOOK OF
CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 133-134 (1982).
16. Coy, 110 S. Ct. at 2809 (emphasis added).
17. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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have an opportunity to observe the children undergoing "trauma." The
state's experts predicted that the children would not be able to commu-
nicate if forced to testify in open court. The experts testified that one
child "would probably stop talking and she would curl up," and that
another child would "become highly agitated."
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court's deci-
sion to permit the children to testify by use of the closed circuit televi-
sion. The appellate court felt that the state's showing of threatened
harm to the children "was insufficient to reach the high threshold" re-
quired by Coy. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and
reversed the Maryland appellate court. Not surprisingly, the dissenting
and concurring panel in the Coy case became the majority in the Ma-
ryland case, joined by Justice Kennedy, who had not taken part in the
Coy decision.
In its initial discussion, Maryland departed from the absolutist po-
sition taken by Coy: "We have never held, however, that the Confron-
tation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to
face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial."18 Maryland
noted, "our precedents establish that 'the Confrontation Clause reflects
a preference for face to face confrontation at trial' . . . a preference
that 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case.' "19
The Supreme Court in Maryland also engaged in an analysis that
was sorely lacking in the Coy case. The Court discussed public policy
justifications for abused child witness protection statutes. The Mary-
land case acknowledged the growing body of literature and law sub-
stantiating the necessity for such protections:
We likewise conclude today that a State's interest in the physical
and p~ychological well-being of child abuse victims may be suffi-
ciently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's
right to face his or her accusers in court. That a significant major-
ity of States has enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from
the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the
widespread belief in the importance of such public policy. 0
The Maryland court identified 37 states which permit the use of video-
18. Id. at 3163 (emphasis in the original).
19. Id. at 3165 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)) (emphasis in
original).
20. Id. at 3167.
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taped testimony of sexually abused children; 24 states which authorize
the use of one-way closed circuit television testimony in court; and
eight states which authorize the use of a two-way system."' The Court
acknowledged and discussed the "growing body of academic literature
documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims
who must testify in court."2
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Maryland, it
also decided Idaho v. Wright."3 The Wright case involved an alleged
sexual abuse of two little girls. The oldest child told her father's girl-
friend that a co-defendant had sexual intercourse with her while her
father held her down. The youngest child was found to be incompetent
to testify in court because of her age and verbal skills. Nevertheless,
the youngest child had volunteered some statements to the examining
physician, which were admitted as hearsay under a residual hearsay
exception, 2' and the co-defendants were convicted. The father argued
that admission of the hearsay statements violated his Sixth Amend-
ment right of confrontation.
The facts of the Wright case are exceedingly important. The state-
ments which were admitted into evidence in Wright were responses
given by the younger child to the examining physician's questions. The
examining physician asked these questions in an extremely leading and
suggestive fashion.25 None of the conversations between the doctor and
21. Id. at 3168.
22. Maryland, 110 S. Ct. at 3168.
23. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
24. Interestingly, this case did not involve a specific child-abuse hearsay excep-
tion, but a garden variety residual hearsay exception. This distinction is important be-
cause the residual hearsay exception is generic, accommodating "ad hoc instances in
which statements not otherwise falling within a recognized hearsay exception might
nevertheless be sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial." Id. at 3147. On the other
hand, if the statement had been brought in under a special legislatively enacted hear-
say exception for children who are the victims or witnesses of sexual or physical abuse,
the Supreme Court would have had a much more difficult job of departing from the
analysis in Maryland that a specialized hearsay exception "was specifically intended to
'safeguard the physical and psychological well-being of child victims by avoiding, or at
least minimizing, the emotional trauma produced by testifying.'" See Maryland, 110
S. Ct. at 3168.
25. Several studies have focused upon the suggestibility of children at different
ages, and the results of such studies are in conflict. See JEFFREY HAUGAARD & N.
DICKON REPPUccI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 349-51 (1989). Each of the
studies cited in that chapter utilized different situations and children of different ages.
None of the studies concentrated on sexually and physically abused children or child
witnesses. One study conducted by Goodman and Reed examined childrens testimony
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the younger child had been videotaped. The Idaho appellate court also
made a factual finding that the doctor had a preconceived notion of
what the child should be disclosing.
When reviewing the facts, it is not surprising that the final out-
come was a reversal of the conviction. The Supreme Court outlined a
two-prong showing necessary for the admission of hearsay: 1) the pros-
ecutor must either produce the child or demonstrate the unavailability
of the declarant, and 2) the statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate indicia of reliability. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court felt
that the State did not carry its burden of proving that the younger
daughter's incriminating statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability.
Although the decision was correct based upon the facts, the nature of
the Supreme Court's analysis presents the child advocate with some
very difficult hurdles.
The Supreme Court noted that the Iowa residual hearsay excep-
tion was not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation
Clause purposes.2 Therefore, there must be particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.2" The State had argued that physical evidence of
the children's sexual abuse corroborated the children's statements, and
thus, the requirement for a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness
was fulfilled. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held
that adequate indicia of reliability must be found in reference to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statements,
and not from subsequent corroboration of the criminal act. Physical
corroboration of the sexual abuse was not admissible for the purpose of
showing trustworthiness of the statements, because, according to the
Supreme Court, physical corroboration "sheds no light on the reliabil-
ity of the child's allegations regarding the abuser."2 8 (One would won-
der if that would be true if the physical corroboration was gonorrhea in
a five year old child's throat.)
The Supreme Court recited some factors that other courts had uti-
lized to demonstrate trustworthiness: Spontaneity, consistent repetition,
in a situation that mimicked victimization (children in the study had undergone inocu-
lation which required that the children be restrained and given shots by a nurse). The
finding in the Goodman study was that older children showed greater resistance to
misleading information than did younger children, but that suggestibility was greater
for peripheral acts than for the specific actions that took place or the physical attrib-
utes of the culprit.
26. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3151.
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use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of
motive to fabricate. However, the Supreme Court refused to approve or
disapprove such factors as sufficient to demonstrate that the child's
statements bear the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 9 In
short, the child advocate is left to wonder how to prove trustworthiness
and the courts are left to ponder how much proof is enough.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case on child testi-
mony is White v. Illinois." In White, the trial court admitted the testi-
mony of an allegedly sexually abused child under the "spontaneous
declaration," and "medical examination" exceptions of the hearsay
rule. The child did not testify at trial. The appellant claimed that
before testimony could be admitted under the "spontaneous declara-
tion" and "medical examination" exceptions, the child must be shown
to be unavailable. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argu-
ments, noting that statements made under the "spontaneous declara-
tion" exception and the "medical treatment and diagnosis" exception
provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness. "Where proffered
hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satis-
fied.""1 White simply reiterated that statements which come within
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions can be admitted without additional
qualifications. White also eliminates the argument that the prosecution
is required to show unavailability of the child for the admission of
hearsay statements.
IV. BLEAK HOUSE: PROTECTING THE CHILD IN A FAMILY
COURT
Although this article focuses upon the Confrontation Clause and
the use of child witness protection techniques in a non-criminal pro-
ceeding, the previous section zeroed-in on the confrontation analysis in
criminal proceedings. The practitioner must understand the line of
Confrontation Clause cases in criminal proceedings before being able to
distinguish those key Supreme Court cases in a non-criminal case.
29. Id. at 3149-50.
30. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
31. Id. at 738.
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A. Is the Confrontation Clause Available to the Alleged Perpe-
trator in a Child Protection Case?
The starting point for this discussion is the Confrontation Clause
itself. The Confrontation Clause, by its own terms, is a criminal protec-
tion enjoyed by the accused. The Confrontation Clause states: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witness against him." '32
As stated in a Washington dependency case, the Confrontation
Clauses of the United States (and the Confrontation Clause of the
State of Washington) do not apply to a dependency proceeding "since
by their terms they . . . apply only in criminal cases."3
Although the United States Supreme Court has not analyzed the
Confrontation Clause in a child custody or non-criminal child abuse
case, the United States Supreme Court has analyzed the defendant's
Fifth-Amendment right when raised in a dependency proceeding. Both
the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation are limited to criminal prosecutions.
The Fifth Amendment states: "No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 13 '
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,33
a child had been adjudicated a child in need of assistance and placed
back in his mother's care under the supervisory powers of the state.
Eight months later the state feared for the child's safety and petitioned
the court to remove the child from his mother's control and place him
in foster care. The mother refused to reveal the location of the child,
and the court held the mother in contempt for failure to produce the
child as ordered. The mother contended that the contempt order vio-
lated her constitutional right against self-incrimination. The United
States Supreme Court rejected her argument, and held that the Fifth
Amendment could not be invoked in a non-criminal juvenile child pro-
tection proceeding.3 6 The Supreme Court characterized a juvenile child
protection proceeding as a "non-criminal regulatory regime constructed
to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment.) (emphasis added).
33. In re Dependency of Penelope B., 709 P.2d 1185 (Wash. 1985) (emphasis
added).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
35. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
36. Id. at 905.
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criminal laws," 37 and held:
Once Maurice was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, his
care and safety became the particular object of the state's regula-
tory interests . . . . By accepting care of Maurice subject to the
custodial order's conditions . . . Bouknight submitted to the rou-
tine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice
in a manner consistent with the State's regulatory interests.38
The Supreme Court did note, however, that the information which was
appropriately compelled for the purposes of the juvenile child protec-
tion case might be excluded from any criminal prosecution over the
same acts consistent with Fifth Amendment principles. The Supreme
Court decision in Bouknight is important to our Confrontation Clause
analysis because it recognizes boundaries of constitutional criminal pro-
tections, and acknowledges the non-criminal regulatory nature of the
child dependency case. It also emphasizes the propriety of enforcing
child protection statutes.
The holding in Bouknight does not offer carte blanche admissibil-
ity for all child hearsay, nor does it mean that child witness protections
will obtain the "nod" of every family court judge. The two-prong test
of "emotional harm" and "trustworthiness" may still be required if the
child is to testify by less traumatic means than face-to-face
confrontation.
The distinction between the right to confrontation in a criminal
case, and due process rights to confront and cross-examine in a depen-
dency case was also analyzed in the California dependency case of In
re Kerry 0.19 In that case, after a mistrial, parents counsel stipulated
that the trial judge could read the transcripts of the initial trial. The
trial transcripts contained testimony of the minor in the judge's cham-
ber in the presence of the parents' attorneys but outside of the presence
of the parents. The parents argued that their right to confrontation was
violated because they were not properly advised that they were waiving
a fundamental constitutional right. The California court noted that the
federal and state constitutional right of confrontation "are confined by
their terms to criminal cases,"' 0 and reiterated that "not all formalities
of a criminal trial are required in, or applicable to, a dependency pro-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 907.
39. 258 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
40. Id. at 453.
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ceeding."' 1 As in Bouknight, Kerry noted that dependency proceedings
are designed to protect the child rather than to prosecute the parent.
The parents' counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine the child in
the in camera hearing, thus meeting the due process requirements for
civil cases.
Most child-witness protection statutes do not discriminate between
criminal and civil cases. The child-witness protection statutes often re-
quire a showing that the child will suffer at least moderate mental or
emotional trauma before the child can testify through the use of video-
taped deposition, two-way camera, or two-way mirror or screen devices.
Hearsay statutes which protect children require a showing of unavaila-
bility, of mental or emotional trauma, and of "trustworthiness." The
statutes do not specifically soften the standard when the child is in a
family court. Perhaps such statutes should differentiate between child
protection cases and criminal proceedings. Perhaps some day a model
act will fashion child witness courtroom protections which recognize
the developing research concerning the child victim's needs.
B. State Case Law
1. Hearsay and the "Corroboration" Requirement
New York, of course, is a leader in child protection laws. Contrary
to the national trend which blurs the distinction between family court
and criminal court child-witness laws, New York has developed special
family court child victim/witness protections. These protections include
a specific hearsay exception which permits the child's out-of-court
statements into evidence in a family court proceeding. Although uncor-
roborated statements alone are not sufficient to make a finding of abuse
or neglect, the statute flexibly defines corroborating evidence so that
the burden of corroboration may be easily met in an appropriate case.
In addition the statute specifically provides that the testimony of the
child is not necessary in a dependency case in order to make a finding
of abuse and neglect.42
In In re Nicole V.,4" a New York appellate division stated:
Because due process requirements must vary with the subject mat-
41. Id.
42. N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 1046(a)(vi) (Consol. 1992).
43. 510 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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ter and necessities of the situation and these Family court pro-
ceedings are designed to protect victims from further harm, not
punish the offenders or even terminate their parental rights perma-
nently, we conclude that due process requirements are met by per-
mitting a finding of abuse to be made on the basis of a child's out-
of-court statement which is corroborated by any competent non-
hearsay, relevant evidence which confirms that the child has been
sexually abused and enhances the credibility of the child's state-
ment as to its material elements.44
In re Nicole V. suggests that corroboration may consist of medical
proof; proof of abuse of other children; the child's in camera interview;
a validation interview confirming the existence of intrafamilial child sex
abuse syndrome, and the consistency of the child's statements to other
witnesses, Furthermore, corroboration may include such behavioral in-
dicators as age-inappropriate knowledge of sexual behavior, enuresis in
a toilet trained child, regressive behavior and withdrawal, sleep distur-
bances, or other emotional behavior inappropriate for children of that
age. In In re Nicole V., virtually every one of these factors were
demonstrated, the child's out-of-court statements to several witnesses
were admitted, and the appellate court upheld the trial court's finding
that the child was sexually abused. In In re Francis Charles W., Jr.,"
statements of other children were held to be sufficient corroboration of
the child's statements which were admitted into evidence through affi-
davits of a Sheriff's Department investigator.
A Pennsylvania case, M.R.F. v. Department of Public Welfare,46
offers another liberal interpretation of the corroboration standard and
the use of hearsay. M.R.F. involved an expungement proceeding insti-
tuted by an alleged child sexual abuser. The contested testimony in-
cluded statements by a qualified social worker who interviewed the
child on three occasions. On each occasion, the child indicated clearly
and consistently that she had been sexually abused and demonstrated
specific incidents of abuse with anatomically correct dolls. The child
demonstrated inappropriate knowledge of sexual matters. Psychological
evaluations concluded that the child's behavior and verbalization
demonstrated sexual abuse. The Pennsylvania court held that although
the caseworker's testimony was hearsay, a hearsay exception existed to
permit the introduction of statements by a child describing sexually
44. hd. at 572-73.
45. 511 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
46. 595 A.2d 644 (1991).
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abusive conduct. The hearsay exception required that the time, content,
and circumstances surrounding the statements indicated sufficient indi-
cia of reliability. The Pennsylvania court determined that there was
adequate indicia of reliability because the caseworker accurately re-
corded the child's words shortly after the incident was first reported,
and the caseworker was a disinterested professional. Certainly, this is a
very liberal application of the trustworthiness doctrine.
Illinois, on the other hand, has a most oppressive and hard-line
definition of "corroboration." In Brunken v. Brunken" an Illinois ap-
pellate court rejected the notion that almost identical statements made
by the abused child to several witnesses were sufficient "corroboration."
The appellate court likewise rejected testimony that the child's behav-
ioral problems, consistent with the behavioral problems of sexually
abused children, adequately corroborated the child's out-of-court state-
ments. The allegations and testimony concerning the child's sexual
abuse in Brunken certainly would have met the New York standards.
The child had allegedly stated, "Mother be gentle with me," when her
mother was drying her off with a towel, and stated "Daddy sticks his
finger in my bottom," when her mother was diapering the child. One
day the mother stated she observed the child poking items in and
around her vaginal area when she was in the bath, and when her
mother told her not to do that, the child stated, "Well, Daddy does like
that." The mother also reported the child "passionately" kissing her,
and the child reported she had learned this "from Daddy." The child
stated to the mother that her daddy hurt her with puzzle pieces. The
mother testified that the child's vaginal area was very red, the child
complained of her bottom hurting, and the child had increased enuresis
until the father's visitations were stopped by the abuse proceeding. An-
other witness stated that when she was diapering the child, the child
recited a variation of the nursery rhyme "Hickory Dickory Dock," as
follows: "The clock struck one and Daddy put his hands in my pants"
The second witness also reported that during bath time, the child
stated, "I take baths with Daddy in the shower and Daddy hurts me."
A social worker testified that when she interviewed the child, the child
stated that "Daddy stuck his fingers and put wooden puzzle pieces into
where she pee pees and poo poos." The child demonstrated where her
father touched her with anatomical dolls-she also demonstrated, using
dolls, sexual situations with her father. The child's therapist testified
47. 487 N.E.2d 397 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
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that the child made similar consistent statements to her and identified
a bad touch by her daddy on a stick figure drawing. A psychotherapist
testified as to the signs of a sexually abused child-all of which were
consistent with the testimony of the other witnesses. There was, how-
ever, no physical evidence of sexual abuse. The Illinois court systemati-
cally rejected all of this evidence as sufficient to corroborate any of the
child's out-of-court statements. Not only did the court find that the
father had a right to cross-examine the child, the court reversed the
adjudication in its entirety and dismissed the petition outright. This
child was no doubt visiting with her father the next week. The state
was not even given an opportunity to call the child to corroborate her
own out-of-court statements. Given the facts of the case, the only ac-
ceptable corroboration for an adjudication of dependency in Illinois ap-
pears to be positive physical findings, such as a positive test for vene-
real disease, or the testimony of the child or of an eye-witness who
observed the sexual abuse. Pity the poor child in Illinois.
2. Creative Use of Hearsay Exceptions
Skillful use of the hearsay rules will also permit the introduction
of the child's statements and non-verbal acts. In Re Dependency of Pe-
nelope B.,' 8 notes that many of the child's statements and much of the
child's non-verbal conduct will not be hearsay, as it is not intended to
be an assertion for the purpose of its truth.49 For instance, the Wash-
ington appellate court pointed out that the child's act of running, hid-
ing, screaming, or crying out "I hate you," when the accused's name is
mentioned or when the accused walks into a room would be non-verbal
acts and not hearsay. The child's statements during play with anatomi-
cally correct dolls showing the child's inappropriate knowledge of sex-
ual situations was also not hearsay according to that court.50
Another very important portal for the admission of admissible
"hearsay" is the medical diagnosis. When a sexual assault medical doc-
tor makes a diagnosis of sexual abuse, or when a psychologist or thera-
pist is treating the child for psychological problems secondary to sexual
abuse, the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule applies, and
the child's statements made during diagnosis or treatment (therapy)
48. 709 P.2d at 1191.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1192.
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Children's hearsay statements may also come in as excited utter-
ances. The classic factors to be considered in determining whether
statements are excited utterances include: "(1) the lapse of time be-
tween the event and the declarations; (2) the age of the declarant; (3)
the physical and mental state of the declarant; (4) the characteristics
of the event; and (5) the subject matter of the statements. 52 Most of
the cases which have analyzed whether child victim statements qualify
as excited utterances focus almost exclusively on the time frame be-
tween the event and the declaration. This analysis presumes that a vic-
tim will speak at the first opportunity-a presumption that proves falla-
cious in most child abuse cases. As noted earlier in this article, most
children will not reveal sexual abuse for long periods of time-days,
weeks, months or years, if ever. In Morgan v. Foretich,53 the United
States Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit criticized undue emphasis
on the spontaneity requirement, since children do not necessarily un-
derstand that sexual contact by adults is considered to be shocking, and
since children may delay reporting because of confusion, guilt, or fear.
Acknowledging studies which show that children are reluctant to report
abuse immediately, some courts consider statements as "spontaneous"
if the statements occur at the child's first opportunity to report the
abuse.54 Spontaneity may also be measured by other factors, such as
whether the child was upset at the time the statement was made or
whether the child described that act in sexually explicit terms that ex-
ceed a normal child's age-appropriate understanding of the sexual act.
3. In Camera Proceedings
Child protection courts and family courts have also approved of in
camera proceedings where the child appears before the judge without
the presence of the parents. In Castellanos v. Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services,55 a Florida court upheld the use of an in
camera hearing where neither the parents nor the parents' attorney
were present. The Florida rules of procedure provided that "the child
may be examined by the court outside the presence of other parties
51. Id. at 1193.
52. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947.
53. 846 F.2d at 947.
54. Id.
55. 545 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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. . ." and the child protection statute stated that "the child and the
parents or legal custodians may be examined separately and apart from
each other." The appellate court noted that there was no statutory re-
quirement on the part of the social service agency to prove that the
child would suffer mental or emotional harm prior to utilizing an in
camera procedure and stated:
This is hardly surprising as the legislature has obviously deter-
mined that such a procedure is particularly suited to all juvenile
dependency cases, that the effort to obtain the truth from the mi-
nor child is unlikely to be successful if conducted in the presence of
his parent or guardian whose care of the child is being questioned,
and that the child necessarily requires a special exemption from the
rigors of cross examination by the parent or guardian.8 6
A Louisiana appellate court espoused a similar rationale, uphold-
ing an in camera interview of child where the child had a genuine and
justifiable fear of her father and where the parents were informed of
the child's statements and given ample opportunity to introduce contra-
dictory evidence.6 In New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v.
S.S.," a New Jersey court came to the same conclusion regarding an in
camera procedure that was simultaneously transmitted by electronic
means into the courtroom where the parents and their counsel were
present.
In camera procedures have also been upheld in divorce proceed-
ings. For instance, in Okum v. Okum, 9 a California appellate court
upheld a trial court's decision to interview the children in chambers
with only a court reporter and the parents' attorneys present. During
the interview the trial court refused to allow either attorney to pro-
pound any questions to the children. The Okum case relied on Califor-
nia Evidence Code 765 which requires the court to protect children
under fourteen from undue harassment or embarrassment, requires the
court to insure that questions are stated in an age appropriate fashion,
and permits the court to forbid questions which are not likely to be
understood by children. The Okum court held: "We find no error in the
court's restriction of the children's testimony. This litigation was par-
56. Id. at 456.
57. Interest of Driscoll, 410 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
58. 447 A.2d 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), cert. denied, 453 A.2d 883
(1982).
59. 240 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Dist Ct. App. 1987).
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ticularly acrimonious . . . . The court was obviously concerned that
certain testimony by the children in this highly charged proceeding
might later affect their relationship with their parents."6
4. Summary of Non-Criminal Child Witness Protections
There is still a very small body of case law pertaining to child
witness testimony in non-criminal settings. However, there is a trend in
the emerging case law to apply child witness protection statutes and
special hearsay provisions liberally. The dependency and family courts
tend to reduce the "trustworthiness" obstacles which preclude admis-
sion of children's hearsay statements. Courts have uniformly admitted
evidence under time-honored hearsay exceptions. Finally, child protec-
tion and family courts are permitting special techniques, such as in
camera proceedings, with liberality. The essence of these decisions is
that the family court proceedings exist for the protection of the child
and not for the punishment of the alleged abuser.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD PROTECTION CASE
Traditionally, the courts have failed to accord children a full spec-
trum of constitutional rights because children are not little adults: They
do need guidance, care, supervision, and discipline. If children are not
little adults when it comes to enjoying all constitutional rights, they
certainly should not be treated as little adults when they are forced to
be witnesses. Yet, Confrontation Clause analysis has in fact treated the
child abuse victim just like any witness.
The failure of the courts to fully protect children from the harmful
continued abuse applied by the justice system has two basic causes.
First, trial and appellate court judges and justices are not specialists in
child development and child psychology. Thus, the courts tend to follow
a traditional Confrontation Clause analysis without accounting for the
differences between the way a child and an adult remembers and com-
municates and without accounting for the fact that children have much
greater fear and far less control over situations than adults have. Since
the judges do not have an innate knowledge of child development and
psychology, and child development and psychology are not a part of the
body of law which may be cited to as stare decisis, judges and justices
need a record replete with testimony as to child development, child psy-
60. Id. at 463.
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chology, and actual facts about a particular child in order to determine
that the child's need for protection overrides the accused's right to
confrontation.
Secondly, attorneys are not fully developing their cases at the trial
level to insure that the courts have all the data that they need to justify
child witness protections from face-to-face confrontations.
Appropriate development of the case includes:
1. Competent child psychologists, child interviewers, and child de-
velopment specialists who will testify concerning child development and
child psychology, setting the groundwork for exploring the child's
mental and emotional state and for explaining any inconsistencies of
the child's out-of-court statements. It is not always necessary for such
experts to have a connection with the particular child. Their purpose is
to instruct the court.
2. The attorney, in conjunction with the other child experts, should
teach adult "factual" witnesses to be aware of behavioral patterns
which identify the abused child. Foster parents or temporary custodians
are especially valuable for this purpose, but other witnesses prior to the
child coming into custody may reveal valuable information if the attor-
ney takes the time to make the witness understand the process of child
abuse. Adult factual witnesses should record such behavioral indicia
and recount the child's behavioral patterns to the court.
3. By sheer number and repetition, a child's consistent re-telling of
the abuse through numerous witnesses tends to corroborate the child's
out-of-court statements. Most courts accept "consistency" of the child's
statements, as independent corroboration of the trustworthiness of the
child's statements. This is especially useful during a preliminary hear-
ing where non-admissible hearsay should be permitted.
4. Videotapes of child testimony often capture the child's fear, an-
ger, and behavioral idiosyncracies, in addition to recording the child's
statements concerning the abuse. Whether an interview is videotaped or
not, it is important for the attorney to caution the interviewer to use
non-leading forms of questions, and it is important that the interviewer
be skilled in the processes of interviewing child abuse witnesses. Fi-
nally, the interviewer must have adequate credentials to withstand ex-
pert qualification voir dire.
5. Medical doctors, psychological examiners, and treating ther-
apists should be able to relate the child's statements made to them both
for the purpose of demonstrating the child's mental state and for the
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6. Medical information may or may not be admissible as corrobo-
rative information for the purpose of demonstrating the trustworthiness
of the child's out-of-court statements. Positive medical findings, of
course, should be utilized as proof of the sexual and physical abuse.
Obviously, showing a positive test for venereal disease in a child under
ten is very useful in demonstrating that the child is not simply dream-
ing up a sexual encounter with the accused. It is also useful to show
medical information of physical abuse even in a sexual abuse case,
since this bolsters the theory that the child will suffer mental duress.
7. Attorneys should be on the lookout for less obvious witnesses.
Teachers and foster care parents make valuable witnesses. Teachers
and school principals see things and hear things that others may not.
Even when a case worker or investigator may not have included the
teacher or foster care parent on a preliminary witness list, the attorney
should call up these folks and talk to them. School records may also be
very revealing. The child may have serious behavioral disturbances that
have been recorded by school personnel. Teachers, principals, and
school counselors may have seen suspicious bruises too often for com-
fort, but not often enough for an abuse report. Children often tell their
teachers and school counselors information which they hide from
others. Sometimes, teachers or school counselors even go to the home to
help young students who appear to have problems. If a child has been
in the hospital, or where babies are involved, nurses and medical pro-
fessionals may also have revealing information. Public health nurses
often know incredible information concerning the family dynamics.
In order to permit the use of testimony other than face-to-face
testimony, the court must often entertain a preliminary hearing to show
that the child is "unavailable" to testify because the child may suffer
severe or moderate mental or emotional harm if forced to face the ac-
cuser in court. The preliminary hearing is also used to determine the
trustworthiness of the child's out-of-court statements. Competent
mental health professionals and child-advocate attorneys should be able
to make the court understand that mental distress is almost inevitable
where the abuse has taken place in a family situation.
There must be a beneficial exchange between the fields of psychol-
ogy and law to demonstrate to the court that:
1. Children have selective memories and remember differently
than adults and that just because children's memory and recitation dif-
fers from adults does not make them untrustworthy. Young children
are actually more trustworthy than adults when dealing with issues of
abuse because they traditionally lack a motive to lie about the abuse.
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2. Children have a different way of communicating their thoughts
and fears than adults.
3. Spontaneous statements and excited utterances are different for
a child than an adult. In particular, most children do not reveal their
abuse immediately because of their fears.
4. Testifying is difficult even as an adult. Children will have even
greater difficulty understanding the legal process itself.
5. Recantation is almost the norm after a child has been sexually
or physically abused due to threats, family pressures, and the child's
dependency on the family unit.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have put men on the moon, listened to the stars, traveled to
London in less then three hours, laser-beamed music in our cars, and
computerized our homes. It is time to shed our medieval legal approach
to dealing, with children in the courtroom. It may not be possible to
make all homes safe for kids, but we should put an end to child abuse
by the courts. The truth will not suffer from making it easier for a
child to testify, and children should not be made to suffer in order to
tell the truth. Special laws should protect children in family courts to
minimize the child's trauma of telling the tale of child abuse, and child
advocates and family courts should be well versed in using the emerg-
ing research and the appropriate legal reasoning to justify the use of
the least traumatic means to achieve the end.
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I. OVERVIEW
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to
our very existence and survival."
Today, most Americans find proposals to allow same-sex mar-
riages to be either unacceptable or unthinkable,2 yet the consensus of
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law,
St. Thomas University. B.S., M.A., Bradley University; J.D., University of Illinois. In-
structor of AIDS law courses at three law schools.
** Associated with the Law Offices of H. Candace Gorman, Chicago. B.S.N., St.
Xavier College; M.A., Roosevelt University; R.N., Oak Park Hospital School of Nurs-
ing; J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 1992. Formerly, staff nurse in psychiatric
and alcohol treatment units for Illinois Department of Mental Health and Instructor of
Psychiatric Nursing at Ravenswood Hospital and DePaul Hospital.
1. Chief Justice Earl Warren writing the opinion in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967).
2. A poll of Americans revealed that 69 percent disapproved of legal recognition
of homosexual marriages. Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights?,
TIME, November 20, 1989, at 101.
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the settlers in the colonies of New England accepted the fact that mar-
ried women enjoyed almost no separate legal existence apart from their
husbands. Before the Civil War, not many people seemed to object to
the laws which prohibited marriages among slaves. Even into the 1960s
many states had statutes on the books which outlawed a marriage be-
tween a white person and a person of color. Looking back, thoughtful
and compassionate people find embarrassment about the role of our so-
ciety in adopting and fostering such notions. Perhaps, obstacles to
same-sex marriages will soon become archaic as well.
Some signs of erosion of opposition to same-sex marriages have
appeared in recent years. Moreover, there are sound public policy rea-
sons not only to allow same-sex marriages, but also to encourage them.
After all, we are now faced with the deadly and incurable HIV-AIDS
disease.3 It is of epidemic proportions in the United States' and has
3. "AIDS" means the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, as defined by the
Centers for Disease Control or the National Institute of Health. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 56
2, § 12-16.2(B) (1989). See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the relationship between AIDS and its causative agent, the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV). "HIV" refers to the human immunodeficiency virus. The
HIV virus is identified by isolation of the virus. However, these techniques are not
generally available to the public and are as yet not sensitive to detection of the infec-
tion. Cohen, Safe Sex, Safer Sex, and Prevention of HIV Infection, in THE AIDS
KNOWLEDGE BASE § 11.1.1 (1990). There is a close correlation between the persons
with clinical manifestations of AIDS and the presence of HIV antibody. Id. See gener-
ally Centers for Disease Control, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the
United States: A Review of Current Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. Supp. 6 (1987). For a list of additional sources of classification of HIV and
AIDS, see Scott H. Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HIV-Infected Health Care
Workers, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 439, n.1 (1990). The term "AIDS" is regarded
by public health authorities to be obsolete. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC xvii (June 24, 1988) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION]. "HIV infection" better defines the complexity of the
problem. Id. The focus of the medical and public health community has mistakenly
been on AIDS rather than on the full scope of the disease, including the initial state of
infection with the HIV virus. Accordingly, this comment will use the term "HIV/
AIDS" when referring to the disease, AIDS, caused by infection with the HIV virus.
4. For a discussion of the urgency and breadth of the HIV epidemic in the
United States, see generally the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 3. The Ameri-
can Public Health Association (APHA) is considering replacing the threat of nuclear
war as the number one health problem in the United States with the HIV-AIDS crisis.
MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1989 [hereinafter CLOSEN,
AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS]. See also Centers For Disease Control, The Second
100,000 Cases of Aquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 267 JAMA
788 (February 12, 1992).
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sexual intercourse as one of its two most common modes of transmis-
sion.' Hence, encouragement of long-term monogamous relationships is
in our best interest. Perhaps, legislation recently enacted in Denmark
will serve as the vehicle by which approval of same-sex marriages can
be more effectively urged in the United States.
The Danish Registered Partnership Act (Danish Act), enacted by
the Danish Parliament in 1989, is the first legislation in the world to
allow two members of the same sex to enter into a "partnership" and
legally cohabit as a married couple.6 The statute requires that one of
5. The relative risk of becoming infected with HIV depends on whether a sexual
partner is likely to be at high risk as determined by the following criteria:
High-risk groups include anyone who within the past ten years has engaged in male
homosexual activity or intravenous drug use, has resided in Haiti or central Africa, has
a history of multiple blood transfusions, . . . is a hemophiliac . . . or has had a regular
sexual partner who is a member of any of these groups.
"Norman Hearst, MD, MPH & Stephen B. Hulley, MD, MPH, Preventing the Heter-
osexual Spread of AIDS, 259 JAMA 2428, 2431, (1988) [hereinafter Hearst & Hul-
ley]. However, there is an increasingly popular view that we should no longer refer to
risk groups, but only to risk behavior.
6. THE DANISH REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP ACT, No. 372 (Denmark 1989) [here-
inafter DANISH ACT]. On May 24, 1984, the Danish Parliament passed a Bill calling
for the establishment of a commission "to elucidate the position of homosexuals in
Danish society." M. Elmer & M. Larsen, Explanatory Article on the Legal Conse-
quences of the Danish Law on Registered Partnership, 3 JURISTEN 1 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Elmer & Larsen]. Accordingly, the Minister of Justice set up a commission on
November 21, 1984 to investigate the "legal, social and cultural circumstances of
homosexuals." Id. The commission was also directed to make proposals for the removal
of existing discrimination against homosexual persons in Danish society, for the im-
provement of the situation of homosexual persons and for the establishment of "perma-
nent forms of cohabitation." Id. Based on a February 1986 provisional report from the
commission, the Danish parliament amended the inheritance and gift taxes provisions
of the Danish Taxation Act. FOLKETING ACT No. 339 (Denmark 1986) (alleviating
inheritance tax under certain circumstances for persons of the same sex sharing a
home).
Just before the final report of the commission was published in January 1988, the
Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Social Liberal Party in-
troduced their registered partnership bill, L 182. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 6. This
bill was passed with minor changes on June 7, 1989. Id. A companion bill was passed
at the same time to amend the Danish Marriage Act, the Inheritance Act, the Inheri-
tance and Gifts (Taxation) Act and the Civil Penal Code due to changes brought about
by the Registered Partnership Act. Id.
The CHICAGO TRIBUNE reported that members of the Danish Parliament passed
the law by a vote of 71-47. CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 2, 1989, at p. 3. See also Danish
Parliament Legalized Gay Marriages, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 27, 1989, at 3, Clar-
ence Page, A Non-traditional Way to Say 'I Do', CHICAGO TRIBUNE October 8, 1989,
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the two partners be either a permanent resident of Denmark or of Dan-
ish nationality, and there is no restriction on residence or citizenship of
the other person.7 With limited exceptions, the Danish Act grants such
a partnership the same rights and responsibilities as heterosexual mar-
riage partners.8
at 3; Incidental (Sexual) Intelligence, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, No-
vember 1, 1989, at 19; Telephone interview with Lisa Powers, General Secretary of the
International Lesbian and Gay Association (Aug. 30, 1990).
In 1987, the Swedish government amended the national marriage code to expand
the property rights of unmarried cohabitants, including same sex couples. SVENSK
FORFATTNINGSSAMLING (SFS) § 14 (Sweden). However, the Swedish law provides far
more limited rights than does the Danish Act. See DANISH ACT, supra note 6. The new
law specifically extends these limited property rights to homosexual persons who live
together in a marriage-like relationship for a minimum five-year period. Id. These
property rights includes items acquired during the relationship, such as a home and its
furnishings. Id. at § 5. See also Mathew Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent
Swedish Legislation Grants Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24
FAM. L.Q. 179 (1990).
7. The Danish Act requires that at least one of the partners have either perma-
nent residence in Denmark or be of Danish nationality. DANISH ACT, supra note 6, §
21/2. at 1. Thus, an American citizen could enter into a registered partnership in Den-
mark with a Danish national or a person whose permanent residence is Denmark. See
Elmer & Larsen, supra, note 6. The potential number of persons affected by the Dan-
ish Act could be very small. Nevertheless, the recognition of even one same sex mar-
riage could be precedent setting.
8. There are four exceptions to the provision that the registration of a partner-
ship will have the same legal effect as the contracting of marriage. DANISH ACT, supra
note 3. The first exception is that the Provisions of the Danish Adoption Act regarding
spouses does not apply to registered partners. Id. § 4.1, at 1. The legal consequence of
this provision is that persons in a registered partnership have no possibility of adopting
jointly. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 6.
The second exception is that the regulations of Danish law on child custody that
apply to married couples are not applicable to registered partnerships. DANISH ACT,
supra note 6, § 4.2, at 1. The legal consequence is that a registered couple cannot
obtain common custody of the child from a previous marriage of one of them. Elmer &
Larsen supra note 6, at 3. A person in a registered partnership is, however, permitted
to obtain custody of a child under regulations that apply to other single or married
persons. Id.
The third exception is that the rule in the Danish law that a husband is responsible
for "his wife's ordinary contracts . . . (for) her own special needs," does not apply to
registered partnerships. Id. at 4. The last exception is that "[p]rovisions of interna-
tional treaties shall not apply to registered partnership unless the other contracting
parties agree to such application." DANISH ACT, supra note 6, § 4.4, at 1.
The provisions of Danish law that apply to marriage and to marital spouses apply
similarly to registered partnerships and to registered partners. DANISH ACT, supra note
6, § 3.2, at 1. The act permits a couple consisting of two persons of the same sex to
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While courts in the United States generally recognize marriages
validly contracted in another country,9 the courts have not yet faced
enter into a "registered partnership" with the same legal consequences as marriage,
subject to certain exceptions. The legal consequences are that the rules governing prop-
erty in a marriage and the right of married persons to social welfare payments have
corresponding application to registered partnerships. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 6, at
3. The death of one of the partners dissolves the registered partnership. Id. The surviv-
ing partner "may retain undivided possession of the estate in accordance with section 9
of the Inheritance Act," and will receive the other benefits which would be accorded to
a married spouse, subject to the exception regarding common heirs. Id.
The consequences of the Danish Act are that registered partners are bound by the
same rules as are married spouses concerning mutual maintenance obligations, taxa-
tion, and the possibility that upon dissolution of a registered partnership, one of the
partners may be ordered to pay alimony to the other. Id.
9. State marriage statutes generally contain provisions which grant validity to
the marriage of residents whose marriage was celebrated in a foreign country. UNIF.
MARRIAGE: AND DIVORCE ACT § 210 (1974). See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 20 (1977) (grant-
ing validity to marriage contracts which are valid under the laws of the country in
which a marriage was contracted). Such provisions merely declare the common law
rule. Bowers v. Wyoming State, 593 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 1979); see also K. v. K., 393
N.Y.S.2d :534 (1977) (giving effect to law of Poland which did not recognize religious
solemnization of marriage).
The validity of a marriage is determined by the local law of the state which has
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1969). Section 284 states that "[a] state usually
gives the same incidents to a foreign marriage, which is valid ...that it gives to a
marriage contracted within its territory." Id. at § 284. In assessing the validity of a
foreign marriage, the first consideration is whether the marriage complied with the
legal requirements where the marriage took place. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 13.6 (1986). The usual view in the United States, that a marriage valid where
entered into is valid everywhere, is based on the strong public policy for upholding the
validity of marriage wherever possible. Id. § 13.8. However, a number of cases have
denied validity to foreign marriages where persons were forbidden to marry by the law
of their domicile. Id. If a particular union is explicitly forbidden by the law of the
domicile, a conflict arises between the strong public policy for upholding marriage and
the common domicile's notions of "propriety and good morals" that are contained in
statutory prohibitions, such as polygamy, incest, or non-age. Id.
Some states have passed Marriage Evasion Acts to prevent their marriage laws
from being circumvented by couples who marry in a jurisdiction outside their common
domicile, which permits their marriage, and who subsequently return to their common
domicile, which prohibits the union. For example, if residents of Maine "with intent to
evade subchapter II and to return and reside here, go into another state or country and
there have their marriage solemnized and afterwards return and reside here," such
marriage is void in Maine. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 91 (1964). Although the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws "withdrew" the Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act in 1943, Maine is one of thirteen jurisdictions which have enacted one form or
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the question of whether a marriage performed pursuant to the Danish
Act would be valid in the United States. A state or federal court could
uphold the validity of a marriage contracted under the Danish Act if a
legitimate public interest exists and if case law and statutes impose no
insurmountable legal obstacles.
The spread of HIV-AIDS has created a national health crisis.10
An estimated two million Americans are either infected with, or have
suffered from, HIV-AIDS. 11 For this reason, each state and the federal
government have an interest in finding ways to stop the transmission of
HIV-AIDS. There is no immunization to prevent HIV-AIDS and more
importantly there is no cure for it. Additionally, there is no evidence
that any one has recovered from the disease. Although many things
about this desease are unknown, there is no doubt that HIV can be
transmitted during sexual intercourse. In fact, sexual transmission of
HIV accounts for more cases of HIV-AIDS in the United States since
1981 than any other cause.' 2 Worldwide, sexual transmission of HIV
accounts for the overwhelming number of all cases of HIV-AIDS (un-
doubtedly, more than all other causes combined)." The gay community
has borne the brunt of the scourge of sexually transmitted HIV-AIDS
in this country.
Research clearly indicates that having multiple sexual partners in-
another of a Marriage Evasion Act. HOMER CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 87 (2d ed.
1987). The other jurisdictions are Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. Id.
10. See supra note 3.
11. "The actual number of people carrying the HIV in the United States, as of
the end of 1987, was not the 900,000 to 1.4 million the official sources estimate, but
probably more than twice that number . . . between two and three million . . . with
the most likely total of infections probably close to 2.4 million. Hopkins & Johnston,
Incidence of HIV Infection in the United States, 114 ATLANTIC INFO. SERV.'S INC. 7
(1988).
12. See C.D.C., HIV-AIDS Surveillance, June 1991, at 8 (regarding HIV expo-
sure categories, reporting 59 percent male homosexual/bisexual contacts and six per-
cent heterosexual contacts).
13. This conclusion follows from the fact that the United States accounts for
about 48 percent of all reported cases of AIDS (and that sexual transmission is the
major cause of HIV transmission in the U.S.) and that about 35 percent of the other
AIDS cases have been reported in Africa and Latin America (low income areas where
sexual transmission, rather than intravenous drug transmission, predominates over-
whelmingly). See POSITIVELY AWARE, August 1991, at 4; LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS
(1991), Donald Hermann and William Schurgin (eds.) at 1:25 ("heterosexual trans-
mission is probably the leading route of HIV infection worldwide").
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creases the risk of becoming infected with HIV-AIDS. Conversely, the
encouragement of permanent, exclusive relationships between people,
including same-sex partners, will undoubtedly reduce the transmission
of the disease."' In fact, it appears that many people have already em-
barked upon non-marital, monogamous unions in reaction to their fears
about the risk of contracting HIV-AIDS.15
The Danish Act comes at a time of unprecedented need for sexu-
ally active people to form monogamous partnerships to reduce the like-
lihood of their exposure to HIV-AIDS. By removing the legal barriers
to same-sex marriage in Denmark, the Danish Act offers a reasoned
approach to assist in limiting the spread of HIV-AIDS and to assist in
lifting the burden of unsupportable discriminatory views. State and fed-
eral recognition of marriages contracted under the Danish Act would
amount to a major step towards encouraging monogamy between same-
gender partners, thereby reducing the spread of HIV-AIDS in this
country and moving us in a more tolerant direction.
While there are barriers that may discourage some state and fed-
eral courts from recognizing the validity of same-sex marriages under
the Danish Act, much support is available to advocate the legality of
such marriages. Certainly, there is social stigma against marriages be-
tween persons of the same sex in many quarters at the present time. A
few statutes prohibit such marriages, while other laws appear to erect
obstacles to same-sex marriage. Additionally, many court decisions
have rejected the validity of same-sex marriages or have refused to ex-
tend to same-sex couples the incidents which attend traditional matri-
mony. However, the courts should evaluate the larger issues, overcome
these impediments and further the more important public interest of
reducing the advance of HIV-AIDS. Significantly, in only a very few
states are there clearly expressed statutory prohibitions against same-
sex marriage. Therefore, most state and federal courts could distin-
guish, disregard, or reverse precedent which may seem to oppose same-
sex marriage.
This article argues that state and federal courts should recognize
14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Number of Sex Partners and Potential
Risk of Sexual Exposure to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 37 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 565 (1988) [hereinafter NUMBER OF SEX PARTNERS].
15. ROBERT JARVIS, ET AL., AIDS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 99 (West 1990) [herein-
after AIDS LAW] (AIDS has contributed to a trend in the gay community for people
to remain in monogamous sexual unions); CLOSEN, AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS,
supra note 4, at 397 (one of the side effects of the HIV/AIDS emergency is the in-
crease in monogamous relationships).
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the validity of a Danish marriage between two persons of the same
gender. The public policy of reducing the spread of HIV-AIDS and the
advancement of rational and non-discriminatory attitudes towards peo-
ple, their sexual orientations, and their lifestyles demand such a view.
This paper begins with an examination of a portion of the historical
development of American marriage laws together with the social poli-
cies that those laws embodied. In particular, the paper will review
changes in the legal rights granted to married women, to former slaves,
and to persons of different races wishing to marry. The historical re-
view shall be followed by a discussion of the current legal status of
same-sex marriages, including the barriers or apparent barriers to such
unions that exist in the statutes and case law. Finally, the paper con-
cludes that recognition of same-sex marriages contracted under the
Danish Act would serve the public health of the citizens of the United
States and at the same time would remove unjustifiable objections to
marriage between same-sex partners.
II. EARLY AMERICAN MARRIAGE LAWS
American marriage law has its origin in the canon law of the
Catholic Church, which consisted of decrees of various Popes.1 In
England, canon law was established as the basis of matrimonial law
with the arrival of Christianity in the year 605.17 The early canon law
did not require any marriage ceremony until the Catholic Church de-
creed in 1563 that any marriage not solemnized by a parish priest was
void. 18 This decree was not accepted as part of England's law for nearly
two hundred years. Consequently, common law rather than canon law
was in force until 1753.19 However, even the performance of a formal
ceremony and a valid marriage did not result in extending to the fe-
male spouse the same rights as were enjoyed by the male spouse, where
statutes or common law decisions provided to the contrary.
At common law, a married woman had no independent legal status
of her own. She simply did not exist as a separate legal person."0 In
16. Reaves v. Reaves, 82 P. 490, 494 (Okla. 1905) (marriage laws in America
can be traced to ancient canon law consisting of decrees of various Popes).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Canon law again became part of the marriage law of England with the pas-
sage of Lord Hardwicke's 1753 act that regulated the form and validity of marriage.
Id.
20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430-33 (1765). "The very being or
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order to "protect" the married woman, as Blackstone explained in his
Commentaries, a husband and wife were "one person in law. ' 21 The
one person was the husband under English law.22
British marriage law was generally adopted as the law of this
country." Until the end of the last century, the doctrine of the unity of
husband and wife stripped married women of their legal existence and
left them and their property subject to their husbands' almost absolute
will.2 "4 Despite the social attitudes favoring the denial of legal rights for
married women, state legislatures began to amend the common law
with statutes that put married women on a more equal footing with
unmarried women.2 5 By the end of the century, these statutes, called
Married Women's Property Acts, were enacted in every state.20 These
laws granted married women the rights to own and transfer property,
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs everything . I..." d. (emphasis in original). Blackstone comments
that once married, a woman had no control of her real property or her chattels and was
unable to contract in her own name with anyone (all deeds executed by a married
woman during her coverture were void or voidable except for certain fines). Id. The
single identity of both spouses rendered it impossible for them to contract between
themselves during their marriage. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
229 (1968). See also RADIN, The Common Law of the Family, in 6 NATIONAL LAW
LIBRARY LEGAL RELATIONS 79, 175 (1939) [hereinafter RADIN].
21. Blackstone wrote that the law requiring a married woman to lose her legal
rights were "for her protection and benefit" because of the special, favorite place held
by the women in the laws of England. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 443, 430-33.
22. Id. at 430-33.
23. State ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 207 P. 75, 76 (Nev. 1922) (common law of
England is part of common law of this country except as altered by statute).
24. Id. See also RADIN, supra note 20, at 177. Professor Radin points out that
the common law deals only with persons and relations between them; it does not recog-
nize the family as a unit of any kind at all. Id. Consequently, a contradiction exists
between American legal theory that assumes that family issues are between individuals,
but still uses the term "family" in its discussions. By contrast, at least one common law
country, Ireland, does recognize the family. BUNREACHT NAHEIREANN (Constitution)
art. 41 (Ireland). "The State recognizes the Family as the natural primary and funda-
mental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and
inperscriptable rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law". Id.
25. HARRY KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES. COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS, 175 (3rd
ed. 1990); 1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS, § 2,48 (6th ed. 1921).
26. KRAUSE, supra note 25, at 175. See also Lenore J. Weitzmann, Legal Regu-
lation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172 n.14 (1974).
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to make contracts, and to sue (and be sued). 7
Some courts resisted these reforms, however, and interpreted the
laws in restrictive manners.2 8 Courts have looked to traditional social
policies, the protection of the married woman, and the preservation of
the family institution to frustrate the clear intent of these statutes.2 9 As
a result, state legislatures have repeatedly passed specific amendments
to the Married Women's Property Acts to override the courts' deci-
sions.8 0 In this manner, state legislatures eventually succeeded in re-
moving most of the legal disabilities which had beset women through-
out British and American history.31
27. Id. at 175-76.
28. CLARK, supra note 20, at § 7.2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at n.4 (listing the Married Women's Property Acts of all fifty states and
the District of Columbia as of 1968). Ironically, by 1882 Married Women's Property
Acts had also become law in England, the country whose laws had been the source of
women's inferior legal position. Weitzmann, supra note 26, at 1169, 1172 n.14.
One of the remnants of the doctrine of marital unity which survived in the United
States was the prohibition against interspousal tort actions. BLACKSTONE, supra note
20, at 430-33. Although the unity doctrine was discredited by the Married Women's
Property Acts, it remained the basis for the social policy that barred tort actions be-
tween spouses because of the belief that such actions would destroy marital peace and
harmony. Dean Prosser vigorously attacked this social policy with the following
statements:
This is on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of
peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry
to sue him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by denying her the
legal remedy-and this even though she has left him or divorced him for that very
ground, and although the same courts refuse to find any disruption of domestic tran-
quility if she sues him for a tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecution
against him. If this reasoning appeals to the reader, let him by all means adopt it.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 122, at 863
(4th ed. 1971).
In many states, the legislatures intervened to end interspousal immunity, thus per-
mitting married persons to bring tort actions against each other. See S.A.V. v. K.G.V.,
708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (abolishing the spousal immunity in tort action where wife
claimed husband willfully or negligently infected her with herpes). But see Hill v. Hill,
415 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 1982) (reaffirming doctrine of interspousal immunity doctrine
for intentional torts in action brought against the husband of wife involuntarily com-
mitted for mental illness for one day).
Likewise, the fiction of marital unity has been the basis for the inability of a mar-
ried woman to sue for loss of her husband's consortium. D. DAVIDSON ET AL., SEX
BASED DISCRIMINATION 171-73 (1974). While this has changed only recently, a hus-
band has always been able to sue for loss of his wife's consortium. See also Karczewski
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In the last century, the legal status of married women has changed
profoundly. Changes in state laws have aided in overcoming the social
stigmas against recognizing the legal rights of married women. 32
Whereas the doctrine of marital unity formerly required married
women to yield virtually all of their legal rights to their husbands, the
Married Women's Property Acts and other marriage laws now protect
the legal rights of married women.3" Under modern law, the status of
marriage actually bestows upon the married woman, equally with their
male spouses, numerous additional legal benefits, such as joint property
rights, intestate succession, and favorable tax consequences.3 4
Tradition, notions of morality, and social policy operated upon
state legislatures and courts, not only to limit the legal rights of mar-
ried women, but also to control who had the right to marry. Before
emancipation, marriages between slaves in the South were without le-
gal effect.3 ' Although slave masters generally permitted and even en-
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Iil. 1967) for a discussion of the
principles at issue.
In 1938, the American Law Institute denied a married woman the right of a cause
of action for harm caused by a third party who negligently injured her husband. THE
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 695 (1938). In 1969, the Institute reversed its position and
allowed such an action. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 695 (1969) (Tent.
Draft No. 14). See Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 304 So. 2d 881, 885 (Ala.
1974) (unrealistic in more modern social fabric to continue adherence to old doctrine
that denied a wife loss of consortium).
Today, remnants of the doctrine of marital unity still remain embodied in parts of
American law. For example, the spouse of a party with a pecuniary interest in a will
cannot witness the will, at the risk of having their gift or bequest held void. Fearn v.
Postlethwaite, 88 N.E. 1057 (I1l. 1909). Blood relatives of a party with a pecuniary
interest in the will, however, may be witnesses to a will even though their share would
be greater than the gift or benefit to a spouse under like circumstances. In re Ackerina,
90 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 20-34 for a discussion of the changes in
state laws regarding the legal rights of married women.
33. Id.
34. For a discussion of the legal and economic benefits of traditional marriage,
see John Dwight Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to
Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice At the Same Time,? 10
J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 34-35 (1984); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799,
874 (1979).
35. "[A]II persons held as slaves within any state or designated part of a state,
the people where of shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then,
thenceforward, and forever, free .... " EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, in I THE
PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE 769 (U. Chi. ed. 1949).
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couraged slave marriages, the masters regarded such marriages as
animal breeding, having as its purpose increasing the master's
"stock." '36 One historian has noted that no state legislature ever seri-
ously considered encroaching upon the master's property rights over
slaves by giving legal status to slave marriages. 37 Tragically, slave mas-
ters could take sexual advantage of any slave woman. As the Attorney
General of Maryland once proclaimed, "a slave has never maintained
an action against the violator of his bed."38
Not only were slave marriages without legal effect, but slave mar-
riages could be dissolved by the sale of one or both of the spouses,
depending upon the "caprice or necessity of the owners." 39 Indeed, in
Virginia, even a marriage between a free black and a slave was prohib-
ited, and children born of such an unrecognized union were regarded as
slaves or as bastards.40 Although the slave family had no legal founda-
tion, family life existed widely among slaves. It provided the traditional
functions of the family, and it was among the most important survival
mechanisms for the slave.41
The following cases illustrate that marriages between slaves produced no civil ef-
fect unless and until ratified by the parties by cohabitation after their emancipation.
Succession of Blackburn, 98 So. 43 (La. 1923); Succession of Walker, 46 So. 890 (La.
1908); Johnson v. Raphael, 42 So. 470 (La. 1906). Because slave marriages had no
legal effect, the law did not recognize fornication or adultery between slaves. I H. CAT-
TERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 287
(1926).
36. S. FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE 52 (1971). One former slave stated the
following:
Legally, there is no such relation as husband and wife among slaves, be-
cause the law adjudges them to be things, and not men and women ....
The whole affair is in the hand of the master as a means of the increase
and improvement of stock . . . .The slave being "property to all intents,"
is subject of course, to the laws relating to "things" and not to "persons."
Id. at 54.
37. STAMPP, infra note 42, at 198.
38. A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "'Rather Than The Free':
Free Blacks In Colonial And Antebellum Virginia," 26 HAR. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 53
(1991).
39. STAMPP, infra note 42, at 198. When slaves unions existed, they were fre-
quently and callously broken by their masters. H. BLASINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMU-
NITY 91 (1972). Records of 2,888 slave unions compiled by the Union army and the
Freedmen's Bureaus in four southern states indicate that 32.4 per cent of the unions
were dissolved by masters. Id. at 90 n.29, 91.
40. Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 54.
41. BLASSINGAME, supra note 39, at 78-79.
[Vol. 16
202
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Closen
After emancipation, states that had denied legal status to mar-
riages between slaves enacted or amended their marriage laws to vali-
date marriages between former slaves."2 In spite of hostile social atti-
tudes, the amended laws automatically recognized former slaves, who
had cohabited as husband and wife, as being legally married .4  These
newly enacted marriage laws also provided that "freed Negroes" and
"mullattoes" could marry each other." Such laws represented radical
changes in the legal status of marriages between former slaves in
America. Moreover, changes in such laws were followed by, and influ-
enced changes in, societal attitudes that had approved slavery but op-
posed slave marriages."5
Even after emancipated slaves were permitted to marry, anti-mis-
cegenation46 laws prohibited marriages between whites and blacks, and
between whites and persons from other non-white races.' 7 In some
states, such as Mississippi, the law prohibited intermarriage between
whites and those persons descended from blacks "to the third genera-
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT. § 51.5 (1984). Slave marriages had no legal effect
until after the emancipation of slaves. See Jones v. James, 125 So. 761, 762 (La. 1930)
(marriage between slaves produced no civil effect unless ratified after emancipation by
parties through continued cohabitation or by acknowledgment). See also Lewis v.
King, 54 N.E. 330, 332 (I11. 1899) (marriage between slaves is ratified by their ac-
cepting each other as husband and wife after their emancipation); Butler v. Butler, 44
N.E. 203, 204 (I11. 1896) (slave marriages give rise to no civil rights and are equivalent
to marriages between infants, lunatics or insane persons); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88
n.10 (West 1952) (at the moment of emancipation marriage of slaves possess all rights
and privileges of lawful marriage); K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 150, 198
(1956) (slaves were chattels and slave marriages were not legally binding).
43. "[F]ree Negroes, and mulattoes may intermarry with each other, in the same
manner and under the same regulations that are provided by law for white persons
.... "THE PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 778.
44. Id.
45. Case Comment, Homosexuals Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a
Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 199 n.42 (1979).
46. '[M]arriage between persons of different races, as between a white person
and a Negro." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (1979); "[Mjarriage or cohabitation
between a white person and a member of another race." 3 WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1442 (1968).
47. Ryan v. Barthelmy, 32 So. 2d 467, 469 (La. App. 1947) (marriage between
white man and Negro woman was void); Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 321 (1869) (Geor-
gia law prohibiting marriage between white and black persons prevents inferior race
bringing down superior race and is therefore constitutional); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 94
(West 1952); OR. LAWS § 1 (1866) (prohibiting marriage between a white person and
a person having Negro, Chinese, Kanaka or Indian blood).
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tion."' The penalty for this felony in Mississippi was life
imprisonment. 9
Courts cited decency, morality and patriotic pride as the bases for
condemning interracial marriage80 For example, in 1890 in State v.
Tutty,5 1 the United States Circuit Court8 2 for the Southern District of
Georgia considered whether a white man and a black woman could be
indicted for the crime of fornication in Georgia after marrying in the
District of Columbia." In language that harkened back to Blackstone's
explanation that the loss of a married woman's legal existence was for
her "protection and benefit," 5 the Tutty court explained that the de-
fendants must face the charges of fornication because Georgia's misce-
genation law is absolutely necessary for the "amelioration" of the Ne-
gro condition and for the "permanent advancement" of the race. In
callous and cruel fashion, consistent with the often prevailing public
attitudes about people of color, court opinions in miscegenation cases
spoke of the inferiority of blacks and the impropriety of mixing the
races.
56
Laws prohibiting and punishing miscegenation still existed in six-
teen states as of 1967 when the United States Supreme Court, in Lov-
ing v. Virginia,"" struck down Virginia's miscegenation statute as re-
pugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In doing so, the Supreme
Court rejected the State's argument that because the statute punished
both whites and blacks equally for participating in an interracial mar-
48. THE PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 778.
49. Id.
50. State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 762 (1890); Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 309
(Tenn. 1889) (demoralization and debauchery is involved in such an alliance).
51. 41 F. 753 (1890).
52. United States Circuit Courts were abolished in 1912. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION 165 (15th ed. 1991).
53. Tutty, 41 F. at 756. A Georgia anti-miscegenation law prohibited such mar-
riages and declared that a marriage between a white person and a black person was
null and void. Id. at 755.
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 433.
55. Tutty, 41 F. at 762-63. The Tutly court further stated that nullifying the
laws made to prevent miscegenation would be as cruel to the Negro race as it would be
"injurious to society, destructive to social order, and ruinous to the future of a large
portion of the country." Id.
56. See supra note 42.
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Id. at 4 n.1l.
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riage, the legislation was not violative of equal protection.5 9 In Loving,
the Court held that the Virginia law criminalizing only those interra-
cial marriages involving "white" persons was akin to the state's history
of adopting policies of white supremacy. 0 This decision put an end to
the official policy of white superiority that had been used by state legis-
latures to erect legal obstacles to marriage between persons of different
races. Today, no state law prohibits interracial marriage and it appears
that such marriages are socially acceptable.61
This brief review of developments in marriage laws concerning the
legal rights of married women, slaves, and persons of different races
illustrates that preexisting social biases can and should yield when
more important social concerns are at stake. Though initially thought
to be radical, the described changes in the rights granted through mari-
tal laws to women, to slaves, and to persons of different races have
subsequently appeared reasonable and grounded in the need to shed
archaic policies regarding morality and tradition. Although social bi-
ases against same-sex relationships, often expressed in moral and reli-
gious terms, appear deeply rooted, times are changing. As societal atti-
tudes toward homosexuality slowly improve and as more and more
people come to appreciate the severity and extent of the HIV-AIDS
health crisis, decisions with regard to the acceptability of same-sex
marriages must evolve to reflect the changing times. 2 Clearly, it is
59. Id. at 10-11. The State of Virginia found support for its "equal application"
argument in Pace v. Alabama, in which the United States Supreme Court let stand a
conviction under Alabama law that imposed a greater penalty for fornication between a
white person and a Negro than between members of the same race. Id. (citing Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882)). The Court in Loving rejected the Pace Court's rea-
soning as not having withstood subsequent Supreme Court analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 n.ll.
60. Id. at 7.
61. See, e.g., Leslie Dreyfous, Mixed Families Smash Color Barrier, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), July 11, 1991 at 4.
62. Susan Elizabeth Reese, The Forgotten Sex: Lesbians, Liberation, and the
Law, I1 WILLAMETTE L.J. 354, 377 (1975) (legal system alone can never exorcise soci-
ety's discrimination against lesbians); Catherine M. Cullem, Comment, Fundamental
Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141, 163 (1979)
(tradition of discrimination and hatred toward persons with different sexual orientation
should not justify denying basic human rights); Edward Veitch, The Essence of Mar-
riage: A Comment on the Homosexual Challenge, 5 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV. 41
(1976) [hereinafter Homosexual Challenge] (distinct state advantage in recognition of
same sex marriage if prejudices can be diluted and policy changed).
For a typical view of the rationale for denying the validity of a same sex marriage,
see N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 4 (1988) (General Commentary on Article 2).
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once again time to discard outdated and irrational barriers to monog-
amy among same-sex partners that do not serve the common good.
III. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION
This paper will focus upon the argument for judicial recognition of
Danish same-sex marriages because the authors share the view that
legislative action in favor of such marriages is much further away than
possible court approval. Legislatures seem generally to lag behind
many societal changes and to react to those changes rather than to lead
the way. That seems to be the politically safe and expedient course of
action (or inaction). While legislatures do not have to act at all, judges
cannot dodge issues quite so readily once they have been presented in
the form of a litigation. Moreover, while courts show due respect for
precedent in the common law, countless opinions note the obligation of
the common law to remain flexible and to adapt appropriately in light
of changing mores and the needs of society.6"
A few recent legislative initiatives with regard to pre-marital HIV
testing and restrictions of marriage in the context of the HIV-AIDS
epidemic have provided further evidence that our doubts about the will-
ingness of legislatures to enact same-sex marriage laws in the near fu-
The commentary to section four explains that "marriage has been traditionally defined
as the union of one man and one woman for life as husband and wife." Id. New York
statutes do not expressly prohibit same sex marriage, however, the statutes do not au-
thorize issuance of marriage licenses to persons of the same sex. Id. Furthermore, New
York courts have consistently refused to recognize the validity of same sex marriages.
See B. v. B., 255 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974) (no valid marriage where female to male
transsexual person was unable to procreate and lacked male sex organs); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971) (marriage between two biological males a legal
nullity). See generally Phyllis W. Beck, Non-traditional Lifestyles, 17 J. FAM. L. 685
(1978); Case Comment, Homosexuals Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a
Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1979); Homosexual Challenge, supra
this note, at 41; Note, Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (marriage was a custom long
before the state began to issue marriage licenses); Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (moral character of lesbian mother who seeks custody
of a child is relevant to issue of custody). For a review of virtually every civil case
dealing with homosexuality prior to 1979, see Rivera, supra note 34, at 799-47. The
author concludes that a systematic and pervasive discrimination exists against homo-
sexual persons in the courts. Id. at 947.
63. See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also LAW-
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ture are well founded. For example, Illinois and Louisiana adopted
mandatory pre-marital HIV testing statutes,6' and Texas enacted a
unique version of such a law.65 Additionally, Utah adopted a law which
declares a marriage to someone with AIDS to be invalid.6 In reality,
those acts represent backward policy, based upon lack of knowledge
and compassion about HIV-AIDS and the people affected. Fortunately,
both Illinois and Louisiana repealed their pre-marital HIV testing re-
quirements because those laws were such dismal failures.67 Addition-
ally, numerous other statutory enactments indicate that legislatures are
not well-informed about HIV-AIDS matters and, accordingly, cannot
be expected to take the initiative to recognize that same-sex marriages
are valid. 68
We are not naively optimistic about the courage and wisdom of
judges as compared to legislators. We are aware of substantial evidence
derived from cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick,69 In Re Estate of
Cooper,7 and others"l to be addressed more fully below which suggest
that courts are not eagerly awaiting test cases by same-sex couples as-
serting entitlement to treatment as spouses. Nevertheless, we are gener-
ally optimistic that there has been more erosion of the opposition to
same-sex marriages in the judiciary than in the legislatures. The time
may be ripe for judicial recognition of those marriages.
64. See Michael L. Closen, Family Law, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS, 4:04 (Her-
mann and Schurgin, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Closen, Family Law]; Turnock & Kelly,
Mandatory Premarital Testing for [HIV]: The Illinois Experience, 261 JAMA 3415
(1989) [hereinafter Turnock].
65. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 81.102 (West 1991) (authorizing
mandatory premarital HIV testing when the HIV prevalence rate is at least 83
percent).
66. UTAH CODE ANN., § 30-1-2 (1987) ("The following marriages are prohibited
and declared void: (1) with a person afflicted with [AIDS] . . .; (6) between persons of
the same sex.").
67. Closen, Family Law, supra note 64; Turnock, supra note 64.
68. See generally Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test
Results To the Individuals Tested: A Matter Of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 Loy.
U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (1991); Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally
Pregnant: ,4re AIDS-Transmission Laws Encouraging Abortion?, 76 A.B.A. J. 76
(1990); Michael L. Closen & Jeffrey Deutschman, A Proposal To Repeal the Illinois
HIV Transmission Statute, 78 ILL. B.J. 592 (1990).
69. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1990).
71. See cases cited at note 80 and accompanying text. See also such sodomy
cases as Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d
508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); State v. Gary, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
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IV. THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
All fifty state legislatures, the District of Columbia, and the
United States territories have enacted statutes that regulate mar-
riage.72 The marriage law of each jurisdiction is somewhat unique, and
consequently, many variations exist between state marriage laws.
Among other things, these state laws define who shall be eligible to
marry. Ordinarily, the formats of the statutes include central provisions
defining the concept of marriage and announcing the authority of the
government to solemnize a marriage. Other corollary provisions of the
statutes typically set out procedures, fees, and similar details.
Some of these marriage statutes contain provisions or references
that seem to erect obstacles for same-sex partners to seek recognition of
their Danish marriage. One apparent obstacle arises from those stat-
utes that include gender references in their language, and an even
greater obstacle is created by those few laws which contain express
prohibitions against same-sex marriages.
The first type of statutory obstacle is the use of gender-related
terms, such as "male" and "female," 73 or "husband" and "wife,"" in
the text of the law without an explicit requirement that the marriage
partners be of the opposite sex. The Alaska marriage law is fairly typi-
cal. It prohibits marriage if either party has a living husband or wife.7 5
However, the section defining marriage contains no reference to the
terms "husband" or "wife," and no other requirement provides that
marriage partners be of the opposite sex.76 This problem is widespread.
Gender related terms appear variously in the texts of the marriage stat-
utes of at least forty-three jurisdictions.7 7 The statutes in four of those
72. See infra notes 77-79 for citations to marriage statutes in the fifty states and
the District of Columbia.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51.1 (1984).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20.1.50 (Supp. 1989).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.021 (1989).
76. Id. at § 25.05.011.
77. The state marriage statutes that use gender-related terms are the following:
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.021 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9.11.102 (1987); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4100 (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 10 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.104 (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572.1 (1985); IDAHO CODE §
32.202 (Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 201 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. §
31.7.1.2 (Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23.104(a) (Supp.1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Michie Supp. 1988); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West Supp. 1990); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2.201
(Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. §
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jurisdictions, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware and South Dakota, con-
tain an especially incidental, quite nominal reference to gender that is
not part of either the essential definition of who may marry or any
other provision of significance. 8 By contrast, the marriage laws of eight
other jurisdictions do not use gender specific terms, but instead use
gender neutral terms such as "persons" or "applicants".7 9
Although some courts have noted the existence of gender refer-
ences in marriage laws to support judicial rejection of same-sex mar-
riages,80 there are some persuasive reasons why statutes containing gen-
93.1.5 (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.090 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40.1.103 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-102 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.020 (1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457.4 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51.1 (1984); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14.03.01 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 3 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.101 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1.3
(1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15.1.6, 15.2.3, 15.2.5 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20.1.300,
20.1.50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36.3.104 (1984); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §1.01 (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30.1.2 (1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.14 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.04.020 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 48.1.1 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.13 (West
1981); WYo. STAT. § 20.1.101 (1987).
78. For example, the marriage law of Colorado requires proof of immunity
against the disease rubella from each "female applicant" under the age of forty-five
years of age, although the designation "female" does not otherwise appear in the stat-
ute. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14.2.106 (1987) (proof of rubella immunity required for fe-
male marriage applicants under forty-five years of age). Rubella, also known as Ger-
man measles, is "an acute infectious disease, resembling both scarlet fever and measles,
but differing from these in its short course, slight fever and freedom from sequelae." C.
TABER, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1038 (11 th ed. 1970). See also
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b.36 (1986) (property rights of husband and wife not
affected by marriage); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (1981) (no male under the age of
18 nor any female under the age of 16 shall marry); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
25.2.1 (1984) (rights and obligations of marriage include that husband and wife con-
tract toward each other mutual respect and support).
79. "Marriage is contemplated by the law as a civil contract for which the con-
sent of the contracting parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential." N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40.1.1 (1986). In addition to New Mexico, the seven other states' statutes
which use gender-neutral terms are the following: ALA. CODE § 30 (1989); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25 (1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
1 (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37
(West 1973 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 1 (McKinney 1988).
80. It should be noted that courts in four states have held that same sex mar-
riages were impermissible even though the statutes in those states did not specifically
prohibit such marriages. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(apparent from plain reading of marriage statutes that legislature has not authorized
same sex marriages); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (two women
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der references should not be regarded as signaling a policy against
same-sex marriages. First, these gender references sometimes appear in
incidental provisions of the laws, rather than in those central sections
that define matrimony. This fact suggests that gender references might
not be of key concern. Second, almost all of the laws containing gender
references fail to include express prohibitions against same-sex mar-
riages. Hence, the failure of a legislature to act to prohibit same-sex
marriages might be interpreted to suggest a number of things. Two
possibilities are that the state did not regard the matter of expressly
prohibiting same-sex marriage to be important public policy or that the
state did not intend to definitively prohibit same-sex marriages. This
might suggest that legislatures intended to leave the question open.
Third, and most importantly, most of the original marriage stat-
utes with gender references were drafted many years ago, at a time
when no realistic consideration had been given to the thought that peo-
ple of the same sex might want to be married. As a consequence, per-
haps such statutes should be regarded as not addressing the issue of
same-sex marriage at all.
More formidable obstacles to judicial recognition of same-sex mar-
riage are those statutes which expressly provide that only a man and a
woman may marry. Interestingly however, there are only a few such
laws. The Maryland and Ohio marriage statutes state that a marriage
between a man and a woman is valid. 8 The Indiana, Utah, and Vir-
ginia statutes prohibit and/or declare void a marriage between individ-
not prevented from marrying by Kentucky statute but by their incapability to enter
marriage as that term is defined); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500
(1971) (marriage defined as voluntary union for life of one man and one woman and
marriage between two biological males is a legal nullity); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (Minnesota statute governing marriage construes the term ac-
cording to common usage and does not authorize same-sex marriages.).
For example, in Singer v. Hara, the court dismissed the petitioners claim that the
statutes of the State of Washington did not prohibit same sex marriages. 522 P.2d at
1188-89. Despite an amendment to the marriage statute that substituted the word
"person" for prior references to "males" and "females," the court found it apparent
from a "plain reading" of the statute that the legislature did not authorize same sex
marriages. Id. The Washington marriage law states that "[m]arriage is a civil contract
which may be entered into by persons of the age of eighteen years, who are otherwise
capable .... " WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (1986) (amended 1970) (empha-
sis added).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Closen
uals of the same sex. 82 Remedial legislation is probably the only real
hope for same-sex marriage in those states.
Another statutory obstacle to same-sex marriage might be inferred
from the existence of state sodomy laws that criminalize homosexual
behavior."' Prior to 1961, every state criminalized anal and oral sexual
conduct between persons of the same sex. 4 Alghough few men, and
even fewer women, have ever been punished under these laws,88 these
82. IND. CODE ANN. § 31.7.1.2 (Burns 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30.1.2 (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20.14 (1990).
83. The "crime against nature" statutes originated in the early Christian writ-
ings and were codified in an English statute in 1553. Ralph Slovenko, The Homosexual
and Society: A Historical Perspective, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445, 446 (1985). Legal
codes in the American colonies that called for the death penalty for sodomy continued
in force until they were abolished by most of the states in 1825. Id. at 446, n.5. See
infra note 88 and accompanying text for a listing of citations to the present 24 state
anti-sodomy statutes.
84. Arthur Leonard, The Legal Position of Lesbians and Gay Men in the United
States, in 12 UTRECHT SERIES ON GAY AND LESBIAN STUDIES 104 (1988).
85. "[Tlhere had been no reported decisions involving prosecution for private ho-
mosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (quoting the state referring to Georgia's anti-sodomy law).
The same issues that the United States Supreme Court considered in Hardwick the
European Court of Human Rights considered two years later in 1988 in Norris v. Ire-
land. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186; Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
Norris, a senator in the Irish Parliament, challenged Irish laws that make homosexual
practices between consenting adult men criminal offenses. Id. at 3. Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights saw as critical the fact
that "the authorities [had] refrained in recent years from enforcing the law in respect
of private homosexual acts between consenting [adult] males . . . capable of valid con-
sent." Id. at 15. Since there was no evidence that this had been injurious to the moral
standards of the people of Ireland, the European Court held that there was no "press-
ing social need" to make such acts criminal offenses. Id. at 15-16. The European Court
concluded that although some members of the public would regard homosexuality as
immoral or be shocked, offended or disturbed by private homosexual conduct, these
considerations alone were insufficient, under Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, to warrant government intrusion on individual privacy. Id. at 16.
Under Article 52 and Article 53 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
the Irish law at issue in Norris must be brought into conformity with the European
Court's decision. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1953, art. 52, 53.
The European Court's decision also has precedential authority with all twenty-one
member states of the Council of Europe. The member states are Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Id. at 3 & n.2. See also "Re-
port Warns of Conflict Between EC Law and Constitution," IRISH TIMES, July 21,
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laws carry the unfortunate stigma of criminality that attaches to every
same-sex partnership.86 In 1962, the Model Penal Code incorporated
the recommendations of the American Law Institute and decriminal-
ized private, consensual, adult homosexual sexual acts. 7 By 1989,
twenty-four states had either adopted the Model Penal Code or had
repealed criminal penalties for such conduct.88 Moreover, the highest
courts of both New York and Pennsylvania held that their state stat-
utes prohibiting voluntary, adult "deviate" sexual intercourse between
1990, at 2, col. 1 (discussing conflict between the Irish Constitution and the European
Convention on Human Rights); Glain, Hong Kong. Debate on Gays, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 29, 1990, at 2. (discussing decriminalization of homosexuality
in Hong Kong noting that law has been largely ignored). See also Tielman & de Jong,
A Worldwide Inventory of the Legal and Social Situation of Lesbians and Gay Men,
in 12 UTRECHT SERIES ON GAY AND LESBIAN STUDIES 183 (1988) (providing data on
124 countries' laws on sexual contacts between men and between women).
86. "People think that homosexuals are criminals by their definition because of
the sodomy charges. So the statute creates a stigma of criminality that attaches to
every gay person." N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1980, at B-2. (quoting the legislative counsel
of the New York Civil Liberties Union, commenting on New York's anti-sodomy law).
For an excellent analysis of the argument that homosexual persons' private intimacies
offend no one and should be protected from governmental intrusion, see LAWRENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978). See also Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1890) (since the
common law always recognized a man's house as his castle the courts ought not close
the front entrance to constituted authority and open the back door to prurient curios-
ity); Born or Bred. The Origins of Homosexuality, NEWSWEEK, February 24, 1992, at
46 (reporting research suggesting that homosexuality may be a matter of genetics).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (1962). In Bowers v. Hardwick, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy statute as it applied to consenting
adults of the same sex. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court found that there is no constitu-
tional right to engage in consensual sodomy, but limited its holding to homosexual
sodomy. Id. at 188 n.2. See also Rivera, supra note 34, at 942 for a discussion of
criminal issues regarding homosexual behavior.
88. For a listing of the twenty-six state statutes and the District of Columbia
statute that currently criminalize private, consensual, adult homosexual sexual acts, see
J. Drew Page, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sodomy Statutes, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 367, 379 n.67 (1989). For a listing of the text of the statutes which still prohibit
consensual sodomy, see Debra McCloskey Barnhart, Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio:
Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A Comparative Analysis, 43 U. PITT. L. REV.
253, 278-84 (1981) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis]. The crime that is prohibited is
usually called "sodomy." The acts which are prohibited range from nearly every type
of sexual activity that is not penile-vaginal intercourse, to sexual relations between peo-
ple of the same sex, to oral sexual acts. Id. See also Rivera, supra note 34, at 952-53
for a listing of the most recent court decisions on the constitutionality of state statutes
prohibiting private, consensual, adult homosexual sexual acts.
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unmarried persons violated their respective state constitutions.89 There
continues to be a series of legal attacks upon the sodomy laws, as well
as efforts to repeal them.90 Sodomy laws are unnecessary, antiquated,
discriminatory, and counterproductive. As the revelation of one of the
now-retired members of the Supreme Court's five-to-four majority in
Bowers recently revealed, sodomy statutes should have been declared
unconstitutional some time ago and enjoy dwindling support. 91
Nevertheless, because sodomy laws exist in about half of the
states, some people will rely upon them to oppose same-sex marriage.
This reliance is misplaced because there is not necessarily a connection
between the two issues. Many marriages do not involve sexual relations
because of the advanced age, physical incapacity, unwillingness of one
or both spouses, or mutual agreement not to engage in intercourse.
Many marriages are entered into for purposes exclusive of sexual rela-
tions, such as financial, legal, religious, and other reasons. 91
V. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In addition to analysis of the legislative context for possible judi-
cial recognition of a Danish same-sex marriage, there must be a review
of the relevant case law. Courts in the United States have uniformly
held that unions between persons of the same sex are without legal
89. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981) (as a matter of constitutional law the state may not prosecute as criminal the
acts of consensual sodomy between consenting adults in private noncommercial set-
ting); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (statutory prohibition of
consensual sodomy forces majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm
others). See also Comparative Analysis, supra note 88, at 253 for a discussion con-
cluding that state courts retain extensive authority to act through their own constitu-
tions to afford greater protection than has the United States Supreme Court.
90. See Juli A. Morris, Comment, Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Consti-
tutional Projections for Sexual Privacy, 66 IND. L.J. 609 (1991). See also, Gerald E.
Berendt, Laws Which Prohibit Consenting Adults From Participating In Homosexual
Activities In Private, 23 S.C. L. REV. 816 (1971).
91. Retired Justice Lewis Powell has publicly said that he thinks he was wrong
in making the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick which upheld the Georgia sodomy law,
and conservative former United States Solicitor General Charles Fried (President Rea-
gan's last Solicitor General) also has recently disapproved of the result in Bowers. Ron-
ald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV., July 18,
1991, at 23-24.
92. John Dwight Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right
to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice at the same time?, 10
J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 48 (1984).
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effect.9 3 In support of their decisions restricting marriage to opposite
sex partners, courts cite traditional definitional,9 religious, 95 moral,96
or procreative" considerations that are grounded in social policy that
courts argue "is and always has been."98
93. See the cases cited in notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
94. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (denying
right of two homosexual men to marriage license because by definition, marriage can
only be entered into by persons of opposing sex); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
589 (Ky. 1973) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, and other dic-
tionaries to deny constitutional rights of two women to marry because of their incapa-
bility to enter into marriage as that term is defined).
95. By the end of the seventeenth century, religious condemnation of homosexu-
ality was reinforced by laws that criminalized what was already a sin. Carter v. State,
500 S.W.2d 368 (Ark. 1973) (upholding Arkansas' 21 year maximum sentence and 8
year actual sentence for sodomy between two adult men); Griffith v. State, 504 S.W.2d
324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (Missouri legislature justified in fixing limit of punishment
for sodomy at thirty years); State v. Leadinghorse, 222 N.W.2d 573 (Neb. 1974) (Ne-
braska anti-sodomy statute valid); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), affid. mem., 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S.
985 (1976) (no constitutional bar to punishing homosexual behavior under Virginia
criminal sodomy statute). See also Ralph Slovenko, A Panoramic View: Sexual Behav-
ior and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 81 (1965). At the end of the last
century and the beginning of this century, courts sometimes imposed criminal penalties
on same sex couples who had obtained marriage licenses. J. KATZ. GAY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 85-86, 381-87 (1976). See generally
E. BOGGAN, ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY
PERSON'S RIGHTS 1 (1975) (discussing the range of discrimination against homosexual
persons).
96. The morality of a same sex marriage may be strongly influenced by the
moral value judgments implicit in state laws that criminalize sodomy. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 5.14.122 (1987) (unnatural and lascivious act). State statutes refer to
sodomy as an "infamous crime against nature," an "unnatural carnal copulation," and
an "abominable and detestable crime against nature." ALA. CODE § 13.1.110 (1975)
(infamous crime against nature); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1986) (unnatural
carnal copulation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 34, 35 (West 1970) (the abom-
inable and detestable crime against nature). See also Debra McCloskey Barnhart,
Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse A Compara-
tive Analysis, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 253, 278-84 (1981) (citing 25 state anti-sodomy
statutes).
97. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982) (Congress denied
preferential immigration status to spouses in same-sex marriages because homosexual
marriages never produce offspring.).
98. "The law makes no provision for a 'marriage' between persons of the same
sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman." Anon-
ymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (1971).
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In 1971, in Baker v. Nelson,99 the first United States case to chal-
lenge the prohibition against same-sex marriage, two men filed suit on
statutory and constitutional grounds after the state of Minnesota re-
fused to grant them a marriage license.10° The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that, even though the state statute did not contain an ex-
plicit prohibition against same-sex marriage, the legislature did not in-
tend to permit such marriages. 1 1 The court emphasized the fact that
the statute included frequent references to "bride and groom" and
"husband and wife."' 1 2 The court also cited Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary to support its ruling
that the institution of marriage was defined as a union of persons of the
opposite sex. 108 In addition, the court noted that marriage was a union
of man and woman uniquely involving procreation that was "as old as
the book of Genesis."' 0 " The court then rejected the petitioners' consti-
tutional challenges, holding that unlike the impermissible marital re-
striction in Loving based "merely upon race," the restriction in Baker
was based on a "fundamental difference in sex" and was therefore con-
stitutionally permissible. 05
In rather quick succession, three other cases, the New York deci-
sion in Anonymous v. Anonymous0 6 in 1971, the Kentucky decision in
Jones v. Hallahan0 7 in 1973, and the Washington decision in Singer v.
99. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 186. In 1977, the Minnesota legislature amended the marriage stat-
ute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 1990). The statute now states that
"[miarriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between a man
and a woman, to which the consent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is
essential." Id. (emphasis added).
102. 191 N.W.2d at 186.
103. Id. at 186.
104. Id. at 311.
105. Id. at 315. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the prohibition against interracial marriage that previously existed in the United
States. The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1967, in Loving v. Virginia, that
prohibitions against interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 388 U.S.
1 (1967). Until Loving, however, racial distinctions were sufficiently "fundamental" to
justify statutory prohibitions against interracial marriages. What differences courts re-
gard as "fundamental" change over time as values change. See also Hannah
Schwarzchild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Le-
gal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 94, 111-112, 114 n.125 (1988) (discussing
the courts' changing policy on what constitutes a fundamental difference).
106. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971).
107. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
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Hara °8 in 1974, refused to give state approval to same-sex marriages.
The facts of Anonymous were bizzare. In that case, the male
plaintiff had been tricked into a marriage ceremony with a transvestite
who was actually another male. The New York court concluded, "Mar-
riage is and always has been a contract between a man and a wo-
man."1 9 In Jones, the Kentucky court held that two women were not
entitled to a marriage license because "[m]arriage has always been
considered as the union of a man and a woman." 1 0 Suprisingly, the
Court observed that no constitutional issues were even implicated in
such a case.1 ' Similarly, the Singer court relied heavily upon the "rec-
ognized definition" of marriage as a relationship to be entered into only
by persons of the opposite sex. 1 2
In Adams v. Howerton in 1980, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California ruled that a "marriage" between
Sullivan and Adams did not qualify Sullivan, an alien, as Adams's
spouse for immigration purposes.118 The court noted that for centuries
canon law and scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity vehemently
condemned all homosexual relationships.11 ' Thus, the court concluded
that it could not sanction any marriage between persons of the same
sex. Like the Baker court, the Adams court relied on Black's Law Dic-
tionary and Webster's Third New International Dictionary to support
its decision that a marriage is a relationship between a man and a wo-
108. 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
109. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
110. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
111. Id. at 590.
112. 522 P.2d at 1192.
113. 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D.Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). Sullivan sought classification as an immediate rela-
tive of an American citizen under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The relevant
portion of that Act provides that, "the term 'immediate relatives' means the children,
spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States . . . ." IMMIGRATION AND NA-
TIONALITY ACT, § 201(b) (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)
(1965)).
114. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1123. For a detailed description of the early aver-
sion to homosexuality in the Torah, the Talmudic law codes, and the Christian church,
see Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 577 n.17 (1973).
See also Lincoln C. Oliphant, What Churches Can Expect from "Gay Rights" Laws,
33 CATH. LAW. 87, 107 (1990) (arguing that churches and the moral authority they
carry will be harmed by civil rights bills that forbid discrimination based on sexual
orientation); William Orbach, Homosexuality and Jewish Law, 14 J. FAM. L. 353
(1975) (providing a detailed tracing of the history of the Jewish view of homosexuality
and reasons for strong condemnation of homosexual practices in Jewish law).
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man.115 Consequently, the court concluded that Sullivan was not Ad-
ams' spouse. The court stated that Congress probably denied preferen-
tial immigration status to spouses in same-sex marriages because
homosexual marriages never produce offspring, are not recognized in
most of the states, and violate traditional "societal mores.'' 6 The trial
court's decision was affirmed on appeal in 1982.1"
The notion that marriage must be between opposite sex persons
because marriage is and has always been between men and women in-
volves circular judicial reasoning. Courts, such as the one in Adams in
1980, cite the dictionary definition of marriage as authority for finding
that marriage is a union between a man and a woman."18 One of the
dictionaries which the Adams court used, Black's Law Dictionary, cites
the 1974 Washington case of Singer v. Hara as support for the proposi-
tion that marriage is a relationship between a man and a woman." 9
Singer relied on the 1971 Baker decision as authority for the "proper
definition' of marriage, but Baker had relied on the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary.120
Definitions should change to meet the usages of society unless rea-
soning is to be replaced by recalcitrism. It has often been observed that
if the longevity of a doctrine were determinative of its legitimacy,
changing public opinion and societal mores would operate within an
antiquated framework of technical law that would hinder the evolution
of real justice. Indeed, had this historical argument prevailed at earlier
times, we would still have married women who would enjoy few rights,
115. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (3rd ed. 1971) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876
(5th ed. 1979)).
116. Id. at 1042-43.
117. Id. at 1038.
118. See supra notes 103 and 115 and accompanying text for references to the
Baker and Adams courts' citations to the dictionary as authority for the definition of
marriage.
119. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1193
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974)); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979).
120. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). In Singer, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals denied two women the right to enter into marriage because of the
"recognized definition of that relationship" as one which may be entered into only by
opposite sex persons. Id. Moreover, the Singer court cited favorably the other courts
which it knew to have considered the issue of same sex marriage, noting their reliance
also on the "proper definition" of marriage. Id. (citing Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); and Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971)).
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slaves who could not marry at all, and people of color who would be
restricted as to the race of their spouses. 121
To date, reported decisions of courts in California, Kentucky, Min-
nesota, New York, and Washington have refused to grant the right to
marry to same-sex couples, and there are opinions of the Attorney
Generals of Colorado and Texas to the same effect. 12 2 One of the latest
judicial rejections of the concept of same-sex marriage came in Matter
of Estate of Cooper.2 The surviving lover of a long-term gay relation-
ship, where the decedent had died of HIV-AIDS, sought to challenge
the decedent's will on the ground that the surviving lover was a spouse
entitled to inherit. In lofty language, the trial judge proclaimed:
[T]he state has a compelling interest in fostering the traditional
institution of marriage (whether based on self-preservation, procre-
ation, or in nurturing and keeping alive the concept of marriage
and family as a basic fabric of our society), as old and as funda-
mental as our entire civilization, which institution is deeply rooted
and long established in firm and rich societal values.'2 4
It should be noted that there is no case decision which addresses
the question of what effect, if any, would result to a marriage in the
event one spouse underwent sex-change surgery after the parties had
consummated their marriage. Under such facts many questions would
arise. Would one spouse's subsequent transsexualism void the mar-
riage? Would it merely serve as a ground for divorce if the other
spouse objected? If neither party objected to the marital status, should
121. See supra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
122. There is a recent District of Columbia trial court decision rejecting the
claim of entitlement of two gay men to a marriage license, and that decision is on
appeal. See Dean and Gill v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 90-13892 (December 30,
1991). In DeSanto v. Barnley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the issue was
whether two men should be granted a divorce from a common law marriage. The court
held that because two men could not contract a common law marriage, one of them
could not seek a court-ordered divorce. Attorney General Opinions of seven states dis-
aaprove same-sex marriages on legal grounds: Alabama (ALAG, 190 Op. Att'y. Gen.
30, March 1, 1983); Kansas (KSAG, Opinion No. 77-248, August 4, 1977); Maine
(MEAG, Opinion No. 84-28, October 30, 1984); Nebraska (77 Op. NE. Att'y Gen.
170, Opinion No. 113, June 27, 1977); South Carolina (SC-AG, August 12, 1976 and
SC-AG, October 17, 1983); Tennessee (No. 88-43, February 29, 1988); Virginia
(VAAG, 1977/78 Rep. A.G. 154, December 16, 1977).
123. 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1990).
124. Id. at 688.
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a different result obtain? The better position is that sex-reassignment
surgery subsequent to a marriage should not nullify the marriage.
However, it should certainly serve as a ground for annulment or di-
vorce if the other spouse objected. 125
Interestingly, there is a split of authority in this country on the
issue of whether a valid marriage may be entered into by a man and a
male-to-female postoperative transsexual. The 1976 New Jersey case of
M. T. v. J. T. 2 6 held that a valid marriage can occur between two such
parties, 12 while the 1987 Ohio case of In re Ladrach,28 and the 1970
English case of Corbett v. Corbett'29 determined otherwise. Each of
these cases focused upon the need for a marriage to be between oppo-
site sex persons, and therefore, each is further support for the tradi-
tional concept of matrimony. However, the issue of the right of con-
senting adults to marry should not depend upon their sexes at all, so
that whether one or both of them have undergone sex-change surgery
should be irrelevant to the validity of their marriage.
A review of the marriage statutes, sodomy statutes, and case law
suggests that there are five states where a test of the validity of a Dan-
ish same-sex marriage would meet with the greatest likelihood of suc-
cess. Those states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico and
South Dakota. None of those jurisdictions have marriage laws that ex-
pressly prohibit same-sex marriage, none of those jurisdictions have a
sodomy statute and none of those jurisdictions have case decisions or
Attorney General opinions opposing same-sex marriages. While the
marriage laws in Connecticut, Delaware and South Dakota, contain
gender references, 30 the statutes in both Maine and New Mexico em-
125. The post-marriage sex reassignment surgery of one spouse should be a basis
for an annulment or a divorce if the other spouse objects. This is so for a number of
reasons. It might prevent the parties from consummating the marriage through sexual
intercourse. It might cause the other spouse severe mental cruelty. If the sex-change
had been planned prior to the marriage but not disclosed to the other spouse, the mar-
riage might have been fraudulently induced. These are standard bases for annulment
and divorce set out in the various state statutes on marriage and dissolution of mar-
riage. See, e.g., Closen, Family Law, supra note 64, at 43-44.
126. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
127. See also Note, M.T. v. J.T.: An Enlightened Perspective on Transsexual-
ism, 6 CAP. U. L. REV. 403 (1977).
128. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Probate Ct. 1987).
129. 2 W.L.R. 1306, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A. 1970).
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ploy neutral terms such as persons or applicants." 1 Thus, Maine or
New Mexico might be the very best site for a test of the legal validity
in the United States of a Danish same-sex marriage.
VI. EROSION OF OPPOSITION TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Several developments signal a gradual trend of willingness among
Americans to grant some degree of formal approval to same-sex rela-
tionships, or at least to remain open-minded about the issue. These
signs include: 1) the continuity and intensity of the public debate about
the issue of same-sex marriage, 2) the successes of several plaintiffs in
palimony cases involving same-sex couples, 3) the granting of employ-
ment benefits to same-sex partners of employees by several major pub-
lic and private employers, 4) the enactment of several local ordinances
dealing with same-sex domestic partnerships, and 5) most importantly,
the small number of court decisions extending to same-sex partners
rights previously thought restricted to spouses in traditional marriages.
A great deal of public attention has been directed toward the sub-
ject of same-sex marriages in recent years. The debate about the topic
has been treated widely in the media,132 including publications in the
professions. 133 Of course, the publicity generated by the several claims
of individuals to have cohabited in same-sex relationships with people
of notoriety, such as Rock Hudson, Martina Navaratolova, Liberace,
Billy Jean King and Merv Griffin, has helped to keep the subject in the
headlines."' Familiarity with a subject like this one tends to diminish
surprise, fear, and opposition. Hence, the continuous presence of the
131. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18A, § 1 (1964 & Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40
(Michie 1986).
132. See, e.g., Rising Worry on "Partner" Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, August 16,
1989, at DI; Benefits for Live-In Mates of Workers Face Obstacles, WALL ST. J., July
25, 1989, at i; New York Housing Officials Redefine Family to Block Evictions, N.Y.
TIMES, November 9, 1989, at B1; Should Gays Have Marriage Rights? TIME, Novem-
ber 20, 1989, at 101.
133. See, e.g., Thomas Stoddard, Gay Marriage: Should Homosexual Mar-
riages Be Recognized Legally?, A.B.A. J., January 1990, at 42 (presenting the pro and
con sides of the argument).
134. See, e.g., Christian, Advice From Rock's Ex to Merv and Merv's Ex, AD-
voc., May 21, 1991, at 60 (article about Rock Hudson and Merv Griffin); Whine,
Women, and Wimbledon, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 49 (article about Martina
Navratilova); The Way It Was, PEOPLE, March 5, 1984, at 98 (article about Liberace
and Billie Jean King]; A Disputed Love Match, TIME, May 11, 1981, at 77 (article
about Billie Jean King).
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subject of same-sex relationships in the public spotlight contributes to a
measure of acceptance of such relationships.
The palimony cases have also contributed to the erosion of opposi-
tion to same-sex relationships and to same-sex marriage. The line of
cases, beginning especially with Marvin v. Marvin'3 5 in 1976, has at-
tracted a great deal of attention nationwide. Indeed, nearly all of the
states have encountered litigation on the palimony issue, and virtually
every state has approved some cause of action by one of the unmarried
co-habitants against the other to enforce an agreement between them
regarding -the ownership and distribution of their property.1 36
Hence, the palimony cases evidence an erosion of Victorian style
reverence for the institution of marriage. The Marvin opinion actually
began with the observation that in "the past 15 years, there has been a
substantial increase in the number of couples living together without
marrying."'13 7 Moreover, in several palimony cases in several states,
courts have applied the palimony doctrine to settings in which the un-
married co-habitants were same-sex partners.13 8 These cases stand as
symbols of judicial recognition and, to some degree, of judicial sanc-
tioning of same-sex relationships. Put simply, justice requires recogni-
tion of the realities of life, and in the case of same-sex couples, the
acceptance of the good faith wishes of consenting adults.
Some public and private employers have voluntarily extended em-
ployment benefits to the same-sex partners of employees.' 39 Also, some
135. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
136. See generally Grier H. Raggio & Kenneth G. Raggio, Couples By Agree-
ment, 49 TEX. B.J. 709 (1986); Stacey Lynne Boyle, Note, Marital Status Classifica-
tions: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 11 (1986); Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Pos-
sibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829 (1987). But see, Hewitt v. Hewitt,
394 N.E.2d 1204 (III. 1979); Audrey Holzer Rubin, Spafford v. Coats: An Alternative
To Palimony, 74 ILL. B.J. 286 (1986).
137. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 109.
138. See, e.g., Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980); Weeks v. Gay,
256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979). But see, Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981).
139. See generally Domestic Partnership: Issues and Legislation (Lamba Legal
Education and Defense Fund 1990) [hereinafter Domestic Partnership]; Robert L. Eb-
lin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee
Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1990) [hereinafter
Domestic Partnership Recognition]. See also Bronx Hospital Gives Gay Couples
Spouse Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1991, § A, at 1; Maria Patricia Treuthart,
Adopting A More Realistic Definition of Family, 26 GONz. L. REV. 91 (1990/91).
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insurance companies underwrite policies for same-sex partners of em-
ployees equal to the coverage granted to spouses of employees. 140 Pub-
lic and private employers are beginning to include same-sex partners
within the coverage of other benefits ordinarily provided only to spouses
and children of employees. 14 1 Of course, the argument might be ad-
vanced that there is no need to endorse the doctrine of marriage for
same-sex couples if such couples are, or can be, protected through such
devices as the palimony concept and voluntary employer programs.
Yet, such an argument is unpersuasive because the extent of these pro-
tections is relatively minimal at present and because each case of appli-
cation to a same-sex couple requires an ad hoc determination that the
couple qualifies for the special treatment. 1 2 Married people are not
burdened with such a requirement. One is either married or not. One
who is married need not establish the existence of other facts to prove
the genuineness of the marriage.
To establish the entitlement to protection as a same-sex couple,
absent coverage of a statute allowing them to marry or to register as a
domestic partnership, the people involved must present satisfactory
proof of several factors, such as the longevity and exclusiveness of their
relationship, the interdependence of each on the finances and domestic
services of the other, the manner in which the parties have held them-
selves out to the world, and other factors set forth in Braschi v. Stahl
Associates.'"
Obviously, a marriage between insincere heterosexual people who
engage in extramarital sexual affairs, who do not share any dependence
on one another, and who do not live together, nevertheless constitutes a
marriage which triggers all applicable benefits and protections from the
moment of marriage. In contrast, same-sex partners cannot qualify for
benefits and protections until such time as the couple can convince an
employer or a court of the sincerity of their relationship. That might
take years."' Furthermore, the same-sex partners might be called upon




143. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
144. It should be noted that the same-sex couple in the Braschi case had lived
together for more than 10 years and that the same-sex couple in the Donovan case had
been in their relationship for more than 25 years. Id. at 50; Homosexuals' Dependency,
infra note 149, at 152; see also Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12
CARDOZO L REV. 681, 687, n.36 (1990).
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heterosexual spouses can rely upon the technicality of their marital sta-
tus for so long as they remain married.
Significantly, several local communities in several states have de-
fied state-wide populist views regarding gay and lesbian rights and
same-sex relationships and have adopted gay rights ordinances or do-
mestic partnership ordinances. 1" While gay rights ordinances do not
expressly speak of same-sex unions, a natural consequence of those lo-
cal laws should be some degree of protection against discrimination di-
rected at individuals discovered to be cohabiting in same-sex relation-
ships. While domestic partnership ordinances do also protect
heterosexual couples, those local laws also apply with equal effect to
same-sex couples unless the ordinances were to expressly except same-
sex relationships .46
American tradition suggests that the right of local governments to
enact ordinances reflecting the wishes of their citizens is fundamental
and important although such ordinances cannot supercede state or fed-
eral law. 14 7 Advocates of recognition of same-sex marriage can point to
the local provisions on domestic partnerships as having the force of law
and as showing that same-sex unions are no longer unthinkable. In-
deed, not only is there Danish precedent for same-sex marriage, but
there is also American precedent.
Although no court has yet allowed a same-sex couple to engage in
a state-sanctioned marriage, a few court decisions have extended to
same-sex couples incidents previously thought appropriate only to het-
erosexual spouses. The first was Donovan v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board,'" where the California court remanded the case to a
review board for further proceedings including consideration of whether
the petitioner, as the gay lover of the deceased employee, was a depen-
dent covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. The following year,
1983, the Board found that the surviving gay lover was entitled to re-
cover death benefits under the Act.14'The Board observed that out-
145. See Domestic Partnership, supra note 139; Domestic Partnership Recogni-
tion, supra note 139.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, sect. 2. See also TRIBE, supra note 63, at
479-81.
148. 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
149. 73 LA 385 (1983) (Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.); see also CAL. LA-
BOR CODE § 3503 (Deering 1976). For a discussion of the considerations courts should
employ in deciding workers' compensation cases, see Note, Donovan v. County of Los
Angeles and State Compensation Insurance Fund. California's Recognition of Homo-
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dated views about such non-marital relationships result in inequitable
property distributions, whose harm outweighs the policy of promoting
the institution of marriage. 150
The second important case in this group of decisions was Braschi
v. Stahl Associates' in which it was held that a surviving lover of a
long-term same-sex relationship qualifies as a member of the decedent's
family under the anti-eviction provisions of the New York rent control
law. 152 The apartment lease in issue in the case named only the de-
ceased gay lover as tenant. After the decedent died due to complica-
tions from AIDS, the landlord served notice upon the surviving lover to
quit the premises. The survivor refused, asserting that he was part of
the deceased tenant's family. The thoughts articulated by the plurality
opinion are well put:
[W]e conclude that the term family . . . should not be rigidly re-
stricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order.
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on
fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should
find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of
eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a
family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is
long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commit-
ment and interdependence. This view comports both with our soci-
ety's traditional concept of "family" and with the expectations of
individuals who live in such nuclear units.' 5 '
In objectively assessing the relationship of the non-marital part-
ners, the plurality reiterated four factors employed by the lower New
York courts:
[l]the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship,
[2]the level of emotional and financial commitment of the parties,
[3]the manner in which the parties have conducted their everyday
lives and held themselves out to society, and
sexuals' Dependency Status in Actions for Worker's Compensation Death Benefits, 12
J. CONTEMP. L. 151, 161 (1986) [hereinafter Homosexuals' Dependency].
150. 73 L.A. 385.
151. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id. at 53-54.
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[4]the reliance placed upon one another for daily family
services.' 4
Nevertheless, the opinion cautioned that "it is the totality of the rela-
tionship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the
parties which should, in the final analysis, control."' 55
The third case in this short line of decisions was State v. Had-
inger,'56 holding that a member of a same-sex couple was protected
under the state's Domestic Violence Act which applied to persons living
together in a spousal relationship. That statute expressly and broadly
defined "person living as a spouse" to include a person "who otherwise
is cohabiting with the offender.' 15 7 Although the trial court had con-
cluded that the statute was intended to protect only opposite sex
couples who had the ability to marry, the Ohio appeals court disagreed
and opined that the trial court's reading of the statute "would eviscer-
ate the efforts of the legislature to safeguard, regardless of gender, the
rights of victims of domestic violence.' 58
The fourth and last case is In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 59 the
widely-publicized case involving Sharon Kowalski, who sustained seri-
ous brain damage in an automobile accident, and involving the efforts
of her lesbian lover to obtain guardianship over her. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that same-sex families are families of affinity
and should be accorded respect. Thus, due to the opportunities
presented by determined litigants, the courts have begun to whittle
away at the institution of heterosexual-only marriage. The significance
of these cases, decided since 1983, is not in their number; it is in their
very existence. We have passed that monumental hurdle of having a
court somewhere declare that a same-sex couple can be a family.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no question about the seriousness of the HIV-AIDS epi-
demic in the world, and in this country in particular. We cannot afford
the staggering financial costs of the disease, nor can we tolerate the
staggering human costs. Although some other illnesses annually ac-
154. Id. at 55.
155. Id.
156. 156. 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
157. Id. at 1192.
158. Id. at 1193.
159. 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. App. 1991).
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count for as much loss of life, unlike these other ailments, HIV-AIDS
is transmissible by way of voluntarily entered into conduct. Thus, HIV-
AIDS is far more readily subject to containment and prevention than
those other life threatening conditions. Moreover, those other ailments
develop over periods of many years, whereas HIV can be transmitted
by a single episode of conduct that could take only a few minutes.
Unfortunately, the world and this country have been unable to
curb the spread of HIV-AIDS. Statistical projections suggest that the
rate of new HIV infections will increase, rather than decline, for years
to come. 6' In the United States, the evidence of our failure to contain
the spread of sexually transmitted HIV is especially compelling. In
1988, for example, more than 40,000 cases of syphilis and more than
719,000 cases of gonorrhea were reported in this country, and this epi-
demic of sexually transmitted diseases has continued. 6' As is well
known, cases of sexually transmitted diseases are always underreported,
and cases of syphilis, gonorrhea, and HIV-AIDS are particularly sub-
ject to such underreporting. 62 For each of the more than 759,000 times
in 1988 that sexual contact occurred and led to the transmission of
syphilis and gonorrhea, the parties involved were also engaging in con-
duct having the potential to transmit HIV-AIDS. 63 Certainly, a large
number of Americans continue to engage in unprotected sexual inter-
course with multiple partners.
Our public health efforts obviously have not succeeded in dealing
adequately with sexually transmitted HIV-AIDS. One of the simplest,
least expensive, and most effective means to reduce the spread of sexu-
ally transmitted HIV-AIDS is to encourage long-term monogamous re-
lationships. The public interest of assisting in containment of HIV-
160. See, e.g., AIDS: The Next Ten Years, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1990, at 20-21
(stating: "The AIDS epidemic is far from over. It's not even under control.") [herein-
after Next Ten Years].
161. See, e.g., C.D.C., Notifiable Diseases-Summary of Reported Cases, By Age
Group, United States, 1988, 37 M.M.W.R. 10 (October 6, 1989). See also Next Ten
Years, supra note 160, at 21.
162. See General Accounting Office, AIDS Forecasting. Undercount of Cases
and Lack of Key Data Weaken Existing Estimates, June 1989; Doctors Cite Stigma of
AIDS in Declining to Report Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1986, at Al.; Cleere, 202
JAMA 117 (1967).
163. See, e.g., Next Ten Years, supra note 160, at 21 (stating: "Syphilis and
gonorrhea-diseases that not only indicate unsafe sexual practices but facilitate the
spread of the AIDS virus-have skyrocketed in recent years." Of course HIV would
not be transmitted to an uninfected partner if both parties already had HIV).
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AIDS should serve as sufficient justification for approval of same-sex
marriages, even for those who otherwise oppose such marriages.
Approval of same-sex marriages is needed. It would not only foster
the public health, but also foster a more tolerant attitude about our
fellow citizens. Judicial recognition of Danish same-sex unions can
serve as the next step in the process, so that barriers to same-sex mar-
riages will suffer the same fate as barriers to the rights of married
women, to marriages of slaves, and to marriages between people of dif-
ferent races.
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Boy, 11, is held in Hyde Park slaying.
An I1-year-old boy fatally stabbed a 16-year-old
with a steak knife yesterday outside a Hyde Park home,
police said. Children in the quiet residential neighbor-
hood said the stabbing resulted from an argument over
music cassette tapes.
Dolly Smith, Boston Globe, July 30, 1991.
Teen: Beverly suspect plotted murder.
The ex-girlfriend of the Beverly teenager charged
in the killing of a 14 year-old cheerleader said yesterday
he outlined a plot eerily similar to the murder a year
ago. Diane M. Wagner, 15 of Broughton Drive, Bev-
erly, said Jamie P. Fuller, 16, detailed a plan to kill
Amy Carnevale during a phone conversation last
summer.
"He said, 'I've been thinking about some way to
kill Amy.' "He wanted to take her on a long walk to the
woods. He was going to give her flowers, and then he
was going to kill her and then throw her into a pond,"
she told the Herald.
Gary Witherspoon, Boston Herald, August 30, 1991.
A Sunday Boston Globe Magazine Cover:
A stark, despondent photograph, in shades of gray,
shows from the rear, a White attorney, walking down a
corridor in a Westborough, Massachusetts juvenile
lockup, with his right arm across the back of his 15-
year-old Black client, and his right hand resting on his
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client's right shoulder, in what appears to be quiet, sup-
portive consultation. The youth is being held for the
April 20, 1991 double shooting of two youths, aged 15
and 11. Across the bottom of the page, in bold white
print, is the feature article title: "When Children Kill.:
Crime, Punishment, and the Debate Over Juvenile
Justice."
Eileen McNamara, Boston Globe Magazine, November
24, 1991.
I. INTRODUCTION
The above 1991 excerpts from Boston newspapers, available FBI
arrest data,' and U.S. Census Bureau statistics2 all sadly affirm the
validity of Charles Patrick Ewing's closing predictions in When Chil-
dren Kill: The Dynamics of Juvenile Homicide. Namely, "the rate of
juvenile homicide is almost certain to continue growing over the next
ten years . . . and the 1990s will probably witness the highest annual
number of juvenile homicides in American history."'
Since 1984, the annual number of juvenile arrests for murder and
non-negligent manslaughter has steadily increased." While 1,004 per-
sons under the age of eighteen were arrested for homicide in 1984, 7.3
percent of the total 13,676 arrests that year; by 1990 the number of
arrests of those below eighteen had more than doubled, rising to 2,555,
15.6 percent of all 1990 arrests for murder and non-negligent man-
1. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Just., Uniform Crime Reports
for the United States 184 (Table 33-Total Arrests, Distribution by Age 1990) (1991)
[hereinafter FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1990)]; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of Just., Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 182 (Table 33-Total Ar-
rests, Distribution by Age 1989) (1990) [hereinafter FBI Uniform Crime Reports
(1989)]; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Just., Uniform Crime Reports for
the United States 178 (Table 33-Total Arrests, Distribution by Age 1988) (1989)
[hereinafter FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1988)].
2. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 1057, U.S. Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1989 2 (Table A. Population by Age Group, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin.
July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1989 and text) (March 1990).
3. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, WHEN CHILDREN KILL: THE DYNAMICS OF JUVE-
NILE HOMICIDE 135 (Lexington Books 1990) [hereinafter WHEN CHILDREN KILL].
4. Id. at I ("based upon calculations using data from FBI Uniform Crime Re-
ports 1979 through 1988" Id. at 138 n.3).
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slaughter.5 These figures become even more disturbing when other
things are considered. During the 1980s there was "a steady, annual
decrease in the number of juveniles in the United States." 6 Yet, the
1990 figures for those under 18, when compared to 1988 (the final year
reported upon by Ewing),7 show an alarming 45 percent increase, or
790 more homicides.' Still more alarming, in terms of percentages, al-
though the actual numbers remain few, is the 1990 increase, over 1988,
in the under 15 age group. In 1990 there were 283 reported arrests of
juveniles under the age of 15-a 41 percent increase over the 201 re-
ported arrests in 1988.1
Building on earlier joint research'0 on juvenile justice and juvenile
homicide, done with sociologist Simon Singer and research assistant
John Rowley, Ewing, a clinical and forensic psychologist, attorney and
professor of law and clinical associate professor of psychology at the
State University of New York at Buffalo, looks behind the headlines, in
When Children Kill, to describe who these children are. Some kill par-
ents, siblings or other family members; some kill during the course of
committing other crimes, most often rape and robbery; some partici-
pate in gang killings; a very few are girls and children under 10 years
of age; and then there are "the bizarre homicides, including 'thrill' kill-
ings, cult-related killings, and killings committed by disturbed
juveniles."" A tightly written volume, When Children Kill is intended
to be a useful resource for legal and mental health professionals who
represent or work with violent juvenile offenders.
Part I of this Essay recounts, in some detail, Ewing's findings
about juveniles who kill-the incidence and prevalence of juvenile
homicide, the law's current response and his projections for the future.
The book's strengths and weaknesses are discussed in part II. Because
this book forced the reviewer to ponder the horrendous societal conse-
5. See FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1990), supra note I.
6. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at I (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Estimates of the Population of the United States by Age, Sex
and Race: 1980-1986 (1987)).
7. See id. at 2 (Table 1-1: Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter Arrests by
Age Group 1979-1988); and FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1988), supra note 1.
8. See FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1990) and FBI Uniform Crime Reports
1988), supra note 1.
9. See supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., John C. Rowley et al., Juvenile Homicide. The Need for an Inter-
disciplinary Approach, in 5 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 1 (1978).
11. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at inside back flap of book jacket.
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quences and costs, if this growing phenomenon of juvenile homicide is
not accurately understood and comprehensively addressed as a serious
public health12 issue, an attempt is made in part III to delineate what
the challenges are for society and the law-both the juvenile justice
system and the criminal justice system. Finally, in part IV, an urgent
prescriptive plea is made regarding how the phenomenon of juvenile
homicide ought to be understood and addressed.
I][. A TROUBLING PHENOMENON: DESCRIPTION OR
EXPLANATION?
A. Summary of Contents
Just as this Essay began with headlines taken from local Boston
newspapers, Ewing begins his examination of the growing incidence of
juvenile homicide with terse, graphic summaries of twenty-three homi-
cides, committed in fifteen states and reported by the news media, be-
tween January 1986 and January 1989.1" After these introductory vi-
gnettes, Ewing begins his work with two chapters: first a statistical
description of the incidence and prevalence of juvenile homicide, pri-
12. See generally DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH & MICHAELE WEISSMAN,
DEADLY CONSEQUENCES: How VIOLENCE Is DESTROYING OUR TEENAGE POPULATION
AND A PLAN To BEGIN SOLVING THE PROBLEM (1991) [hereinafter DEADLY CONSE-
QUENCES]; infra part IIIA (for further discussion); see also C. Everett Koop, Introduc-
tion, in DEADLY CONSEQUENCES xvii, xviii ("that the discipline of public health pos-
sesses the solution to the mounting toll of violence in this country. The public health
approach seeks to prevent tragedy; it seeks to identify and treat young males who are
at risk for violence before their lives and the lives of those around them are ruined. The
discipline of public health provides strategies to stop violence before it mains and
kills.").
Public health can be defined in broad terms, even though its more specific
focuses alter with time and place . . . . [T]he Milbank Memorial Fund
for Higher Education for Public Health [defines] public health [as] en-
compass[ing] those activities that organized societal entities (both govern-
mental and non-governmental) deliberately conduct to protect, promote,
and restore the health and quality of life of the people on a broad commu-
nity or population basis.
Gerry A. Solon, Health Services: Public Health Programs, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL WORK 611 (17th ed. 1977).
13. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at xiii-xv. The reported homicides had
occurred in Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida (2), Georgia (3), Indiana (2), Lou-
isiana, Massachusetts (3), Missouri, New Jersey, New York (2), Oregon (2), Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
1992]
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marily drawn from analysis of U.S. Census Bureau population data
and FBI Uniform Crime Reports; and a longer chapter 2, critically
reviewing published research studies on juveniles who kill.
Ewing then devotes six chapters to discussion of specific types of
juvenile homicides. Chapter 3's focus is "intra-familial homicides:
juveniles who kill their parents and/or siblings."" "[H]omicides com-
mitted by juveniles in the course of perpetrating other crimes, primarily
theft crimes (such as robbery and burglary) and sex crimes (such as
rape and sexual abuse)"'" are examined in chapter 4. In chapter 5,
Ewing looks at "unusual, highly deviant or bizarre juvenile homicides,
as well as those perpetrated by juveniles who appear to be psychotic or
suffering from some other form of serious mental illness."' 6 Two
shorter chapters follow: chapter 6 on gang killings, "one of the most
visible and troubling forms of juvenile homicide in America: killings
committed by groups or gangs of youths, acting together-killings that
are almost always senseless and often related to drug trafficking;""
and, chapter 7 reviewing "homicides committed by very young chil-
dren, essentially those under the age of ten."' 8 In chapter 8 data is
presented on "a minority group among juveniles who kill: girls" who
"account for less than 10 percent of all homicides committed by Amer-
ican juveniles annually."' 9
Ewing concludes When Children Kill with two final chapters: a
review of the law's response to juvenile homicide (Chapter 9) and a
predictive look at the future of juvenile homicide between now and the
year 2000 (Chapter 10). In these closing chapters, Ewing "examines
the general legal structure for dealing with juveniles who kill," espe-
cially the state statutory provisions "that allow some juvenile killers to
be tried as adults, sent to prison, and, in some cases, even executed."20
To support his assertion that the annual incidence and rate of juvenile
homicide in the United States of America will increase, he points to the
confluence of five forces, currently operative in American society: "(1)
increasingly serious substance abuse among juveniles and adults; (2)
apparently rising rates of child maltreatment; (3) expanding access to
14. Id. at xv (pp. 31-47).
15. Id. (pp. 50-62).
16. Id. (pp. 63-80).
17. Id. (pp. 81-90).
18. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at xv (pp. 91-100).
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guns . ..; (4) the growing number of juveniles living in poverty; and
(5) the anticipated resurgence in the juvenile population."21
B. Juveniles Who Kill: A Statistical Overview
Salient facts about the incidence and prevalence of juvenile homi-
cide that can be drawn from analyzing available FBI arrest records,
U.S. Census Bureau data, and various writings of others22 are
presented in chapter 1. First, the most striking aspect is age. Eighty-
five percent or more of those juveniles who kill are fifteen, sixteen or
seventeen; less than one percent arrested for murder or non-negligent
manslaughter are under fifteen.2 Ewing notes that "[a]s age levels rise,
so do the annual number of arrests for murder and non-negligent man-
slaughter. Interestingly, other crimes committed by juveniles do not
show nearly so clear a positive connection between incidence and
age." 24
Second, "[j]ust as younger juveniles rarely kill, girls of any age
are extremely unlikely to commit homicide. 25
Third, with respect to race, Ewing observes that:
Black youth are vastly overrepresented among those juveniles ar-
rested for murder or non-negligent manslaughter. Only about one
sixth of all Americans under the age of eighteen are Black, yet in
recent years roughly half the juveniles arrested for these homicide
crimes have been Black. Indeed, . . . in recent years, Black youth
have constituted the majority of those arrested for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter in the under-eighteen age bracket.26
While recognizing the existence of racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system, Ewing yet states, "there also seems to be no
question that Black youths are disproportionately involved in the com-
21. Id. at 127.
22. Frequent references are made to Dewey G. Cornell, Causes of Juvenile
Homicide: A Review of the Literature, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE 1-36 (Elissa P. Benedek
& Dewey G. Cornell eds. 1989) [hereinafter JUVENILE HOMICIDE]; Rowley et al.,
supra note 10; Frank E. Zimring, Youth Homicide in New York: A Preliminary Anal-
ysis, in 13 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 81 (1984).
23. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 3.
24. Id. (table 1-3-Murder and Non-Negligent Man-Slaughter Arrests of
Juveniles By Age Group 1984-1988).
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mission of criminal homicide. In short, Black youths are much more
likely than White youths to kill." 27
Next, if the ethnicity of juvenile homicide arrestees is reviewed, it
is striking that Hispanics constitute only about 8 percent of the popula-
tion, but "Hispanic youths account for almost a quarter of all under-
eighteen arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter. 2 8 Ewing
comments:
Hispanics, like Blacks, are undoubtedly the victims of discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system, and so these figures must also
be interpreted with caution. Like Blacks, Hispanics are probably
somewhat more likely than Whites to be arrested for homicide
crimes they commit. Yet, even allowing for such discrimination,
there can be little doubt that, like Black youngsters, Hispanic
youths account for a disproportionate share of homicides commit-
ted by persons under the age of eighteen. 9
The fifth statistical category examined by Ewing was the relation-
ship between perpetrator and victim. Contrary to what might be in-
ferred from much of the research to date, "the fact is that only a rather
small percentage of juvenile killers kill their parents or stepparents, and
only a slightly larger percentage kill other family members."30 The vast
majority of juvenile killers kill either acquaintances or strangers. Ew-
ing's analysis of available data 3' "demonstrate two clear and statisti-
cally significant associations: (1) between victim-offender relationship
and whether the homicide was incidental to a theft offense (such as
larceny, burglary, or robbery) and (2) between victim-offender rela-
tionship and whether the homicide was committed individually or by a
group."32
Utilizing a series of four tables, Ewing shows that intrafamilial
homicides almost never are incidental to a theft offense, but six percent
of acquaintance homicides and fifty-eight percent of stranger homicides
occur in the course of a theft offense.33 The majority (fifty-three per-
27. Id.
28. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 6.
29. Id. This overrepresentation of Hispanic youth is particularly striking and far
exceeds the roughly 16 percent of Hispanic adults arrested for murder or non-negligent
man-slaughter. Id.
30. Id. at 7.
31. See supra note 10.
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cent) of juvenile homicides involving acquaintance or stranger victims
are perpetrated by multiple offenders acting in concert. In contrast,
"when the victim was a family member, less than twenty percent of the
homicides were committed by more than a single perpetrator. 3 4 An-
other interesting victim-offender association was that found between
the gender of the killer and the relationship to the homicide victim.
Girls almost always killed family members or acquaintances; boys more
likely killed acquaintances or strangers. "[Y]ounger juveniles were
somewhat more likely than older juveniles to have killed family mem-
bers. Also Whites were somewhat more likely than non-Whites to have
killed family members.""5
Ewing ends his statistical overview chapter with an analysis of the
circumstances under which juvenile killings occur, namely (1) during
the commission of other crimes, specifically robbery; (2) by groups as
opposed to individuals acting alone; and (3) with utilization of weapons
such as guns and knives. As previously noted, "a substantial percentage
of nonfamilial juvenile homicides are committed incident to (i.e., in the
course of accomplishing) some sort of theft crime."36 As the age of the
youngest perpetrator of a theft crime increases, so does the likelihood
that a robbery victim could be killed. While "multiple-perpetrator juve-
nile homicides are rather rare when the homicide victim is related to
the perpetrator," group killings "constitute a substantial portion (42.1
percent) of juvenile acquaintance homicides . . . and make up the ma-
jority (68.6 percent) of juvenile stranger homicides. 3 7 Younger perpe-
trators are more likely to act in concert with others.
Finally, consistent with national data on all arrests for murder and
non-negligent manslaughter revealing a use of firearms in almost 60
percent of these killings, a majority, though a slightly lower percentage,
of juvenile homicides also are perpetrated with firearms. "[N]ot sur-
prisingly, gun use in juvenile homicides is lower in younger age groups
and seems to increase steadily with increasing age." 38
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id.
36. id. at 9.
37. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 10. Ewing asserts that review of
arrest data from New York City for the years 1973-1980 [see Zimring, supra note 22]
and for all of New York State for 1987 [see Office of Justice Systems Analysis, New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Homicide 1987
(1988)] reveal a close correlation between the age of an offender and whether a homi-
cide is committed individually or by a group.
38. Id. at 11.
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C. Review of the Research
1. General Assessment
In Ewing's opinion, the professional and scientific literature of
children and adolescents who kill, beginning with two published stud-
ies89 from the 1940s, is "surprisingly sparse-both in quantity and in
quality. Most publications on the subject share a number of common
but significant methodological shortcomings."40
First, most of the literature deals with juveniles who kill family
members, primarily parents, even though "juveniles who kill parents or
other family members represent only a small proportion-less than 20
percent-of homicidal youth."'4' Second, many study samples, with few
exceptions, have been extremely small. "The bulk of empirical data on
juvenile homicide comes from anecdotal case studies-reports on ex-
tremely small samples of homicidal youngsters: commonly fewer than
ten, often under four, and sometimes just a single case." '42 A third limi-
tation is that frequently "subjects have been selected on the basis of
their availability to the investigators," often psychologists and psychia-
trists to whom the juveniles who killed within the family "were referred
for psychological/psychiatric evaluation/treatment."' 3 Ewing further
decries other problems:
Moreover, for the most part, those few studies that did involve
greater sample sizes and more sound sampling procedures have
been plagued with methodological limitations, flaws that signifi-
cantly limit any generalizations that might be drawn from their
results. Virtually none of these studies have employed control or
even comparison groups, and most researchers have relied upon
their own, sometimes idiosyncratic, interests and theories in decid-
ing what data to collect, how to collect it, and how to report it. 4
Nevertheless, Ewing concludes that while "it is difficult to draw relia-
39. See R. M. Patterson, Psychiatric Study of Juveniles Involved in Homicide,
in 13 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 125 (1943); Thom, Juvenile Delinquency and Crimi-
nal Homicide, in 40 J. MAINE MED. Ass'N 176 (1949).
40. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 13.
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ble generalizations from these studies[, s]till, some data, limited though
they may be, are better than no data." '45 Then, drawing from the re-
viewed literature, he proceeds in the rest of chapter 2 to describe sali-
ent characteristics of both youngsters who kill and their families, fre-
quently noted prehomicidal behavior and adjustment problems, and the
types of homicides committed.
2. Individual Characteristics of Juvenile Killers
In response to the questions: "Who are the juveniles who kill? Are
they emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, mentally retarded, learning
disabled, neurologically impaired, or simply 'normal' youngsters who
commit extremely abnormal acts?""" Ewing draws these findings from
the literature. First, most juvenile killers are not psychotic and do not
suffer from major mental disorders. Most of those "studied by re-
searchers to date have fallen into the diagnostic category of personality
disorder, sometimes referred to as character disorder. Personality (or
character) disorders are characterized by inflexible, maladaptive 'pat-
terns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and
oneself.' "I"
Though studies suggest that juveniles who kill may tend to be be-
low normal in intellect, they generally are not mentally retarded. Some
may evert have IQs above 100.48 What is striking is the strong evidence
45. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 14.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 16 (quoting American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. rev. 1987); see also notes 28-41 and accom-
panying text.
48. Id. at 18 & nn. 46-49 (citing studies by Bender, Children and Adolescents
Who Have Killed, in 16 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 510 (1959); Patterson, supra note 39;
King, The Ego and the Integration of Violence in Homicidal Youth, in 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 134 (1975); Brand.tadter-Palmer, CHILDREN WHO KILL, paper
presented at Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (Toronto
August 1984)). But see id. at nn. 42-43, 45 (citing studies suggesting "that juveniles
who kill tend to be below normal in intellect, although generally not mentally re-
tarded"); Hays et al., Intellectual Characteristics of Juvenile Murders Versus Status
Offenders, in 43 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 80 (1978) (a sample of 35 juvenile killers
had significantly lower IQs than a similar sample of 39 juvenile status offenders); Petti
& Davidman, Homicidal School-Age Children: Cognitive Style and Demographic Fea-
tures, in 12 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEV. 82, 85 (1981); Solway et al., Adoles-
cent Murders: Literature Review and Preliminary Findings, in VIOLENCE AND THE
VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 193 (J. Hays et al., eds. 1981); Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric
Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in
Howe
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of a correlation between cognitive and language deficits and juvenile
homicide.49 Early studies, by Patterson5" and Bender,"' as well as later
studies, 2 in the 1970s and 1980s, all report that juvenile killers exper-
ienced major learning problems, had drastically stunted language skills,
poor academic performance, or may have quit school. Ten of the four-
teen juveniles on death row, in the 1988 study by Lewis et al., were
found to have major learning problems; only three read at grade level;
and three had never learned to read until incarcerated.5 3
Among the general juvenile population, it is unclear whether
mental retardation and learning difficulties are associated with or
caused by neurological impairment. But, "it has long been acknowl-
edged that juveniles who kill often do suffer from neurological defects.
For example, three decades ago Bender reported that among fifteen ju-
venile killers tested, ten had abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG)
tracings.""' During the 1980s, Lewis and her colleagues found a simi-
larly striking prevalence of neurological impairment in two studied
groups of juvenile killers, one general in nature and the other all given
death sentences.
Among the death row group ...Lewis and her associates found
that all fourteen of these subjects had histories and/or symptoms
consistent with brain damage. In fact, eight had experienced head
injuries 'severe enough to result in hospitalization and/or indention
of the cranium' and nine had 'serious' documented neurological ab-
normalities, including focal brain injury, abnormal head circumfer-
ence, abnormal reflexes, seizure disorders, and abnormal EEG
the United States, in 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 587 (1988)).
49. Ewing states: "Many of the juvenile killers described in case studies were
reported to have been experiencing significant academic problems at the time they
killed, despite their generally average or better intellectual capacities." Id.; see, e.g.,
nn. 50-51 citing D.J. Scherl & J.E. Mack, A Study of Adolescent Matricide, in 5 J.
AM. ACADEMY OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 559 (1966); I.B. Sendi & P.G. Blomgren, A
Comparative Study of Predictive Criteria in the Predisposition of Homicidal Adoles-
cents, in 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 423, 425 (1975); and J. Bernstein, Premeditated
Murder by an Eight-Year-Old Boy, 22 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 47 (1978).
50. See supra note 39.
51. See supra note 48.
52. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 19 & nn. 55-57 (citing studies by
Sendi & Blomgren, supra note 49 and by King and Brandstadter-Palmer, supra note
48).
53. Id. at 18-19.
54. Id. at 19.
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findings.5
Ewing stresses, however, that "whether or not a given juvenile killer
suffers from neurological dysfunction may not be ascertainable from
published clinical accounts of his or her case." '56
3. Family Characteristics
The families of juvenile killers are typically described as being
broken, disturbed, neglectful and abusive. For nearly half a century,
reported studies have shown that the percentage of juvenile killers who
come from homes broken by parental separation, desertion and/or di-
vorce is very high.57
Ewing notes that probably the most consistent finding from the
reviewed research is "that children and adolescents who kill, especially
those who kill family members, have generally witnessed and/or been
directly victimized by domestic violence. ' '5 8 Many juvenile killers have
witnessed spousal abuse. The more common occurrence is personally
being victimized by child abuse, mostly physical, but "several accounts
also suggest that many juveniles who kill also have been abused
sexually."" 9
55. Id. at 19-20 (quoting from Lewis et al., supra note 48) (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 20.
57. Id. at 20-21 & nn. 71-79 (referring to Patterson's early 1942 study [see
supra note 38] in which "five out of six juveniles [that] he studied came from broken
homes marked by serious marital disturbances." Id. at 21; more than four decades
later, "Brandstadter-Palmer [supra note 48] found that among the twelve juveniles
murder defendants in her study, only one was living in an intact family." Id.; Lewis et
al., [supra note 48] found that of the fourteen youth on death row studied, nine "had
at least one parent who was an alcoholic, was mentally ill, and/or had been hospital-
ized for psychiatric treatment." Id.)
58. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 22.
59. Id. at 23 & nn. 98-100. Ewing notes:
For example, in the recent death row study by Lewis and associates
[supra note 48], five of fourteen juveniles who killed had been previously
sodomized by older family members. Earlier, Sendi and Blomgren [supra
note 49] found that while four of ten adolescents killers had been "se-
duced" by a parent, none of the ten youngsters in a control group had
experienced such abuse.
The findings of Corder and colleagues [Corder et al., Adolescent Par-
ricide: A Comparison with Other Adolescent Murder, in 133 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 957, 959 (1976)] suggest that sexual victimization by a parent
may also be more likely found in cases where the child-victim has killed
19921
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4. Prehomicidal Behavior and Adjustment
While most juveniles who kill are neither psychotic nor suffer from
any major mental disorder, the research data reviewed by Ewing did
suggest that many, if not all, juvenile killers exhibit "some form of
noticeably deviant behavior prior to committing homicide. The most
common forms of such behavior . . . are antisocial conduct, substance
abuse, truancy, running away from home, enuresis, and problems relat-
ing to peers.60 Many studies found a prehomicidal history of antisocial
behavior documented by prior records of arrests and criminal convic-
tions. A few cited studies6 found no clear history of prior anti-social
acts. Other researchers found major differences in the incidence of
prior antisocial behavior depending upon the nature of the youthful
homicide perpetrator or the relationship between the perpetrator and
homicide victim. For example:
Zenoff and Zients divided their youthful homicidal subjects into
three subtypes: sexual-identity conflict killers (relatively normal
youngsters with sexual identity problems that seemed related to the
homicide); nonempathic killers (essentially self-centered, impulsive
youngsters with cognitive deficits, and innocent killers (juveniles
who killed accidentally or in self-defense). Of the six juvenile kill-
ers in the sexual-identity conflict group, none had prior court
records for violent offenses and only two had referrals for property
offenses. Only one of the innocent killers had any history of as-
saultive behavior. But all seven youthful killers in the nonempathic
group had histories of both assaultive behavior and numerous prop-
erty offenses.6 2
Corder and associates, who grouped their subjects according to victim-
offender relationships, "found histories of aggressive behaviors in all
ten juveniles who killed strangers, in six of ten who killed acquaint-
his/her parent.
Id.
60. Id. at 23-24.
61. Id. at 24-25 nn. 109-111 (citing studies by C.P. Malmquist, Premonitory
Signs of Homicidal Aggression in Juveniles, in 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 461, 462
(1971) and Patterson, supra note 39).
62. Id. at 25 (summarizing the findings of E.H. Zenoff & A.B. Zients, Juvenile
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ances or relatives, but in only three of ten who killed parents."6 Simi-
larly, with respect to prior institutionalization for criminal acts, Corder
et al. found that nine of the ten who killed strangers, five of the ten
who killed acquaintances or relatives, but only one of the ten who killed
parents had such a history.
Although general criminological research indicates "a significant if
not causal relationship between substance abuse and criminal activity,
especially violent crime," Ewing's research review found that
"[s]urprisingly few studies of juvenile killers have examined this rela-
tionship." '64 Cornell and associates recently "reported that thirty-eight
of the seventy-two homicidal youth they studied had killed while intoxi-
cated."65 Of this group, twenty-four were deemed regular or heavy al-
coholic users, and twenty-nine regular or heavy drug users. "Similarly
noteworthy data have also been reported by Brandstadtner-Palmer,
who recently found that two thirds of the dozen juvenile murder de-
fendants in her sample had histories of substance abuse."6 6
Two other phenomena often appearing in the profiles of juvenile
killers are truancy and running away from home. The frequent inci-
dence of school and learning problems has been noted earlier in this
essay. Ewing comments that "[n]ot surprisingly . . . running away
from home has been reported almost exclusively as a behavior engaged
in by juveniles who eventually killed one of their parents.1 67
Many clinicians and researchers have recognized an interesting
correlation between juvenile homicide and "childhood enuresis."6 8 Ew-
ing credits an early 1961 article by Michaels, entitled "Enuresis in
Murderous Aggressive Children and Adolescents," as having set the
63. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 25 (referring to Corder et al., supra
note 59).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 26 (citing Dewey G. Cornell et al., Characteristics of Adolescents
Charged With Homicide: Review of 72 Cases, in 5 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & L. 11
(1987) (a study of a comparatively large sample of youth referred for pretrial evalua-
tion in the State of Michigan over a nine-year period, compared with a control group of
35 adolescents charged with nonviolent larceny offenses)).
66. Id. (citing Brandstadter-Palmer, supra note 48).
67. Id. & n. 126 (citing R.L. Sadoff, Clinical Observation on Parricide, in 45
PSYCHIATRY 65-69 (1971); Scherl & Mack, supra note 49; and E. Tanay, Reactive
Parricide, in 21 J. FORENSIC SCIENCES 76-82 (1976)).
68. Childhood enuresis is "the repeated involuntary or intentional voiding of
urine during the day or at night into bed or clothes, after an age at which continence is
expected." Id. (quoting American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 47).
Howe
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stage for this interest."' Ewing notes that two other behaviors, fire set-
ting and cruelty to animals, often appear conjointly with enuresis, in
juveniles who kill; but the literature has not given them as much atten-
tion as enuresis.
Lastly, many juveniles who kill are considered to have had
problems relating to their peers. Those "who commit parricide may be
more likely than other juvenile killers to have demonstrated difficulties
relating to their peers. Corder and his colleagues found an absence of
peer relations among seven of ten juveniles who killed their parents,
three who killed a relative or close acquaintance, and three who killed a
stranger."7
5. Types of Homicides
Ewing reports that researchers have categorized and compared
juveniles who kill either on the basis of the type of homicide committed
or "the following factors: victim-offender relationship; means of homi-
cide; motivation for the killing; and the presence or absence of
accomplices." 71
As noted earlier, while the literature is heavily devoted to in-
trafamilial homicides, "most juvenile killers kill acquaintances or stran-
gers, not members of their own families. '72 Often studies or reports on
juvenile killings are silent with respect to the means. When descriptions
are given, "[miost of the killings .. .were perpetrated with guns,
knives, or the killer's bare hands, although occasionally other objects
have reportedly been used. Perhaps the most consistent and striking
finding with regard to means of homicide is the extent to which
juveniles who kill do so with guns.
Ewing concludes that "[m]any juvenile homicides appear motive-
less . . . .In other cases, however, the juvenile killer's motive seemed
69. Ewing states: "'[P]ersistently enuretic' individuals, Michaels suggests, can-
not hold their tensions, are impatient, and are impelled to act. They feel the urgency of
the moment psychologically, as at an earlier date they could not hold their urine."
WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 26 (quoting J.J. Michaels, Enuresis in Mur-
derous Aggressive Children and Adolescents, in 5 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 94
(1961)).
70. Id. at 28 (citing Corder et al., supra note 59).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 29.
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reasonably apparent, though not always understandable."' 7 Often a
parricide seems to be "rooted in the juvenile's desire for revenge
against and/or escape from a parent who is (or at least is perceived by
the youth to be) abusive." Some parricides seem to be motivated also
"by a desire to protect and/or please a parent. '7 5 The studies do not
indicate any similar clear motive for the killing of other family mem-
bers. "Killings of acquaintances seem most commonly to be related to
some immediate interpersonal conflict or to be incidental to the com-
mission of other crimes, such as burglary or rape. Killings of strangers
generally seem to occur in the course of committing other crimes, such
as burglary, robbery, and rape, but often have no apparent motive."' 76
D. The Law's Response to Juvenile Homicide
After presenting descriptive profiles for juvenile perpetrators of va-
rious types of homicidal acts, in chapter 9, Ewing provides his reader
with an overview of the current options, mandated by the laws of dif-
ferent American jurisdictions, for dealing with juvenile killers.
1. Trial in Adult Criminal Court
Formerly, "it was legally presumed that all juveniles below a cer-
tain age (usually eighteen but sometimes sixteen) were not sufficiently
sophisticated and mature to be held criminally responsible for their an-
tisocial acts. Youth below this age were automatically treated as
juveniles. ' 7 7 Today, all American jurisdictions have laws, "variously
known as transfer, waiver, or certification provisions, [whereby] older
juveniles (generally those older than twelve) who commit the most seri-
ous personal crimes (e.g., homicide, rape, kidnapping, armed robbery,
arson, sodomy, aggravated assault) may be prosecuted and, if con-
victed, punished as adult criminals."7' 8 The minimum age at which a
74. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 29-30.
75. Id. at 30 & nn. 163-68 (citing studies by Patterson, supra note 39; J.W.
Duncan & G.M. Duncan, Murder in the Family: A Study of Some Homicidal Adoles-
cents, in 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 74-78 (1971); Sadoff, supra note 67; Cornell et al.,
supra note 65, at 2-21; and Malmquist, supra note 61, at 464)).
76. Id. nn. 175-76 (referring to study by Rowley et al, supra note 10, at 3).
77. Id. at 117 & n.23 (citing Levine et al., Juvenile and Family Mental Health
Law in Sociohistorical Context, in 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 91 (1987)).
78. Id. at 114; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN § 31-6-2-3 (West 1991); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 1, 53 (Law. Co-op. 1991); 1991 La. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. C. Ann. art.
19921
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juvenile killer may be prosecuted as an adult varies greatly.7 9 Gener-
ally, to be tried as an adult, "a juvenile must, in addition to meeting
age and crime requirements, be found by the court not suitable for
treatment as a juvenile." 80 Ewing explains that in most states judges
are directed by statute to consider specific factors such as "(1) the dan-
ger or threat posed to the community by the juvenile; (2) the degree of
sophistication and maturity exhibited by the juvenile; and (3) the likeli-
hood that the juvenile can be rehabilitated through the services availa-
ble to - and prior to expiration of the jurisdiction of - the juvenile
court."81
Ewing aptly comments as follows:
Given the clear relationship between these factors and the juve-
nile's psychological makeup and functioning, it is not surprising
that forensic mental health professionals (primarily psychologists
and psychiatrists) have come to play a major role in helping courts
to determine whether or not a given juvenile should be tried as a
juvenile or as an adult. Juveniles charged with serious crimes and
eligible for transfer, waiver, or certification are now routinely sub-
jected to forensic mental health evaluations, and the courts rou-
tinely give great weight to these evaluations in determining
101, 116 (West); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1102
(1991).
79. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 114-15. Ewing lists fifteen states as
setting no minimum age: Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming. A juvenile as young as 10 years old may be prose-
cuted as an adult in three states: Indiana, South Dakota and Virginia. Three states
have a minimum age of 13 years: George, Illinois, and Mississippi. The minimum age
is 14 in eleven states: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Utah. Ten other jurisdictions:
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Ten-
nessee, Texas and Virginia, have a minimum age of 15 years; and in eight states: Cali-
fornia, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and Wis-
consin a youth must be 16 years old. See also Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide. A
Study in Legal Ambivalence, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE 194 (Elissa P. Benedek & Dewey
G. Cornell eds. 1989) (Table 3, presenting the minimum ages for exercise of criminal
court jurisdiction in murder cases, adds New York to the group of eleven states listed
by Ewing as having 14 as a minimum age; and in the footnote explains that in both
New York and North Dakota, criminal court jurisdiction is mandatory at 14).
80. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 115. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 5502 (1990) with WYO. STAT. § 14-6-203 (1991).
81. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 116.
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whether to try a youngster as a juvenile or as an adult.82
In discussing these factors, Ewing identifies certain underlying as-
sumptions and societal concerns. First, concern about the danger a ju-
venile may pose to society is "a reflection of incapacitation as a justifi-
cation for criminal punishment. [This assumes] that juveniles who pose
no danger or only minimal danger to society may safely be treated as
juveniles, while those who are more dangerous require longer and more
secure incarceration for the protection of the public." 83 Second, under-
lying "concern over maturity and sophistication is society's long-stand-
ing notion that adult penal sanctions should be reserved for those ma-
ture enough to be held fully responsible for their crimes."' As
previously noted, youths, seventeen and younger, were not deemed
criminally responsible. "Under modern waiver, transfer, or certification
laws, the presumption remains but is rebuttable." 85 Third, Ewing as-
serts that two questions are critical in determining a given youth's ame-
nability to treatment: "(1) Are the dispositions available to the juvenile
court likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before that court's jurisdiction
ends? (2) Are the services available to the juvenile in the criminal jus-
tice system appropriate to his/her needs?" 86
From his study of the research literature, Ewing concludes that
certain factors are particularly predictive of adult prosecution of
juveniles who kill, as illustrated by Eigen's study of 154 juveniles ar-
rested for homicide in Philadelphia in one year.87 Factors predictive of
waiver for trial as an adult were: (1) a killing during the commission of
a felony; (2) by one seventeen year old at a time; (3) acting as the
principle assailant; and (4) having a prior criminal record.
2. Punishment of Juveniles Who Kill
The law's response to juvenile homicide is different depending on
whether art alleged juvenile killer is tried in juvenile court as a juvenile
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 116-17.
85. Id. at 117.
86. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 117.
87. Id. at 117 n.28 (citing J. Eigen, Punishing Youth Homicide Offenders in
Philadelphia, in 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1072 (1981) (51 percent of these
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or in criminal court as an adult. If dealt with in the juvenile justice
system, most state laws limit the duration of a sentence to the of-
fender's minority or a relatively short period thereafter.88 In contrast, a
youth who is "tried and convicted of murder or manslaughter in adult
court may be sentenced to prison, detention in a juvenile facility, or
both."89 In states imposing the death penalty for certain murders,
juveniles, unless expressly exempted, upon conviction of murder or non-
negligent manslaughter in adult court, are eligible for capital punish-
ment.90 Thus, as Ewing poignantly notes, "in some cases the transfer or
waiver decision may mean the difference between life and death for a
juvenile killer."91
3. Incarceration of Juveniles Who Kill
Ewing reports that "juveniles convicted of homicide crimes in
adult court are treated much more harshly than those found guilty of
such crimes in juvenile court."'92 Eigen's study of 154 Philadelphia
juveniles revealed sharp differences in outcomes. Ninety percent of
those tried as adults were given prison sentences, while fewer than fifty
percent of those tried in juvenile court were incarcerated. No youth
tried in juvenile court was confined to a state institution beyond his or
her twenty-first birthday. "In those cases tried in criminal court, how-
ever, all . . . convicted of felony-related murder and 84 percent of
those convicted of murder not related to another felony were sentenced
to terms of imprisonment ranging from one to two years to life in
prison. One youth convicted in adult court was sentenced to die."9
88. Id. at 121; see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.10 (Baldwin 1991) (consid-
ering the seriousness of the offense, whether the offense was against persons or prop-
erty, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons; the maturity of the
child as determined by the environment; the child's prior record; the best interest of the
child and community; the prospects of adequate protection of the public; and the likeli-
hood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services and
facilities currently available to the juvenile justice system).
89. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 121; see, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
119, § 58 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (providing for a probationary or commitment period for
a child that shall not be for a period longer than until such child becomes eighteen or
age nineteen in the case of a child whose case is disposed of after he has attained his
eighteenth birthday).
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4. Capital Punishment for Juveniles Who Kill
Ewing finishes his summary of the American legal system's re-
sponse to juvenile homicide, with the sobering observation that "while
rarely imposed, the death penalty remains a viable option for punishing
juveniles who kill."" Very few nations in the world today execute per-
sons for crimes committed while they were juveniles. Yet, three of the
eight executions of juveniles, documented by Amnesty International as
occurring since 1979, "took place in the United States. The remaining
five occurred in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados.' 95
Drawing from the review of state statutes in the 1989 Supreme
Court opinion for two juvenile capital punishment cases decided to-
gether, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri," Ewing states
that of the thirty-seven states permitting capital punishment, "twenty-
two of these states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming) allow the execu-
tion of juveniles convicted of murder committed before they were sev-
enteen years old.""' Three more states (Georgia, North Carolina, and
94. Id. at 126.
95. W1-EN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 123. It is to be noted that,
[miore than 90 juveniles have been sentenced to death in the USA since
the death penalty was reinstated in the 1970's; all were aged between 15
and 17 at the time of the offense. Although many have had their sentences
vacated on appeal, four were executed between 1985 and 1990 and 31
remained on death row as of 1 July 1991. Although they represent only a
small proportion of the more than 2,400 prisoners under sentence of death
in the USA, there are more juvenile offenders on death row in the USA
than in any other country known to Amnesty International.
Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty and Juvenile
Offenders, Summary (Al Index: AMR 51/23/91) (issued 9 October 1991).
96. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
97. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 123 & n.57 (though not explicitly
listed in Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Stanford, Ewing apparently com-
piles this list of states from those enumerated in footnote two and the accompanying
text. 109 S. Ct. at 2975.). Conversely, Justice Brennan points out in his dissent:
The 15th State to have rejected capital punishment altogether is Vermont.
Vermont repealed a statute that had allowed capital punishment for some
murders. See Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 2303 (1974 and Supp. 1988). The
State now provides for the death penalty only for kidnapping with intent to
extort money. Id., §2403. Insofar as it permits a sentence of death, § 2403
was rendered unconstitutional by our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408
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Texas) allow execution of a juvenile who was seventeen years at the
time the killing occurred.
During the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court heard several
cases raising constitutional challenges to state death penalty laws as
applied to juveniles. In 1982, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,9 8 the Court va-
cated the death sentence of sixteen-year-old-runaway, Monty Lee Ed-
dings, who had been abused by his father. While acknowledging that
Monty's youth was a substantial factor, the sentencing judge "refused,
as a matter of law, to consider Monty's disturbed family life and emo-
tional problems as mitigating evidence."99 The Court rejected Monty's
claim of a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and
unusual punishment and instead decided the case on the narrower
grounds "that in a capital sentencing proceeding, sentencing authorities
may not 'refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence.' Youth, the Court concluded, 'is itself a relevant mitigating
factor of great weight.' "100
Six years later, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 0' the Court was con-
fronted with the question whether or not a person could be executed for
a crime committed while under the age of sixteen. William Wayne
Thompson's death sentence was vacated, but the Court "failed to re-
solve the controversy over the age at which capital punishment becomes
a constitutionality valid penalty."'0 2 Four justices held that execution
of a person under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense was
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A fifth justice, Justice
O'Connor, concluding that there very likely was a national consensus
forbidding such execution, nevertheless stated her unwillingness "'to
adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better
evidence than we now possess.' "10 She provided the fifth concurring
U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), because Vermont's sen-
tencing scheme does not guide jury discretion, see Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13,
§§ 7107-7017 (1974). Vermont's decision not to amend its only law al-
lowing the death penalty in light of Furman and its progeny, in combina-
tion with its repeal of its statute permitting capital punishment for murder
leads to the conclusion that the State rejects capital punishment.
109 S. Ct. at 2983 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. 455 U.S. 105 (1982).
99. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 123.
100. Id. at 124 (quoting Justice Powell in Eddings, 455 U.S. at 877).
101. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
102. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 124.
103. Id. (quoting Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment in Thompson,
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vote, but on the narrower ground "that those 'below the age of 16 at
the time of their offense may not be executed under the authority of a
capital punishment statute [such as the Oklahoma law under which
Thompson was sentenced] that specified no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution.' "104
One year later in 1989, the Court again was confronted with the
question of at what age is capital punishment a constitutionally valid
penalty. In the jointly decided cases, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins
v. Missouri, 5 the Court upheld death sentences imposed upon Kevin
Stanford (seventeen years and four months at the time he and an ac-
complice, during a robbery, raped and sodomized a female gas station
attendant whom later he shot in the head) and Heath Wilkins (sixteen
years and six months old, when robbing a convenience store with an
accomplice, repeatedly stabbed the store clerk). "Justice Scalia, joined
by four other justices, concluded that there is no national consensus
against executing sixteen- and seventeen-year olds convicted of murder
... ."106 This time, only Justice Brennan, in dissent, referred to "psy-
chological and psychiatric data indicating that juveniles lack the judg-
ment and moral maturity necessary to hold them fully responsible for
their crimes.' 10 7 Thus, Ewing asserts "that there is no constitutional
bar to imposing the death penalty upon juveniles who were at least
sixteen years old at the time of their capital crimes."' 08
E. The Future of Juvenile Homicide
In chapter 10, Ewing concludes his book with a brief discussion of
the "forces currently operating in American society" that lead him to
forecast "that the number and rate of juvenile homicide will continue
to increase and may reach record proportions by the turn of the
108 S. Ct. at 2706).
104. Id.
105. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
106. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 125.
107. Id. at 125-26 (citing Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2988-92 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
108. Id. at 126. Thus, while Eddings requires that, whatever the age of the juve-
nile, all mitigating evidence including the offender's youth must be considered by the
sentencing authority, judge or jury; under Thompson, a youth may be given the death
sentence so long as the statutory provisions under which the youth is sentenced explic-
itly set a minimum age for capital sentencing. Id.
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Ewing claims that substance abuse affects juvenile homicides in
three ways: "(1) most directly by altering the psychological functioning
of juveniles in ways which make them more likely to kill; (2) less di-
rectly by creating an environment in which some juveniles have eco-
nomic incentives to kill; and (3) indirectly, by contributing to the likeli-
hood of child maltreatment."' 10
Although Ewing found "no definitive data regarding how many
juvenile homicides are committed by youths under the influence of
drugs,""' he mentions disturbing statistics about New York City:
In 1988, the overall estimated number of drug abusers under
seventeen in New York City alone reached an all-time high of
140,000. As juvenile drug abuse was reaching record highs, so too
was juvenile homicide. In 1988, the number of murders in New
York City reached an all-time annual high of 1,896, and the num-
ber of murders committed by juveniles went from twenty-four
in 1987 to fifty-seven in 1988, a 138 percent increase in a single
year."
Secondly, Ewing notes that some juvenile homicides may result
from the behavioral changes, lowered inhibitions or impaired judge-
ment flowing from drug use and abuse. Other killings occur "not be-
cause the perpetrators are necessarily under the influence of drugs
when they kill, but rather because these homicides [are] committed as
part of the juvenile perpetrators' efforts to make or protect drug prof-
its.""' Ewing predicts that juvenile killings will increase "[a]s drug
trafficking increases and/or becomes more competitive."',
Lastly, Ewing states that the serious growing problem of parental
109. Id. at 127.
110. Id. at 128.
111. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 128.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 129.
114. Id.; see also Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991 184 (111 th ed.); No. 309, Drug Arrest Rates
for Drug Abuse Violations, 1980 to 1989, and by Sex and Region, 1989; No. 310 Drug
Removals, Laboratory Seizures, and Persons Indicated, by DEA: 1984 to 1989 (1991)
(indicating a marked increase in seizures and arrests for 1984-1989).
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drug abuse "has had and will continue to have an indirect and long-
term but significant impact upon the incidence of juvenile homicide by
contributing to the incidence of child abuse and neglect." 115 The num-
ber of child abuse and neglect cases involving parents who are drug
abusers and/or addicts is growing rapidly.
2. Child Maltreatment
Ewing asserts that "[t]he correlation between child abuse and ju-
venile homicide, though not well researched, makes serlse intuitively
... (. [Thus,] increases in the incidence and/or severity of child abuse
are likely to be followed by corresponding increases in the number and
rate of juvenile homicides."116 To substantiate the contention that "the
United States is experiencing an 'epidemic' of child abuse" which "will
undoubtedly affect the incidence of juvenile homicide for some time to
come," Ewing refers to "testimony given before the United States Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee in May of 1989 indicat[ing] that there was a
64-percent increase in the number of confirmed child abuse cases in the
United States between 1980 and 1986."1
3. Guns
"Most homicides, including those perpetrated by juveniles, involve
the use of firearms."' 118 From Ewing's discussion of various juvenile
killings-shooting a parent, sibling or playmate with a parent's hand-
gun, using a handgun during a robbery to kill the victim, or firing a
semiautomatic assault rifle out of a car window in a drive-by gang re-
lated killing of a rival, one thing stands out. All these perpetrators had
ready access to guns. Hard data on gun ownership in the United States
may not readily be available. Yet, "several points seem beyond dispute:
millions of guns ranging from small handguns to semiautomatic assault
rifles are owned by Americans; and many of these weapons are either
115. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 129.
116. it. at 130.
117. Id. at 130-31; see also Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991 182 (111th ed.); No. 305. Re-
ported Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, by division: 1980 to 1987; No. 306. Child
Maltreatment Cases Reported-Summary: 1976 to 1986 (1991) (indicating a increase
from 785,100 cases in 1980 to 2,025,200 in 1987).
118. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 132.
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in the hands of or readily available to juveniles . . . ."'" Some large
urban school districts have installed metal detectors in an effort to keep
guns out of their schools. Three states, Florida, Connecticut and Vir-
ginia, reacting to a 1989 "rash of accidental shootings of children by
other children . . ." have enacted legislation "making it a crime to
leave loaded guns where they are accessible to children. ' 120 Ewing
notes "[e]ven the National Rifle Association (NRA), which vehe-
mently opposes virtually any legal controls on gun ownership, has ac-
knowledged the growing problem of juveniles' access to guns." 2 '
Ewing is not hopeful that any of these efforts will make any imme-
diate difference. Rather, he maintains that "juvenile access to guns will
likely continue to grow, and thus continue to contribute to the growing
problem of juvenile homicide. '122
4. Poverty
First, Ewing states that "[t]he link between poverty and crime in
American society, including violent crime, is complex and not entirely
understood, but almost universally recognized."I 2s In Table 10-2 he
provides figures for the years 1978 through 1987, showing a steady rise
in the percentage of youths under the age of 18 in families below the
"official" poverty level.1 2' Acknowledging a lack of hard data about the
percentage of juvenile homicides committed by economically impover-
ished youths, Ewing nevertheless asserts the following:
Youngsters living in poverty are more likely to become involved in
juvenile gangs, more likely to commit economically motivated
crimes such as robbery, and more likely to be exposed to the temp-
tations of involvement in the drug trade flourishing in their com-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 133.
121. Id. Ewing notes, "[r]ecently, the NRA began producing and distributing a
children's coloring book. The booklet, My Gun Safety Book, is designed for children
from kindergarten through first grade and tells them that if they find a gun, they
should leave it alone, leave the area, and tell an adult." Id.
122. Id.
123. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 133.
124. The "official" poverty threshold rises each year by the same percentage as
the annual average Consumer Price Index. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 195 Current Population Reports,
Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 175, (Table A-2, Poverty Thresholds in 1990, by
Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 Years) (1991).
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munities. Thus, with increased poverty is likely to come increases
in the number and rates of these kinds of juvenile homicides. 125
5. Resurgence of the Juvenile Population
Recent United States Census Bureau estimates and projections in-
dicate that "the United States is beginning to undergo a demographic
shift in which the population of juveniles at risk for committing homi-
cides will no longer be decreasing but instead will be increasing. '"126
Between 1990 and 2000, the five to seventeen year old age group is
expected to increase by 7 percent. However, given the "described con-
fluence of the forces now at work in American society . . . that is,
increasing drug abuse, child abuse, access to guns and childhood pov-
erty," Ewing solemnly predicts a rise in the rate of juvenile homicide
over the next ten years which will result in annual record numbers of
juvenile homicides far in excess of the anticipated 7 percent growth in
this age group. 127
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF EWING'S TREATMENT OF THE
PHENOMENON OF JUVENILE HOMICIDE
When Children Kill: The Dynamics of Juvenile Homicide is de-
scribed on the back flap of its book jacket, as being "a valuable re-
source for mental health care professionals, lawyers, and those who
work with violent juvenile offenders." In the Introduction, Ewing de-
clares his intent to examine "the phenomenon of juvenile homicide
from a variety of perspectives."'1 8 He then provides a descriptive sum-
mary of the book's ten chapters-the critical questions to be answered
and the type of information to be presented. In this section, considera-
tion is given first to determining whether When Children Kill, in fact,
addresses all of the issues raised by Ewing in his Introduction. Second,
an assessment is made regarding the overall adequacy of Ewing's dis-
cussion of the phenomenon of juvenile homicide.
125. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 133.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 135.
128. Id. at xv.
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Chapter l's statistical overview, as discussed above in section IB,
is the most complete and successful part of When Children Kill. From
a series of ten tables and accompanying text, a reader readily learns
about all aspects of juvenile homicide. Namely, the number of juveniles
who kill each year, the comparison between the numbers of juvenile
homicides and the numbers of adult homicides each year; the numbers
of boys, as opposed to girls who kill; the ages of those who kill; the
types of relationships between victims and juvenile offenders; and the
circumstances under which juvenile killings occur. Ewing also presents
data on the recorded racial and ethnic group membership of juvenile
murder and non-negligent manslaughter arrestees.
In contrast, chapter 2's review of the published research on juve-
nile homicide does not answer fully the questions raised by Ewing in
his descriptive summary. Namely: What has been discovered to date
about this phenomenon? What remains to be discovered? What are the
limitations of existing research approaches, and how can these limita-
tions be overcome? 129
The bulk of chapter 2 is a presentation of the findings from vari-
ous studies conducted over the past 50 years. As noted above in section
ICI, Ewing deems the existing literature to be "surprisingly
sparse-both in quantity and in quality."'3 0 He complains about vari-
ous methodological flaws, such as very small study samples or anecdo-
tal case studies by professionals to whom youths have been referred for
evaluation or treatment, and the virtual lack of control or comparison
groups. Moreover, while intrafamilial homicides account for less than
one-fifth of all juvenile homicides, most of the research literature fo-
cuses on youth who have killed family members. This means that, as
Ewing asserts, "to date, precious little has been learned"' 3 1 about the
other more than 80 per cent who kill non-family. Ewing devotes very
little space to identifying what remains to be discovered, or how to
overcome the limitations of existing research approaches. By not ad-
dressing these two questions more completely, Ewing misses an oppor-
tunity to encourage or shape the design and direction of needed future
research. For some reason, Ewing does not repeat the closing statement
of his earlier study, co-authored with Rowley and Singer, that explic-
129. See id.
130. See supra text accompanying note 40.
131. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 13.
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itly calls for "not only greater methodological sophistication but a
broader, interdisciplinary conceptual approach [to juvenile homicide]
which emphasizes and examines sociological as well as psychological
and psychiatric variables. 13 2
This is not to say that Ewing does not make several very general
observations. He does note the need for more solid empirical data, espe-
cially on those youngsters who kill acquaintances and strangers, given
the strong indication that there are some clear differences between
these youth and those who kill family members. And, he makes the
point that empirical data is needed from studies with larger samples
and control or contrast groups, conducted by investigators other than
those providing "psychological/psychiatric evaluation/treatment
services. "133
Ewing, however, does not articulate any clear agenda for future
research or make any suggestions about how to overcome the method-
ological flaws that he decries. While chapter 2's literature review is a
close replica of Cornell's first chapter3 in the 1989 co-edited work,
Juvenile Homicide (to which Ewing frequently cites), for some reason,
Ewing does not mention any of Cornell's very specific observations
about "Iw]hat can be learned from the literature that would benefit
future researchers and future users of juvenile homicide research. 13 5
132. See Rowley, supra note 10, at 9. Nor does Ewing refer to another co-au-
thored work with Murray Levine et al. See supra note 77 (tracing the development of
juvenile and family mental health law and policy in the United States and concluding
that "the evolution of child and family mental health law and policy has been, is, and
undoubtedly will continue to be a reflection of a variety of changing social needs and
concerns ....").
133. See supra text accompanying note 43.
134. See Cornell, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 28. For instance, Cornell states: "publication of further case reports
outside the context of empirical study (emphasis original) is unnecessary." He calls for
more attention to be paid to sampling issues, and particularly cautions authors of stud-
ies using samples from hospital settings to be more conservative in their generaliza-
tions. Research on court-referred samples should be examined for representativeness
and efforts should be made to replicate findings on a broader sample if possible.
Second, given the smallness of many study samples, Cornell urges adherence to
well-accepted methodological standards. Care should be taken to support claims of
group differences by running appropriate tests of statistical significance. "When re-
searchers rely on chart reviews, interviews, ratings, or similar methods, evidence for the
interrater reliability of the measures must be presented." Id. Of special importance is
whether or not raters are blind to group membership of the subjects they rate.
Third, Cornell urges that studies that attempt to characterize the juvenile mur-
derer should be rejected automatically as naive. Case studies have documented consid-
Howe
256
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
Instead, Ewing merely reports on the conflicting results from some of
the research, but he does not flag any areas as meriting additional
study.
For example, he reports on a number of studies that have found
some correlation between the cognitive and language deficits of mental
retardation and learning disabilities and/or neurological impairment
and juvenile homicide.' 3 He notes also that "other studies have been
more equivocal. Numerous case studies have documented juvenile kill-
ers with no apparent neurological impairment.' 3 7 Yet, he does not
urge any further inquiry.
With respect to the characteristics of the families of juveniles who
kill, he again refers generally to the need to correct the bias resulting
from heavy use of samples just of intrafamilial killers. He cites certain
conflicting study results about whether the family was broken or intact
at the time of the killing.' This, along with a closer look at the affect
of sexual abuse, might well have been flagged as matters deserving fur-
ther study.
Next, with respect to patterns of prehomicidal behavior, Ewing
mentions studies reporting conflicting references to the presence and
erable heterogeneity of youth committing homicidal acts; recent studies demonstrate
important differences within homicide groups. Hence, future research, Cornell states,
should focus on identifying etiological factors associated with relatively homogenous
subgroups of violent youths.
And fourth, Cornell demands that attempts to subgroup violent youth should fol-
low standards procedures for proposing any diagnostic entity. Criteria should be clear
and reliable. The means by which youths are classified should be distinguished from
findings used to support the validity of the classification. Id. at 28-29.
136. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
137. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 20 nn. 64-67 (citing studies by
D.H. Russell, Girls Who Kill, in 30 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
171, 172 (1986) (no apparent neurological impairment); T.A. Petti & L. Davidman,
Homicidal School-Age Children: Cognitive Style and Demographic Features, in 12
CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEV. 82, 85 (1981) (evidence of brain damage in only
one of eleven children); K.S. Walsh-Brennan, Psychopathology of Homicidal Children,
in 94 ROYAL SOCIETY OF HEALTH 274, 276 (1974) (none of ten juveniles killers suf-
fered epileptic symptoms); I.B. Sendi & P.G. Blomgren, supra note 49, at 424 (only 20
percent of those studied demonstrated abnormal EEGs)).
138. See id. at 20-21; supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text (citing studies
that found a high percentage of homicidal youth came from broken homes; two studies
with contrary findings, cited by Ewing are: (1) King's study, supra note 48, (most of
the sample of 9 youths were living in intact families when they killed) and (2) Fiddes,
A Survey of Adolescent Murder in Scotland, in 4 J. ADOLESCENCE 47, 58 (1981)
(twenty-two of thirty-seven homicidal youngsters studied were from intact families)).
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absence of certain behaviors from prehomicidal histories;139 possibly,
another area for further investigation. Similarly, he comments how few
studies have examined substance abuse among juveniles who kill, al-
though '[criminological research in general indicates that there is a
significant if not causal relationship between substance abuse and crim-
inal activity, especially violent crime."'4 0 Ewing, however, calls for no
further investigation. Another inquiry area, not specifically flagged by
Ewing, is the extent to which fire setting and cruelty to animals, two
behaviors frequently found along with enuresis, actually appear in the
prehomicidal histories of juvenile killers.
At the beginning of chapter 2, Ewing states:
Ultimately, deciding how society and law should deal with homici-
dal youth will require answers to a number of difficult questions:
Who are these youngsters who kill? Why do they kill? To what
extent, if any, do they pose a continuing threat to society? And,
what, if anything, can be done to rehabilitate them and reduce the
magnitude of that threat?' 4 1
Ewing's middle chapters, 3 through 8, provide very graphic, descriptive
profiles for seven different types of juvenile homicide. 42 These chapters
are replete with references to all types of juvenile killings committed in
various parts of the United States and reported in the media during the
1980s. This is a strength of the book and indeed, sets it apart from the
frequently cited chapters 43 in Juvenile Homicide, a work whose orga-
nizational approach to subgroup classification Ewing follows in When
Children Kill. From the many media accounts that Ewing includes, one
gets a clear sense of the variety of youngsters who kill.
What these middle chapters do not answer, in any comprehensive
way, is why these juveniles kill. Implicit, in Ewing's closing prediction
139. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 23-28; supra notes 60-63 and ac-
companying text.
140. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 35.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Namely, intrafamilial homicides; homicides committed in the course of
other crimes; senseless killings; gang killings, killings by children under 10 years; and
homicides by girls. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Elissa P. Benedek & Dewey G. Cornell, Clinical Presentations of
Homicidal Adolescents, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE, supra note 22, at 37-58; Dewey G.
Cornell, A Causes of Juvenile Homicide: A Review of the Literature, in JUVENILE
HOMICIDE, supra note 22, at 1-37; Dewey G. Cornell et al., A Typology of Juvenile
Homicide Offenders, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE, supra note 22, at 59-84.
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of an anticipated growth in juvenile homicide during the 1990s, is the
affirmative acknowledgement that these youngsters do pose a threat to
society. There is, however, no exploration of what, if anything, can be
done either to rehabilitate them or to reduce the magnitude of the soci-
etal threat they pose. These omissions constitute major shortcomings
and seriously undercut the usefulness of this book.
Chapter 9, as discussed part in II.D.,'" introduces the reader to
the existing structure of state statutory provisions under which some
juvenile killers remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice sys-
tem and others are prosecuted in adult criminal courts, sometimes re-
ceiving lengthy or life prison sentences or the death penalty. Again, by
limiting himself strictly to reporting the status quo, Ewing adds nothing
to the continuing debate14 5 over how our legal system should respond to
and deal with youngsters who kill. So, although he refers to several
chapters" 6 in Juvenile Homicide, he completely ignores Bonnie's sug-
gestions14 7 for a more coherent sentencing system for juvenile offenders.
As promised in the Introduction, chapter 10 concludes with a spe-
cific prediction about the likely incidence of juvenile homicide in
America between now and the turn of the century. Ewing presents sta-
tistical data on each of five forces, 148 currently operating in society, and
deemed to have a close relationship to juvenile homicide. The real
strength of this final chapter, as can be said about the entire book, is
the clarity with which Ewing describes who these youngsters are. Per-
haps this is enough to make the work "a valuable resource" for profes-
sionals, but this reviewer found Ewing's failure to answer or grapple
comprehensively with all of the difficult questions,' 49 so precisely posed
at the beginning of chapter 2, very frustrating.
144. See supra notes 77-108 and accompanying text.
145. See discussions infra part III.B.
146. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide: A Study in Legal Ambiva-
lence, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE, supra note 22, at 183-218; Dewey G. Cornell et al.,
Legal Outcomes of Juveniles Charges with Homicide, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE, supra
note 22, at 163-82.
147. See discussion infra part III.B.
148. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 127-135 (table 10-1 relating Na-
tional Estimates of the Number and Rate per 1,000 of Child Abuse and Neglect and
table 10-2 relating Percentage of Americans under Age 18 in Families below the Pov-
erty Level 1978-1987).
149. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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B. Is the Phenomenon Adequately Explained?
Having assessed the extent to which Ewing accomplishes his stated
aims in writing When Children Kill, the sufficiency and accuracy of
Ewing's treatment of the phenomenon of juvenile homicide is next con-
sidered. Has he fully and properly explained the "dynamics" of juvenile
homicide?
The; term "dynamics" '150 has various meanings. It is presumed,
however., that its use in the subtitle of When Children Kill indicates
that the book attempts to explain and/or define what "forces, physical
or moral," contribute to the phenomenon of juvenile homicide or, what
kind of "psychological aspects or conduct of interpersonal relation-
ships" are associated with juvenile homicide.
Perhaps, because Ewing is a forensic, clinical psychologist, his dis-
cussion of the phenomenon of juvenile homicide primarily focuses on
individual psychological aspects and conduct of interpersonal relation-
ships of juveniles who kill. Surprisingly, he makes no reference to any
overarching or unifying theory to explain why some youngsters commit
homicidal acts and most others do not. Of course, Ewing did not have
the opportunity to consider the applicability of the theory advanced by
Gottfredson and Hirschi in their 1990 book, A General Theory of
Crime. They assert that the essential element of criminality is the ab-
sence of self-control and identify ineffective child-rearing as "[t]he ma-
jor 'cause' of low self-control."' 51
Another limitation in Ewing's treatment of juvenile homicide is
that he acknowledges an important array of societal forces' that pre-
dictably may increase the incidence of juvenile homicide, but he does
not exhaustively explore the broader underlying societal dynamics that
make juvenile homicide a serious public health 53 issue-indeed a
threat to society, yet a problem with very identifiable historical antece-
150. The term "dynamics" has various meanings. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 407 (1973). When used in reference to the
physical sciences, the term may indicate "a study of the relationship between motion
and the forces affecting motion." Or more generally, "dynamics may mean "the physi-
cal or moral forces that produce motion and change in any field." When used in the
context of psychoanalysis, "dynamics" may mean "(a) the action of psychic forces or
mechanisms; (b) the psychological aspect or conduct of an interpersonal relationship."
151. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY
OF CRIME 97 (1990); infra part liA (for further discussion).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 109-127.
153. See supra note 12.
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Many years ago, an observation by Dr. Luther Halsey Gulick, in
the first chapter of The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas
made a profound impression on this reviewer. Dr. Gulick declared:
"Once an indivisible problem is divided, nothing effective can be done
about it." 15" Generally regarded to be the dean of American public ad-
ministration, Dr. Gulick was speaking about problems confronting mid-
twentieth century American urban cities. The same truism, however,
can be said today about the phenomenon of juvenile homicide. If effec-
tive strategies are to be mounted to reduce the threat of a steadily
growing incidence of juvenile homicide, there first must be full recogni-
tion of the complex, underlying interrelatedness of individual and socie-
tal factors.
In order not to divide an indivisible problem, such as the phenome-
non of juvenile homicide, social policy makers and professionals who
work with juvenile killers need to understand clearly both who these
youngsters are and why they kill. It is not enough to present statistical
data, as Ewing does in his closing chapter 10, on certain critical socie-
tal forces deemed to contribute to the incidence of juvenile homicide,
without some further historical discussion of broad transformations in
American society or the structure of its families.
What is the relationship between the developmental deficits in a
juvenile killer and the way in which society may default on its responsi-
bility to ensure that parents and families successfully rear their chil-
dren to be law-abiding citizens? Is juvenile homicide an inevitable con-
sequence of a violent society-one in which violence is portrayed
resoundingly and repetitively in all forms of popular culture? Does sig-
nificant breakdown in the family mean that an alarming proportion of
our child population no longer is reared to be "WAPs"-well-adjusted
persons with positive self-esteem, capable of respecting other human
life, and possessing sufficient self-control to abstain from violent behav-
ior such as murder or non-negligent manslaughter? Hence, the refer-
ence in the title of this essay to Malcolm X's metaphoric characteriza-
tion of President Kennedy's assassination as "a case of 'the chickens
coming home to roost.' "155 Is our society merely reaping what has
154. LUTHER H. GULICK, THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS
24 (1966).
155. See MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 301 (Ballantine
Books 1973) (authored with the assistance of Alex Haley). Shortly after President
Kennedy's assassination, Malcolm X spoke in New York City at the Manhattan
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been sowed?
To be a truly useful resource, generally more is required than just
a straightforward description of the present and a prediction about the
future. Knowledge of the etiology and past historical evolution of a sit-
uation informs development of an effective response. In this respect,
Ewing's treatment of juvenile homicide is incomplete. He implicitly ap-
proaches the phenomenon as though it were a freestanding, extraordi-
nary occurrence and provides no general discussion of man's age-old
tendencies and urges to attack.156 No explicit references are made in
When Children Kill to certain significant historical developments that
some assert have undermined the authority of parents and undercut
their ability to rear and civilize their children. Such background infor-
mation can be found in two recently published scholarly works on the
American family. 157
Historian Steven Mintz and anthropologist Susan Kellogg, a hus-
band and wife research team, in Domestic Revolutions: A Social His-
tory of American Family Life effectively make the point that domestic
Center. He recounts:
It was on the theme, familiar to me, of 'as you sow, so shall you reap,' or
how the hypocritical American white man was reaping what he had sowed
... . Without a second thought, I said what I honestly felt-that it was,
as I saw it, a case of 'the chickens coming home to roost.' I said that the
hate in white men had not stopped with the killing of defenseless black
people, but that hate, allowed to spread unchecked, finally had struck
down this country's Chief of State. I said it was the same thing as had
happened with Medgar Evers, with Patrice Lumumba, with Madame
Nhu':; husband.
Id.
156. See, e.g., DESMOND MORRIS, THE NAKED AGE (1969) (explaining the na-
ture of man's aggressive urges as understood against the background of his animal
origins); see also Gottfredson & Hirschi, supra note 151, at 31, 34 asserting that:
Despite popular and scholarly opinion to the contrary, homicide is perhaps
the most mundane and, in our view, most easily explainable crime; and
further that: "[H]omicide may be prevented by eliminating interaction be-
tween victims and offenders, by removing lethal weapons from offenders,
by increasing the availability of by-standers and the probability of their
interventions by decreasing the resistance of victims of lesser crimes, and
by decreasing the use of alcohol and drugs. Homicide can also be pre-
vented by reducing the number of people who tend toward criminality.
157. See JAN E. DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN, THE MINIMAL FAMILY (1990);
STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE (1988).
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violence is nothing new.'6 8 This work systematically traces how the
American family of today has changed from early colonial days when it
"was the fundamental economic, educational, political, and religious
unit of society."" Mintz and Kellogg believe that the most striking
differences that set the seventeenth-century family apart from its pre-
sent-day counterpart involve the social experiences of children. For-
merly, many children died in infancy or before attaining their majority.
Young children of the well-to-do might be "put-out" to wet nurses.
Since many New Englanders, unlike Europeans of the time, did not
swaddle their young, "carelessly supervised children sometimes crawled
into fires or fell into wells."'160 In contrast:
The moral upbringing of Puritan children was never treated casu-
ally . . . . [B]elief in infant depravity and original sin exerted a
powerful influence on methods of child rearing. In their view, the
primary task of child rearing was to break down a child's sinful
will and internalize respect for divinely instituted authority through
weekly catechisms, repeated admonitions, physical beatings, and
intense psychological pressure. "Better whipt, than damned," was
Cotton Mather's advice to parents.' 6'
Mintz and Kellogg describe how "[d]uring the early years of the
twentieth century, a host of educators, legal scholars, social workers,
and academic social scientists created a new ideal of family life that
they termed the 'companionate family'." 62 In this new ideal family,
relations formerly based on authority now depend on affection and mu-
tual interest. Spouses are to be friends and lovers and parents and chil-
dren are to be pals. "To achieve this ideal, influential groups recom-
mended liberalized divorce laws; programs of marriage counseling,
domestic science, and sex education; and permissive child-rearing prac-
tices stressing freedom and self-expression over impulse-control."' 6 As
a result, Mintz and Kellogg assert that "[s]ince the 1960's America
158. See MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 157, at 11-13 (Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony Puritan court records reveal: "Between 1630 and 1699, at least 128 men were tried
for abusing their wives." But the punishments imposed on the men were mild, in con-
trast to the harsh punishments given Puritan women brought to court for heaping
abuse on their husbands.)
159. Id. at xiv.
160. Id. at 14.
161. Id. at 14-15.
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has become a permissive society, not merely in the superficial sense of
becoming more open and tolerant, but in the more profound sense of
becoming reluctant to accept responsibility for the economic and social
consequences of social change ... "16 To the phenomena of increas-
ing numbers of divorces, working mothers, and teen-age pregnancies,
that Mintz and Kellogg cite, one could add juvenile homicide.
Dizard and Gadlin165 also thoughtfully examine how the American
family has changed. Some of their insights help to explain the post-
industrial social environment in which children who kill today are being
reared. To describe today's American family-a consequence of em-
bracing -the "companionate family" ideal promoted early in the twenti-
eth century, they use the term "minimal family." They assert that
traditional family values and the very base of familism'66 have been
destroyed by "the interplay between a growing economy that seeks to
stimulate steadily expanding consumption and individuals whose per-
sonal lives are increasingly predicated upon egalitarian and democratic
forms of interaction. ' 167 Furthermore:
As industrialism gained momentum, it necessarily had to under-
mine the bases of familial mutual aid. In order to produce the au-
tonomy that a full-fledged market economy requires, both the pub-
lic and private sectors had to adopt policies that would make it
possible for people to reduce their embeddedness in kin networks,
allowing them to be geographically and socially mobile and more
164. Id. at xvii. Mintz & Kellogg further assert that:
Individuals, families and society as a whole have been hesitant to accept
full responsibility for the care of the young, the elderly, the poor, the hand-
icapped, or the mentally ill or for sex education or questions of birth con-
trol. Responsibility has been splintered, and as a result many family-re-
latea' problems are dealt with in a piecemeal or makeshift manner.
Unable to decide whether further to encourage the transfer of traditional
family functions to public institutions or to help families to become more
capable of handling these problems on their own, Americans have re-
sponded with a pervasive sense of uncertainty.
Id. at xvii-xviii (emphasis added).
165. See DIZARD & GADLIN, supra note 157.
166. Dizard & Gadlin use the term "familism" to "mean a reciprocal sense of
commitment, sharing, cooperation, and intimacy that is taken as defining the bonds
between family members. These bonds represent the more or less unconstrained ac-
knowledgment of both material and emotional dependency and obligation .... Famil-
ism embraces solicitude, unconditional love, personal loyalty, and willingness to sacri-
fice for others." Id. at 6-7.
167. Id. at 35.
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receptive to the idea of meeting needs through markets rather than
through intrafamilial exchanges . ... 168
When Dizard and Gadlin shift from considering broad economic
changes to focusing on changes within individual families, they claim
that the status of parents in today's minimal family is dramatically dif-
ferent than that of parents in the traditional family of our agrarian
past.
Parents were [once] the principal and authoritative interpreters of
the world for their children and generally possessed the skills, apti-
tudes, and know-how that children knew they needed to get on in
the world . . . . Parents' skills were undeniable, even if they were
resented. Traditional societies offered the young few, if any, alter-
natives to parental guidance. Whatever the style of parent-child in-
teraction, whether parents were authoritarian or permissive, stern
and distant or gentle and warm, they were authoritative.69
As industrialism and its accompanying "shift in the basis of wealth
from the land to the ownership of capital" made "whole new reperto-
ries of skills" necessary, "[s]lowly at first, but with steadily accelerat-
ing momentum, parents ceased being the authoritative interpreters of
the world for their children.' 170 Parents rooted in an agrarian society
did not possess the skills to prepare their children for the factory or
city. "Quickly, children become more knowledgeable about the new so-
cial order than their parents."'
To illustrate the erosion of parental authoritativeness, Dizard and
Gadlin refer to the immigrant experience-with children often teaching
their parents the English they need or serving as translators for interac-
tions with police, social workers and other agents of the mainstream
culture. They claim that:
The intense chauvinistic Americanization campaign begun in the
late nineteenth century and sustained through the early decades of
the twentieth century altered to the point of inverting the custom-
ary relationship between parents and children. In manifold ways,
the systematic discrediting of ethnic cultures and languages drove a
wedge between parents and children. The fact that this went on
168. Id. at 23.
169. Id. at 67-68.
170. Id. at 68-69.
171. DIZARD & GADLIN, supra note 157, at 69.
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under official auspices and thus carried the full weight and blessing
of the society as a whole clearly certified the children as culturally
superior to their parents.1 7 2
As Dizard and Gadlin point out, "[i]f parents insisted on their chil-
dren's obedience and respect, they flirted with disabling their children
for the world in which they would live. The combined effects of immi-
gration and rapid industrialization undercut the substantive basis on
which parental authority rested.' ' 3
As the authority of all parents, not just immigrant parents, de-
clined, emotional bonds with children expanded and became the basis
for intensified parental influence on children. Dizard and Gadlin note
that "emotional intensity and intimacy replaced authoritativeness not
only as the primary force behind parents' power over children but also
as the primary base for familial interdependence.' 174 Overtime, various
interdependencies 75 between parents and children have been eroded
just as traditional skills and authority have waned.
In the modern family, according to Dizard and Gadlin, the pri-
mary aim of childrearing has shifted from discipline directed toward
obedience to socialization that encourages flexibility and choice.' 76
172. Id. at 70. The same can be said today for Hispanics, South East Asian and
other newer immigrant families. Dizard & Gadlin note that:
The current dispute over bilingualism in our schools and in public facilities
is a dispute that, similarly, has considerable implications for family life. To
reject bilingualism is to insist that Hispanic children learn to derogate the
language of their parents. That this will reduce the authority of parents
can scarcely be doubted. In this sense, the controversy is not only about
language and assimilation; it is also about the integrity of a certain kind of
relationship between parents and children.
Id. at 234-35 n.6.
173. Id. at 71.
174. Id. at 74-75.
175. See id. at 73-74. Not only were children once dependent on their parents
for sustenance, but they also were expected to make a contribution to the family in the
form of chores and/or labor outside the home. Parents were reciprocally dependent
upon their offspring to care for them in their old age. Dizard and Gadlin state:
[T]he interdependencies between adults and their elderly parents [have]
changed-the elderly [can] no longer count on their adult children to at-
tend adequately to their needs. By the same token, as social security and
private pension plans were put in place, many of the elderly quickly came
to prefer being independent of their children.
Id. at 74.
176. I)IZARD & GADLIN, supra note 157, at 73.
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Many parents, however, do not know how to accomplish this.
When parents are unable to instill in their children appropriate
standards and values; when knowing their own location in society
does not tell them how to treat their children; when the inappropri-
ateness of prevailing adult roles makes traditional modes of chil-
drearing obsolete, then they must look elsewhere for childrearing
advice .... 177
Some parents, frequently those of the middle and upper classes, seek
the help of child guidance and family therapy professionals. 178 Many
other parents, frequently those of the lower classes, residing in troubled
and distressed communities, either have no access to help or lack the
capability to utilize it.
Dizard and Gadlin see a real "catch-22" type dynamic as now op-
erating in the minimal family that poses some serious obstacles to the
development of solid self-esteem in children. "[Love, intimacy, and
emotional dependency-the principal if not the only bases of parent-
child interaction-have been made increasingly conditional. 17 9 Given
the lack of any true economic role in the family, the child is very vul-
nerable to the withdrawal of love; and "[p]arents need love and affir-
mation from their children almost as much as children need these from
their parents." 180
Indeed, Dizard and Gadlin's analysis of the minimal family sug-
[I]n traditional society, a parent could simply demand that a child do
something because that was the parent's will. This approach was fine for
teaching obedience and is well suited to shaping an adult who can follow
orders or rules within clearly structured situations. However, it is not well
suited to creating persons who can respond adaptively to situations in
which one needs to understand the requirements and preferences of others
and know how to act in constantly shifting circumstances. Toward this
end, a disciplinary procedure in which the parent points out to the child
the consequence of his or her actions for the parent's feelings is much more
likely to create a person attuned to the subtleties of interpersonal interac-
tion . . . . In traditional societies, the parent says to the child, "If you do
X, I will hurt you." By contrast, a contemporary parent is much more
likely to say "If you do X, you will hurt me." The child learns about unde-
sirable behavior in terms of its consequences for others.
Id. at 75-76.
177. Id. at 78.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 81.
180. DIZARD & GADLIN, supra note 157, at 80.
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gests that a close examination of certain factors might provide more
complete responses to Ewing's questions about why juveniles kill, the
nature of the threat to society, and whether anything can be done to
reduce it. For example, their following comments suggest some under-
lying casual factors involved in the increasing incidence of juvenile
homicides occurring during the commission of theft-related felonies.
As the satisfactions of family life grow more and more problematic
and uncertain, the array of satisfactions offered via consumption
has expanded exponentially. Though people still ritually acknowl-
edge that "you can't buy happiness," it is clear that getting and
spending have become major sources of gratification for Americans
... . [T]he accumulation of things has become a significant mea-
sure of self-worth . . . . The impersonality of the marketplace in-
creasingly appears as a refuge from emotional entanglements that
diminish autonomy. 81
And, there are at least two other professional fields, criminology and
public health, that Ewing does not consider. 182 Both offer clearer un-
derstandings about why some young people kill, the nature of the
threat these juveniles pose for society, and what, if anything, can be
done for them or to protect society than articulated by Ewing in When
Children Kill.
IV. DEFINING THE CHALLENGES
The urgent need, in this writer's opinion, to view juvenile homicide
as a public health issue was noted in the Introduction of this Essay. 8 '
Ewing's failure to do this in When Children Kill was recognized in the
preceding part II.B. 84 Now, in this section, fuller attention is given,
first, to spelling out the broad societal challenges that this phenomenon
poses and, second, to summarizing the specific dilemmas that confront
our legal systems.
181. Id. at 98.
182. See supra notes 151 and 154 and discussion infra part III.A. (regarding the
relationship between ineffective child-rearing and criminal acts) and note 12 and dis-
cussion infra part III.A. (regarding the public health approach).
183. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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A. Will Society Heed This "Wake-Up" Call?
The growing phenomenon of juvenile homicide is not the only ba-
rometer of the high price many consider American children to be pay-
ing "for the social transformations of the 1960s and 1970s-spiraling
divorce rates, the rapid influx of mothers into the work force, a more
relaxed attitude toward sex, and the widespread use of television as a
form of child care." 185 Mintz and Kellogg list a variety of social indica-
tors to support their assertion that the well-being of American children
has declined.
Since 1960 the high-school drop out rate has increased until
roughly one student in four drops out before graduation; juvenile
delinquency rates have jumped 130 percent; the suicide rate for
young people fifteen to nineteen years old has more than tripled;
illegitimate births among white adolescent females have more than
doubled; and the death rate from accidents and homicides has
grown sixteenfold. Half a million adolescent females suffer from
such eating disorders as anorexia nervosa or bulimia. American
teenagers have the highest pregnancy rate of any industrialized na-
tion, a high abortion rate and a high incidence of such venereal
diseases as syphilis, gonorrhea, and genital herpes.188
Various social commentators believe that American society "has
largely failed to come to grips with the major issues facing children,
such as the need for quality care while parents work and the need for a
stable emotional environment in which to grow up. ' 18 7 Reference was
made, supra part II.B., to the major causal role ineffective child-rear-
ing plays in explaining the low self-control that is a common character-
istic of those who commit criminal acts. Gottfredson and Hirschi claim
that:
[L]ow self-control is not produced by training, tutelage or sociali-
zation. As a matter of fact, all of the characteristics associated.
with low self-control tend to show themselves in the absence of nur-
185. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 157, at 218.
186. Id. at 219 (citing Peter Uhlenberg & David Eggebeen, The Declining Well-
Being of American Adolescents, in 86 PUBLIC INTEREST 25-38 (Winter 1986)).
187. Id. at 228 & n.83 (citing DAVID ELKIND, THE HURRIED CHILD: GROWING
Up Too SOON (1981); VANCE PACKARD, OUR ENDANGERED CHILDREN: GROWING UP
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turance, discipline, or training . ... [T]he causes of low self-con-
trol are negative rather than positive; self-control is unlikely, in the
absence of effort, intended or unintended, to create it.188
To teach a child self-control, Gottfredson and Hirschi identify
three minimum conditions: "some one must (1) monitor the child's be-
havior; (2) recognize deviant behavior when it occurs; and (3) punish
such behavior."' 8 9 They simply maintain:
All that is required to activate the system is affection for or invest-
ment in the child. The person who cares for the child will watch his
behavior, see him doing things he should not do, and correct him.
The result may be a child more capable of delaying gratification,
more sensitive to the interests and desires of others, more indepen-
dent, more willing to accept restraints on his activity, and more
unlikely to use force or violence to attain his ends. 1'"
Rejecting the notion that any parent or societal subgroup positively so-
cializes their youth to be uncivilized, Gottfredson and Hirschi, yet, rec-
ognize how easily things can go wrong:
First, the parents may not care for the child (in which case none of
the other conditions would be met); second, the parents, even if
they care, may not have the time or energy to monitor the child's
behavior; third, the parents, even if they care and monitor may not
see anything wrong with the child's behavior; finally, even if every-
thing else is in place, the parents may not have the inclination or
the means to punish the child. 19'
Some worry about the use of television as a form of child care and
"believe that violence on TV provokes children to emulate aggressive
behavior and acquire distorted views of adult relationships and commu-
nication."19 Regarding the research into television's impact, Mintz and
Kellogg conclude:
188. Gottfredson & Hirschi, supra note 151, at 94-95.
189. id. at 97.
190. Id.
191. id. at 98. To illustrate the need for a child supervisor to recognize qnd take
actions to have an impact on self-control, Gottfredson & Hirschi state: "Extensive tele-
vision-viewing is one modern example, as is the failure to require completion of home-
work, to prohibit smoking, to curtail the use of physical force, or to see to it that the
child actually attends school." Id. at 99.
192. ID1NTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 157, at 221.
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Television does appear to be a cause of cognitive and behavioral
disturbances. Heavy television viewing is associated with reduced
reading skills, less verbal fluency, and lower academic efforts. Ex-
posure to violence on television tends to make children more willing
to hurt people and more aggressive in their play and in their meth-
ods of resolving conflicts . . . However, television also introduces
children to new experiences . . . . For many disadvantaged chil-
dren, it provides a form of intellectual enhancement that deprived
homes lacking books and newspapers could not afford . . . . While
some television shows, such as Sesame Street and Mr. Roger's
Neighborhood, do appear to improve children's vocabularies, teach
them basic concepts, and help them verbalize their feelings, over-
whelming evidence suggests that most television programs convey
racial and sexual stereotypes, desensitize children to violence, and
discourage the kinds of sustained concentration necessary for read-
ing comprehension. On balance, it seems clear that television can-
not adequately take the place of parental or adult involvement and
supervision of children and that the tendency for it to do so is a
justifiable reason for increased public concern.1 98
Mintz and Kellogg view the United States today as "a society
without a clear unitary set of family ideals and values . . . in [which] a
profound sense of confusion and ambivalence reigns. One consequence
of this confusion has been deep social division over which responsibili-
ties the individual family should shoulder and which should be assumed
by other, nonfamilial institutions."194 They cite the 1978 White House
Conference on Families, convened by President Jimmy Carter to de-
velop coherent policies to assist and strengthen American families, as a
dramatic illustration. Following the Conference, the White House is-
sued a report. "Among the proposals were calls for ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, the right to abortion, and sex education in
the schools, but, because of the opposition spearheaded by the pro-fam-
ily movement, implementation of these measures proved impossible."1 95
It seems, thus, only practical to question whether American soci-
ety will reach any meaningful consensus about ways to help families
deal with contemporary problems in time to avert a disintegration of
our society as a result of a collective failure of families and society to
193. Id. at 221-22.
194. Id. at xvii.
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rear children to be "well-adjusted," productive, contributing members
of society. Mintz and Kellogg call for "new social arrangements to help
moderate the effects of women's entry into the work force, of divorce,
and of women's increasing need for autonomy." But, "the ultimate
question is whether the nation has the political will to create conditions
that will foster stronger families."' 96
Dizard and Gadlin also recognize a deep division within our soci-
ety that may prevent us from achieving any meaningful solutions to
problems such as juvenile homicide. In the final chapter of The Mini-
mal Family, they restate their belief that the American family has
been robbed "of its sources of stability: parental authoritativeness, self-
sufficiency of the family unit, and reciprocal bonds of dependency
. . . .Familism will continue to decline, . . . [and a] sense of crisis
will become endemic. ' 197 They further assert:
This crisis, which appears as a crisis of the family, is better under-
stood as a crisis of the public realm. The contemporary resurgence
of conservatism affirms this view, though conservatives respond to
this crisis perversely-they attack one source of the public realm,
government, as if reducing its power will restore power to families.
But such is not the case. Indeed, the opposite is more nearly true
198
Dizard and Gadlin then end by postulating a scenario in which the
public realm is made to reflect the values of familism. If this occurred,
they believe that "families may well find themselves more able to meet
the emotional needs of their members; [and thus] it is also likely that
more of our families will produce individuals who will not be content to
be passive recipients of a benevolent bureaucracy, whether public or
private."' 9 But, such a scenario includes some very big and uncertain
"ifs;" and merely reenforces this reviewer's worry that American soci-
ety may lack the capacity to heed the "wake-up" call to make correc-
196. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 157, at 237. Mintz & Kellogg suggest such
policy changes as flexible working arrangements to enable employees to be effective
parents-maternity and paternity leaves, adequate supplies of affordable quality substi-
tute care when parents work, revision of welfare policies that encourage fathers to de-
sert, and custody and visitation agreements that facilitate continuing contact between
divorced parents and their children.
197. DIZARD & GADLIN, supra note 157, at 223-24.








Fortunately, some within the field of public health are responding
to the "wake-up" call that juvenile homicide can be viewed as giving
society. In 1984, Dr. C. Everett Koop, "while serving as the Surgeon
General of this nation . . . startled a great number of Americans, in-
cluding health professionals, when [he] declared that violence is as
much a public health issue for physicians today as small pox, tubercu-
losis, and syphilis were for [his] predecessors in the last two centu-
ries."2 0 Seven years later, Dr. Deborah Prothrow-Stith, a former Mas-
sachusetts Commissioner of Public Health, now an Assistant Dean at
the Harvard School of Public Health, states in her book, Deadly Con-
sequences, that this statement by the Surgeon General "gave credence,
support and legitimacy to the fledgling efforts of a small band of physi-
cians and public health experts who were redefining violence as a prob-
lem that needs to be studied and addressed as a gross assault on the
public health."' 0 '
Working within the discipline of public health-"the area of
medicine most concerned with education and prevention,120 2 Dr.
Prothrow-Stith is convinced that "public health strategies such as
health education in the classroom; health education via the mass me-
dia; community awareness; hospital-based screening for risk determina-
tion ' s can be employed to change public attitudes toward violence
and reduce violent adolescent behavior. She notes a string of successful
public health approaches and interventions that have resulted in: a 30
percent decrease in the incidence of smoking after a twenty year cam-
paign; public refusal to accord a right to drive while intoxicated; in-
creased awareness about the problems of lead poisoning; child abuse;
and the importance of exercise and diet in reducing the risk of heart
disease and stroke.20 4
From a Harvard Medical School senior project attempt to design a
public health intervention to combat adolescent violence, over the
years, Dr. Prothrow-Stith has developed, refined and marketed a vio-
200. See C. EVERETT Koop, Introduction, in DEADLY CONSEQUENCES, supra
note 12, at xvii.
201. Id. at 28. Dr. Prothrow-Stith also states: "Twenty thousand homicide
deaths a year convinced me that violence was a public health problem. To me it seemed
self-evident: an 'ailment' that killed so many ought to have the full attention of physi-
cians and others concerned with improving health." Id. at 3.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 133.
204. Id. at 28 and 133.
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lence prevention curriculum "directed at 10th graders [that] is being
used in schools in 400 cities in 45 states,"20 5 as well as in Canada,
England, Israel, and America Samoa. 06 This curriculum offers young-
sters concrete alternative strategies for coping with life and resolving
interpersonal conflicts without resort to violence.
Just as this reviewer intuitively has questioned the efficacy of Ew-
ing's understanding of the phenomenon of juvenile homicide and has
wondered whether an "indivisible problem" is being divided, Dr.
Prothrow-Stith in Deadly Consequences writes of how she reviewed
three separate disciplines-criminal justice, mental health, and the bio-
logical sciences to learn more about the nature of violence and violence
prevention. While acknowledging that she learned a great deal from
each, she notes:
For me, however, each of these professions left two many questions
unanswered-questions about the social context in which violence
occurs. The more I learned, the more I was convinced that a new
multi-disciplinary approach to violence, one beginning with the per-
ception that violence is an assault on the public health, was re-
quired to save the endangered lives of our young. 07
In Deadly Consequences, Dr. Prothrow-Stith and her co-author
Michaele Weissman offer a way to respond to the epidemic of violence
that is decimating a generation of young men, especially Black men20 8
living in poverty stricken urban areas. By recognizing the importance
205. Marian Christy, Prothrow-Stith: A Voice Against Violence, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 7, 1991, at 51, col. 4. For information about the Violence Prevention
Curriculum For Adolescents, address inquiries to the publisher, Education Develop-
ment Center, Inc., 55 Chapel Street, Newton, MA 02160.
206. Deadly Consequences, supra note 12, at 4.
207. Id. at 10.
208. See id. at 13-17. Utilizing statistics from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports
and a comparative study by L.A. Fingerhut & J.C. Kleinman, International and Inter-
state Comparison of Homicide Among Young, in 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 24 (June 27,
1990), Dr. Prothrow-Stith states:
In the United States in 1986, 4,223 young men between the ages of 15 and
24 died in homicides. That worked out to a homicide rate of 21.9 per
100,000 for young males in this age bracket was a staggering 85.6 per
100,000-making homicide the leading cause of death for young men of
color. Young blacks die in homicides seven times more frequently than
young whites, and there us reason to believe that the percentage of black
victims is increasing.
Deadly Consequences, supra note 12, at 13-14.
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of the social context, they are able to discern the destructive interrela-
tionships between societal failures to provide adequate housing, educa-
tion and employment 0 9 to a rapidly increasing percentage of our popu-
lation and the inability of many individual parents to protect their
children from becoming either victims or perpetrators of violence.
There exists today, as their first chapter so rightly recognizes, much
"free-floating anger."21 "What is required, is a broad array of strate-
gies; strategies that teach new ways of coping with anger and aggres-
sive feelings."21
Some, like Dr. Prothrow-Stith, are "convinced that more police
will not solve the problem of homicide in America. More police in pa-
trol cars, more street lights, stiffer sentences, and new prisons will not
...prevent two young people from settling their differences with a
209. Housing, education and employment are three important variables that can
determine and explain where, how and why certain American families succeed and
others fail. Where a family lives will greatly determine the educational opportunities
available to the children of the family. The level of educational achievement will either
expand or delimit the employment options open to those children upon reaching adult-
hood. One's earning capacity then will determine the range and quality of housing/
community neighborhood in which the family's next generation can afford to live.
210. See id. 1-10. To explain the violence in poor black and white communities,
Dr. Prothrow-Stith uses the term "free-floating anger" (suggested by psychologist
Louis Ramey as presented in a symposium, Homicide Among Black Males, sponsored
by The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, May 13-14, 1980 and
published in 95 PUBLIc HEALTH REPORTS 549-61, Nov.-Dec. (1980)):
This generalized anger, accompanied by feelings of frustration and help-
lessness, results from a feeling that the deck is stacked against them-that
the double whammy of class and race places them so far outside the eco-
nomic and social mainstream that they can never find a place inside. Dis-
enfranchised, they are perpetually irritable, like a person who wakes up on
the wrong side of the bed day after day. Their free-floating non-specific
feelings of anger are easy to ignite. Any small provocation can cause an
explosion ....
Id. at 6-7.
In the economic downturn of the 1990s, it is not just the poor who may experience
"free-floating anger," but many formerly secure middle class workers and managers
are experiencing grave losses and disruptions as they are laid off or furloughed from
jobs, as businesses fail and bankruptcy filings dramatically increase. Some people ex-
periencing such uncertainties and trials for the first time, have no coping skills. Those
with strong dependency needs are apt to self-medicate themselves with either alcohol or
drugs. In other cases, frustrations turn into uncontrolled outbursts of verbal or physical
abuse in the home.
211. Id. at 28.
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firearm." '212 And thus, she advocates vigorous use of a variety of public
health interventions to reduce the incidence of violence. She focuses on
the large societal picture and how our society glamorizes violence and
asserts that this must change.
Dr. Prothrow-Stith, however, clearly recognizes that:
Public health is not a substitute for criminal justice. Criminal jus-
tice is after the event; it looks for blame and tries to punish. Public
health is before the event; it looks for risk factors and tries to re-
duce those risk factors. In combination there is some hope that we
will have an impact on a problem that is overwhelming our
society. 18
And so, the efforts of public health educators, like Dr. Prothrow-Stith,
are to be applauded. Perhaps, through their efforts, "schools, the me-
dia, industry, government, churches, community organizations, and
every organized unit within our society [can be mobilized] to deliver
the message [(and show by example)] that anger can be managed and
aggressive impulses controlled."214
B. Efficacy of Current Legal Responses
At the beginning of chapter 2, Ewing states: "Juveniles who kill
challenge long-standing and widely held conceptions of childhood and
adolescence and create a serious dilemma for the criminal and juvenile
justice systems."'21 Which system should have dispositional jurisdic-
tion? For what purpose-rehabilitation or punishment? How should
the interests and fears of the public be balanced and weighed against
the interests and rights of the accused juvenile homicidal offender?
In response to the epidemic spread of juvenile homicides, espe-
cially teens killing teens on the "mean streets" of our cities and even in
the quiet of suburban areas such as Beverly, Massachusetts, or inside
our schools, some today call for prosecuting these youngsters as adults
in criminal court and giving them long prison sentences, in some cases
212. Id. at 27.
213. Deborah Prothrow-Stith, The Epidemic of Violence and Its Impact on the
Health Care System, Special Presentation at the Second Annual Bridgewater State
Hospital Conference on Violence, Bridgewater, Massachusetts (Mar. 5, 1991) (on file
with the author).
214. DEADLY CONSEQUENCES, supra note 12, at 28.
215. WHEN CHILDREN KILL, supra note 3, at 13.
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imposing the death penalty. This approach focuses on the conduct of
individual offenders and its threat to society. It has rekindled a "sim-
mering controversy regarding the mission and performance of the juve-
nile justice system. Doubts about the capacity of the juvenile system to
protect the public from the 'violent juvenile' have led to widespread
efforts to shift jurisdiction of these cases entirely to the criminal
courts.
216
Just as Gulick in the 1960s when considering the problems then
confronting American metropolitan areas was forced to say: "Many of
the heralded 'solutions' have only made matters worse. In fact, condi-
tions, are generally deteriorating and deteriorating fast ... *,,17 so the
same today can be said about the failing responses to crime in general,
and to juvenile homicide in particular.
The tension that juvenile homicide today creates for the juvenile
and criminal justice systems, is closely related to historical shifts be-
tween two paradigmatic conceptions of the goals of the sentencing pro-
cess-one classical, one positivistic, 218 as well as the fact that certain
very serious offenses committed by older teens, traditionally were ex-
empted from the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.2 1 9
The classical approach, as described by Bonnie:
Emphasizes the nature and seriousness of the offense as the pre-
dominant consideration in criminal sentencing; under this view, an
explicit connection between the severity of punishment and the se-
riousness of the offense is necessary to achieve the retributive and
deterrent goals of the penal law. In its most pronounced form, this
view is reflected in the imposition of mandatory sentences on all
persons convicted of a particular type of offense.2 0
In contrast, the positivistic philosophy of individualized sentencing as-
sumes that "the social goal of preventing crime is thought to be served
best by choosing the sentence most likely to minimize further criminal-
ity, either by facilitating rehabilitation or by incapacitating the
216. Bonnie, supra note 146, at 188.
217. GULICK, supra note 154, at 3.
218. See Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 185-86; see also GOTTF-
REDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 151, at 3-14 (describing and contrasting the classical
and positivist conceptions of crime and appropriate sanctions).
219. See text supra part 1.D.5, and accompanying notes 77-79.
220. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 185.
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offender. 21
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, positivistic assumptions
shaped the criminal system's pursuit of rehabilitation as its major goal
throughout most of the twentieth century. It was thought that offenders
could be changed into law-abiding citizens if they received proper ther-
apeutic treatment. Justice Black, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court,
in the 1949 decision of Williams v. New York,222 succinctly articulated
this individualized paradigm, when he declared:
The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cate-
gory calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender .. . .Today's philosophy of
individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example be-
tween first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences, the ul-
timate termination of which are sometimes decided by non-judicial
agencies, have to a large extent taken the place of the old rigidly
fixed punishments .. . .Retribution is no longer the dominant ob-
jective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of of-
fenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.223
Under this approach, judges were accorded wide discretion "to base the
length of the sentence on the amount of treatment thought to be re-
quired . . . as well as on the seriousness of the offense and the danger
posed by the offender to the community. ' 224 Not only did this approach
provide justification for probation, parole and creation of a separate
justice system for juveniles, it also opened the door to expanded roles
for mental health experts (psychologists, psychiatrists and social work-
ers) in the criminal justice system.
But, prevailing sentiments change. During the mid-1970s, rehabili-
tation fell into disfavor. Gottfredson and Hirschi state that "the link
between positivism and rehabilitation was so strong that the 'failure' of
rehabilitation led to a search for a new justification for sentencing deci-
sions. Hence, during the late 1970s, the deterrence school rose to
prominence. Sentencing legislation reflecting this "marked shift toward
the classical paradigm, now commonly characterized as a philosophy of
221. Id.
222. 338 U.S. 241 (1949).
223. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 186 (quoting Williams v.
New York, 338 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949)).
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'just desserts,' " is well illustrated by the preamble to the California
Penal Code which states in part: "[T]he purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate
to the seriousness of the offense with provisions for uniformity in the
sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar cir-
cumstances."22 Gottfredson and Hirschi note that "[s]ince the early
1980s, incapacitation has been a major ...policy ...based on the
obvious conclusion that an offender in prison is not committing crimes
in the community. 227
At its founding a century ago, the juvenile court was welcomed as
a promising social experiment. "It would treat children as different
from adults. Children would be removed from contact with adult of-
fenders. The Court was to discover and meet the needs of each ne-
glected or dependent child. It was to discover why a child was moving
down a delinquent path and redirect him." 2 But, alas, this "image of
the juvenile court as a great benevolent child guidance clinic has lost
all credibility in the last 20 years."229
The tension between the juvenile justice system, still ostensibly
tilted toward the individualized paradigm, and the adult criminal sen-
tencing system, that has shifted toward a classical paradigm, has given
rise to a number of legislative enactments and amendments both to
state transfer and waiver statutes and to state death penalty laws. Pub-
lic outcry is forcing a round of amendments to either permit or require
the transfer of younger offenders to be tried in adult criminal court.
Some legislation, like that recently enacted in Massachusetts, 230 by em-
226. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 186.
227. GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 151, at 258.
228. JUSTINE WISE POLIER, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DIS-
TANCED COMMUNITY AND VENGEFUL RETRIBUTION 2 (1989).
229. W. Lawrence Fitch, Competency to Stand Trial and Criminal Responsibil-
ity in the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE HOMICIDE, supra note 22, at 159.
230. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1991). Under this provi-
sion, last amended in 1990, the request for a transfer hearing to determine whether a
14-year or older juvenile is to be tried as an adult is discretionary with the common-
wealth, except, "the court shall order a transfer hearing, in every case in which the
offense alleged is murder in the first or second degree, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping
or armed robbery that has resulted in serious bodily injury." Id.
In all cases except those involving murder in the first or second degree, the court
at the transfer hearing:
shall find whether probable cause exists to believe that the child has com-
mitted the offense or violation charged. If probable cause is found, the
court shall then determine whether the child presents a danger to the pub-
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phasizing consideration of the seriousness of the offense and the danger
the juvenile poses to the community, may seem to reflect positivistic
assumptions, but in fact, by introducing the use of either age and/or
the seriousness of the offense, create a presumption that the juvenile is
not amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system which ulti-
mately subverts the individualized rehabilitative aims and goals of the
juvenile justice system. Of grave concern, is the reality, in Ewing's
words, that "to date precious little has been learned" about most of the
juveniles who commit homicide."3 1 Yet,
judicial determination regarding the juvenile's "amenability" to
treatment (or "dangerousness") . . . [often] turn as much on the
judges' values and intuitions as on any objectifiable criteria. To the
extent that judges defer to the supposed clinical judgments of psy-
chiatrists and other mental health professionals, the outcome turns
largely on the clinician's own intuitions and values rather than any
proven expertise.'
lic and whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile
system. In making this determination the court shall consider but is not
limited to evidence of the following factors: The nature, circumstances and
seriousness of the alleged offense; the child's court and delinquency record;
the child's age and maturity; the family, school and social history of the
child; the success or lack of success of any past treatment efforts for the
child; the nature of services available through the juvenile justice system;
the adequate protection of the public; and the likelihood of rehabilitation
of the child.
If . . . the court enters a written finding based upon clear and convincing
evidence that the child presents a significant danger to the public and that
the child is not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice sys-
tem, the court shall dismiss the delinquency complaint and cause a crimi-
nal complaint to be issued . ...
If the child is charged with murder in the first or second degree, and a
finding of probable cause has been made, there shall exist a rebuttable
presumption that the child presents a significant danger to the public and
that the child is not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice
system. If, at the hearing, the court enters a written finding based upon a
preponderance of the evidence that the child presents a significant danger
to the public and that the child is not amenable to rehabilitation within
the juvenile justice system, the court shall dismiss the delinquency com-
plaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued . . ..
Id. (emphasis added).
231. See supra part ICI, IIA, notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
232. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 205-06.
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In this reviewer's opinion, both approaches are bankrupt. The con-
cept of rehabilitation is seriously flawed, especially when applied to
conduct such as juvenile homicide. The concept of "rehabilitation" as-
sumes that something once whole, has been fractured and now can be
healed or put back together. It simply is not appropriate to expect the
juvenile justice system, after a horrendous event as a homicide, to "re-
habilitate" the perpetrator when the true causal factors contributing to
the conduct indicate that the offender is not a fully formed, "well-ad-
justed" person with sound self-control, but rather is an incompletely
formed individual with low self-esteem and little or no self-control.233 It
is as though the glass vessel were half-full from the outset; not that it
was full, then shattered, and by some miracle, all the liquid can now be
recaptured and put back in place.
The policies of deterrence and incapacitation are also flawed for
they assume a degree of rationality and self-control that does not exist
in those who commit homicidal acts. Gottfredson and Hirschi claim:
[M]any homicides in fact seem to have little to do with "pleasure"
and much to do with the reduction of "pain." The pain suffered by
the offender is . . .often . . . the removal of a temporary source of
irritation or an obstacle to the achievement of some immediate end,
such as a successful burglary. In other words, the benefits of homi-
cide are not large, profound, or serious. They are, on the contrary,
benefits of the moment, and the effect of alcohol or drugs may be
found precisely in their tendency to reduce the time-horizon of the
offender to the here and now.134
Thus, Gottfredson and Hirschi's thesis is "that high self-control
effectively reduces the possibility of crime-that is, those possessing it
will be substantially less likely at all periods of life to engage in crimi-
nal acts."235 They further note that:
[P]eople with low self-control tend to be self-centered, indifferent,
or insensitive to the suffering and needs others ....
[Pleople with low-self control tend to have minimal tolerance for
frustration and little ability to respond to conflict through verbal
rather than physical means.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
234. GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 151, at 33.
235. Id. at 89.
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In sum, people who lack self-control will tend to be impulsive, in-
sensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-
sighted, nonverbal, and they will tend therefore to engage in crimi-
nal and analogous acts.""
In other words, these are all the traits that Ewing describes in the
profiles of various types of juvenile killers. As discussed supra III.A.,
Gottfredson and Hirschi attribute low self-control to ineffective child
rearing and believe that these traits tend to persist through life.
They are very, very pessimistic about the effectiveness of current
policies. They, like Dr. Prothrow-Stith, urge intervention that "would
normally be regarded as prevention rather than treatment. They as-
sume that trouble is likely unless something is done to train the child to
forego immediate gratification in the interest of long-term benefits.
Such training must come from adults who watch for and recognize
signs of low self-control and take immediate corrective action. "Effec-
tive and efficient crime prevention that produces enduring consequences
would thus focus on parents or adults with responsibilities for child-
rearing;" they maintain that "[s]uch intervention does not suffer from
coming too soon or too late in relation to when crime is committed; it
does not suffer from potential illegality; and few serious objections can
be raised to it on justice grounds. 23 7
V. PRESCRIPTION FOR FUTURE ACTION
A. What Society Should Do
On the broad societal front, the following needs to happen. Vio-
lence must be recognized as a threat to the public health and the very
future of our society. Ways must be found and programs supported,
whereby all segments of our society, i.e., all ethnic groups, at every
socioeconomic class level, are given meaningful opportunities to be
gainfully employed. People must have meaningful roles from which
they derive self-esteem and the means to acquire decent housing in
neighborhoods that afford their children sound educational opportuni-
ties to acquire the requisite skills to be competitive in a technologically
sophisticated workplace.
236. Id. at 89-90.
237. Id at 269.
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Immediate attention needs to be given to according greater status
to those who are parents and teachers. All those responsible for social-
izing our young must be rewarded with greater respect and the re-
sources needed to successfully parent and educate our young.
B. Legal Reform
Careful, thoughtful attention should be given to the suggestion of
those who call for a more coherent sentencing system for juvenile of-
fenders, such as Richard J. Bonnie.2 38 He maintains that "[ilt is impos-
sible to justify the marked discontinuity between the dispositional con-
sequences of juvenile and criminal court adjudication, a discontinuity
that is especially pronounced in homicide cases. "239 In Bonnie's view,
"[t]he choice between delinquency adjudication in the juvenile court
and criminal prosecution should be explicitly characterized as a deci-
sion about grade or severity of punishment, not as a choice between
therapeutic and punitive intervention. 240
In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice recognized that "juvenile justice is a system of
social control, not a system of mental hygiene. Its separate existence is
warranted not because of proven rehabilitative success but because le-
niency toward the young is morally justified and because the risk of
failure is worth taking. '24 1 In 1978, the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force stated that:
No single age during mid-adolescence should be used as a sharp
dividing line for sentencing policies. [Policy makers must consider]
sentencing policy toward young offenders in both juvenile and
criminal courts and [must coordinate] the policies of these two in-
stitutions so that public policy toward young offenders is based on
consistent and coherent premises. (p.5) 242
Thus, Bonnie asserts, no "[o]ne birthday should . . . bring on the
full force of the criminal law . . . ." Age, of course plays a role. But,
"[tIhere must be some point below which the moral basis for punitive
intervention is so much in doubt that even delinquency adjudication
238. See Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 206-14.
239. Id. at 206.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 207.
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should be precluded."24 Bonnie suggests that between 10 and 21 years
of age "severe and mandatory escalation of punishment based solely on
the offender's age or solely on the offense charged should be
avoided." '44
Bonnie suggests two alternatives. The dispositional jurisdiction of
juvenile courts could be extended "for some designated period beyond
the adjudication (say three or four years) or . . ., a distinct sentencing
for 'youthful offenders' in criminal courts [could be developed"]. The
primary effects of 'youthful offender' statutes should be to authorize
placement in separate facilities and to exempt the young offender from
the imposition of mandatory sentences otherwise prescribed by the pe-
nal law."' 8
Next, Bonnie would significantly restrict the class of transferable
cases and require that jurisdictional choice be "governed by objective
criteria relating to age, offense, and prior record, not by individualized
predictive judgments. With one exception . . ., clinical opinion should
play no role in the transfer decision and should be confined instead to
dispositional recommendations. '240
Bonnie justifies his suggestions by arguing the following:
[I]t is unwise to require transfer of the entire class of murder cases
involving offenders over a designated age. A generic exception for
murder or intentional homicide is overinclusive because it would
fail to take into account the clinically and morally significant varia-
tions among juveniles offenders. Many, if not most, of these cases
belong in the juvenile court because the interventions available to
the juvenile court are adequate to effect the social purposes of pun-
ishment. As Cornell et al. have shown, offenders who commit "con-
flict" homicides are distinguishable in prior adjustment and history
from those who commit homicides in the context of other criminal
activity. In many of these situations, the punishments available to
the juvenile court are sufficiently severe to serve the retributive
aims of the penal law and the risk of recidivism is so remote that
the incapacitating functions of penal intervention are not
implicated.2 47
243. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 207.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 207-08.
246. Id. at 208.
247. Id. at 210 (citations omitted); see also Juvenile Justice, Not Vengeance,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 1991, at 16 (editorial claiming that Massachusetts' State
Department of Youth Services (DYS) "has a record of success in treating teenage
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And finally, with respect to the death penalty, Bonnie observes
that the current Supreme Court is unlikely to endorse the admittedly
arbitrary proposition that 18-year old juveniles may be executed even
though 17-year-olds are constitutionally exempt.24 8 Bonnie acknowl-
edges that line drawing is a legitimate legislative function and some
states have statutes clearly permitting the death penalty for youngsters
below 18.249 But Bonnie's argument against the execution of juveniles
"proceeds not from premises about the moral legitimacy and social
value of the death penalty but rather from [his] premises about con-
tinuity in sentencing ... .",,o To avoid the horror of exaggerated dis-
parity between dispositional outcomes available in juvenile and crimi-
nal court which distort "the process of jurisdictional choice in all cases
for which the death penalty is potentially available[, and t]o promote
the graded approach to juvenile sentencing outlined above, the death
penalty must be unavailable in any case initially within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court. '25 1
Clearly, state legislatures need to make a definitive judgment
whether juveniles otherwise within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
should be put to death. "Even the American Bar Association which has
refused to take a position on the death penalty, has urged legislatures
to preclude the death penalty for offenders under 18. " 252
Some, like "Amnesty International [do] not argue that juveniles
should not be held criminally liable or subject to severe penalties when
appropriate." 2 1 This reviewer, however, is deeply perturbed that "there
are more juvenile offenders [(disproportionately poor and minority)] on
death row in the USA than in any other country known to Amnesty
International."25' Especially, since imposition of the death sentence is
in clear contravention of international human rights standards,' 5 5 "de-
murderers. Of 79 offenders in its custody from 1967 to 1987, only one was found guilty
of another killing, and that was in 1971, when the DYS system was in its infancy. Of
those 79 offenders, 60 had no further trouble with the law within the first two years of
their release.").
248. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 212-13.
249. Id. at 213; see also supra text accompanying note 97.
250. Bonnie, Juvenile Homicide, supra note 146, at 213.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 214.
253. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty and
Juvenile Offenders, Summary (Al Index: 51/23/91) (issued 9 October 1991).
254. Id.
255. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Stanford, stated that "three leading human
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veloped in recognition of the fact that the death penalty-which denies
any possibility of rehabilitation or reform-is a wholly inappropriate
penalty for individuals who have not attained full physical or emotional
maturity at the time of their actions."215 Also disturbing is the fact
that only 12 of the 36 states which impose the death penalty have ex-
pressly prohibited its imposition on persons below 18 at the time of the
crime.2 57 Most of these states introduced the 18-year minimum age
limit during the 1980s.' 8 The last state to do so was Maryland in
1987, according to Amnesty International, bringing it into line with
both international standards against the execution of juveniles and
standards recommended by criminal justice organization in the
USA. 5 9
rights treaties ratified or signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death
penalties." 109 S.Ct. at 2985. In footnote ten, he then cites:
Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Annex to G.A. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doc.
A/631.6 (1966) (signed but not ratified by the United States), reprinted in
6 International Legal Materials 368, 370 (1976); Article 4(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/
Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970) (same), reprinted in 9
International Legal Material 673, 676 (1970); Article 68 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, (ratified by the
United States). See also Resolutions and Decisions of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council, Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1),
p. 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984) (adopting "safeguards guaranteeing
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty," including the
safeguards that "[p]ersons below 18 years of age at the time of the com-
mission of the crime shall not be sentenced to death"), endorsed by the
United Nations General Assembly, U.N.GAOR Res. 39/119, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51, p. 211, 2, 5 (1985), and adopted by the Seventh United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers, p. 83, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 121/22, U.N. Sales No. E.86.IV.1 (1986).
Id. at 2985-86.
256. Amnesty International, supra note 253.
257. Id. at 65 (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee).
258. Id. (Ohio in 1981; Nebraska in 1982; Tennessee in 1984; Colorado and Or-
egon in 1985; New Jersey in 1986; Maryland in 1987).
259. Id. The American Law Institute's 1962 Model Penal Code recommended
that the death penalty not be imposed on persons under 18. This position was reaf-
firmed by the 1980 Code revisers. Since 1971 the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws has opposed imposition of the death penalty on those under 18.
In 1983, in response to the American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Criminal
19921
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"However, there has been a retreat from what was an emerging
legislative trend toward eliminating the death penalty for minors. Since
1986 several states have rejected attempts to introduce an age limit of
18 or have introduced minimum ages below 18."110 Also, Part II of
Amnesty International's 1991 report describes how U.S. capital punish-
ment laws contain safeguards intended to ensure that the death penalty
is applied fairly and imposed only for the worst crimes and most culpa-
ble offenders, but that evidence in the cases examined revealed that
these safeguards have not been met in practice.2 1
Clearly, the increasing phenomenon of juvenile homicide is undis-
putedly of critical importance. The question remains whether our soci-
ety has the capacity to answer the "wake-up" call and institute the
kinds of preventive programs and supports for families so that they can
perform their essential role of socializing our children. What is sorely
needed, as Justice Wise Polier, states in her book, Juvenile Justice in
Double Jeopardy: The Distanced Community and Vengeful Retribu-
tion, is "serious leadership [which] can prevent yielding to the current
demands for retribution, vengeance, and reincarceration as the answer
to delinquent youth [and] search out the causes of maladjustment, de-
linquency, alienation, and violence practiced by youth." 2 ' Judge Polier,
speaking out of her 37-year tenure as the first woman appointed to the
New York Family Court, would have Americans " end the meanness of
current programs for youth and reject as unworthy the cruel and futile
recriminalization of younger and younger children." ' "
It seems only fitting, thus, to end this essay as Dr. Prothrow-Stith
concludes her book Deadly Consequences, with the poignant plea of
Clementine Barfield, Detroit founder of SOSAD-Save Our Sons and
Daughters:
Justice's Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, Report No. 117A
(August 1973), the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution opposing in principle
"the imposition of capital punishment upon any person for an offense committed while
under the age of 18." Id. at 74.
260. Id. at 65. (Kentucky's 1980 revised juvenile code exempting juveniles under
18 from the death penalty was repealed in 1984; Kentucky and Indiana established 16
as the minimum age in their death penalty statutes in 1986; Georgia rejected a mea-
sure to raise the age from 17 to 18 in 1987; Wyoming introduced a minimum age of
16, and bills to introduce to raise the minimum age failed in Georgia, Mississippi and
Virginia in 1989).
261. Id. at Summary & 71-4.
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The children who are dying are real kids . . . They are real kids,
from real families. Some were doing foolish things. Some were just
caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. But all kids have a
right to make mistakes. All kids have the right to live. Somebody
has to wake up and see that our children are dying. My child is
dead. Your child could be next.""
264. DEADLY CONSEQUENCES, supra note 12, at 203 (as spoken by Clementine
Barfield to Dr. Prothrow-Stith during an interview in December of 1990) (SOSAD can




Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Notes and Comments
No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 909
II. ANNULMENT AS A REMEDY ...................... 911
III. STATES' TREATMENT OF ANNULMENT OF ADOPTION 916
A. Case Law ..... ................. . 916
B. Statutory Law ............................ 920
IV. WRONGFUL ADOPTION AS A REMEDY ............. 923
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................ 932
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................... 934
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment discusses the recourse available to adoptive parents
whose child develops a physical or mental defect which was intention-
ally or negligently misrepresented or undisclosed to the parents at the
time of adoption.
Adoption is the legal process by which the parent-child relation-
ship is created by persons not so related by blood.' Adoption of chil-
dren was unknown to the common law, but was a recognized practice
under the civil law from which our modern statutes of adoption are
derived.' The procedure is entirely statutory.' The adoption process ter-
minates a child's ties with his natural parents and creates a new famil-
ial relationship with the adoptive parents.' This statutorily created "le-
gal fiction" enables the adopted child to become the natural child of
1. Green v. Paul, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (La. 1947).
2. Butterfield v. Sawyer, 58 N.E. 602, 604 (I1. 1900).
3. E.g., In re Henderson, 644 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Wash. 1982) ("[I]t is established
that adoption is a statutory procedure .. "); In re Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475, 476-77
(Mich. 1964) ("[Tlhe adoption of children ... is governed solely by statute.").
4. See generally Anne Harlan Howard, Note, Annulment of Adoption Decrees
on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549 (1983-1984).
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the adoptive parents for all legal and familial purposes.6 Generally,
people adopt a child through a consensual arrangement, much like a
contract, and a subsequent judgment of a court.6
An important issue raised in Burr v. Board of County Commis-
sioners and the issue of this comment is the recourse available to adop-
tive parents whose child develops a physical or mental defect which the
parents were unaware of at the time of adoption.7 It is true that unde-
tectable health problems are a risk assumed by both adoptive parents
and natural parents when they decide to become parents. 8 However,
the situation changes when the adopted child's condition has been in-
tentionally or negligently misrepresented or undisclosed.' Previously,
adoptive parents in this type of situation could petition the court for an
annulment of the adoption which voids the adoptive relationship,' 0 or
keep their child and meet the expenses themselves."
The issue of annulment of adoption was recently heard in Florida
before the Third District Court of Appeal in M.L.B & J.B. v. Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 2 where the court permit-
ted the adoptive parents to annul the adoption because the Department
5. Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 459 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal.
1969).
6. In re Anonymous, 352 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Sur. Ct. 1968). Under contract
law consensual arrangements may usually be rescinded on equitable principles, such as
mutual mistake of fact. Id. at 745. A contract is a promise or set of promises the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some
way recognizes as a duty. 1 SAMUAL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932). The Uniform Commercial Code in essence de-
fines a contract as the total legal obligation created by a bargain. U.C.C. § 1-201(3),
(11) (1987). It is this writer's opinion that a contract analysis applying the principle of
mutual mistake of fact is inappropriate when applied to annulment of adoption, be-
cause such an analysis implies that the child is an item to be bought and sold: one
which is returnable when later found defective or unwanted.
7. 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ohio 1986).
8. Id.
9. Id.; Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372-
73 (Ct. App. 1980).
10. The annulment of an adoption decree deprives it of all force and operation,
either ab initio or prospectively as to future relationships. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
47 (6th ed. 1989).
11. See Susan Kempf LeMay, Note, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a
Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475 (1988-1989).
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of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") had perpetrated a
fraud upon the parents.13
This comment takes the position, for policy and practical reasons,
that allowing financial recovery to adoptive parents who have been vic-
tims of fraud or misrepresentation is legally sound and superior to the
remedy of annulment of adoption. Part two discusses wrongful adoption
as an alternative remedy to adoption annulment and why annulment
does not promote the child's best interests in light of M.L.B. Part three
discusses other states' treatment of annulment of adoption and statu-
tory authority for annulment of adoption. Part four discusses wrongful
adoption as a remedy. Part five suggests recommendations that may
prevent future annulments of adoption.
II. ANNULMENT AS A REMEDY
Most states are attempting to promote the child's best interests
and stability in the family relationship by limiting the circumstances in
which annulment actions are permitted." Most states have recognized
that permitting the annulment of an adoption after family bonds have
been formed is rarely in the child's best interests and are hesitant to
annul a completed adoption. 5 In fact, the remedy of annulment is gen-
13. Id. at 88. According to M.L.B., on remand the trial court found that HRS
had committed fraud and the child was therefore returned to HRS. Telephone inter-
view with M.L.B. (May 28, 1991).
14. See generally In re Welfare of Alle, 230 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1975)
("[T]here is great policy concern in making adoptions conclusive and final."); In re
Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Mich. 1964) (setting aside the adoption will not serve
the child's best interests); McDuffee v. Rehm, 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc)
(the adoptive parents were not entitled to have the adoption decree annulled merely
because the child was mentally disturbed and needed institutional care); Howard,
Note, supra note 4, at app. A (a statutory survey reflects the general national trend
toward discouraging the annulment of final adoption decrees).
15. See, e.g., Leach, 128 N.W.2d at 476; McDuffee, 352 S.W.2d at 23; In re
Adoption of Children By 0., 359 A.2d 513, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)
("Public policy dictates that there be very unusual facts and circumstances which
would compel a court to set aside or revoke a judgment for adoption."); In re Anony-
mous, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (Sur. Ct. 1961) (holding since the court originally deter-
mined that the adoption was for the best interest of the child, there was no justification
to upset the formal adjudication); In re Adoption of L., 151 A.2d 435, 437 (N.J.
County Ct. 1959) (the parents were not permitted to annul the adoption because the
best interests of the child and society would not be served by such an action); Howard,
Note, supra note 4, at app. A.
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erally frowned upon by the courts. 6 The purpose of adoption is to place
the adoptive parent and child in the same position as the parent and
child in a natural family. 17 Annulling the adoption destroys the family
unit, causing the child to experience rejection, doubt and instability,18
and conflicts with the court's policy of promoting the best interests of
the child.' 9 A parent should not be permitted to set aside an adoption,
16. Pierce v. Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Annota-
tion, Annulment or Vacation of Adoption Decree by Adopting Parent or Natural Par-
ent Consenting of Adoptions, 2 A.L.R.2d 887 (1948)).
17. Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 459 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal.
1969).
18. In re Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982) ("Some serious and
compelling reason must exist in order to once again uproot the child and dramatically
change his living environment.").
19. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150, 156 (Ind.
1958) (en banc). According to Florida Statute section 39.467, in determining the best
interests of the child, the court should consider and evaluate all relevant factors, such
as:
(a) The ability and disposition of the parent or parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and
permitted under state law in lieu of medical care, or other material needs.
(b) The capacity of the parent or parents to care for the child to the extent
that the child's health and well-being will not be endangered upon the
child's return home.
(c) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and the
future needs of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascer-
tained based on the present condition of the child.
(d) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the child
and the child's present parent or parents, siblings, and other relatives and
the degree of harm to the child arising from the termination of parental
rights and duties.
(e) The likelihood of an older child remaining in long-term foster care
upon termination of parental rights due to emotional or behavioral
problems or any special needs of the child.
(f) The child's ability to form a significant relationship with a parental
substitute and the likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable
and permanent family relationship as a result of permanent termination of
parental rights and duties.
(g) The length of time that the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(h) The depth of the relationship existing between the child and the pre-
sent custodian.
(i) The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to
express a preference.
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previously found to be in the child's best interests,20 simply because the
parent has changed her mind or feels that she has received a bad
bargain.'1
In M.L.B., the plaintiffs, the adoptive parents, approached HRS
seeking to adopt a troubled child.2 The adoptive parents were aware
that the child they subsequently adopted had psychological problems.2 8
However, according to the parents, HRS misrepresented the extent and
the severity of these problems24 by concealing the reports which were
the basis of the adoptive parents' allegations of fraud .2  The adoptive
parents alleged that during the adoption, and for the following year,
HRS concealed reports that indicated the child had severe psychologi-
cal problems which made it impossible for her to function in a tradi-
tional home environment.26 Furthermore, by withholding the medical
reports, HRS violated Florida Statute section 63.08(3).2 Because of
the severity of the psychological problems, the adoptive parents wished
to have the adoption set aside so that they could return the child.26
However, the adoptive parents brought the annulment action after the
() The recommendations for the child provided by the child's guardian ad
litem or legal representative.
(k) Any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a relative of the
child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2)(a)-(k) (1991).
The Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner v. Pannick set forth a best interest test
where the court is to consider and evaluate several factors, such as:
[T]he moral fitness of the two parties; the home environments offered by
the parties; the emotional ties to the parties by the child; the emotional ties
to the child by the parties; the age, sex or health of the child; the desirabil-
ity of continuing an existing child-third party relationship; and the prefer-
ence of the child.
540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska 1975) (citing Comment, Alternatives to Parental Right
in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L. 151, 153 (1963)).
20. In re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
21. Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d at 17.
22. M.L.B. & J.B. v. Department of HRS, 559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
23. Telephone interview with M.L.B. (May 28, 1991).
24. It.
25. M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 88; see also FLA. STAT. § 63.082(3) (1985) (requiring HRS to attach a
copy of the child's medical history to the form providing consent to the adoption; how-
ever, HRS failed to do so).
28. M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87.
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one year statutory period allowed for curing procedural defects in an
adoption decree."
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that the alleged
fraud of HRS was not a procedural irregularity encompassed within
the statute barring attacks on the validity of an adoption after a period
of one year.30 Consequently, the adoptive parents' motion to annul the
adoption decree was not time barred.3 The case was subsequently re-
manded to the trial court to determine whether HRS' conduct had
been fraudulent. On remand, it was determined that HRS' conduct was
in fact fraudulent.32 Subsequently, the adoption was annulled and the
adoptive parents returned the child to HRS.83
In dicta, the Third District Court of Appeal mentioned that the
best interest of the child is the state's primary concern34 and that in an
attempt to promote the child's best interests, the state provides a lim-
ited period in which to bring attacks on the validity of a judgment of
adoption.3 Although the court was aware that the best interest of the
child is the determining standard in the adoption setting, it failed to
apply this standard when reaching its decision.36 The court failed to
consider that after one year, it is generally not in the best interest of a
child to remove her from the adoptive family unit. 7
By choosing to annul the adoption, rather than sue HRS for dam-
ages, the adoptive parents focused on the wrong party. The adoptive
parents in M.L.B. had essentially articulated a "bad child" case. 8 By
petitioning for adoption, they established a legal parent-child relation-
29. Id. at 88. The purpose of Florida Adoption Act section 63.022(1) is "to pro-
tect and promote the well-being of persons being adopted and their natural and adop-
tive parents and to provide to all children who can benefit by it a permanent family
life." FLA. STAT. § 63.022(1) (1985). In an effort to provide finality in adoptions, the
statute provides a limited time for any attack on the validity of a judgment of adoption.
M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87. Under Florida law, after one year from the entry of a judg-
ment of adoption, any irregularity or procedural defect in the proceedings is cured, and
the validity of the judgment should not be subject to attack. FLA. STAT. § 63.182
(1985).
30. M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 88.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 89.
33. Telephone interview with M.L.B. (May 28, 1991).
34. M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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ship, 9 but when petitioning for annulment the parents claimed this re-
lationship never existed because the child turned out to be less than
perfect.' Nonetheless, as far as the child was concerned, these adoptive
parents were her family.
Judge Nesbitt in M.L.B. makes an important point in his concur-
ring opinion: a finding that HRS committed a fraud upon the adoptive
parents should not automatically terminate the adoption,4' because the
trial court must still determine the child's best interests. 2 Furthermore,
severing the parent-child relationship is usually not in the child's best
interest, especially if the fraud goes unnoticed for a substantial period
and the child has assimilated into the family unit.'8
By finding that fraud, such as that practiced in M.L.B., was not a
procedural irregularity encompassed within the Florida adoption stat-
ute, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal did adoptive children a
great disservice. Parents should never be permitted to return a child
once they have established a legal parent-child relationship and the
child has become part of the family. This court's decision basically
gives adoptive parents the green light to return their children whenever
they become dissatisfied. What happens to the child's mental and emo-
tional health if he is returned after he has become a part of the family?
What happens to the child after he is returned to HRS? Is he placed in
a foster home or is he placed with another family for adoption? The
Florida Third District Court of Appeal ignored these questions by fo-
cusing on a procedural defect when instead it should have focused on
the best interests of the child, as Judge Nesbitt suggested."" The court
also ignored modern adoption trends which are intended to promote the
best interests of the child.45 However, even though some case law rec-
ognizes annulment as a remedy,' 6 states which do promote the child's
39. Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
40. M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87.
41. Id. at 89 (Nesbitt, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 89 (Nesbitt, J., concurring).
45. E.g., In re Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Mich. 1964) (the best interests of
the child will not be served by setting aside the adoption); McDuffee v. Rehm, 352
S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (the primary concern in adoption annulment is the
child's best interest); Eggleston v. Landrum, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (Miss. 1951) (citing I
AM. JUR. Adoption of Children § 4 (1951) (the welfare of the child is the main
consideration)).
46. E.g., M.L.B., 559 So. 2d at 87 (the parents were allowed to return the child
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best interests should deny annulment of adoption.
III. STATES' TREATMENT OF ANNULMENT OF ADOPTION
A. Case Law
Although in the past there have been cases in which the adoptive
parents' petitions for annulment based on fraud have been granted,' 7
courts today generally frown upon setting aside an adoption decree.' 8
The courts' hesitancy to annul adoptions is based on the policy of pro-
moting stability in family relationships and the emphasis on the best
interests of the child. 9
The best interests view was used in In re Leach, where the
Leaches alleged that at the time of the adoption of a seven year old
child, inquiry was made to the caseworker as to whether the child,
to HRS); In re Anonymous, 352 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sur. Ct. 1968) (the child had psychiat-
ric problems so the adoptive parents' petition for annulment was granted); County
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 1958) (en banc) (the
Department of Public Welfare perpetrated a fraud on the adoptive parents by misrep-
resenting the child's background, which resulted in the court granting the parents' ac-
tion to set aside the adoption).
47. In County Department of Public Welfare v. Morningstar, an Indiana Appel-
late Court found that the public welfare department had perpetrated a fraud upon the
adoptive parents by not disclosing that the child was mentally retarded, possibly feeble
minded, and that the natural parents were "immoral and depraved." 151 N.E.2d at
155. The court concluded that the adoptive parents had relied upon the department's
misrepresentations and were, therefore, fraudulently induced to adopt the child. Id.
The court stated that the primary concern was the best interests of the child and the
child's needs could more "efficiently" met by placing her with the children's Aid Soci-
ety. Id. at 156. It is hard to justify the court's rationalization that severing the parent-
child relationship and institutionalizing the child served her best interests.
In In re Anonymous, the New York Surrogate's court allowed an annulment of an
adoption after a few months, because it appeared to be for the best interest of the child.
352 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The court likened the adoption proceeding to a contract agree-
ment and stated that "the relation of adoptive parents and child, unlike a natural par-
ent and child, is largely one entered into by consent or contract." Id. The court went on
to state that consensual arrangements can usually be rescinded on equitable principles,
such as mutual mistake of fact and there had been a mutual mistake of fact because
the parties had entered the adoption under a fundamental misapprehension. Id. Since
the contract analysis focused only upon the legal rights and remedies, there was no
thought to what was truly in the child's best interests.
48. E.g., In re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
49. See generally Howard, Note, supra note 4, at app. A.
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Nancy, had any history of mental illness.5" The parents were informed
that nothing of consequence existed. In fact, a report of the adoption
supervisor showed that Nancy had trouble adjusting to her new home
and was antagonistic towards the family. When Nancy had a nervous
breakdown and was adjudicated mentally incompetent, the Leaches
sought an annulment of the adoption. Because Nancy's mental illness
had been kept from them at the time of the final adoption, the Leaches
requested that the adoption be set aside for the best interests of all
parties.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and de-
nied the annulment by summarily stating that an annulment would not
be in the child's best interests.51 The court found that the fraud com-
mitted by the county caseworker upon the Leaches was insufficient to
overturn the adoption, especially in light of the fact that the Leaches
had the child in their home for eleven years. 2 Furthermore, the court
found that they had ample opportunity to withdraw prior to the final-
ization of' the adoption if they felt it was necessary within the statutory
period."
Another case in which the adoptive parents wished to annul the
adoption was McDuffee v. Rehm. 4 The adoptive parents claimed that
an annulment would be in the child's best interests because the child
was mentally disturbed and required institutional care."5 The child's
mental illness had begun at an early age prior to her placement with
the McDuffees. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the decree be-
cause it would not be in the child's best interests."6 The court stated
that, in the absence of some compelling reason, an adoption should
never be annulled solely at the insistence of the adoptive parents where
the child would be cast aside to become a public charge: thus, freeing
50. 128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964).
51. Id. at 476. The Leaches contended that the adoption should have been set
aside because there was active concealment of facts concerning the child by the
caseworker at the time of the adoption. Id.
52. Id. at 477 (only when the child became institutionalized did the parents seek
revocation).
53. Id,
54. 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 28. The court was reluctant to annul the adoption simply because the
child needed treatment, and opined that many parents in similar situations manage to
get the treatment their children require. Id.
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the adoptive parents of an obligation they voluntarily assumed.5 7 Fi-
nally, the court concluded: "[T]he natural parents abandoned their
child. It cannot now be in the best interest of that child that a court of
equity, on petition of its adoptive parents, decree it a similar fate."58
A third case in which annulment of adoption was not permitted
because it was not in the child's best interests was the New Jersey case
of In re Adoption of G. in which a young couple wished to adopt a
baby girl. 9 A little girl was placed in the couple's home for a trial
period. During the trial period the adoptive parents became concerned
over the child's slow development. The baby was taken to a physician
and the physician found the baby to be normal, except for her slow
development. After the child had been in the care of the couple for the
one year trial period, the adoption was finalized. Since the baby's de-
velopment did not improve, the child was taken to a specialist who de-
termined that the baby was retarded to such an extent that she would
eventually require commitment to an institution. The adoptive parents
subsequently commenced a motion to annul the adoption. 0
The New Jersey Superior Court denied the annulment, finding it
would not be in the child's best interests to annul the adoption."1 Not-
ing that the child would be returned to the adoption agency, which did
not have facilities to deal with the problem, the court concluded that
the parents would do "the right thing by their child." 62
The previous cases illustrate the general direction courts are tak-
ing in deciding adoption annulment cases. Courts are now placing great
weight on what is truly in the child's best interest. Generally, an annul-
ment should never be granted when it is not in the child's best inter-
ests.6" Since the adoptive relationship was initially found to promote
the child's best interests; this relationship should not be ended simply
because the parents have changed their minds.
Also, as a matter of public policy, a child should not be treated as
a piece of defective merchandise, returnable by the adoptive parents if
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id. at 28.
59. 214 A.2d 549 (N.J. County Ct. 1965).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 551. The court also stated that the adoption was meant to be final, and
that there was no legal distinction between the adoptive parent-child relationship and
the natural parent-child relationship. Id. at 552.
62. Id. at 552.
63. See generally In re Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964); McDuffee v.
Rehm, 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
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not worthy of the price paid.' To allow annulment of a final judgment
of adoption after the child has been assimilated into the family, for any
reason, would open a Pandora's box, and would result in chaos and
instability in the child's life and development. 5 Just as the adoptive
parent stands in the place of the natural parent after an adoption be-
comes final, the adoptive child has every right of a natural child to
continuation of the parent-child relationship. 66
In addition, the family unit is further traumatized by granting an
annulment. Unfortunately children facing an annulment of adoption
have often been abandoned or neglected by their natural parents. 7
Consequently, they experience the annulment of adoption proceeding as
yet another abandonment.6 The annulment of an adoption is drastic; it
breaks up the family unit, and has dramatic effects upon the adopted
child.6 9 When the adoptive parents are victims of fraud, it is unlikely
that they will learn of the misrepresentations until well after the time
for annulment has passed and long after the parent-child relationship
has developed into a relationship similar to a natural parent and
child's.7 0 Consequently, annulment of adoption has only a limited de-
terrent effect upon those who perpetrated the fraud but harms the fam-
ily unit and the child, contrary to the childs best interests.
64. ln re Adoption of Hobson, 667 P.2d 911, 915 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Pierce v. Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975) (where the stepfather
sought to set aside his adoption of his former wife's children)).
65. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
31-37 (1979). See generally 4 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY (P. Mussen ed.
1983) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
66. Anne Snider, Note, Adoption-Abrogation of Adoption, 16 B.U.L. REV. 700,
705 (1936).
67. See generally Elizabeth N. Carroll, Abrogation of Adoption by Adoptive
Parents, 19 FAM. L.Q. 155 (1985).
68. Id.
69. The adoptive parents are also affected by the annulment process. The parent
is left with immense guilt and feelings of doubt concerning his or her parenting abili-
ties. However, the responsibility rests with the parents alone just as it would if the child
was born to them naturally.
70. S'ee In re Adoption of Male Minor Child, 619 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1980) (the natural mother attempted to have the adoption decree set aside on the
grounds that her consent was obtained by fraud, duress and undue influence). In Burr,
the adoptive parents learned of the fraud after 18 years. Burr v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 4.91 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). In Morningstar, the adoptive parents learned
of the fraud after two years. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d
150 (Ind. 1958) (en banc).
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B. Statutory Law
Adoption procedures in each state are governed by numerous stat-
utes. These statutes cover the basic procedures to be followed in apply-
ing for an adoption:71 the investigation of the qualifications of the adop-
tive parents;72 the inheritance rights of the adopted child; 3 the
confidential hearings and records in an adoption proceeding;74 and the
rights of the parties. 5 These statutes attempt to cover the procedural
aspect of adoption, while serving the best interests of the child, as well
as protecting the rights and interests of all parties involved.7 6 However,
when an adoptive parent seeks to annul an adoption, the various state
statutes pertaining to annulment reveal a variety of approaches.
These approaches can be divided into five categories.
The first category is composed of states that have specific statutes
authorizing the treatment of annulment cases the same as any other
civil case. 78 States in the second category rely on the court's implied
equitable power to grant annulments in other types of cases, like mar-
riage. 79 The justification is that the courts' broad equitable powers au-
thorize them to vacate any decree on proper grounds.80 In these first
71. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (1988).
72. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.46 (West 1982).
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 920 (1981).
74. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-126 (Supp. 1991).
75. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117 (1989).
76. See, e.g., Hopper v. Brittain, 612 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); In re
Adoption of Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
77. Howard, Note, supra note 4, at app. A; Note, supra note 66, at app. A.
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-14 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-8 (Burns 1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2213 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.64 (West 1982):
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-127 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 60.19 (West
1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.370 (1989).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-90 to 466-114 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE §
16-1506 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 40 § 1517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.13 (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:438 (West 1987); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 210 § 6 (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28 (West
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 259.28 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.150
(1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 to 3-56 (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. 40-7-
15 (1987); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 114 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 2101-2909
(Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-
13 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.120
(1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.911 (West Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-101 to 115
(Supp. 1991).
80. For instance, one court has stated:
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two groups, the courts do not have the benefit of specific adoption an-
nulment statutes, which results in the application of several different
standards, often not in the best interests of the child.
The third category of states have specific abrogation statutes that
deal only with procedural defects and irregularities such as lack of no-
tice or consent.8 1 Although procedural statutes are better than having
no statutory guidelines, they have two basic problems: their limited
scope and their time constraints. The typical statute reads: "No final
decree of adoption shall be attacked by reason of any jurisdictional or
procedural defect after the expiration of two years following the entry
of the final decree. ' '82 If annulment of the adoption is sought on any
other ground, the statute is inapplicable.8" Because annulments based
on these statutes are procedural, any action brought within the applica-
ble time frame should be granted. However, when the time the child
spent with the family before the adoption is added to the time the child
spent with the family after the final decree, the cumulative time may
have been long enough for parent-child bonds to have formed. Thus,
separation while within the limitations period could still be harmful to
the child." If parent-child bonds have formed and separation would be
harmful to the child, an annulment of the adoption should not be per-
It is often asserted that the adoption of children was unknown at common
law and the subject is generally said to be governed and limited by the
statutes .... But we entertain no doubt that the broad equitable powers
vested in our courts of general jurisdiction (and which are also vested with
jurisdiction of the laws of this state relating to adoption) empower them to
vacate a decree of adoption upon any of the classical grounds that entitle
such courts to vacate any other decree, such as judgments procured by
fraud or to prevent injustice where such final judgments were the result of
unavoidable accident or excusable mistake.
McDuffee v. Rehm, 352 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); see also Pierce v.
Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975); In re Adoption of G., 214 A.2d 549
(N.J. County Ct. 1965). See generally Annotation, Annulment or Vaction of Adoption
Decree by Adopting Parent or Natural Parent Consenting of Adoptions, 2 A.L.R.2d
887 (1948).
81. ALA. CODE § 26-10-5 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-123 (1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-4-116 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 918 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-310 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 63.182 (1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. XVI § 79 (1988);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-15 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-28 (1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-127 (1984).
82. COL. REV. STAT. § 19-4-116 (1990).
83. Id.
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mitted even if within the limitations period.
The fourth category consists of states which have specific annul-
ment statutes not solely limited to procedural defects. These statutes
are based on deficiencies in the child which may later be grounds for
annulment.8 5 It must be noted that these states are in the minority. For
example, the California statute allows adoptive parents to seek annul-
ment within five years after the final decree if the child develops a
mental illness as a result of conditions prior to the adoption. 6 The
Kentucky statute allows parents to annul an adoption within five years
of the decree if the child exhibits traits of a different ethnological an-
cestry than that of the adoptive parents, and the parents had no knowl-
edge of such ancestry.87 Both California's and Kentucky's statutes fo-
cus on the child's deficiency, not his best interests.
The states in the final category have adopted the Uniform Adop-
tion Act which comprehensively covers the grounds upon which an an-
nulment may be based.8 The Uniform Adoption Act is the only cur-
rent statute which addresses the best interests of the child. 80 Although
currently enacted in five states, enactment of this statute should be the
trend in the future if states intend to promote the child's best interests.
The commissioner's note following the Act explains that: "The pol-
icy of stability in a family relationship, particularly when a young mi-
nor is involved, outweighs the possible loss to a person whose rights are
cut off through fraud or ignorance." 90 States at the forefront of adop-
tion law have demonstrated that the trend is to place the best interests
of the child above those of the adoptive parents when the adoptive par-
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 227b (West 1991); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-12 (1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (Baldwin 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 538
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-116 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1800 (Law. Co-op.
1986); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16-08 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §
454 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-237 (1984).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 2276 (West 1982).
87. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 199.540 (Baldwin 1982). Ethnological ancestry deals
with the various races or cultural groups of people, their origin and distribution, dis-
tinctive characteristics, customs, institutions, and culture. THE RANDOM HOUSE COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY 454 (rev. ed. 1982).
88. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 15(b), 9 U.L.A. 11 (1979). Alaska, Arkansas, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio are the states which have adopted the act.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140 (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-216 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:17 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-15 (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.16 (Baldwin 1989).
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ents attempt annulment as a remedy because they have been the Vic-
tims of fraud or misrepresentation of the child's health or mental con-
dition.9' While annulment is recognized as a remedy, the Uniform
Adoption Act bars any attack on the adoption decree after the one year
statute of limitations has passed.92 It is assumed that if an adoption is
annulled within the one year time period, it will be before parent-child
bonds have formed. This insures that an adopted child cannot be
treated any differently than a natural child solely by virtue of his adop-
tive status.93 Although a minority of jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Adoption Act, Florida should adopt this approach because it
is the most consistent with the best interests of the child. A preferable
alternative to statutory annulment that is also consistent with the best
interests of the child is a cause of action for damages based on wrong-
ful adoption.
IV. WRONGFUL ADOPTION AS A REMEDY
The denial of the opportunity to make an informed decision is the
essence of the tort of wrongful adoption. Likewise adoptive parents
should be permitted to recover damages for any misrepresentation or
fraud that denies them the opportunity to make an informed decision. 94
This remedy provides compensatory damages to adoptive parents who
have been fraudulently induced into an adoption.95 Because the wrong-
ful adoption remedy does not alter the family unit, it is more suitable
than annulment. 96 It is likely that the wrongful adoption remedy also
would deter future acts of adoption fraud because the wrongdoers
would be subject to monetary liability for the harm they inflict. Liabil-
ity was found in the case of Burr v. Board of County Commissioners.7
91. E.g., In re Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964); McDuffee v. Rehm, 352
S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); In re Adoption of G., 214 A.2d 549 (N.J. County
Ct. 1965).
92. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 15(b), 9 U.L.A. 11 (1979).
93. Id.
94. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986).
95. See id. at 1109; Wallerstein v. Hospital Corp. of America, 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct.
App. 1988)
96. While annulment may be appropriate in cases where the fraud is immedi-
ately discovered, it is contrary to the policy of making adoptions conclusive and final.
In re Welfare of Alle, 230 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1975). However, in cases like
Burr, the child will remain a part of an established family. 491 N.E.2d at 1101.
97. 491 N.F2d at 1101.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio found an adoption agency liable in tort for
making material misrepresentations of a child's background and physi-
cal condition to the adoptive parents. 8 The adoptive parents alleged
that the adoption was fraudulently induced by the agency, and that
because of this wrongful adoption, they had incurred general and spe-
cial damages.
In 1964, the Burrs contacted the adoption division of the Stark
County Welfare Department hoping to adopt a male child up to six
months old. 99 A few days later the Burrs were informed that a seven-
teen month old boy was available for adoption. The Burrs met the
county caseworker and were informed that the infant had an eighteen
year old mother who was living with her parents and was trying to
work and take care of the child. The mother decided to go to Texas for
better employment and surrendered the child for adoption. Russell
Burr testified that the case worker represented that the child "was a
nice big, healthy, baby boy."100 The Burrs proceeded with the adoption
and Patrick became a legal member of the family. During the following
years, Patrick suffered from many physical and mental problems. 01
Eventually, he was diagnosed as having Huntington's Disease, a geneti-
cally inherited disease which destroys the central nervous system. Dur-
ing his treatment, the Burrs obtained a court order to open the sealed
record of Patrick's background. In 1982, the Burrs discovered that the
representations made to them by the case worker in 1964 were false.
The records revealed that Patrick's biological mother was a thirty-
one year old mental patient who shared some of Patrick's problems.'0 2
In fact, Patrick had been born at the state mental institution, not at the
hospital. The father's identity was unknown, but it was presumed that
he, too, was a mental patient. All information regarding Patrick, except
his age and sex, had been fabricated. In fact, he had been placed in two
foster homes before the adoption. Prior to the adoption, the agency was
aware that the baby was developing slowly, and a series of psychologi-
cal assessments that had been conducted indicated he was functioning
at a low intellectual level for his age. Future assessments were recom-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1103.
100. Id.
101. Patrick's symptoms included twitching, speech impediment, poor motor
skills and learning disabilities. He was classified as educable, mentally retarded and
attended special education classes. Id.
102. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1104.
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mended for evidence of deviant social and emotional development. Ex-
pert testimony established that Patrick's background put him at risk of
disease.1"3
The Burrs commenced a wrongful adoption action against the
agency to recoup Patrick's excessive medical expenses.10 4 The Burrs
testified that they would have never adopted Patrick if they had known
the truth.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Burrs in the
amount of $125,000.106 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that where adoptive parents allege that they have been fraudulently
misled to their detriment by material misrepresentation concerning a
child's background, they may recover if each element of fraud is
proven. 107
The court found that fraud was proven since the adoption agency
had made: several untrue statements with knowledge of their falsity; the
representations were material in the Burr's decision to adopt, and were
obviously made with the intention of misleading the Burrs into relying
upon them as fact. 0 8 The court opined that justice required a public
agency charged with the duty and authority to place children through
adoption to be held accountable for injuries resulting from their deceit-
ful and material misrepresentations.' 0 9
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision was not intended to make





107. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1104-05.
The elements of fraud were listed as: (a) a representation, or where there
is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, (b) which is material to the
transaction at hand, (c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with
such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that
knowledge may be inferred, (d) with the intent of misleading another into
relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or conceal-
ment, and (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.
Id., 491 N.E.2d at 1102-03 (citing Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 462 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio
1984)).
108. Id. at 1105. The Ohio Supreme Court also found that the Burr's reliance on
the representations were justifiable and that their injuries resulted therefrom. Id. at
1106. "It would be a travesty of justice and a distortion of the truth to conclude that
deceitful placement of this infant, known by [the agency] . . . to be at risk, was not
actionable when the tragic but hidden realities of the child's infirmities finally came to
light." Id. at 1107.
109. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1107.
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child adopted will remain healthy and happy."0 Couples must weigh
the risks of becoming natural parents, and so too should adoptive par-
ents have the opportunity to make an informed decision."' The mere
failure of the agency to disclose the risks inherent in the child's back-
ground was not held to be actionable, it was the agency's deliberate act
of misinforming the couple that deprived them of their right to make a
sound decision." 2
In contrast, in an earlier case, Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child
Care Service, a California Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought against an adoption agency, Vista, for failing to warn the
adoptive parents that the infant's premature birth might lead to future
health problems." 3 Vista had placed an infant male child, Gregory, in
the home of the adoptive parents at their request. Vista informed them
that Gregory was premature and had large earlobes, but otherwise he
was a healthy child. Before the adoption, the adoptive parents con-
sulted their pediatrician, Dr. K., who found Gregory to be in good
health. However, three years later, Gregory began experiencing neuro-
logical problems, and six years after the adoption Dr. K informed them
that Gregory's emotional and physical problems were predictable at
birth. The adoptive parents then brought suit against the agency and
Dr. K."'
The court stated that the gravamen of the adoptive parents' com-
plaint was fraud and to constitute a ground for relief, the fraudulent
representations must pertain to existing and material facts." 5 Even
though Vista had informed the adoptive parents prior to their adoption
of Gregory that he was premature, the adoptive parents claimed that
Vista's statement that Gregory was healthy and "'a proper subject for
adoption'" was a factual representation of Gregory's health and consti-
tuted a representation that he would enjoy good health in the future."'
Furthermore, the parents claimed that Vista's representations were
false because after placement in their home, Gregory began exhibiting
severe emotional problems. " 7 The court found the statement to be
110. Id. at 1109.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
114. Id. at 372.
115. Id. Predictions of future events or expressions of opinion are usually not
actionable.
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opinion, or prediction, and not actionable because Vista had made a
full disclosure of the facts within its knowledge as they existed at the
time of Gregory's placement." 8
The decision did acknowledge that if the party stating the opinion
or prediction had knowledge of facts not warranting the opinion, or if
the other party reasonably relied upon the opinion or prediction as fact,
there would be a basis for liability in fraud." 9 Since the adoptive par-
ents consulted their own physician and did not rely on the agency's
representations of Gregory's health, the requisite element of reliance
was lacking for a cause of action based on fraud or
misrepresentation. 2 '
Arguably, public policy also influenced the California appellate
court's decision that no cause of action should be recognized against
Vista for its opinion or prediction. 1 1 The policy inherent in the court's
decision was that "to impose liability in a case such as this would in
effect make the adoption agency a guarantor of the infant's future good
health.""":a However, natural parents that are fortunate enough to have
a healthy child, have no guarantee that the child will continue to re-
main healthy. 2 ' Thus, since Vista made a full disclosure of Gregory's
health, they should not be held liable for the continuation of Gregory's
good health in the future.
Although the Richard P. court dismissed the wrongful adoption
suit, the facts are distinguishable from Burr which allowed recovery. 12
In Burr, the agency had engaged in a deliberate act of misinforming by
making false statements about the child's background.2 5 In Richard
P., the agency truthfully disclosed the child's history, but stopped short
of informing the parents of the potential health problems that might
have occurred as a result of a premature birth. 126 However, if the
agency had withheld known information about the child's health, it is
likely fraud would have existed.12 7 The question then becomes whether




122. Id. at 374.
123. Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
124. Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370; Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491
N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
125. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109.
126. Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
127. See, e.g., McMahon v. Meredith Corp., 595 F.2d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 1979)
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a duty to disclose arises in adoption proceedings. A duty to disclose
should be found in adoption proceedings because full disclosure is the
most effective way of eliminating adoption annulment and suits for
wrongful adoption.
In cases like Burr, there is little doubt that a duty exists, since the
adoptive parents place their trust in the adoption agency as the agency
usually has superior knowledge of the child's condition and back-
ground. 12 8 In this situation where "one party has superior knowledge
not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party,' 12 9 a duty
to disclose is found. An adoption agency that fails to inform adoptive
parents of known risks concerning their prospective child is not acting
in the child's best interests. Additionally, the best interests of the child,
which is the primary concern in any adoption, would be best served
when the adoptive parents are fully informed of the child's condition
and background. Fully informed, the adoptive parents will be better
able to confront and deal with the situation when the risks become re-
ality.130 Therefore, the victims of such nondisclosure should be provided
for in the form of compensatory damages, and possibly punitive dam-
ages, where the party placing the child fails to disclose known risks and
injury subsequently results.
However, recognition of the wrongful adoption theory and al-
lowing recovery in such situations will not make agencies the "guaran-
tors of their placements." '' Adoptive parents will only be allowed to
recover when they prove an intentional false representation or a failure
("A failure to disclose a material fact can be considered to be an implicit representa-
tion of the nonexistence of such fact on which a party may rely, but only if the alleged
fraud-feasor has a duty to speak."); Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ohio
1979) ("It is well established that an action for fraud and deceit is maintainable not
only as a result of affirmative misrepresentations, but also for negative ones, such as the
failure of a party to a transaction to fully disclose facts of a material nature where
there exists a duty to speak."); In re Greene, 620 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Or. 1980) ("A half-
truth or silence can be as much a misrepresentation as a lie.").
128. "The classic illustration of fraud is where one party having superior knowl-
edge intentionally fails to disclose a material fact . . . which is not discoverable by
ordinary observation .... " Nessim v. DeLoache, 384 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted).
129. McMahon, 595 F.2d at 439.
130. Parents can choose not to adopt the child at all. Thus, saving the parents
and the child the anguish of having to file suit to correct the agency's wrong.
131. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986);
Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App. 1988).
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to disclose known material facts about the child or her background.
13 2
Further it will place a much needed check on the system.
Also, public policy cannot condone concealment or intentional mis-
representation that misleads potential adoptive parents.
The adoption of a child is an act of compassion, love and humani-
tarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily assumes enor-
mous legal, moral, social, and financial obligations. Accordingly, a
trustworthy process benefits society, as well as the child and parent.
As keepers of the conscious of the community, we cannot counte-
nance conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance into
the emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from schemes
or tactics designed to discharge societal burdens onto the unsus-
pecting or unwary. As trustees of the child's destiny the agency
was obligated to act with morals greater than those found in a pur-
veyor's common marketplace.133
Thus, concealment or misrepresentation of a child's background by in-
dividuals or agencies involved in the adoption proceeding is against
public policy. Similarly, this reasoning can be extended to include any-
one that the parents rely on in making their decision to adopt, includ-
132. See Wallerstein v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Burr, 491 N.E.2d 1101. The following case further illustrates the need for
disclosure. In Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App.
1988), recovery of damages was allowed because the adoptive parent proved the
agency's failure to disclose a known material fact about the child. Michael was born on
March 30, 1970. Since birth he had a port wine stain on his upper torso and face.
Based upon medical knowledge and information available in 1970, the county knew or
should have known that this was a manifestation of Sturge-Weber Syndrome. The
county concealed this fact from Mary Trout, who inquired about the stain when she
was considering adopting Michael. Mary did not know that the stain was a manifesta-
tion or symptom of a disorder and would not have adopted Michael if she had known.
The California Appellate Court opined that an adoption agency cannot be made the
guarantor of an infant's future good health and should not be held liable for mere
negligence in providing information concerning the prospective adoptee's health. Id. at
513. However, the court found that the agency's failure to disclose a material fact
within its po;session, and that the examining physician would not render a prognosis
for Michael, suggested that the nondisclosure was fraudulent and a cause of action for
fraud existed. Id. Although the court recognized an action for intentional misrepresen-
tation or fraudulent concealment, this was not an attempt to place upon the agency a
duty to guarantee the future good health of prospective adoptees. Id. The court stated
that: "[T]here must be a good faith full disclosure of material facts concerning existing
or past conditions of the child's health." Id.
133. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
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ing treating physicians. 134
Florida also recognizes wrongful adoption as a remedy. In Waller-
stein v. Hospital Corporation of America, the Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal applied the theory of wrongful adoption to physicians
who attended a child after his birth.1"' The allegations were based on
the doctors' assurance to the adoptive parents that the child was
healthy and suitable for adoption.136 The child, Shawn, was born in
Plantation General Hospital on July 1, 1983 and was placed under the
care of the doctors of Plantation General. The Wallersteins employed
the doctors and the hospital to examine and diagnose Shawn's health to
determine his suitability for adoption. Even though the doctors had as-
sured the Wallersteins that the child was healthy and suitable for adop-
tion, they presumably failed to properly examine and diagnose the con-
dition of the child.137
The Wallersteins adopted Shawn and subsequently discovered, one
year after the adoption, that he had chronic, fixed, non-progressive en-
cephalopathy (brain dysfunction) with spastic quadriparesis (paralysis),
and had been tentatively diagnosed as having cerebral palsy. 13 8 The
Wallersteins contended that these conditions, and the child's unsuita-
bility for adoption, were known or should have been known to the doc-
tors, and if they had known of the child's condition, they would not
have adopted Shawn.
The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal found the Waller-
stein's suit for negligent misrepresentation actionable since in a suit for
negligent misrepresentation, "[a]ll that must be alleged . . . is not that
the representor intended to make a false statement, but rather that the
representation was made under circumstances in which its falsity
should have been known."'13 The Wallersteins were permitted to re-
cover for economic loss resulting from the doctors' conduct in misrepre-
senting or negligently failing to determine the medical condition of the
adopted child.'4 0 Thus, when a physician informs potential adoptive
134. Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct.
App. 1980) (parents sued the physician as well as agency for wrongful adoption).
135. 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (this was a private adoption as
opposed to an agency adoption).
136. Id.
137. They failed to properly communicate the medical information determinative
of the child's suitability for adoption to the Wallersteins. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Wallerstein, 573 So. 2d at 10.
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parents that the child is healthy and suitable for adoption, it is foresee-
able that if that information is wrong, the parents will suffer some eco-
nomic harm. Obviously, if the parents adopt the child, they will be le-
gally responsible for the medical costs and should be allowed to recover
damages commensurate with the child's medical expenses. This remedy
is preferable to annulment of adoption as it keeps the child within the
family unit while compensating the adoptive parents for damages
incurred.
As previously discussed, an adoptive parent's motion to annul an
adoption based on fraud should not be granted, because unlike wrong-
ful adoption, it does not promote the child's best interests and other
remedies are available. The preferable solution in cases where adoptive
parents are fraudulently induced into an adoption is a damage suit for
the tort of wrongful adoption. The adoptive parents' right to be free
from being victimized by fraud is recognized without forcing them to
end their relationship with the child they have come to know as their
own. In fact, one of the main beneficiaries of the wrongful adoption
theory is the adoptive parents since full disclosure would enable the
agencies to find suitable parents that may want to raise handicapped or
other types of special children. Although the best interests of the child
is the primary concern, "the protection of ... the adopting parents
should [also] be considered along with that of the child."114 1 Permitting
adoptive parents to seek compensatory damages when they have been
the victims of fraud or misrepresentation promotes both the child's and
adoptive parents' best interests.
Specifically, the adopted child benefits from the wrongful adoption
theory since the child remains with the family. When an adoption is
annulled, the child is removed from the family unit and returned to the
agency. This is a drastic measure. The child is removed from his caring
family unit and is again alone and parentless. While annulment of
adoption may be appropriate when the fraud or misrepresentation is
immediately discovered and before significant parent-child bonds are
formed, it is otherwise contrary to the child's best interests and the
policy of making adoptions final."'
An additional benefit of the wrongful adoption theory is that it will
deter others from future fraudulent conduct or misrepresentation, be-
cause perpetrators of adoption fraud will be required to redress their
141. In re Adoption of Children by 0., 359 A.2d 513, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1976).
142. In re Welfare of AlIe, 230 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1975).
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wrongs through the payment of civil damages."4 3 Although the main
purpose of compensatory damages in actions of wrongful adoption is to
redress the victim's injuries,14 these damages also serve the purpose of
reducing future fraudulent conduct. Unfortunately, most state statutes
do not clearly designate what information must be disclosed to adopt-
ing parents thus allowing the agency to omit select facts concerning the
child's background. This is demonstrated in M.L.B. where the court
granted the adoptive parents' petition to annul the adoption. This was
the wrong remedy; wrongful adoption would have been a more appro-
priate remedy.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
One factor contributing to adoption fraud is that the records of the
adoptee's condition and background are sealed when the adoption is
finalized and can be seen by the adoptive parents only by court or-
der.145 These sealed records may give the individuals placing the child
a false sense of security that their fraudulent conduct will never be
discovered. The rationale behind keeping records confidential serves
several purposes. "It shields the adopted child from possibly disturbing
facts surrounding his or her birth and parentage, it permits the adop-
tive parents to develop a close relationship with the child free from
interference or distraction, and it provides the natural parents with an
anonymity that they may consider vital." '46 These expressed concerns
are valid. However, the sealed records have the tendency of allowing
material information about the adoptive child's condition or back-
ground to be kept from the adoptive parents,14 7 which does not promote
the child's best interest when considering placement of the child.
A few states have enacted statutes that provide the potential adop-
tive parents with access to vital medical records without interfering
with the natural parents' wishes to remain anonymous.14 8 However,
143. Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct.
App. 1980).
144. 11 SAMUAL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338
(3d ed. 1957).
145. FLA. STAT. § 63.162(i)(b) (1991).
146. In re Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (N.Y.
1981) (citations omitted) (Linda was an adopted child who was denied access to her
adoption records).
147. Id. at 1303.
148. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5.328 (1988) ("[Wjhenever possi-
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none of the state's provisions provide sanctions for failure to disclose
this vital information. 1 9 In most cases, it can be presumed that counsel
for the adoptive parents would be aware of the disclosure requirements
and would insist upon compliance. To insure that this information is
provided, the legislatures should provide financial sanctions for failure
to disclose this information.
Florida Statute section 63.162 mandates that upon the request of
the adoptive parent, all non-identifying information obtained prior to,
or subsequent to, the adoption shall be furnished to the adoptive par-
ent.150 This section contributes to the problem of non-disclosure by put-
ting the burden of discovery on the adoptive parent. In order to receive
any information concerning the child, the adoptive parents must re-
quest the information."" Some parents might not realize that the infor-
mation is available upon request. If the agency is trying to hide infor-
mation that would affect an adoption, they are not likely to bring this
to the parents' attention. Even though full disclosure may slow the
placement process in some instances, when the parents, agency, child
and the court are all aware of the relevant information about the child,
chances are that once the adoption is finalized, it will remain so.
These mandatory disclosure laws are beneficial to all parties in-
volved in the adoption proceedings. The natural parents' confidentiality
is protected while the adoptive parents are able to make an informed
intelligent decision.' Even though every family which adopts a child
takes certain risks as to the future progress of the child, 5 8 full disclo-
sure of information will help prepare the adoptive parents for any spe-
cial needs the child may develop. Even those placing children for adop-
ble, the person authorized to place a minor child for adoption shall compile and make
available to the adoptive parent a pertinent medical history of the natural parents of
the minor child."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.121(5)3 (1989) ("Nonidentifying informa-
tion, if known, concerning undisclosed biological parents or siblings shall be furnished
by the child.-placing agency or the juvenile court to the adoptive parents, legal guardi-
ans or adopted adult upon written request therefore."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 461(b)
(1991) ("Upon written request of an adoptee or an adoptive parent, an agency or an
individual involved in a private adoption proceeding shall release non-identifying infor-
mation . . ").
149. No sanctions were included in the statutes for failure to disclose. See gener-
ally MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5.328 (1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.121 (1989);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 461 (1974).
150. FLA. STAT. § 63.162 (1991).
151. id.
152. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986).
153. Id. at 1101.
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tion benefit from the law. They would no longer fear annulment suits if
full disclosure is made. Although mandatory disclosure laws cannot
prevent adoption fraud or misrepresentation, they can lessen the past
security derived from sealed records.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoptive parent-child relationship should mirror the natural
parent-child relationship. This was the intent in the creation of the
adoption statutes.15
It is difficult to justify the annulment of an adoption by the adop-
tive parents. A finalization of an adoption creates a new status, that of
natural parent and child. Natural parents do not have the alternative of
annulment because they are dissatisfied or wish to rid themselves of a
bad bargain. 155 "If the status attained is what it purports to be, the
parent should meet all situations with the same attitude of mind that
he naturally would have, had the child been his by birth."'"' Since
adoption grants the adoptive parents the same rights as natural par-
ents, the adoptive parents should also be subject to the same
constraints.
The best alternative for adoptive parents, who have been injured
because of misrepresentations or fraud concerning their child's back-
ground or condition, is the tort recovery of wrongful adoption. The law
should recognize the right of potential adoptive parents to make an in-
formed decision, based on all the available information regarding the
adoptive child's background and condition that would reasonably influ-
ence their decision.
The remedy of wrongful adoption is superior to annulment of
adoption because it recognizes the rights of the adoptive parents, while
it protects and promotes the best interest of the adoptive child, and
deters future cases of adoption fraud. The remedy of wrongful adoption
should apply to both active fraud and non-disclosure where the party
placing the child controls the adoptive parent's access to material infor-
mation about the child's background or condition. The adoptive parents
154. See generally Howard, Note, supra note 4, at 549.
155. But see L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (enlisting state assis-
tance to deal with disobedient or stubborn children); In re Wallace & Snyder, 532 P.2d
278 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (defining an incorrigible child as one who is beyond the
control or power of his parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of the child's
conduct).
156. Snider, Note, supra note 66, at 705.
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should not be permitted to annul the adoption because they are no
longer satisfied with the child. Furthermore, a child should not be
treated as an item that can be bought and sold. Since during the initial
placement, the adoption was found to be in the best interests of the
child, it should not be changed simply on the whim of the parents. If
the parents are allowed any complaints whatsoever, they should be
against the parties placing the child in the form of wrongful adoption.
In this way the child's best interests will be protected.
Kelly Bennison
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I. INTRODUCTION
"I don't care if he is my real dad. I hate his guts and I always
will.''
Those icy words were spoken by an eleven year old girl during a
hearing upon motions to modify custody, support and visitation, as she
tried to convince the trial judge that she did not want to visit her fa-
ther.2 Even though the judge attempted to persuade the young girl to
concede to visitation, she could not comprehend why she had to see her
father if she hated him.' She did not know that the courts had deter-
mined that it is in a child's best interest to maintain a positive relation-
ship with the non-custodial natural parent." All that mattered to her
was that her father had walked out on her mother and abandoned his
two daughters when she was three.5 Now, seven years later, the
1. Brief for Respondent at 9, Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1991)
(No. 72-471) [hereinafter Father's Brief].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 10.
4. See Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464, 466 (Fla. 1933) (stating "[n]o ... inher-
ent right of an individual [should] be esteemed more highly, than that which arises out
of the natural relationship of love and affection which normally exists between parent
and child .... "); see also Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991) (quot-
ing FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a) (1989) "'frequent and continuing contact with the non-
residential parent' is generally considered to be in best interest of child.")).
5. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
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thought of visiting this man gave her nightmares.6
During the custody modification hearing, the trial judge found
that Laurel Schutz ("Mother"), the custodial parent, had instilled
great animosity in her two daughters towards her former spouse, Rich-
ard Schutz ("Father"), the noncustodial parent.' The trial court deter-
mined that the Mother had done far more than neglect her "affirmative
obligation" to encourage her daughters to visit their Father. 9 In fact,
the trial court found that the Mother had intentionally poisoned the
daughters' hearts and minds against their Father.10 To remedy the situ-
ation, the trial court issued an order ("Order") enjoining the Mother to
"create in the minds of . . . [the daughters] a loving, caring feeling
toward the Father . . . [and] convince the children that it is [her] de-
sire that they see . . . and love their father."'
The Mother challenged the Order claiming that it was an infringe-
ment upon her constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expres-
sion, because it required her to express opinions she did not have. 2 The
Order was upheld by the Third District Court of Appeal as
constitutional. 3
Subsequently, on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the appel-
late court's decision was affirmed. The supreme court found that the
Order was consistent with the custodial parent's "affirmative obliga-
tion" under Florida law;" did not require the Mother to express opin-
ions she did not have; and was constitutional. 15
Schutz v. Schutz is significant because it exceeds the "affirmative
6. Id. at 11 (referencing the testimony of Dr, Epstein, the court appointed psy-
chologist who, interviewed the daughters).
7. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
8. See Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987); In re Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So.
2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (custodial parent of a child owes an
obligation to the noncustodial parent to encourage and nurture the parent-child
relationship).
9. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
10. Id.
11. Schutz v. Schutz, 522 So. 2d 874, 875 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
12. Brief for Petitioner at 20-25, Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1991)
(No. 72-471) [hereinafter Mother's Brief].
13. Schutz, 522 So. 2d 874.
14. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292 (citing Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502
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obligation" placed on primary residential parents under Florida law. 6
However, the Supreme Court of Florida failed to acknowledge the sig-
nificance of Schutz. The court's finding that the Order did not infringe
upon the Mother's freedom of speech and expression rights was unsup-
ported by the facts. The Florida Supreme Court should not have af-
firmed the Order.
This comment discusses why the Florida Supreme Court should
not have affirmed the Schutz Order, as well as demonstrate that the
Order exceeded the "affirmative obligation" of residential parents
under Florida law and is unconstitutional. The first section of this arti-
cle gives the detailed factual background of Schutz that led to the issu-
ance of the Order. The second section deals with the review of the Or-
der by the Third District Court of Appeal 17 and the Florida Supreme
Court.18
The remainder of this comment discusses the flaws in the Florida
Supreme Court's analysis, which led to the erroneous decision to affirm
the Order. Primarily, this section will focus on the court's unsupported
conclusions, beginning with the finding that the Order is consistent
with the custodial parent's affirmative obligation."9 A comparison be-
tween the actual requirements of the Order and the affirmative obliga-
tion as set forth by the Schutz court demonstrates that the Order is
inconsistent with Florida law.' 0 Next, this section will examine the
court's finding, contrary to the plain meaning of the Order, that the
Mother was not compelled to express opinions she did not have.21 This
section will conclude by demonstrating that the court failed to properly
review the constitutionality of the Order.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SCHUTZ
The Father and the Mother were married in 1972.2 Two daugh-
ters were born to the parties: the first in 1973 and the second in 1975.
16. See Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 877 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he
order ... produces an impermissible result in that it compels the wife to exceed the
legal duty to encourage visitation which she, as a custodial parent, owes the noncus-
todial parent").
17. Id. at 874.
18. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1290.
19. Id.
20. See Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 877 (Hendry, J., dissenting).
21. See Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
22. Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 2.
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In 1977, the Mother filed for dissolution of marriage and the Father
filed a counter-petition. A final judgment dissolving the six year mar-
riage was entered by the trial court on November 13, 1978.3 At that
time, physical custody of the two daughters, ages three and five, was
awarded to the Father because he was found to be the primary care-
taker. " The facts subsequent to the dissolution order were in dispute.
The Mother claimed that the Father never assumed custody of the
children, preferring instead to make her "wait" for him to decide if and
when he would take custody. 5 The Mother stated that the Father's
actions caused her and the children a great deal of stress and emotional
anguish.2 6 To the contrary, the Father contended that his decision not
to expedite custody of the children was in accordance with the custody
order, because the parties had agreed to gradually transfer custody of
the children from the Mother to the Father.2 ' Because the Father re-
fused to assume custody of the girls, the Mother filed for modification
and the trial court awarded her sole custody of the children in October,
1979.28 The Father was granted visitation rights and ordered to pay
child support.2 9
After the modification of custody, there was ongoing "acrimony
and animosity" between the parents.30 The Mother claimed that the
Father continually harassed her by returning the children late from vis-
itation, taunting her by keeping the children in his car outside her
home for extended periods, and cursing her in the presence of the
girls.3" In February, 1981, the Mother moved with the children from
Miami, Florida to Milledgeville, Georgia without notifying the
23. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1291.
24. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 3. The primary caretaker is one of the factors
that courts consider when determining which parent will get custody. See FLA. STAT. §
61.13(3)(c) (1989) ("[F]or purposes of ... primary residence, the best interest of the
child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the
child, including . . . [tihe capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care .
25. Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 2.
26. Id.
27. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 3. The transfer was supposed to be gradual
because the Mother had been awarded the house and the parties wanted to minimize
the stress of the move upon the young girls. Id.
28. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1291.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 3.
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Father.3 2
A few weeks later, the Father received a letter from the Mother in
which she revealed the recent move to Georgia and disclosed her phone
number.s Upon learning of the move to Georgia, the Father ceased
making child support payments. The Father claimed that on three sep-
arate occasions he called the Mother and told her he intended to drive
to Georgia and exercise his visitation rights. However, every time he
drove to Georgia he found an empty house. The Mother stated that the
Father only told her of one planned visit to Georgia, and that after
waiting six hours for him she took her daughters shopping. Also, the
Father sent airline tickets to his daughters for a flight from Atlanta to
Miami, but they were never used. For seven months, the only contact
the father had with his daughters was one letter from his oldest girl
and several brief phone conversations with both children. 4
In September, 1981, unbeknownst to the Father, the Mother and
the daughters moved back to Miami.3 5 Several months later, the Father
happened to see his former wife and his daughters at a shopping plaza.
At that time, the Mother gave him her phone number, but when he
dialed the number he discovered that it had been disconnected.3 6 The
Father finally located the Mother again in February, 1985.37 In May,
32. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1291; see also Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 9. The
Mother testified that she moved to Georgia primarily because the Father was harassing
her. Id. She told the trial court that the Father would arrive late to pick up the girls for
visitation and threaten every time he left with them that he was not going to bring the
girls back. Id. Also, the Mother stated that the Father would hand deliver support
checks to her house and tell her that he was "checking up" on her, even though she
begged him to mail the checks. Id.
33. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
34. Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 4. The Mother stated that while there was
no actual visitation, the Father did maintain contact with the children by telephone
during the seven months that they lived in Georgia. Contra Father's Brief, supra note
1, at 5. The Father claimed that his frequent calls to Georgia were frustrated because
the Mother usually hung up the phone, terminating his attempted conversations with
the children. Id.
35. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 7; see also Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at
4. The Mother told the trial court that she did not notify the Father of their return to
Florida because she did not want to relive the "constant struggle" with the Father that
she experienced prior to leaving for Georgia. Id. at 9.
36. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 7. The Mother instructed the Father to wait
five days before he called and refused to give him her address. Id.
37. Id. at 7-8. The Father went to the Dade County School Board to see if his
children were registered. Also, his mother went to the Dade County Courthouse several
times to check the property recordings for the Mother's name, to no avail. Finally, the
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the Father went to the Mother's house to tell her and the daughters
that he wished to exercise his visitation rights.3 8 After a brief meeting
on the front lawn with his daughters and his former wife, the Father
left unsatisfied.39
The next day, the Father filed a motion with the trial court to hold
the Mother in contempt for violating his visitation rights, because of
the Mother's lack of cooperation and continual efforts to destroy his
relationship with the children.40 The Father also moved to determine
his liability for the child support payments he had not made since
1981."1 Subsequently, the Mother moved to modify visitation and for
an order awarding the child support arrearages.42
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF SCHUTZ
During the final hearing upon the parties' motions, the couple's
thirteen year old daughter was the first to testify.' She told the court
that she was afraid of her father and that she did not want to visit with
him. Next, Dr. Michael Epstein, the court-appointed psychologist, tes-
tified that the Mother's actions contributed to the daughters' strong
negative feelings about their father." Dr. Epstein stated that the
daughters' animosity toward their Father could be characterized as a
mild form of "Parental Alienation Syndrome"."6 The Mother then tes-
Father found the Mother through a real estate listing in the newspaper. Id.
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id.




44. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 12. Dr. Epstein discussed the negative effects
of certain actions by the Mother, such as the move to Georgia, telling the daughters
that "if your [F]ather wanted to see you he could find you", and reading the pleadings
to the daughters. Id.
45. See id. ("Parental Alienation Syndrome" is used to describe a disturbance in
which children become obsessed with deprecation and criticism of one parent partially
as a result of conscious and unconscious efforts by the other parent. Richard A. Gard-
ner, Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation, ACADEMY FORUM, 29(2), 3-7
(1985)). But see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2, Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290 (Fla.
1991) (No. 72-471) (where the Mother claimed that Dr. Epstein only testified that he
agreed with portions of the theory regarding this syndrome and that he found some
"milder form" of this syndrome in the present case); cf. In re T.M.W., 553 So. 2d 260,
262 n.3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (the court specifically rejected a claim that
"Parental Alienation Syndrome" was the subject of Schutz, pointing out that it was
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tified that the reason she moved to Georgia and neglected to keep in
contact with the Father was because she was afraid of him." However,
the court was not satisfied with the Mother's testimony.4
At the conclusion of the two day hearing, the trial judge held the
Mother responsible for the daughters' hostility towards their Father.48
The judge found that "'the cause of the blind, brainwashed, bigoted
belligerence of the children toward the [Flather grew from the soil
nurtured, watered and tilled by the [M]other.'-,9 Further, the judge
found that "the [M]other breached every duty she owed as the custo-
dial parent to the noncustodial parent of instilling love, respect and
feeling in the children for their [F]ather. ' 150 Accordingly, the circuit
judge ordered that:
It shall be the obligation of the Mother to do everything in her
power to create in the minds of [the daughters] a loving, caring
feeling toward the Father. It shall be the Mother's obligation to
convince the children that it is the Mother's desire that they see
their Father and love their Father. Breach of this Paragraph either
in words, actions, demeanor, implication or otherwise, will call for
the severest penalties this Court can impose, including Contempt,
Imprisonment, Loss of residential custody or any combination
thereof.5 1
The Mother appealed, claiming that the Order violated her First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression because it re-
quired her to express opinions she did not have.52
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the Order
by concluding that even though the Order required the Mother to "in-
struct the children to love and respect their father," her free speech
claim was baseless.53 The appellate court held that the primary consid-
eration in this case was the best interests of the children. 5 The court
instead "the subject of a footnote to a footnote").
46. Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292 (Fla. 1991).
49. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 874 n.1).
50. Id. (quoting Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 874 n.1).
51. Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 875 n.2 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 875.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1 (1989) ("The court shall determine all
matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the
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stated that a custodial parent has an "'affirmative obligation' to en-
courage and nurture the relationship between the children and the non-
custodial parent,"55 because "children are entitled to a warm and lov-
ing affinity with both their parents."" Further, the majority noted that
the Mother's free speech rights were subject to reasonable regulation. 57
The court found that the custodial parent's affirmative obligation set
forth in Gardner could be extended in Schutz to require the Mother
"to raise her daughters' opinion of their father to one she herself does
not hold"" because the Mother had "poison[ed] their hearts and minds
against him."59 Therefore, the majority held that the First Amendment
did not protect the Mother from having to express opinions she did not
have in order "to undo the harm she had already caused."60 While the
appellate court correctly recognized the infringement upon the
Mother's First Amendment rights, the court's conclusion improperly
trivialized these rights.
The dissent rejected the majority's erroneous conclusion and found
merit in the Mother's free speech claim.6' The dissent conceded that
under Florida law a custodial parent is obligated to encourage visita-
tion between the children and the noncustodial parent.62 This obligation
requires that the custodial parent not do anything that would "'under-
mine or starve the noncustodial parent's contacts and relationship with
the child.'"I However, the dissent stated that by requiring the Mother
to lessen the hostility she instilled in the children toward the Father,
the Order "compels the [Mother] ...to exceed the legal duty to en-
courage visitation which she, as a custodial parent, owes the noncus-
todial parent."" Accordingly, the dissent correctly argued that the Or-
best interests of the child ....").
55. Schutz, 874 So. 2d at 875 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987)).
56. Id.
57. Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 875-76 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982), for the proposition that certain communi-
cation can be subject to regulation or preclusion if it runs afoul of established principles
of law or policy).
58. Id. at 875.
59. Id. at 874.
60. Id. at 875.
61. Id. at 876 (Hendry, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 877.
63. Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 877 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Adoption
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der was an impermissible infringement on the Mother's first
amendment rights of freedom of speech and expression."8
The Mother appealed and, upon review by the Florida Supreme
Court, the Order was again affirmed."' The court agreed with the result
reached by the appellate court, but rejected the lower court's analysis.67
Specifically, the court did not accept the lower court's finding that the
Order required the Mother to express opinions she did not have.6" In-
stead, the court found that the Order was consistent with the Mother's
affirmative obligation to encourage and nurture the relationship be-
tween the children and the Father.69 Classifying the burden on the
Mother's First Amendment rights as merely incidental, the Florida Su-
preme Court found the Order constitutional. 0 Examination of the
Schutz decision reveals that the court employed very little analysis, and
its conclusions were essentially unsubstantiated.
IV. ScHuTz: EXPANDING THE AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the
challenged portion of the Order was consistent with the custodial par-
ent's affirmative obligation under Florida law.7 However, a careful in-
spection of' the affirmative obligation, as articulated in the cases cited
by the court, reveals that the Schutz Order expands the custodial par-
ent's legal duty.72 The court opined that pursuant to Florida law the
65. Id.
66. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1290 (Grimes, J., dissenting purely on jurisdictional
grounds).
67. Id. at 1291.
68. Id. at 1292.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1293.
71. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
72. See Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 877 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
trial court order in this case does more than direct the custodial parent to encourage
visitation and nurture the relationship between the noncustodial parent and the
child[ren]" and thereby "compels the wife to exceed the legal duty ... she, as a custo-
dial parent, owes the noncustodial parent."). But see Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292 (cit-
ing Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987)); In re Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So. 2d
1178, 1180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). In Schutz the majority found the Order
consistent with the affirmative obligation in spite of the requirement that the Mother
"do everything in her power to create in the [children's] minds . . . loving, caring
feeling[s] toward the father . I. " d.
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custodial parent's affirmative obligation could be met by "encouraging
the child to interact with the noncustodial parent, taking good faith
measures to ensure that the child visit and . . . have . . . continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent, and refraining from doing any-
thing likely to undermine the relationship naturally fostered by such
interaction. ' 3
In Gardner, the appellate court held that a custodial parent cannot
remain neutral regarding visitation. 7' In that case, the mother was
awarded custody of the parties two children and the father was granted
visitation rights. Significantly, unlike Schutz, in Gardner the mother
did not discourage the children's relationship with the noncustodial fa-
ther. Rather, the mother took the position that the exercise of visitation
rights was a matter between the children and their father. The appel-
late court found this position unacceptable and held that the mother's
affirmative obligation required her to "encourage the parties' minor
daughter to visit the husband and to take steps to ensure that the
daughter . . . [did] so."" The Schutz court ignored the vital distinc-
tions in Gardner, and erroneously concluded that the Order was consis-
tent with the Gardner rationale.
However, Gardner is distinguishable from Schutz. While the cus-
todial parent's affirmative obligation in Gardner related exclusively to
the furtherance of visitation7 6 Schutz had another agenda. For exam-
ple, in Gardner the mother was required to encourage her daughter to
visit the father. 77 In contrast, the Schutz Order compelled the Mother
to convince her daughters that she wanted them to visit with and love
their Father.7 s Further, where Gardner required the mother to help en-
sure that her daughter visited the father, Schutz ordered the Mother to
do everything in her power to make her daughters love their father.79
If the differences in the above requirements seem purely semanti-
cal, contemplation of the underlying goal in Schutz reveals the funda-
mental distinction. Unlike Gardner, the goal in Schutz was to compel
73. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
74. Gardner, 494 So. 2d at 502 (holding that a custodial parent's affirmative
obligation can not be satisfied by remaining neutral and instead the custodial parent
must encourage visitation and help ensure that visitation takes place).
75. Id. at 502.
76. Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987).
77. Id.
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the Mother to undo the damage she had intentionally caused to the
relationship between the two daughters and the Father.80 While the
goal of remedying the past animosity instilled in the daughters by the
Mother is undeniably noble, Schutz signifies a novel expansion of the
custodial parent's affirmative obligation as previously defined in
Gardner.8 1
Never before in a Florida decision has the custodial parent's af-
firmative obligation been construed to contain a requirement as nebu-
lous as creating "in the children's minds loving, caring feelings toward"
the noncustodial parent." Accordingly, the Schutz court's finding that
the Order was "[c]onsistent with this obligation"88 is unsupported by
the facts or case law. If the Florida Supreme Court wanted to enlarge
the custodial parent's affirmative obligation to address the egregious
facts in Schutz, then the court should have began its analysis by ac-
knowledging its intent to do so. However, this would have required the
court to address the Mother's First Amendment claim head on.
V. SCHUTZ: PRESCRIBING OPINIONS
Instead, the Florida Supreme Court avoided the Mother's First
Amendment claim by simply concluding that she was not required to
express opinions she did not hold. 84 Mysteriously, the court read the
challenged portion of the Order to require nothing more of the Mother
than to "take those measures necessary to restore and promote the fre-
quent and continuing positive interaction; e.g., visitation, phone calls,
and letters, between the children and their [Flather, and to refrain
from doing or saying anything likely to defeat that end." 85 However,
such a reading denies the plain meaning of the Order. The Order man-
dated that the Mother "convince the children that it is [her] desire that
they see . ..and love their father."8 Contrary to the court's under-
80. See id. at 875 (stating that the Mother was not "'protected' by the [F]irst
[A]mendment from a requirement that she fulfill her legal obligation to undo the
harm she had already caused ....") (emphasis added).
81. See id. at 877 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (Schutz is the first case in which a
custodial parent has been ordered to instill love for the noncustodial parent in the chil-
dren's minds).
82. Id.
83. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (the Florida Supreme Court chose to ignore this language).
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standing of this language, the Order required the Mother to do far
more than promote phone calls and visitation. This portion of the Order
forced the Mother to express a "desire" that she did not have. There-
fore, in spite of the Florida Supreme Court's finding, the Order did
compel the Mother to express opinions she did not hold.8 7
Given the fact that the Mother was forced to express opinions she
did not hold, the Order was necessarily unconstitutional in light of past
United States Supreme Court decisions. 8 In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that the government
can not prescribe what opinions an individual may hold under any cir-
cumstances. 89 In Barnette, the Court held that the state could not re-
quire children in public schools to salute the American flag, and stated
that:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us. "
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court, relying on Barnette, held
that "the state may never force one to adopt or express a particular
opinion."91
In light of Barnette, it is apparent that the Schutz court chose to
deny the fact that the Order required the Mother to express opinions
she did not have, because to do so would have invalidated the Order.
The Schutz court, satisfied with the manner in which the Order re-
dressed the damage the Mother had caused to the relationship between
the children and their Father,92 chose to overlook the unconstitutional
shortcomings of the Order. There is no ambiguity in the Barnette hold-
87. See Schutz v. Schutz, 522 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(Hendry, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that the government cannot force citizens to confess, by word, matters of opin-
ion); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. State Dep't of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1087 (Fla.
1981) ("[T]he state may never force one to adopt or express a particular opinion.")
(emphasis added).
89. 319 U.S. at 624.
90. Id. at 642 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
91. Coca-Cola Co., 406 So. 2d at 1087.
92. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1290.
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ing; the court cannot force the Mother to represent a matter of opinion
as her "desire," even if the government's interest is the children's
welfare." ,
Rather than erroneously concluding that the Mother was not com-
pelled to express opinions she did not have and affirming the Order, the
Florida Supreme Court should have remanded the case with specific
instructions that the lower court strike the unconstitutional language
and tailor the Order to accurately reflect the custodial parent's affirma-
tive obligation as set forth in Gardner.94 In this way, the Court could
have served the best interests of the children in a constitutionally per-
missible manner. If the court had done this, then it could have avoided
its unsound application of constitutional scrutiny employed to justify
the Schutz Order.
VI. SCHUTZ AND THE O'BRIEN TEST
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court in Schutz determined that the
test developed in United States v. O'Brien was the appropriate level of
scrutiny for the Schutz Order.9 In O'Brien, the United States Supreme
Court held that the government could regulate certain expressive con-
duct othe:rwise protected by the First Amendment if the three following
requirements were satisfied: (1) The regulation furthers an "important
or substantial government interest;" (2) the interest is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression;" and (3) the incidental restriction on
First Amendment freedoms is "no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest." 6 While the Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that all the requirements set forth in O'Brien were satisfied,9" a
careful examination of Schutz reveals that the Court misapplied the
93. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. It is doubtful that the "best interest of the
child" is an exception that did not occur to the Court when it stated that "[i]f there are
any circumstances which permit exception, they do not now occur to us." Id.
94. Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987).
95. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968), where the United States Supreme Court held that draft card burning was
"symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment and could be regulated by the
government).
96. 391 U.S. at 377.
97. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1293 (the court's application of the O'Brien test con-








Step one of the O'Brien test, requiring that the Order's intended
goal be an "important or substantial government interest," seems to
have been satisfied.9 8 In Schutz, the government's interest was the chil-
dren's welfare. 99 When a marriage is dissolved, the court, acting in ac-
cordance with the child's "best interests" has the power to determine
all matters relating to custody of minor children of that marriage. 100
Further, "'frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential
parent' is generally considered to be in the best interest of [the]
child."10 1 The Florida trial court found that the negative messages the
Mother gave her daughters about their Father were contrary to the
daughters' best interests. 102 Therefore, the trial court issued the Order
to "resolve the dispute between the parties in accordance with the best
interests of their children by attempting to restore a meaningful rela-
tionship between the children and their [Flather . . . ." Accordingly,
the Schutz Order satisfies the first step of the O'Brien test. However,
the Order fails steps two and three.
The Schutz court did not adequately address the vital second step
of the O'Brien test, which requires that the government's interest must
be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." 104 When consider-
ing this step, the United States Supreme Court has followed a "two-
track" analysis.10 5
98. See id. (stating that "the state's interest in restoring a meaningful relation-
ship between the parties' children and their father, thereby promoting the best interests
of the children, is at the very least substantial.").
99. Id.
100. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1 (1989) which requires that all
matters relating to the custody of minor children be determined in accordance with the
best interests of the children and in accordance with the public policy of this state
which is to assure children continuing contact with both parents following a divorce.).
101. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a) (1989)).
102. See Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 874 n.1 (quoting the trial court's finding that the
Mother "slowly dripped poison into the minds of these children, maybe even beyond
the power of this Court to find the antidote.").
103. Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1293.
104. See id. at 1292 n.2. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (The Florida Supreme Court stated that "[tihe burden is 'incidental' because
the state interests which are furthered by the [Order are 'unrelated to the suppression
of free expression.' "). The court merely concluded in a one sentence footnote that step
two of the O'Brien test was satisfied. Id.
105. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-92 (2d
ed. 1988); see also John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482,
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The "two-track" analysis states that step two of the O'Brien test is
a crossroads, the outcome of which determines whether the regulation
will be subjected to strict scrutiny or a less stringent balancing test.106
If the regulation prohibits certain expression because the government
objects to its communicative content then the regulation will be sent
down "track one" bound for strict scrutiny.101 However, if the govern-
ment's interest in regulating the conduct is unconcerned with the con-
tent of the message then the regulation follows "track two" where it is
subjected to a more easily satisfied balancing test. 108 The Schutz court
erroneously sent the Order down "track two."'109
When determining whether the restriction is related to the sup-
pression of free speech, the proper consideration is not the ultimate in-
terest to which the state points, for that will always be unrelated to
suppression, but rather the causal connection the state asserts.110 Ac-
cordingly, while the court's ultimate interest in Schutz was the chil-
dren's welfare, the proper question is why that interest was implicated
in that particular case."' Since the answer is that the Mother's expres-
sion of negative feelings regarding the Father threatened the children's
welfare, then the interest was related to the suppression of free expres-
sion. " 2 Thus, the Order actually failed step two of the O'Brien test and
warranted the rigorous requirements of strict scrutiny. However, the
Florida Supreme Court followed "track two" and upheld the order.
Nevertheless, the question of which "track" was proper is not dis-
positive, because the infringement upon the Mother's First Amendment
1497 (1975).
106. See TRIBE, supra note 105, § 12-2, at 791-92.
107. Id. at 791.
108. Id. at 792.
109. See 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S381.
110. Ely, supra note 105 at 1496.
ill. See id.
If, for example, the state asserts an interest in discouraging riots, the
Court should ask why that interest is implicated in the case at bar. If the
answer is . . .that the danger of riot was created by what the defendant
was saying, the state's interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.
Id.
112. Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(the Court found that a prohibition against public school students wearing black arm-
bands to protest the Vietnam War was related to the suppression of free speech, be-
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rights was overburdensome. Therefore, the Order would fail under ei-
ther "track two" or the more stringent "track one," because the in-
fringement on the Mother's first amendment rights in Schutz was both
"greater than essential" and not "necessary."
Finally, the Schutz court concluded that the "incidental" burden
on the Mother's right of free expression was essential to the state's in-
terest in the welfare of the children, thus satisfying the final step of the
O'Brien test."'3 However, a practical look at the requirement that the
Mother convince her daughters that it was her "desire" that they love
their father reveals that the Order was overburdensome. The Mother
communicated to her daughters her animosity for their Father for
seven years.11' When the Order was issued in 1986, the daughters were
fifteen and thirteen years old." 5 Even if the court had the authority to
compel the Mother to profess a change of heart regarding her disdain
for the Father, it is highly unlikely that either teenager would be
convinced.
Furthermore, two reasons illustrate that it would be impossible to
actually enforce the Schutz Order. First, the court would have to deter-
mine if the Mother has done everything in her power to create in her
daughter's minds "a loving, caring feeling toward the Father." 6 The
Order is unenforceable because there is no way for the court to mea-
sure this.1 7 However, it would be possible to determine if the Mother
had encouraged the girls to visit their Father or if she had actually
made them do so. Second, what if a daughter says she knows that deep
inside, her Mother still hates the Father and wishes the daughters did
not have to visit him, despite the Mother's outwardly successful efforts
to encourage visitation? According to the Order, the Mother would
113. See Schutz, 581 So. 2d at 1292.
114. Father's Brief, supra note 1, at 3, 14. The period of time from the dissolu-
tion, in late 1978, until the trial court issued the Order, in 1986, was approximately
seven years.
115. See id. at 3.
116. See Schutz v. Schutz, 522 So. 2d 874, 875 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
117. See Mother's Brief, supra note 12, at 21 (citing National Airlines, Inc. v.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 154 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963), where the
court stated that an injunction requiring that National Airlines should "exercise rea-
sonable diligence" in effectuating the injunction was unenforceable because of the
vague standard of conduct imposed); see also Pizio v. Babcock, 76 So. 2d 654, 655
(Fla. 1954) (holding that "[i]njunctive orders . . . should be confined within reasona-
ble limitations and cast in such terms as they can, with certainty, be complied with").
[Vol. 16
331
: Nova Law Review 16, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Ferguson
then be subjected to contempt charges, imprisonment, loss of custody
or any combination thereof.118 While this scenario seems to push the
issue to the absurd, it is a possible outcome of the Order which illus-
trates its immeasurable, unenforceable and thereby unnecessary
requirements.
In order for the infringement upon the Mother's rights to have
been "no greater than essential," the Order should have accurately re-
flected the affirmative obligation as previously defined under Florida
law.1" 9 For example, the Order should have mandated that the Mother
encourage the daughters to establish positive interaction such as letters,
phone calls, and visitation with the Father; and the Mother refrain
from doing or saying anything likely to defeat that end. If the above
requirements sound familiar, that is because they are what the Florida
Supreme Court read the Schutz Order to mandate.120 Either the court
received a copy of the wrong order or it strained to read between the
lines trying to reconcile the Order with the Constitution and Florida
law. At the very least, the Court should have acknowledged that the
Order went too far and then expressly modified it to the above
requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court in Schutz failed to recognize the Or-
der was an unconstitutional infringement upon the Mother's First
Amendment rights of free speech and expression. The court upheld the
Order because it misconstrued the Order's requirements and incor-
rectly applied constitutional scrutiny. Had the court addressed the ac-
tual language of the Order, rather than what it read the Order to re-
quire,' 2' then the court could not have affirmed the Order.
While there was no excuse for the Mother's conduct in Schutz,
this did not justify the Order. The court denied the Mother her consti-
tutional rights, because it was outraged by her behavior. The extension
118. See Schutz, 522 So. 2d at 875 n.2.
119. See Gardner v. Gardner, 494 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986), appeal dismissed, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a custodial parent's
affirmative obligation cannot be satisfied by remaining neutral and the custodial parent
must encourage visitation); see also In re Adoption of Braithwaite, 409 So. 2d 1178,
1180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (custodial parent of a child owes an obligation to
the noncustodial parent to encourage and nurture the parent-child relationship).
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of the affirmative obligation in this manner was improper and unneces-
sary. The children's best interests could have been served if the Order
had accurately reflected Florida's affirmative obligation by requiring
the Mother to encourage visitation and refrain from interfering with
the Father's relationship with the daughters." With time and matur-
ity, through visitation, the daughters would eventually be able to make
their own judgements about their Father. Accordingly, the Schutz
court should have expressly modified the Order to reconcile it with
Florida law and the Constitution.
David L. Ferguson
122. See Gardner, 494 So. 2d at 502.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, population growth has emerged as a major public
issue.' With world population now over 5.3 billion people, one fifth of
whom live in poverty,2 governments around the world recognize that
uncontrolled population growth3 can have devastating consequences.'
1. See Laura E. Farrell, Note, Population Policies and Proposals: When Big
Brother Becomes Big Daddy, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 83 (1984).
2. Siate of World Population 1990: Choices for a New Century, 16 U.N.F.P.A.
NEWSL., No. 6, at 1 (June 1990), [hereinafter State of World Population]. World
population is expected to increase by over a billion people during the 1990s and will
probably double or triple during the next century. Id.
3. The threat of uncontrolled population growth has been theorized for over
twenty years now. See, e.g., ANNE H. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRON-
MENT: ISSUES IN HUMAN ECOLOGY 41-42 (1970) (speculating that if population contin-
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Some of these consequences are too rapid a depletion of global re-
sources, housing and food shortages and irreversible environmental
damage.5 More than ever, governments are aware that the quality of
human life, as derivative of the quality of the environment, cannot be
separated either ideologically or practically, from the issue of human
population control.6
In several developing countries where the effects of uncontrolled
population expansion are even more evident,' governments have begun
to initiate explicit population policies and laws.8 While most of these
measures consist largely of innocuous family planning guidelines, in
some countries, such as The Peoples Republic of China ("China"), re-
ports have surfaced concerning the use of extreme coercive measures to
achieve population targets.9 Recently, in the United States, Chinese na-
tionals seeking political asylum are pursuing claims based upon per-
sonal opposition to their native country's population control policies."0
Though the United States Congress has condemned the Chinese poli-
cies as crimes against humanity," the issue of whether to grant asylum
on this basis is quite troubling. In the first place, Congress has imposed
strict, statutory requirements on granting asylum applications,'" and as
ues to grow at current rates, in a few thousand years "everything in the visible universe
would be converted into people, and the diameter of the ball of people would be ex-
panding with the speed of light.").
4. Lewis, We are Five Billion Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1987, at A19, col. 4.
5. Note, supra note 1, at 83; see also State of World Population 1990, supra
note 2, at I (emphasizing that already the impact of population growth has been suffi-
cient to degrade the soil, threaten the rain forests, thin the ozone layer and initiate a
global warming whose full consequences cannot yet be calculated).
6. Harrison, Pushing the Limits, 16 U.N.F.P.A. NEWSL. No. 6, at 3 (June
1990).
7. World population growth continues to be grossly out of balance, with more
than 90 percent of the growth coming in the developing regions. State of World Popu-
lation 1990, supra note 2, at 1.
8. According to a Population Council report, 35 developing countries have
promulgated official policies to reduce population rates. S. ISAACS, POPULATION LAW
AND POLICY 399 (1981) (citing D. NORTMAN & E. HOFSTATTER, POPULATION AND
FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS 17 (10th ed. 1980)).
9. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PUB. No. 951, CHINA: A COUN-
TRY STUDY (1988) [hereinafter CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY].
10. China Takes Harsh Population Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1988, § A,
at 30, col. I (late city ed.).
11. U.S. Lawmaker Condemns Peiping's Population Control Policy, CENTRAL
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 23, 1988, at 1.
12. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805 (1990).
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further illustrated, not all claims of suffering and abuse, no matter how
devastating, will satisfy present standards.1 3 Also, as population control
policies are evaluated in the context of United States' asylum law, two
important considerations pervade the analysis.
First, the United States' commitment to protecting victims of per-
secution, as embodied in the asylum laws,"' must be balanced against a
realistic awareness of the country's own limited national resources.' 5
Regardless of world economic political and social conditions, the
United States in all practicality cannot admit everyone who wishes to
immigrate.' Second, when the pervasive violence and suffering
throughout the world is reflected upon and priorities are established for
selecting individuals for asylum relief, the legitimacy of coercive popu-
lation policies must be considered in the universal scheme of human
preservation. In the final analysis, fairness and equality in the treat-
ment of all asylum applicants must prevail. To address the issue of
granting asylum protection to aliens opposing population control poli-
cies, this comment examines the current federal statutory asylum stan-
dards and considers the validity of these asylum claims as indepen-
dently sufficient grounds for relief. In doing so, the Comment focuses
specifically on the judicially refined definition of the term "well-
founded fear of persecution" as set forth in section 101(a)(42)(A) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). The legislative history,
statutory construction and judicial interpretations of these standards
are examined. Next, this comment considers whether the present asy-
lum standards should be statutorily expanded by the United States leg-
islature to provide relief for aliens opposing population control policies.
Finally, the comment determines that asylum seekers, who base
their claims exclusively on opposition to population control policies, do
13. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 135.
14. Asylum law is ideologically based on the notion that the United States, itself
a nation of immigrants many of whom fled oppression in their homelands, has a deeply
rooted commitment to the protection of victims of persecution. This interest is espe-
cially strong when the threatened alien is in the United States, seeking our protection,
for if the government compels such a person to return to his native country, it will bear
a direct responsibility for facilitating an act of persecution. Douglas Gross, Note, The
Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1980).
15. A new peak of immigration to the United States occurred in 1989, with ap-
proximately 80 percent of all immigrants intending to reside in six states: California,
New York, Texas, Illinois, New Jersey and Florida. See 1989 INS Statistical Y.B.,
xiii.
16. 1I'. at xvi (discussing worldwide limitation on immigration).
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not meet the current statutory standards as delineated in existing asy-
lum law. Also, any administrative remedy, which seeks to categorically
extend protection to these specific individuals, is unjust and only serves
to manipulate current standards of review. A statutory expansion of
asylum protection to include aliens opposing population control policies
should not be initiated, in light of the acknowledged validity of popula-
tion control measures and in recognition of even more deserving asylum
applicants who currently are being denied our protection.
II. THE CHINESE PLAN
In China, a country already supporting over 1.1 billion people, 17
concern over population growth is intense. Holding only seven percent
of the world's farmland18 and already supporting approximately one
quarter of the world's people, 9 China's population has roughly doubled
in the past forty years, seriously complicating the country's ability to
feed its people and develop its economy.2
As a result, the central government of China has adopted a com-
prehensive population control policy aimed at reaching zero population
growth by the year 2000, and thus limiting total population to a pro-
jected 1.2 billion. 1 Success in achieving this goal,'2 however, is depen-
dent on seventy percent of married Chinese couples having only one
child. 3 To this effect, the present Chinese policy advocating one child
17. China's fourth national census, conducted in July, 1990, estimated mainland
China's population at 1.13 billion. Chinese Minister says Population Over 1.1 Billion,
KYODO NEWS SERV. Oct. 30, 1990; see also Population Growth Still Overshooting,
ECONOMIST PUBLIC. LTD.; Country Rpt., Mar. 20, 1990 (stating that in 1989, China's
natural population growth rate was 14.33 per thousand, or 15.77 million people).
18. Michael Ross, China Feels Impact of Mandatory Birth Control, UNITED
PRESS INT'L., Apr. 10, 1983, at 1.
19. Id.; see also Epstein, China Has Humane and Fair Birth Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1988, at A34, col. 4 (letter to the editor); L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1987, § 1, at
6, col. 3.
20. 1990 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 845
(1991) [hereinafter 1990 COUNTRY REPORTS].
21. Id.
22. China will most likely miss their official population goals. Recent projections
estimate that China will break the 1.2 billion barrier by 1995 and approach 1.3 billion
by the year 2000. Lewis, supra note 4.
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per couple2 4 was established.2 5 In promotion of Chinese population con-
trol policies, the Chinese central government primarily relies on educa-
tion and propaganda.26 Besides offering birth control services on a mas-
sive scale, the Chinese family planning program also emphasizes
delayed marriage and promotes equal rights and responsibilities for
women.17
In addition, a sophisticated incentive system is in place that re-
wards couples who observe the policy and constrains those who do
not.2 8 Couples with only one child are given a "one-child certificate"
entitling them to such benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity leave,
better child care and preferential housing assignments.2 9 In return,
these couples are required to pledge that they will not have more chil-
dren. 0 If a couple violates this pledge, however, corrective action is
taken which may include stiff fines, withholding of social services, de-
motion and other administrative measures. 3'
Enforcement of the Chinese family planning system is linked to an
efficient monitoring system which includes about thirteen million volun-
teers.3 2 These volunteers, often organized into street committees, keep
track of the status of each local family and collect information on con-
24. The one-child policy is a misnomer because Chinese women have, on aver-
age, 2.25 children. China, With Ever More to Feed, Pushes Anew for Small Families,
N.Y. TIME.';, Jan. 16, 1991, § A, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter China Pushes for Small
Families].
25. CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 76. Numerous exceptions are
allowed for ethnic minorities, couples who are themselves only children, couples whose
first child is handicapped and rural couples whose first child is a daughter. Id.; see also
Epstein, supra note 19, at A34; Note, supra note 1, at 100.
26. 1990 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 20, at 852.
27. Note, supra note 1, at 102. Delayed or "late marriage age" in the country-
side is 25 years for a man and 23 years for a woman, however, in the cities, it is 27
years and 25 years respectively. Id. (citing UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR POPULATION
ACTIVITIES, ANNUAL REVIEW OF POPULATION LAW 10 (1980)).
28. See id. at 102-03.
29. Id. at 102.
30. Id. Couples who have a second child must return the certificate and any
other benefits received. Id.
31. 1990 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 20, at 853. In at least a few cases,
people have been fired from their jobs for refusing to adhere to family planning poli-
cies. Id. This is a very serious penalty in China, affecting housing, pension and other
social benefits. Id. Breach of this pledge renders enforcement of family-planning poli-
cies a question of contract law and contract enforcement, rather than a question of
ideological education, persuasion or discipline. Id.
32. C'hina Pushes for Small Families, supra note 24, at 4, col. 4.
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traceptive use, contraceptive methods employed and local
pregnancies.83
The Chinese family planning system and its enforcement tech-
niques have received allegations that it consists of extreme coercive
measures used to achieve the desired results of the one-child policy,
including reports of intense psychological pressure to the use of force.3 4
In some areas, accounts of forced abortions and involuntary steriliza-
tions have appeared. 5 While Chinese officials admit and condemn
these isolated uncondoned abuses of the program, they insist that the
family planning program is administered on a voluntary basis using
persuasion and economic pressure only.3 6
III. MATTER OF CHANG AND BEYOND
The only reported case to address the issue of population control
policies as grounds for asylum was Matter of Chang.87 In this decision,
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 5 dismissed an appeal of a
thirty-three year old alien-a native and citizen of China who entered
the United States without inspection. 9 In deportation proceedings, the
respondent applied for asylum, withholding of deportation and volun-
33. CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 76. Street committees, having
quasi-governmental authority, usually employ local elderly women, sometimes referred
to as "granny police." See China Pushes for Small Families, supra note 24, at 4.
These street committees even keep track of women's menstrual cycles. Id.
34. CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 77; see also 1990 COUNTRY
REPORTS, supra note 20, at 845.
35. 1990 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 20, at 854.
36. Id.; see also XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, March 23, 1989
(quoting Zhao Xixin, minister of the Chinese Embassy in Washington who stated that
"[F]orced abortion and sterilization is nothing but rumor . . . [and] sheer
fabrication").
37. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
38. The BIA is a five-member appellate court which adjudicates a wide variety
of immigration matters, although mostly exclusion and deportation cases. See DAVID
A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 7-9 (1987). The immigration judges
and the BIA are appointed by the attorney general. Id.
39. Id. at 57. Entry without inspection, under the Immigration and Nationality
Act [hereinafter INA] section 241(a)(2) (1982) is the most frequently used grounds of
deportation. Id. Protecting the integrity of the basic system for the screening and initial
admission of aliens, this provision generally applies to aliens who pass through a border
post by displaying false documents. ld.; see also Reidk v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 624
(1975) (fraud is deemed to vitiate any ostensible inspection).
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tary departure.'* At the deportation hearing, the respondent testified
that he and his wife were forced to flee from their commune because
they had two children and they would not agree to stop having more
children."' The respondent also indicated that the "government"
wanted him to go to a clinic to be sterilized and that he thought the
operation would harm his body."2
The issue of coerced sterilization formed the basis of the respon-
dent's asylum application; however, the immigration court denied his
asylum claim.' 3 In response to respondent's appeal of the immigration
court's decision, the BIA found that China's population control policy
did not constitute persecution within the meaning of the asylum stat-
utes even if involuntary sterilization may occur."
[W.e do not find that the 'one couple, one child' policy of the Chi-
nese Government is on its face persecutive . . . . For China to fail
to take steps to prevent births might well mean that many millions
of people would be condemned to, at best, the most marginal exis-
tence. . .. There is no evidence that the goal of China's policy, [to
control population growth,] is other than as stated, or that it is a
subterfuge for persecuting any portion of the Chinese citizenry on
account of one of the reasons enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A)
of the Act."
40. 'Voluntary departure, under INA section 244(e), may be granted during pro-
ceedings at the discretion of the immigration judge. MARTIN, supra note 38, at 73.
Such a grant usually comes in the form of an alternate order of deportation. Id. If the
alien leaves by the deadline set by the immigration judge, he or she is not considered to
have departed under a formal deportation order. Id. Voluntary departure not only gives
the alien greater flexibility in arranging his or her departure time, but also provides
certain legal advantages over deportation, such as a greater possibility of being admit-
ted at a later date. Id.
In this case, the BIA allowed Chang to depart voluntarily within 30 days from the date
of the order. Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, at 16.
41. Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, at 3. Mr. Chang also stated that he disagreed with
China's family planning policies because "in the countryside, especially in the farming
areas, we need more children." Id.
42. Id. Mr. Chang also testified that his wife was supposed to go to the clinic to
be sterilized but did not do so because of illness. Id.
43. Id. at 2. The immigration judge denied Chang's applications for asylum,
withholding of deportation and voluntary departure in a decision dated December 18,
1986. Id.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, at 10. An alien establishes statutory eligibility for
asylum under section 208 by showing that he or she meets the definition of refugee set
forth in INA section 101(a)(42)(A): a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
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Several months after the Chang decision, Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh in response to growing popular concern over China's
human rights abuses issued an executive directive"' instructing the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to give "[c]areful con-
sideration . . . to such an applicant who expresses a fear of persecution
upon return to their country, related to that country's family planning
policy of forced abortion or sterilization . . . ."-7 In response to this
directive, the INS promulgated interim rules which amended existing
asylum regulations and articulated new standards applicable to perse-
cution claims based on alleged coercive population control policies.48
The interim rules stated that an "[a]lien fleeing coercive popula-
tion control policies . . . may be considered to have a clear probability
or well-founded fear 9 of persecution .... ."5 The INS then summarily
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
46. The attorney general's action was an "executive directive," which does not
have the power of law and can be revoked or amended without public notice; an execu-
tive order, by contrast, must be printed in the Federal Register and carries more legal
validity. See N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1990, at A19, col. i.
47. Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Gene McNary, Commis-
sioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Dec. 1, 1989).
48. 55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (1990) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 243) (pro-
posed Jan. 29, 1990).
49. For a general discussion of the standards of review including "clear
probability" and "well-founded fear," see infra text accompanying notes 81 to 94.
50. 55 Fed. Reg. 2804 (1990) (citation added). On April 11, 1990, President
Bush issued a formal executive order which, among other things, directed the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General to provide "[e]nhanced consideration for individuals
• ..who express a fear of persecution ...related to that country's policy of forced
abortion or coerced sterilization ...." Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,896
(1990). Since interim rules, having full legal effect, were already in place when this
order was issued, the President's actions can be seen as a politically motivated effort to
pacify supporters of H.R. 2712, The Emergency Chinese Relief Act of 1989. H.R.
2712, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (President Bush pocket vetoed H.R. 2712, which
would have provided statutory protection from deportation for several groups of Chi-
nese nationals, including those fleeing coercive population control policies).
Although President Bush argued that these administrative measures were
equivalent to the protections provided under H.R. 2712, many Chinese students and
congressional supporters of the bill accused President Bush of yielding to pressure from
the Beijing government. See WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1989, at A4. They complained that
the executive directive could be revoked or challenged in court and that only legislation
could guarantee protection. Id.; WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 4; see also 136
CONG. REC. S335-S382, H44-H66 (1990). A majority of senators voted to override the
President's veto, but the total was four votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to
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categorized these claims as "persecution on account of political opin-
ion.""1 As a result, the BIA's decision in Chang was negated by the
interim rules to the extent that it did not advance a determination of
persecution under China's population control policies.52
On July 27, 1990,"8 Attorney General Thornburgh issued final
asylum regulations54 which went into effect on October 1, 1990. The
final regulations made no mention of either the January interim rules
or the Chinese population control measures. 5 Since these new asylum
regulations supersede and negate all interim rules, 56 it appears that the
Chang decision has been technically restored as the government's offi-
cial word on the Chinese population control policies.57 As a result,
there is some question as to whether Chinese nationals can continue to
rely on asylum protection in this area.58 To date, the July asylum regu-
lations have not been further amended or replaced, 59 and while the
INS is apparently in the process of drafting new regulations, which
should address the issue, there is no definitive statement as to what
Chinese nationals may expect. 60
This discrepancy in official policy has further complicated an al-
ready confusing and disjointed area of law.61 It has also created incon-
pass the bill over the president's opposition. Id. However, the House of Representatives
voted overwhelmingly to override the veto. Id.
51. 55 Fed. Reg. 2804 (1990) (The INS did not explain why it classified the
family planning policy as persecution on the basis of political opinion, as opposed to,
for example, persecution on the basis of membership in a particular social group).
52. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 117-18, 148-49 (Jan 20, 1990).
53. The Code of Federal Regulations dealing with immigration matters is period-
ically amended through the use of Interim Rules, but had not been officially re-codified
since 1981).
54. 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 751, 754 (July 30, 1990).
55. See 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1991).
56. The new regulations completely replace the Justice Department's existing
asylum regulations. 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1222 (Oct. 29, 1990).
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Although the omission of this issue from the final regulations was presuma-
bly an oversight. Id.
60. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1222 (Oct. 29, 1990).
61. See Sophie H. Pirie, Comment, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Per-
secution" in United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV., 186 (1986). Confusion over
eligibility requirements has caused the INS and the courts to treat aliens facing similar
persecution threats disparately. Id. Some of the disparity reflects varying interpreta-
tions of vague statutory language, while other disparity reflects discrimination among
aliens on the basis of political considerations. Id.
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sistency in asylum adjudications.62 While Chang may still be consid-
ered the technical law, immigration judges, with significant flexibility
and discretion in asylum review,63 may interpret existing policy differ-
ently. One immigration judge may circumvent precedential rulings
which he considers unconscionable by emphasizing other legitimate av-
enues of statutory relief."' Another immigration judge may, in his dis-
cretion, look to the interim rules and presidential executive order as an
illustration of executive intention, regardless of existing "technical
law." Still another immigration judge may adhere strictly to Chang's
precedential declaration and deny asylum on this basis alone. Since
Chang, no other appellate courts have addressed the prospect of grant-
ing asylum relief on the basis of opposition to population control poli-
cies. Therefore, this issue with all its complexities, seems open and ripe
for legal challenge and analysis.
IV. ASYLUM RELIEF UNDER STATUTORY LAW-AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Provisions protecting aliens who would face persecution if deported
to their homelands have existed in various forms since the advent of
federal immigration laws. 65 In earlier years, however, the law of asylum
was a somewhat haphazard collection of statutes and informal adminis-
trative procedures.66 Then, in 1968, the United States became a party
62. All references to varying interpretations of the validity of Chang and the
interim rules are based on my personal observations, as a Judicial Law Clerk, United
States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Review, Miami, Fl.
63. Immigration law has always been characterized as an area where judicial
discretion in frequently employed which often creates confusion and controversy. See
generally Comment, supra note 61, at 187; see also Arthur C. Helton, The Proper
Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999
(1985) (discussing discretionary denials in asylum adjudication).
64. For example, additional weight may be given to Chinese nationals fearing
persecution based upon participation in pro-democracy activities. See supra note 62.
65. MARTIN, supra note 38, at 78.
66. Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee by Any Other Name. An Examination of the
Board of Immigration Appeals' Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV., 681 (1989).
One provision, however, in the 1952 version of the INA, served as a partial statutory
authorization for the practice of asylum. INA [[ 243(h) (1952), Pub. L. No. 82-414, [[
243(h). INA section 243(h) as originally enacted, authorized the attorney general, in
his discretion, to "withhold deportation" of aliens who would be subject to persecution
in their homelands; MARTIN, supra note 38, at 78. But See infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text (withholding of deportation would later become the mandatory
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to an important international treaty affecting political asylum, the 1968
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Proto-
col"). 67 The Protocol, opened for signature in 1967,68 mandated protec-
tion69 to any refugee, defined as a person who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country . . . 0
While Congress ratified the Protocol in 1967 and thus became de-
rivatively bound to the treaty's provisions, 71 no statutory protection was
granted until thirteen years later7 2 with the enactment of the Refugee
Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act").7 The Refugee Act, which now governs
form of relief).
67. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
68. The Protocol was designed as a reaffirmation and extension of the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was designed to define refu-
gees using the "well-founded fear of persecution" language now in INA section
101(a)(42)(A), but only afforded protection to aliens who had become refugees as a
result of events occurring before 1951. Id. (the United States never did adhere to the
Convention).
69. Both the Convention and the Protocol include non-refoulment provisions
which establish an alien's right not to be returned to his home country. See MARTIN
supra note .38, at 79. The Convention provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel
or return [refouler] a refugee . . . to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion." Convention, supra note 68, at art. 33.
70. Convention, supra note 68, at art. I (as adopted by Protocol, art. 1).
71. Protocol is undeniably part of the supreme law of the land, and its provisions
must control in any case of conflict with prior acts of Congress or administrative prac-
tice. Douglas Gross, Note, Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1125 (1980); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that together with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States, all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land).
72. See MARTIN, supra note 38, at 79 (Congress relied instead on the Attorney
General to exercise discretion consistently with the treaty). But see Matter of Dunar,
14 I&N Dec. 310, 314-19 (BIA 1973) (the BIA maintains that the intent of Congress
in ratifying the Protocol was not to change existing domestic law).
73. The 1980 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-122, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(amending INA and codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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asylum procedures in the United States, was grounded in the legal
principles articulated in the Protocol and demonstrates the United
States' commitment to humanitarian concerns. 4 Passage of the Refu-
gee Act also reflects a desire to liberalize United States asylum law and
to give fuller effect to the purposes, as well as the language, of the
Protocol.75 The Refugee Act was to become the uniform statutory eligi-
bility standard, established by Congress in an effort to achieve uniform-
ity, fairness and neutrality in the determination of asylum claims.7 6
With its passage, Congress sought to make asylum procedures available
to all applicants on a uniform basis, to ensure that each applicant
would have a full opportunity to be heard and present his or her claim
and to ensure that each claim would be evaluated evenhandedly under
a neutral international standard adopted by the Act. 77
Although the Refugee Act contained several major provisions re-
lating to relief from deportation, the most significant reformations are
found in INA sections 208 and 243(h).7 8 Section 208, which was first
added by the Refugee Act, created a new immigration status for its
beneficiaries, called "asylee," which was later incorporated into various
sections of the Code of Federal Regulations.7 ' Acquiring asylee status
not only facilitates an alien's entitlement to work authorization and
74. Senator Kennedy argued to President Carter when sponsoring the Refugee
Act that it "gives statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns-which are now reflected in our immigration law." SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
75. For example, the Refugee Act makes the protections of the Protocol availa-
ble at exclusion hearings, for aliens who have not technically "entered" the country,
and deportation hearings. See Note, supra note 71, at 1132.
76. See Anker, An Empirical Study of Adjudication of Asylum Claims Before
Immigration Court (Jan. 1990) (executive summary), at 1.
77. Id.
78. INA section 208 was added by section 201(b) of the Refugee Act, enacted
March 17, 1980 and INA section 243(h) was extensively revised. See INA §§ 208,
243, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h) (1980); Pub L. 96-212, 94 Stat 103. The
distinction between relief under section 208, (asylum) and under section 243(h), (with-
holding of deportation) is significant for the purposes of determining "the probability of
harm." See infra text accompanying notes 108-119. Therefore, in this context, the two
forms of relief will be carefully distinguished with all references made to either asylum
under section 208, or withholding under section 243. However, most applicants submit
simultaneous claims for both withholding of deportation and asylum, and therefore, all
other references to statutory relief under the Refugee Act will use the word "asylum"
to refer to both forms of relief since it is the broader form of protection.
79. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1990) (regarding jurisdiction in asylum proce-
dures); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3, 208.4 (1990) (regarding application process).
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public assistance, but also provides for a routine procedure for the
asylee's eventual adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.8
Statutory eligibility for obtaining the status of "asylee" is also provided
for in the Refugee Act.81 Thus, asylee status is established if an alien
can show that he meets the definition of "refugee" as set forth in the
INA."3 This definition, also a product of the Refugee Act's legislation,
is specifically drawn from the definition of "refugee" appearing in the
Protocol83 and provides statutory eligibility for asylee status to a person
outside his or her homeland:
[W]ho is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwill-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country be-
cause of persecution, or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion .... 8,
Meeting this definition of "refugee" is only the first step in the
process of securing relief under the Refugee Act. Since INA section
208 was enacted as a discretionary form of relief,85 the alien must also
demonstrate that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion on his ap-
80. The status of "lawful permanent resident" is much sought after and provides
the beneficiary with a wide range of rights and benefits almost equal to that of a
United States' citizen. See, e.g., INA § 212(c); 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1980) (provides discre-
tionary relief from deportation to lawful permanent residents who have maintained a
lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years). This form of relief is often
used by aliens convicted of crimes which would normally render them deportable. Id.
81. See INA § 208(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980).
82. INA § 208(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980) (citing INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980) (added by section 201(a) of the.Refugee Act)). Meet-
ing this definition is only the first step, since the granting of asylee status remains at
the discretion of the Attorney General through the immigration judge or Asylum Of-
ficer. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1990).
The Regulations implementing section 208 of the INA specify different procedures
for asylum applications. For example:
1) an asylum-seeker may apply for protection with an Immigration and
Naturalization Service District Director if deportation proceedings have
not commenced. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(a) (1990).
2) if the first approach is unsuccessful, the asylum-seeker may resubmit
his or her application for asylum to an immigration judge in subsequent
deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(b), 208.10 (1990).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
84. INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1980).
85. Cf. INA § 243(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1980) (mandatory form of relief).
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plication.8" This is usually a fairly routine procedure, unless the alien
has either opportunities for resettlement in a third country87 or displays
adverse factors"8 such as misuse of the immigration laws 89 or criminal
activity.90
The other significant provision of the Refugee Act concerns relief
in the form of withholding of deportation.91 The Refugee Act substan-
tially amended this provision, changing it from a discretionary form of
relief 2 to a mandatory form of protection.'" This provision also utilizes
a different standard of review, providing mandatory relief to an individ-
ual only if his "[ijife or freedom would be threatened . . . on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion."9" Unlike asylum relief, withholding of deportation
86. The "[a]lien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee .... " INA §
208(a); U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980).
87. See Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec. 3118 (BIA 1989) (Firm resettlement in
another country does not bar an applicant from qualifying for asylum. Instead, it is just
one of the factors to be taken into consideration in the discretionary aspect of this form
of relief). But see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c)(2), 208.15 (1990) (providing for mandatory
denial of asylum for aliens who have been firmly resettled in another country).
88. "In the absence of any adverse factors, asylum should be granted in the exer-
cise of discretion. However, when adverse factors are present, asylum may be denied in
the exercise of discretion if the applicant fails to demonstrate sufficient positive equities
to overcome the adverse factors." Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. 3033 (BIA 1987).
89. See Matter of Shirdel, Int. Dec. 2958 (BIA 1984); Matter of Salim, 18 I&N
Dec. 311 (BIA 1982). However, since most asylum seekers, in deportation and exclu-
sion proceedings are not in compliance with the usual provisions of the immigration
laws, the BIA has itself begun to relax this standard. See Matter of Gharadaghi, Int.
Dec. 3001 (BIA 1985) (emphasizing that an alien's prior misuse of the immigration
laws (fraud) should not lead automatically to a discretionary denial of asylum).
90. An applicant is mandatorily denied asylum if he has been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime in the United States. 8 C.F.R. §
208.14(c)(1) (1990).
91. INA § 243(h)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980) (amended by section 203(e) of
the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107).
92. INA § 243(h); see also MARTIN, supra note 38, at 81. (The discretionary
form of relief is now provided by INA section 208).
93. INA § 243(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980).
94. INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980) (emphasis added). The lan-
guage of section 243(h) is similar to the refugee definition used in section 208(a) for
asylum, especially in its stipulation that the threat be based on one of the same five
factors. Id.; INA § 208(a) (1980). The standards of review used in these two provi-
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does not provide for permanent resettlement in the United States,95
work authorization or public assistance."8
Though it is clear that Congress maintained humanitarian inten-
tions in its adoption of the Protocol as a guiding principal in enacting
the Refugee Act, the statutes which comprise this effort provide no
comprehensive explanation of the term "persecution" 9 7 or of the cate-
gorical distinctions which qualify the grant of asylum. Consequently,
the Refugee Act, while symbolically significant, comes no closer to the
true and useful interpretation of the asylum standards that are abso-
lutely necessary for maintaining consistent and impartial asylum adju-
dication. 98 The terms "well-founded fear" and "persecution" remain
nebulous and manipulable.99 Absolute acceptance of any sweeping as-
sertion that opposition to China's family planning policies constitutes a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of "political opinion" is
only one more example of such manipulation.100
V. DEFINING THE STANDARDS
The Refugee Act for the first time created statutory asylum proce-
dures for aliens within the United States or at its borders who feared
persecution in their home countries and sought United States' protec-
95. As a result, beneficiaries of withholding relief under section 243(h) become
deportable when the threat of persecution ends. See Note, supra note 66, at 687. They
may also be deported to another country. Id.
96. MARTIN, supra note 38, at 81.
97. In 1979, the United Nations published the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status, which was offered to give guidance in determining refugee status to the govern-
ments that signed the Convention or Protocol. U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [here-
inafter Handbook]. The Handbook specifically states that "[t]here is no universally
accepted definition of persecution and [that] various attempts to formulate such a defi-
nition have met with little success." id.
98. See Anker, supra note 76.
99. Comment, supra note 61, at 186.
100. A Government Accounting Office study, focusing on the Executive Office
for Immigration Review procedures concluded that the "[c]urrent adjudicatory system
remains one of ad hoc rules and standards. Despite Congress' goals in creating statu-
tory asylum procedures, factors rejected by Congress-including ideological preferences
and unreasoned and uninvestigated political judgments continue to influence the deci-
sion-making process." Anker, supra note 76, at 3 (citing UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER,
UNITED STATES SENATE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-
FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED (1987)).
1992]
348
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
tion. 11 However, the Refugee Act was not meant to declare a general
right of relocation for all citizens of a nation whenever its government
abuses human rights. 102 Determining exactly what types of abuses
qualify asylum applicants for relief under the Refugee Act is a difficult
task and has led to inconsistent judicial interpretations of the statute.1 03
This analysis interprets and clarifies the statute, focusing specifically on
the "probability of harm," the "content of harm," the "motivation in
inflicting harm" and the "basis of harm."
A. Probability of Harm- Well-Founded Fear/Clear
Probability
From the onset, the courts struggled to identify the degree of risk
or probability of harm necessary to qualify for a grant of statutory re-
lief.'0 ' In this effort, the courts examined and compared the standards
of review used for both asylum, under INA section 208, and withhold-
ing of deportation, under INA section 243(h). 105
In INS v. Stevic,' °6 the first United States Supreme Court case to
address this issue, the Court distinguished between the wording of the
refugee definition, "well-founded fear of persecution," required for asy-
lum under INA section 208, and the wording of the withholding statute
in INA section 243(h), "life or freedom would be threatened."' 0 7 The
Court determined that, for relief under the withholding standard, the
alien must show a "[c]lear probability of persecution on account of one
of the five reasons listed in the Act."'0 8 The Court further refined this
101. Id.
102. MARTIN, supra note 38, at 88.
103. See Comment, supra note 61, at 188 (disparity in asylum adjudication in-
cludes random disparity, which reflects varying interpretations of statutory language,
and political disparity, reflecting discrimination among aliens on the basis of political
considerations).
104. See, e.g., Sankar v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Her-
nandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984); Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA
1985).
105. See generally, Carolyn P. Blum, The Ninth Circuit and Protection of Asy-
lum Seekers Since Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327
(1986).
106. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
107. Id.
108. Id. Before 1980, the courts generally followed the "clear probability of per-
secution" standard for withholding relief. Blum, supra note 105, at 334. However,
when INA section 243(h) was amended under the Refugee Act to become a mandatory
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standard to require proof that the applicant would "more likely than
not" be subject to persecution on account of one of the specified
grounds."0 '
The standard of proof which governed asylum applications, "well-
founded fear of persecution,"' 10 was not addressed by the Court in
Stevic and remained a source of controversy for three more years. 1
Then, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca"2 held that this "well-founded fear" standard is different
from, and more generous than, the "clear probability" standard gov-
erning applications for withholding of deportation under section
243(h)." 1' This Court, however, did not attempt to resolve the ambigu-
ity present in the "well-founded fear" terminology or even how this
standard should be applied." 4 Instead, the Court left this standard to
be given concrete meaning on a case-by-case basis." 5
Although the Court in Stevic" 6 and Cardoza-Fonseca"7 focused
primarily on the asylum/withholding standards in terms of probability
of harm, rather than addressing the content of harm," 8 these decisions
are meaningful to an evaluation of Chinese population policies for evi-
dentiary reasons. To begin, the sweeping language of the interim
rules," 9 with their general assertions of applicability, fails to actually
utilize the standards of review so thoroughly discussed by the Supreme
Court.120 In addition, this language fails to consider the important sub-
grant of relief, the courts questioned whether this test would still apply. Id. The courts
also questioned whether this same standard should apply to the newly created asylum
relief. Id.; see also MARTIN, supra note 38, at 90, 91.
109. Sitevic, 467 U.S. at 416.
110. INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1980); see also INA §
208(a); 8 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1980).
111. The courts were split over which standard to apply for asylum relief. See
MARTIN, supra note 38, at 90 (referring to the diversity of case law regarding this
issue). See, e.g., Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1986);
Youkhanna v INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743
F.2d 562, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1984)
112. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 444.
115. Id. at 448.
116. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407.
117. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 125-36.
119. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (1990).
120. For example, "aliens [who express a fear of coercive population control poli-
cies] in their homeland ... can establish a well-founded fear, in the case of an asylum
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stantive distinctions in the standard of review for these two forms of
relief, before summarily declaring that upon violation of China's popu-
lation control policy, both standards will be satisfied. 121
This becomes significant when we consider that Chinese popula-
tion control policies are enforced by different methods and to different
extents throughout China. 122 To proclaim that resistance to, or viola-
tion of, China's population control policies necessarily forms a basis of
relief, for asylum and withholding alike, is to make factual determina-
tions before hearing the evidence. 123 In addition, this over-generalized
application of the standards goes against the proposition in Cardoza-
Fonseca that ambiguity in terminology be given concrete meaning on a
case-by-case basis. 24
B. Content of Harm-Persecution
In their application of asylum statutes to a variety of situations,
the courts have de-emphasized the subtle distinctions in "probability of
harm" and focused more precisely on the content of the harm feared
and whether such harm amounts to "persecution" as stated in the Ref-
ugee Act. 125 In this haphazard effort to give the term "persecution"
practical meaning, the courts have met with considerable challenge. 26
While the commonly used definition of "persecution" is "to oppress or
harass with ill-treatment,"' 2 no statutory definition of this term has
ever existed. 28 As a result, the courts, by simply analyzing and com-
paring actual threats on an individual basis have endeavored to develop
applicant, or a clear probability, in the case of an applicant for withholding . . . if
evidence exists that they will be persecuted if returned to his or her homeland." Id. at
2804 (emphasis added); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
121. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (1990).
122. See Mark Savage, Note, The law of Abortion in the Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and the People's Republic of China: Women's Rights in Two Socialist Coun-
tries, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1988).
123. For a general discussion of the evidentiary problems associated with asylum
review, see MARTIN, supra note 38, at 84-86.
124. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
125. See generally Note, supra note 66, at 694-705; see also infra notes 131,
132, 134, 138 and 155.
126. See generally Comment, supra note 61, at 188-91.
127. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 977
(6th ed. 1976).
128. See Handbook, supra note 97.
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functional standards that can be uniformly applied. However, despite
their efforts considerable disparity remains." 9
In Kovac v. INS, 3 the first case to address this issue, the court
defined "persecution" as "[t]he infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ . ..in a way regarded as offensive.' 131 More recent
courts have refined and narrowed this definition by focusing on the type
of harm, whether economic or physical, its specificity, whether directed
at individuals, groups or entire populations, and its severity.' 32 Only by
negative implication have any meaningful standards emerged. To this
effect, the courts have generally agreed that "[p]ersecution cannot be
established by allegations of widespread violence, anarchy, or unrest
which equally affects all citizens of the applicant's homeland .. . [or
by] general economic disadvantage, decline in . . .fortunes . . . loss of
.. .family land . . . [or] confinement to . . .quarters . . .133
While only rough and tentative generalizations can be made from
the context of these disjointed holdings, it does appear, though incon-
clusively, that in the determination of asylum relief the courts have
sought to distinguish and exclude claims based upon general violence
and pervasive oppression."" In Matter of Sanchez and Escobar,3 5 the
BIA went even further to require that "[a]n individual [must] show he
would be singled out or treated differently from others in his country
because he possessed a characteristic a persecutor sought to punish."',3
129. Disparity in the application of these statutes is largely the result of political
motivations. See Helton, Political Asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act: An unfulfilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984); see also Comment, supra note 61, at 202-
07.
130. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
131. Id. at 107.
132. See Comment, supra note 61, at 202-07.
133. Blum, supra note 105, at 345 (citing Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d 597, 599
(9th Cir. 1985); Raass v. INS, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d
1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983); Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir.
1985)); see also Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990) (economic persecution
not enough for asylum); Khalaf v. INS, 909 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1990) (punishment for
failure to comply with a country's compulsory military service is prosecution not
persecution).
134. See Matter of Sibrun, Int. Dec. 2932 (BIA 1983) (generalized oppression
by a government of virtually the entire populace is not persecution per se).
135. Int. Dec. 2996 (BIA 1985).
136. Id. at 11. But see Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
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This holding becomes even more significant in the context of these Chi-
nese asylum claims because China's family planning policies are being
applied to all members of its population.""7
For that matter, it is inappropriate to specifically and resolutely
categorize the "harm feared" for purposes of establishing claims of
persecution as either a general "fear of coercive population control poli-
cies" or as "a fear of being forced to submit to abortion or steriliza-
tion."1 8 This classification effectively ignores the actual consequences
of violating the population control policies and not submitting to abor-
tion or sterilization. As a result, it provides asylum relief to applicants
who actually fear a type of harm that under other circumstances would
not be protected.
For example, a Chinese woman who has recently given birth to a
second child may be pressured or even ordered to submit to sterilization
procedures. However, if she refuses to obey this mandate the routine
practice in her locality may only be to withhold a state-given benefit or
to impose on her a monetary fine or surcharge." 9 In this case, the ac-
tual harm feared is economic, not physical, and may not be sufficient to
sustain a claim of asylum based upon on a well-founded fear of perse-
cution. 140 For that reason, any determination of "persecution" in terms
of "content of harm" must include a complete factual analysis per-
formed on a case-by-case basis. To pigeonhole the Chinese policies into
any specific category of harm would be improper.
C. Motivation for Imposing Harm-Punishment and Legiti-
macy
Another important element to consider in the statutory interpreta-
137. See CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 77.
138. As per the language of the interim rules. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (1990)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 243).
139. See CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 76.
140. This example only suggests that the actual consequences be considered in
the persecution analysis, rather than the general "population control policy." It does
not assert that the economic consequences would necessarily be inadequate to satisfy
the persecution standard. Although the courts tend to deny claims based on general
economic conditions, there are circumstances where purely economic harm will suffice.
See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[I]mposition of substan-
tial economic disadvantage ...constitutes persecution."); In re Acosta, I&N. Dec.
2986 (1985) (persecution "could consist of economic deprivation so severe that [it]
constitute[s] a threat to an individual's life or freedom").
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tion of the term "persecution" concerns the home country's motivation
in performing the harmful actions."" In Matter of Mogharrabi,"2 the
BIA adopted a four step test 43 to determine whether the asylum appli-
cant has satisfied the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard."",
The alien was required to demonstrate that:
(1) She possessed a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort;
(2) the persecutor was already aware, or could become aware, that
she possessed this belief or characteristic;
(3) the persecutor had the capability of punishing her;
(4) the persecutor had the inclination to punish her. 45
The Mogharabbi test is significant because of its standard use of
the word "punishment,"'"6 which illustrates an important consideration
in the application of asylum statutes to the Chinese population control
policies. That is, the home country's performance of a feared action
must be motivated by an ultimate desire to impose on the individual
some form of discipline or punishment.147 In Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS,' 8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on this concept
by considering a possible "[l]egitimate basis for governmental action
." 9 To this effect, the court suggests that in determining whether
141. See generally Note, supra note 71, at 1140 (discussing situations where a
government's punishment is based on valid interest in law enforcement); Blum, supra
note 105, at 345 (distinguishing between the scope and nature of persecution and
prosecution).
142. Int. Dec. 3028 (BIA 1987).
143. Id. at 439. The BIA, in Mogharrabi also expanded on Cardoza-Fonseca's
analysis, holding that for asylum "a well founded fear of persecution [exists] if a rea-
sonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned
.I Id. (quoting Guevara Flores v. INS. 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986)).
144. Id. at 448.
145. 1d. The Mogharrabi analysis is actually a modification of the test developed
by the BIA in Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
146. See Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 211. ("The term persecution in the definition
of a refugee under the Act means harm or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual
in order to punish him ....") (emphasis added).
147. Punishment is defined as the act of subjecting someone to a penalty for a
crime, fauli or misbehavior to inflict a penalty on a criminal or wrongdoer for an of-
fense. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1060 (New
College Edition 1976).
148. 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. 1d. at 516.
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the harm feared amounts to persecution required for granting asylum
relief, "[ilt is permissible to examine the motivation of the persecutor,
[and] . . . look to the political view and actions of the entity or individ-
ual responsible for the threats or violence . ".. .160
China's population control measures are enforced for the genuine
purpose of containing population expansion to a manageable level for
the ultimate welfare and survival of the Chinese citizens. 151 Conse-
quently, their application to the general population could hardly be
considered a form of punishment. 152 Likewise, the government's moti-
vation in imposing these policies on the Chinese people could scarcely
be considered illegitimate. The BIA, in Chang,'5" correctly recognized
and highlighted this distinction, stating that "[t]o the extent . . that
such a policy is solely tied to controlling population, rather than as a
guise for acting against people for reasons protected by the Act, 5 " we
cannot find that persons who do not wish to have the policy applied to
them are victims of persecution . ".. ,,15
D. Basis of Harm-Race, Religion, Nationality, Political
Opinion, Membership in a Particular Social Group
As a final requirement, the Refugee Act limits the grant of asylum
protection to those individuals who can demonstrate that their fear of
persecution is based on one of five grounds enumerated in the Act's
definition of a refugee: race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion. 56 To this extent, even appli-
cants who can establish proof of severe physical abuse may not qualify
for asylum relief.157
150. Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 17 to 20.
152. Even if we considered the consequences of violating the population control
policy as a form of sanction or punishment, rather than focusing on the policy itself as
a form of population control, these sanctions may still not rise to the level of persecu-
tion if they are legitimate legal sanctions. See Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259
(9th Cir. 1985).
153. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
154. To this extent, the court in Chang notes that the Chinese policy was not
being selectively applied against members of particular religious groups, being used to
punish individuals for their political opinions, or being applied more severely to those
who oppose the policy. Id. at 11.
155. Id.
156. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1991); see also text accompanying notes 81-84.
157. See, e.g., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 9 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
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The first and third categories, race and nationality, can be summa-
rily dismissed as bases for asylum relief since China's population con-
trol policies are imparted upon the entire nation regardless of race or
nationality and afford even greater allowances to ethnic minorities. 58
Religion, as well, is a tentative argument because the Chinese policy is
itself religiously neutral. 59 Even if an applicant claimed that religious
beliefs precluded him from submitting to sterilization or abortion, he
must also establish evidence showing that the government was actually
persecuting him for the purpose of overcoming these religious convic-
tions.160 Once again, the motivation behind the government's action be-
comes an important issue.' 6'
To be considered for asylum on the basis of membership in a par-
ticular social group, the fourth category, the applicant must establish
that the persecution is "[d]irected toward an individual who is a mem-
ber of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic . . . [such as] sex, color or kinship ties . . . [or] shared
past experience. 162 In Del Valle v. INS, 6 ' this definition was further
expanded to require "[slome evidence that the applicant or those simi-
larly-situated are at a greater risk than the general population."' 64 In
contrast, the Chinese policies are applied to the general population, and
although severity in enforcement may vary from region to region, there
is no link between this geographically based disparate treatment and an
applicant's status as a member of a particular social group. Even if one
suggests that those in opposition to the policy share the common char-
acteristic of belief or conviction, there is still no evidence to suggest
that petitioner had been raped for personal reasons, not for political opinions, despite
the fact thait the rapist shouted political slogans, opposed the agricultural cooperative
that her uncle administered, murdered her uncle before raping her and threatened to
kill her if she exposed him). Other courts, however, have reached unpredictable conclu-
sions in this respect. See generally Linda Dale Bevis, Note, Political Opinions of Refu-
gees: Interpreting International Sources, 63, WASH. L. REV., 395 (1988) (commenting
on inconsistent judicial interpretations of political opinion in asylum requests).
158. Epstein, supra note 19, at A34; see also supra, note 25.
159. Epstein, supra note 19, at A34.
160. In Chang, the BIA compares China's population policy to the United
States' imposition of Social Security taxes against Amish persons whose religious be-
liefs forbade payment of the taxes or receipt of the benefits. Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 at
13 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 142 to 151.
162. Matter of Acosta-Solarzano, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
163. 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. Id. at 1411.
1992]
356
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
that Chinese officials are singling out these resisters for retribution.
The final category, political opinion, is the most commonly used
basis for claims of asylum."0 5 It has also become the most controver-
sial.. 6 While adjudicators differ over what activities or opinions are
properly defined as political, most have accepted as "political" such ac-
tivities as membership in a political organization, expression of a politi-
cal opinion through party membership or political demonstrations and
propaganda distribution. 167 Many Chinese asylum applicants claim that
violation of the Chinese population control policies is an expression of
political opinion.' 68 Assuming an applicant could establish that his re-
fusal to observe the Chinese policy was itself an expression of his politi-
cal conviction, any asylum analysis would be incomplete without also
considering the content and motivation of the Chinese government's
actions.
In this respect, two important distinctions must be addressed.
First, in terms of content, the Chinese population control policies were
initiated as administrative family planning practices designed to im-
prove the physical and economic welfare of the nation; they were not
conceived as manifestations of communist political doctrine or as ef-
forts to quell the population into political conformity.1 6 Second, and
most important, there is again no evidence to suggest that violators of
the policy, regardless of their political associations, are being harmed in
any effort to punish them for maintaining such beliefs.170 Consequently,
the statutorily categorized "basis of harm" standards have not been
adequately satisfied and therefore, do not form sufficient grounds for
asylum.
165. Blum, supra note 105, at 348.
166. See Note, supra note 157, at 401.
167. Id.
168. See China Takes Harsh Population Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1988, §
A, at 30, col. 1 (late city ed.).
169. See generally Note, supra note 122, at 1069-72 (discussing the jurispru-
dence of Quan ("Rights") in the People's Republic of China).
170. The government's motive must first be to punish. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 142-151. Now we see that, for the "political opinion" basis of asylum re-
lief, the punishment must also be for the purpose of suppressing a political belief or
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VI. GRANTING ASYLUM ON THE BASIS OF POPULATION
CONTROL POLICIES
Asylum applicants who base their claims on opposition to or viola-
tion of China's population control policies do not satisfy the current
legislative standards for asylum relief. First, although the Chinese poli-
cies apply to the entire Chinese population, there are many exceptions
to the one-child guidelines, and the consequences for violating these
guidelines are not always severe. 17 1 Therefore, any sweeping assertions,
such as those made in the interim regulations, regarding the probability
of harm, or the content of the harm, are at best over-generalizations.
The INS, in promulgating interim rules which contain such classifica-
tions, make improper pre-hearing factual determinations before factual
evidence has been presented, ignoring the discretionary case-by-case
adjudication process and defying the ultimate purpose of maintaining
asylum standards.
Second, judicial interpretations of the statutory term "persecu-
tion" uniformly agree that the home country's government must be mo-
tivated by a desire to punish an individual for illegitimate reasons.' 7 2 In
China, this is simply not the case. All evidence indicates that the Chi-
nese policies were enacted exclusively for the purpose of controlling
population growth: not as a subterfuge for any illicit or unlawful
designs. 17 3
Finally, the Chinese population control policies are imparted on all
citizens for the benefit of the entire nation. The policies do not discrim-
inate against any particular group, and they do not seek to punish any
individual who opposes the policy for religious, political or social rea-
sons. 174 Therefore, asylum claims based exclusively on opposition to
China's population control policies would likely fail. Also, any attempt
to administratively categorize such claims as expressions of political
opinion, as in the interim rules, manipulates the standards already es-
tablish in asylum law.
Family planning was first recognized as a basic human right on
Human Rights Day, December 10, 1966, in the Declaration on Popula-
tion by World Leaders.1 5 Two years later, it was officially recognized
171. See supra text accompanying notes 26 to 32.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 151 to 155.
173. See supra, text accompanying notes 17 to 25.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 151 to 155.
175. Laura E. Farrell, Note, Population Policies and Proposals: When Big
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by the United Nations.176 Nonetheless, even if China's population con-
trol policies are considered to be gross violations of human rights, one
question remains: Should the United States, in good conscience, expand
the asylum doctrine to afford these individuals statutory relief, while
other victims fleeing far more outrageous human rights abuses such as
terrorism and guerilla warfare remain unprotected?"'
Underlying the issue of providing asylum protection to individuals
opposing population control policies is an even more universal conflict
between the individual's right of choice in family planning and the
state's need to limit the size of its population in the interest of all. 78
The conflict reaches extreme proportions in those countries where the
needs of a rapidly growing population exceed the resources available to
fulfill those needs.179
Even in the United States, concerned humanitarians have grappled
with the challenge of controlling population growth and the ethical di-
lemmas which accompany coercive family planning.' 80 Increasing rec-
ognition of the causal link between unrestricted, irresponsible procrea-
tion and its devastating effects on urban social conditions has led some
to question whether parenthood itself should not be considered a privi-
lege extended to society rather than an inherent right of the
individual.'
Brother Becomes Big Daddy, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 83 (1984) (citing POPULATION
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION
NEWSLETTER No. 1, 44 n.25 (1968)).
176. Id. However, the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights
also contains a clause which authorizes states, in the exercise of their police power, to
place restrictions upon human rights in order to preserve public order, health, safety
and morals. Id. In response to extreme situations, states are permitted to impose cer-
tain restrictions which might otherwise be considered illegal, unconstitutional or viola-
tive of human rights. Id. at 96 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
177. See generally Michael G. Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A Proposal for
Relief for Victims of Civil Strife, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1987) (exploring the
failure of United States asylum law to protect victims of civil unrest).
178. See Note, supra note 175, at 90.
179. Id.
180. For a comprehensive discussion on the competing schools of thought regard-
ing coercive population control policies, see generally, Comment, Legal Analysis and
Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856 (1971).
181. Note, supra note 175, at 96. Excessive population growth might well
threaten substantive constitutional rights by diluting their practical value. Comment,
supra note 180, at 1906. For example, a steadily increasing population might under-
mine individual interests in access to public facilities for communicative purposes and
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As our state governments continue to regulate a wide variety of
activities in ways which impinge on reproductive freedom, including
compulsory eugenic sterilization statutes for confirmed criminals and
mental incompetents, 182 the next question may well be: Should the
United States, with all of its skeletons, be judging China?
To give up some freedom for the survival of a nation is not an
unreasonable notion. With so many other deserving applicants 83 cur-
rently being denied United States protection, the prospect of affording
additional relief to individuals on the basis of opposition to population
control policies seems grossly unfair.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, the United States could offer comfort, protec-
tion and economic sustenance to all individuals requesting such relief.
Of course, in a perfect world, we would not have to. However, with
over 2.3 million active registrants awaiting immigrant visas,"" and al-
most 200,000 applications filed for refugee status, 85 this country is left
with the task of establishing priorities and making hard decisions.
Asylum legislation was enacted for the purpose of protecting vic-
tims of violence, abuse and other human rights violations.1 8 However,
for practical purposes, adjudicators must discriminate among these vic-
tims and select only individuals who fear the type of harm which Con-
gress intended to protect. 187 Individuals in opposition to, or in violation
of, China's population control policies unfortunately do not meet the
appropriate standards of review to qualify for this protection. In addi-
tion, any effort designed to administratively categorize these individuals
as deserving asylum protection under the Act only works to manipulate
the current standards and ultimately disregards the purpose of the Act.
Of course, Congress could statutorily expand asylum standards to pro-
in a zone of personal and physical privacy. Id.
182. See Annotation, Validity of Statutes Authorizing Asexualization or Steril-
ization of Criminals or Mental Defectives, 53 A.L.R.3d 960 (1990).
183. While the determination of which aliens are more or less deserving of asy-
lum relief is purely subjective, the denial of asylum to victims of internal civil unrest is
frequently mentioned by commentators. See generally Heyman, supra note 175 (exam-
ining the predicament of victims of civil strife in El Salvador).
184. 1989 INS STATISTICAL Y.B. 18.
185. Id. at 26.
186. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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vide protection for these individuals. However, such legislation would
create an unfair and inequitable advantage over other asylum seekers
presenting equally desperate claims. China's population control poli-
cies, while no doubt controversial, were established for a legitimate
purpose under extreme and severe conditions. Perhaps as we sit back
and watch our fragile environment decay, our natural resources dwin-
dle and our fellow citizens cry out in hunger and pain, we will one day
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Florida law, an able and willing person may not
adopt a child, and is not even eligible for review as a potential adoptive
parent by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, if
that person is homosexual.' Florida is one of only two states in the
nation which expressly bars gays and lesbians from adopting children
solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.2 Whether the Florida
adoption statute is unconstitutional because it establishes a per se bar
against adoption by homosexuals based solely on their sexual orienta-
tion, regardless of the applicant's parental ability to care and nurture
an adoptive child, was recently brought before the Florida Circuit
I. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
2. Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and
Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1009, 1026 (1989) (New Hampshire also prohibits
homosexuals from becoming adoptive or foster parents. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
B:4 (1990)).
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Court of Monroe County in the case of Seebol v. Farie.'
Edward Seebol, a businessman and resident of Key West, Florida,
applied to the state to adopt a special needs child.' He filled out the
application for adoption candidly, and answered "yes" to the question
as to whether he was a homosexual. The Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services denied his application since he was an admitted
homosexual.'
Seebol decided to challenge the constitutionality of the Florida
adoption statute which states "[no] person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."6 The Florida Circuit
Court of Monroe County agreed with Seebol and eventually held that
the Florida adoption statute was unconstitutional because it prohibited
homosexuals from adopting a child solely on the basis of their sexual
orientation.7
This comment discusses the unconstitutionality of Florida's adop-
tion statute which creates an irrebuttable presumption against homo-
sexuals adopting children, in view of Seebol v. Farie.8 First, it focuses
on the factual background and the legislative intent of the Florida
adoption statute.' Second, it discusses the determination of the chil-
dren's best interest, the essential issue in child custody proceedings. 10
Third, it examines the reasons why the Florida adoption statute violates
the right to privacy under the Florida Constitution." Fourth, it dis-
cusses the statute's violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Florida and United States Constitutions, 2 and examines the level of
scrutiny employed in the analysis of equal protection. Fifth, it focuses
on the irrebuttable presumption contained in the Florida adoption stat-
ute' 3 which bars homosexuals from adopting and which violates both
3. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
4. Id. at C53-54. Mr. Seebol participated in various community services such as:
state sponsored guardianship and guardian ad litem programs, AIDS education and
assistance programs, and is currently the executive director of AIDS Help Inc. Id. at
C54.
5. Id. at C54.
6. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
7. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C57. Seebol's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings was granted March 15, 1991. Id. at C52.
8. Id. at C57.
9. FLA. STAT. ch. 63 (1991).
10. In re Adoption of H.Y.T, 458 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1984).
11. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
13. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (construing FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3)
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procedural and substantive due process. Finally, the comment con-
cludes by discussing the discrimination that homosexuals deal with on a
daily basis and the potential future abolishment of existing irrational
prejudice in light of the Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County
ruling.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Florida Adoption Statute, section 63.042(3)
Prior to addressing the constitutional violations of the Florida
adoption statute asserted by Seebol, the Circuit Court of Monroe
County discussed the definition of adoption, the court's duties in adop-
tion proceedings, and the legislative intent of the Florida adoption stat-
ute. 4 The court's discussion concluded by indicating that certain socie-
tal events have evolved since the enactment of the statute which reflect
that expressly prohibiting homosexuals from adopting is no longer ac-
ceptable in Florida.1" The circuit court began its analysis by defining
adoption "as a personal relationship created by one capable of adopting
and one capable of being adopted."1 6 Furthermore, adoption can only
be "decreed" by Florida statute."' The effect of a decree of adoption is
to create a relationship between the adoptive parent and adopted child
similar in all respects to a relationship were the adopted child is a "le-
gitimate blood descendant" of the adoptive parent.1 8 Next, the circuit
court looked to a Florida Supreme Court case, In re Adoption of
H. Y. T.,19 to define its duties in adoption proceedings. H. Y. T held that
the primary concern of a court in adoption proceedings is for the wel-
(1989)).
14. Id. at C53.
15. Ia.
16. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53 (citing Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d
417, 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
17. Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
18. FLA. STAT. § 63.172(1)(c) (1991); see also 4 ABRAMS, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW
§ 91.01, 91-97 (1991) (definition and legal effect of adoption in Florida).
19. 458 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1984). The potential adoptive child's attorney asked
the court to grant his motion and close the adoption proceedings in accordance with
Florida statute section 63.162(1)(a), and the media protested. Id. at 1128 (citing FLA.
STAT. § 63.162(1)(a) (1991) which states that all adoption proceedings shall be held in
a closed court, meaning that only people who are considered essential to the proceed-
ings are allowed admittance in the courtroom). The Florida Supreme Court held that
Florida statute section 63.162(1)(a) was constitutional. Id. at 1129.
1992]
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fare of the child whose custody is at issue.2
The Circuit Court of Monroe County also looked at the legislative
intent of the Florida adoption statute the primary focus of which is to
protect the best interests of the child by providing a "permanent family
life," as well as to protect the interest of the natural and adoptive par-
ents. " However, the Circuit Court of Monroe County, agreeing with
the holding of H. Y. T, emphasized that the paramount duty of the court
is to protect the welfare of the adoptive child. 2 In its pursuit to protect
the best interests of the child, the court then examined the suitability of
a person to adopt. Past case law of what constitutes a suitable adoptive
parent is important in order to determine what type of factors the court
considers in such disputes. Unfortunately, Florida case law challenging
the suitability of potential adoptive parents is sparse. 3
Age was an issue in In re Adoption of Christian,4 where the peti-
tioner for adoption was a sixty-eight-year-old grandmother who wanted
to adopt her granddaughter .2 The Fourth District Court of Appeal de-
termined that the grandmother was in good health and had a modest
income, and approved the petition for adoption. 6 The grandmother's
love and commitment to provide a stable and loving home overshad-
owed her age or financial limitations. Therefore, advanced age alone
does not disqualify a perspective adoptive parent.2 ' Likewise, in In re
Duke2 8 the Florida Supreme Court held that age and a very modest
20. Id. at 1128. The Florida Supreme Court also recognized that in adoption
proceedings the public policy of the legislature is to protect both the adoptee and the
prospective adoptive parents from unwanted publicity. Id.
21. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(l) (1991) (stating "[iut is the intent of the Legislature
to protect and promote the well-being of persons being adopted and their natural and
adoptive parents and to provide to all children who can benefit by it a permanent fam-
ily life .... ").
22. § 63.022(2)(1) (stating "[iln all matters coming before the court pursuant to
this act, the court shall enter such orders as it deems necessary and suitable to promote
and protect the best interests of the person to be adopted."); see also Sulman v.
Sulman, 510 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasizing that the
judicial system must protect the child's best interest); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So.
2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (child's best interest is paramount in
custody proceedings and is to be protected by the state and the court).
23. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 53 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
24. 184 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 658.
27. Id.
28. 95 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
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income are not a "per se" bar in the adoption process." The petitioners
in In re Duke were a forty-eight year old man and a sixty-three year
old woman who wanted to adopt a child.3° In approving the adoption,
the Florida Supreme Court determined that in light of the petitioners'
good health and moral character, their advanced age and modest in-
come were not grounds for denial. 31 The holdings in these two cases
indicate that a single factor in and of itself, or even a combination of
factors, is not determinative of a person's parental suitability. There-
fore, the single fact that a person is a homosexual should not be deter-
minative of parental unfitness.
The circuit court in Seebol v. Farie concluded its examination of
the factual background of the Florida adoption statute by stating that
since its enactment in 1977, societal circumstances have changed.3 2
Namely, the right of privacy amendment was added to the Florida
Constitution in 1980.33 Additionally, the court determined that society
has become more "knowledgeable" and more "tolerant" of homosexu-
ality. " ' Finally, the court recognized a substantial increase in the births
of special needs children,3" and the extreme difficulty that the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services has experienced in attempt-
ing to find "permanent" families for these special needs children.36
Even though society may be inching forward in its understanding
of homosexuality, no one should have the right to declare that a person
29. Id. at 910.
30. Id. at 909.
31. Id. at 910; see also In re Adoption of M.A.H., 411 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (52 year old grandparents petitioned to adopt their grand-
daughter; it was found that they provided the child with a caring and a "warm and
loving" relationship).
32. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53.
33. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
34. Id.
35. A special needs child is defined by Florida as "a child whose permanent cus-
tody has been awarded to the department or to a licensed child-placing agency and
• ..has established emotional ties with his or her foster parent; or [i]s not likely to be
adopted. . . . FLA. STAT. § 409.166(2)(a)1-2 (1991). A child is considered "not likely
to be adopted" if the child meets one of the following five criteria:
(1) The child has attained the age of eight; (2) the child is mentally re-
tarded; (3) the child is physically or emotionally handicapped; (4) the
child is of black or racially mixed parentage or; (5) the child belongs to a
sibling group in which two or more of the siblings must remain together in
a potential adoption.
FLA. STAT. § 409.166(2)(a)2.a-e (1991).
36. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53.
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is incapable of caring and loving a child simply on the basis of his or
her sexual orientation. The state of Florida has blindly invented the
proposition that there is some connection between who a person wakes
up next to in the morning, and his or her ability to discipline and care
for a child.37 The circuit court in Seebol finally shoved the state of
Florida into the twentieth century by advocating that there is no causal
connection between a person's sexual orientation and their parental
ability.38
B. Homosexual Parents and the Best Interests of the Child
In child custody cases involving a homosexual parent, the modern
judicial trend is that the sexual orientation of the parent is only a fac-
tor in determining custody if there is evidence that the parent's homo-
sexuality has adversely affected the welfare of the child.39 However, a
minority of jurisdictions view a parent's homosexuality as an automatic
"disqualifying factor" in child custody proceedings."' These courts ar-
bitrarily oppose homosexual parenting strictly because it is "a violation
of society's mores.''41
Rather than spending the time to educate themselves about the
concept of homosexuality so that they can make informed decisions in
custody proceedings, these courts blindly promote discrimination
against homosexuals solely because homosexuals' sexual orientation is
different than the societal "norm." While an idealistic society would be
one without private biases, the reality is that prejudice exists in society
today. However, that does not mean that the people who compose soci-
ety should stop trying to eradicate prejudice, and it certainly does not
mean that the judiciary, as well as the legislature,42 should encourage
such discrimination through factually incorrect decisions and statutes.
While custody law has taken strides to overcome the prejudice
37. For example, a person's sexual orientation does not measure his or her ability
to attend a little league game and cheer for their child.
38. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
39. Barbara A. Smart, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "'Coming Out" Custody Contro-
versy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 331, 332 (1981).
40. Id. The minority jurisdictions include North Carolina and Tennessee. Id. at
n.4.
41. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontradi-
tional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 553 (1990).
42. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
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faced by homosexual parents, adoption law is just beginning to eradi-
cate societal misconceptions about homosexual parenting."8 The Florida
Circuit Court of Monroe County in Seebol v. Farie recognized, in ex-
amining, case law of several states, that homosexuality of a parent is
not a "per se" bar to child custody in numerous jurisdictions, and thus,
should not be a bar to child custody in adoption proceedings."
After denouncing the "per se" bar against homosexuals in child
custody cases, the Florida circuit court advocated the use of the nexus
approach' 5 to determine the child's best interest, as applied in Bezio v.
Patenaude."I In Bezio v. Patenaude, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, applying the nexus approach, held that homosexuality
does not bar an award of child custody in the absence of evidence dem-
onstrating a correlation between the parent's homosexuality and any
adverse effect on the welfare of the child. 47 This nexus approach should
be the standard used to determine the best interests of the child in
custody proceedings involving a biological or an adoptive family be-
cause a parent's custody of a biological child is legally identical to an
adoptive parent's custody of an adopted child.' 8
The court in Seebol provided studies which have proven that chil-
dren raised by homosexual parents go through the same process of
child development as children raised by heterosexual parents."9 In fact,
a computation of studies indicated that children whose primary care-
43. Comment, supra note 2, at 1025.
44. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53 (citing In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669
P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983)) (holding that homosexuality, in this case the father's, standing
alone is not an automatic disqualification in child custody proceedings, and that this
holding is consistent with other jurisdictions); see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875,
879 (Alaska 1985) (the fact that the mother is a lesbian is not a factor in the custody
dispute, unless the child has been adversely affected).
45. The nexus approach used in determining the best interests of the child in
custody proceedings states that a parent's homosexuality can only be a factor for the
court to consider if there is evidence that the homosexuality of the parent has adversely
affected the child, whose custody is in dispute. Smart, supra note 39, at 355.
46. 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
47. Id. at 1216; see also Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (S.C. 1987)
(denying a father's claim to change child custody solely because of the mother's homo-
sexuality, since no adverse effects were established); Robert A. Beargie, Note, Custody
Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71, 76 (1988) (par-
ent's sexual orientation only a factor in custody disputes when it has adversely affected
the child).
48. See FLA. STAT. § 63.172(l)(c) (1991); see also ABRAMS, supra note 18, at
91-97.
49. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 53 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
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taker was homosexual exhibited "typical" psychosexual development.50
Additionally, the number of children of homosexual parents who de-
velop same-sex orientation do so as randomly and in the same propor-
tion as children of the general population.' Furthermore, in support of
the nexus standard for child custody, the circuit court of Monroe
County noted that mental health professionals have concluded that
homosexuals do not "learn" sexual preference from the sexual identity
of their parents. 2 Since the development of a child in a homosexual
household is the same as a heterosexual household, it appears that
there is no difference in parental ability between a homosexual parent
and a heterosexual parent. Furthermore, it is in the child's best interest
to be raised in a loving and stable home by a homosexual parent, than
a sterile heterosexual environment filled with turmoil.53
This issue of homosexual adoption has never been addressed by an
appellate court in Florida. 4 However, the circuit court in In re Pearl-
man 5 determined that numerous jurisdictions had adopted the nexus
standard in child custody proceedings involving a homosexual parent,
and held that the nexus approach would be the proper standard for
adoption where a homosexual parent was involved.5 Since there were
no adverse effects on the child, the court awarded custody of the child
to the deceased mother's lesbian companion, who had been become the
child's primary caretaker over the past five years.' 7
50. Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 692, 696 (1978).
51. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53 (citing Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing
Children's Best Interests when a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Cus-
tody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882 (1985)).
52. Id. (citing Marilyn Riley, Note, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and her Right
to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge that can no Longer be Denied, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 799, 861 (1975)); see also Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Chil-
dren's Best Interests when a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody
Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882 (1985).
53. Riley, supra note 52, at 860.
54. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53.
55. In re Pearlman, 15 FLA. L. REP. 1355 (17th Cir. Ct. 1989).
56. Id. at 1356; see also Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 61 (W. Va. 1985)
(to remove custody of the child from the lesbian mother based on a "speculative notion
of potential harm" is an abuse of discretion). Contra Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
(Va. 1985) (the father's "immoral" and "illicit" homosexual relationship classifies him
as an unfit parent as a matter of law); cf. J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (court can not discount the future effect of the father's homosexual rela-
tionship on the child's moral development).
57. 15 FLA. L. REP at 1355.
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The issue in Seebol was raised in In re Adoption of Charles B.,56 a
1990 case in which the Supreme Court of Ohio sanctioned the adoption
of a special needs child by his psychological counselor, who was a ho-
mosexual.59 The child, Charles, was classified as a special needs child
because he was suffering from leukemia. 0 Furthermore, Charles had a
low I.Q., a speech disorder and possible brain damage as a result of
fetal alcohol syndrome. Charles had been in the permanent custody of
the County Department of Human Services since he was three years
old because his family had neglected and abused him.
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on the opinion of mental health
professionals, who testified that it would be in the best interest of
Charles to approve the adoption. 6' The adoptive parent needed to be
"stable" and "flexible," but more importantly, the parent would have
to provide Charles with the special services he needed to sustain his
life. 2 The court also determined that a child is better off living with an
adoptive parent in a permanent home than just existing in an institu-
tion or foster home. 3 Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in approving
the adoption, held that the determination of whether to approve a peti-
tion for adoption should by made on a case-by-case basis, and that the
court should examine all essential factors before concluding what is in
the child's best interests.6
Similarly, both Seebol" and In re Adoption of Charles B.66 in-
volve the adoption of a special needs child by a homosexual parent. The
circuit court in Seebol, guided by the court's reasoning in In re Adop-
tion of Charles B., concluded that it would be in the best interests of
the increasing number of adoptive children to allow homosexuals to
adopt.0  The Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County saved these spe-
cial needs child from being condemned to grow up in a sterile govern-
ment institution, and for some with more serious ailments, the court
may possibly have saved them from being relegated to a life sentence in
a state sponsored foster home.
58. 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
59. Id. at 889-90.
60. Id. at 884.
61. Id. at 889.
62. Id.
63. In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d at 889.
64. hi.
65. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
66. 552 N.E.2d at 884.
67. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53.
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III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FLORIDA
The Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County in Seebol v. Farie,
also held that the Florida adoption statute 8 is unconstitutional because
it violates the plaintiff's right of privacy under the Florida Constitu-
tion.69 The right of privacy explicitly states that people are protected
against governmental interference into their private life.70 Therefore,
the right of privacy under the Florida Constitution protects citizens of
Florida from governmental inquiries to determine a person's sexual ori-
entation. 7 ' The issue of whether the right to privacy in Florida encom-
passes a person's sexual orientation was addressed by the circuit court
in Seebol, who entered into a discussion of the evolution of the right of
privacy under the Florida Constitution.7 2 The court began the discus-
sion by addressing a Florida Supreme Court case, Rasmussen v. South
Florida Blood Service.7 In Rasmussen, the Florida Supreme Court
characterized the right of privacy under the Florida Constitution as
"'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized man.' ",7" The circuit court in Seebol recognized that this right of
privacy is considered to be the most fundamental right afforded a per-
son and includes a person's sexual orientation.75 The Circuit Court of
Monroe County also addressed the United States Supreme Court case
of Roe v. Wade in determining Florida's privacy right.76 In Roe, the
constitutionality of the Texas abortion statute, which made it a crimi-
nal offense to obtain or attempt to obtain an abortion for reasons other
than to save the mother's life, was challenged by a class action brought
68. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991) (prohibits homosexuals from adopting a
child).
69. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 54 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991). Florida
enacted a constitutional amendment in 1980 expressly defining the right of privacy.
Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 246 (1989).
70. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
71. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
72. Id.
73. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
74. Id. at 535 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In Ras-
mussen, the court held that an AIDS victim was not permitted to subpoena the names
and addresses of blood donors to prove the source of the disease because the right of
privacy of the donors, and maintaining a blood donation system, was paramount. Id. at
537.
75. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54 (construing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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by a pregnant single woman." The Court held that the Texas statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the right to privacy of the Con-
stitution,78 and determined that the right to privacy has an "extension"
which includes matters dealing with marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. 79 Since the
right of privacy had been expanded to include matters concerning sex-
ual intimacies, it should be only logical to include under this category
matters concerning sexual orientation.
In furtherance of the discussion of the evolution of the right to
privacy under the Florida Constitution, the circuit court also looked to
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.' The court determined
that the citizens of Florida had adopted an expressed right to privacy
amendment in order to further protect personal privacy, and that the
Florida right to privacy was "stronger" and "broader" than the right to
privacy under the United States Constitution."' Although Seebol is fac-
tually distinguishable from Winfield, it is logical that a person's sexual
orientation is protected under the Florida right of privacy because Flor-
ida citizens have demanded greater protection by approving the privacy
amendment, than the United States Constitution, thus expanding the
categories afforded protection by Roe v. Wade.
Although the court in Seebol admitted that the Supreme Court of
Florida has never decided whether the Florida right of privacy includes
77. Id.
78. Id. at 164.
79. Id. at 152-53; see also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc.,
379 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1980) (person has a right to be free from "unjustified gov-
ernment interference concerning personal decisions."). Contra Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding that the right to privacy did not encompass a consti-
tutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy).
80. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). In Winfield, the Department of Business Regula-
tion and the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering subpoenaed, without notice, the finan-
cial institutions of the people who were under investigation, in order to obtain their
bank records. Id. at 546.
81. Id at 548. The issue of a person's fundamental right of privacy was also
addressed in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
In Public Health Trust, a hospital patient refused to accept a "life-saving" blood trans-
fusion because it was against her religion so the hospital requested a court order to
allow the transfusion. Id. at 97. Once again, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
people have the right to be free from government intrusion into their private life, and
emphasized that the right to privacy is a "deeply embedded belier' which is "rooted"
in "constitutional traditions." Id. at 98.
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matters concerning sexual orientation, 2 In re Florida Board of Bar
Examiners8" supports that it does. This Florida Supreme Court case
was decided two years before the enactment of the Florida right of
privacy amendment.8 4 The Board of Bar Examiners requested that the
Florida Supreme Court advise them as to whether an applicant to the
Florida Bar could be admitted, considering the fact that he admitted to
a homosexual orientation.88 The Supreme Court of Florida held that
where an applicant for the Bar fulfills all the requirements, and is qual-
ified for admission, the mere fact that the applicant has a homosexual
orientation is an impermissible reason to deny the applicant admis-
sion."' Presumably, the Supreme Court of Florida was declaring to the
citizens of the state that they may not discriminate against an individ-
ual solely because of his or her sexual orientation. The importance of In
re Florida Board of Bar Examiners, as noted in Seebol, was that sex-
ual orientation was afforded protection under the Florida Constitu-
tion. 87 The citizens of Florida, two years hence, determined that the
federally implicit constitutional protection of the right to privacy was
"inadequate," 88 and amended the Florida Constitution to include an
express right to privacy that was "broader" and "stronger" than the
United States Constitution.89
In Seebol, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services'
application asked the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive par-
ent, plaintiff Edward Seebol. 90 If the applicant gives a truthful response
indicating a homosexual orientation, that applicant is considered "per
se" ineligible to be an adoptive parent under the Florida adoption stat-
ute.91 Thus, the state of Florida automatically disqualifies applicants
based solely on their private sexual behavior.92 Furthermore, the stat-
ute disqualifies applicants who state that they have a homosexual orien-
tation without any consideration given as to whether the orientation is
82. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
83. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54 (construing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
88. Id.
89. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985).
90. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
91. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
92. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
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accompanied by sexual behavior. 93 A person's homosexual orientation
is a personal matter concerning a person's private life; therefore, the
information requested by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services violated Mr. Seebol's right to privacy under the Florida Con-
stitution. 94 Furthermore, why should anyone have the right to demand
answers to questions about the very intimate area of a person's sexual-
ity, and then to discriminate against that person because he answered
truthfully? The Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County determined
that the right to privacy encompasses the sexual orientation of a per-
son, and therefore, protects a person from being arbitrarily "penalized"
solely o:n the basis of his or her sexual orientation.95
In sum, the court in Seebol determined that the state's inquiry as
to the sexual orientation of the plaintiff, and the subsequent denial of
his adoption application because he truthfully admitted to a homosex-
ual orientation, was an impermissible exercise which infringed on the
applicant's right of privacy under the Florida Constitution.96 The effect
of the state's actions was to punish Mr. Seebol for exercising his right
to privacy.
Since, the Florida adoption statute, section 63.042(3), infringed on
the plaintiff's right to privacy, it had to pass a strict scrutiny analysis.
The right to privacy is so fundamental that in order for the government
to intrude into a person's private life, the government must show: a
compelling interest; the means used to accomplish the end result is nar-
rowly tailored; and that the means is the least intrusive way in which to




96. id. In support of this holding the circuit court then compared Seebol with the
United States Supreme Court case of Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In Har-
ris, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for the government to refuse to
allocate federal funds to subsidize abortions. Id. at 326. However, the Supreme Court
in Sherbert v. Verner emphasized that there is a difference between not subsidizing
constitutional rights and infringing on the exercise of constitutional rights. 374 U.S.
398, 410 (1963) (state may not deny total unemployment compensation to worker who
was fired because she missed one day of work in order to observe her Sabbath). The
court in Seebol, concluded that the Florida adoption statute infringes on the prospec-
tive adoptive parent's right because it prohibits a qualified applicant from adopting
solely on the basis of his sexual orientation. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
97. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990) (surrogate
may exercise right of privacy for incompetent person, if while competent the person
expressed his wishes); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-93 (Fla. 1989) (con-
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stated that "the state has asserted no compelling interest, or for that
matter, any substantial or even rational interest."'98 However, had the
state of Florida asserted an interest, presumably it would have been the
best interests of the child. 9 The court recognized that the best interests
of the child is a compelling interest; however, it determined that the
means chosen by the state to accomplish the goal was not the least
intrusive. 100 The exclusion of homosexuals as potential adoptive parents
infringes on their privacy interests, and does not advance the state's
goal of providing a permanent family life for adoptive children. 01
Finally, the Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County in Seebol
concluded its analysis of the Florida adoption statute, 10 2 in light of the
right of privacy amendment of the Florida Constitution,'0 " by pointing
out other defects of the statute. 04 The statute's exclusion of homosexu-
als as prospective adoptive parents is based on fear and ignorance of
the legislature without any factual basis.' 08 Additionally, this statute
promotes, and even encourages, the discrimination of homosexuals
through "archaic stereotypes."'' 06 Therefore, it was correct for the court
to conclude, that the Florida adoption statute, section 63.042(3), which
prohibits homosexuals from becoming adoptive parents, infringes on
stitutional right to privacy extends to minors and is a fundamental right which de-
mands strict scrutiny).
98. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54. The Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services denied the unconstitutionality of the Florida adoption statute, but de-
cided not to put forth a defense. Telephone interview with Lynn Waxman, Attorney for
the plaintiff, Seebol, (June 28, 1991). The Attorney General for the state of Florida
acknowledged the suit brought by the plaintiff and stated that his office would not be a
party to any of the proceedings to decide the issue. Id.
99. FLA. STAT. § 63.022 (1991) (legislative intent of the Florida adoption
statute).
100. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C54.
101. Id. at C53-54.
102. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
103. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
104. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55.
105. See Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797, 821 (1984).
106. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55 (citing Note, supra note 105, at 821).
The Florida adoption statute is a legislative vehicle used to discriminate against homo-
sexuals. There is no connection between sexual orientation and parental ability, and
therefore, the only reason to inquire as to one's sexuality is to further promote the
discrimination. However, in this case, the more the legislature gives into its fears and
ignorance the more innocent children it victimizes.
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the right to privacy afforded under the Florida Constitution, and is
therefore unconstitutional. 107
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION: ARE HOMOSEXUALS A "SUSPECT
CLASS? '
The second legal issue the court in Seebol had to decide, was
whether the Florida adoption statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Florida and United States Constitutions.0 8 The Equal
Protection Clause contained in the Florida and United States Constitu-
tions states "that all persons similarly situated be treated alike."' 0 9
Before the court could begin the analysis of whether the statute was
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, it first had to determine which
level of scrutiny to apply." 0
It has been stated that homosexuals do in fact constitute a "sus-
pect class,"' and therefore, the Florida adoption statute should be
subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis." 2 The court in Seebol entered
into an evidentiary discussion of the four factors which enable a group
of individuals to obtain suspect classification.I" The first factor is
whether the group in question has been the subject of past "pur-
poseful" discrimination."" Courts throughout the nation agree that
"homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sus-
tained hostility."" 3 The discrimination homosexuals face on a daily ba-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § .; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
110. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 55 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
111. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-28 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990). Contra Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (failing to apply suspect class status to homosexu-
als). However, the issue of equal protection was never addressed by the Supreme Court
in Bowers; the issue in Bowers was solely a right to privacy issue through the Due
Process Clause. Cass R. Sunstein, Note, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A
Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1161, 1165 (1988).
112. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55.
113. Id.
114. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring).
115. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orienta-
tion: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1299-1305
(1985); Note, supra note 105, at 799-807.
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sis penetrates all aspects of their private and public lives. 16
Second, the class in question must be defined by a characteristic
which "bears no relation" to an individual's capability to perform in
society.' 7 In support of homosexuals meeting this qualification, there is
overwhelming evidence that homosexuals are in fact "fit" parents, and
that children of homosexual parents adopt a sexual orientation indepen-
dent from their parents.1 8 The irrational stereotypes which people use
to discriminate against homosexuals have been proven to have no fac-
tual basis." 9 Furthermore, the idea that homosexuals are mentally or
emotional ill has been eradicated, along with the ignorant stereotype
that homosexuals were more likely to be child molesters than heter-
osexuals.12 ° Therefore, homosexual discrimination is based on their sex-
ual orientation, which has no correlation to their ability to function in
society.
Additionally, the circuit court in Seebol dispelled with the anti-
quated "stigma" stereotype' as a reason of parental unfitness, citing
to the United States Supreme Court case of Palmore v. Sidoti12 2 In
Palmore, the father of a young girl petitioned the court to divest the
mother of custody of his daughter because she was "co-habitating"
with a Negro, fearing the daughter would be harassed by the outside
community. 2" The Supreme Court of the United States held that pri-
vate biases and any potential future harm they may cause are an im-
permissible consideration in child custody proceedings. Thus, the
mother retained custody of her daughter. 2 Adhering to Palmore, the
circuit court in Seebol determined the argument that children of homo-
sexual parents will be subjected to harassment due to the stigma of
homosexuality was not a permissible consideration. 25
116. Note, Developments in the Law. Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1671 (1989).
117. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see also Watkins, 875
F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring).
118. See Green, supra note 50, at 696; Comment, supra note 52, at 882;
Marilyn Riley, Note, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and her Right to Child Custody: A
Constitutional Challenge that can no Longer be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799,
861 (1975).
119. Comment, supra note 52, at 870-72.
120. Note, supra note 105, at 822-24.
121. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55.
122. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
123. Id. at 430.
124. Id. at 433-34.
125. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55.
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Children in society are exposed to many different types of discrim-
ination, whether it be: the color of one's skin; a parent's sexual orienta-
tion; the weight of a child; or even judging people by the amount of
money their clothes cost. Society, including the judiciary, must deal
directly with these prejudices to eradicate them, and not send the mes-
sage to our children to look the other way when they are faced with
such prejudice. The court's final note was to emphasize the fact that
"[d]iscrimination against homosexuals . . . bears deep-seated prejudice
rather than reality.' 126
The third factor under suspect classification analysis is whether
the group in question is a politically powerless minority. 127 Due to the
fact that homosexuality is associated with unfounded stereotypes, the
majority of homosexuals, in order to avoid discrimination, do not ac-
tively participate in the political arena in support of gay rights. 28 Iron-
ically, the homosexuals who do venture out to increase gay awareness
by advocating equal protection under the Constitution are not endorsed
by legislators. 29 In conclusion, the laws which discriminate against
homosexuals, which are presently being enforced by the judiciary,
along with the legislature's refusal to effectuate any changes, is evi-
dence in and of itself that homosexuals are politically powerless. 30
The final factor for consideration in the suspect classification anal-
ysis is whether homosexuals are defined by immutable traits.' In Wat-
kins v. United States Army, the United States Court of Appeals stated
that a trait is immutable if in order to effectuate a change would entail
"great difficulties.' 32 The court in Seebol asserted that "'[s]cientific
research indicates that we have little control over our sexual orientation
and that once acquired, our sexual orientation is largely impervious to
change.' "'s Since homosexuals as a group satisfy all four factors, the
126. Id. (citing Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir.
1989)).
127. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985); see
also Watkins, 875 F.2d 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
128. Note, supra note 105, at 826; see also Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (coming
out of the closet exposes homosexuals to discrimination).
129. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (Norris, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; see also Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725-26 (Norris,
J., concurring).
132. 875 F.2d at 726.
133. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army,
875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)); see also Note, supra note
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Florida Circuit Court of Monroe County concluded that homosexuals
are in fact a "suspect class."13'
When the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged, the
court may apply three different levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny; inter-
mediate scrutiny; or rational basis. 35 The appropriate level of scrutiny
applied to the analysis is determined by the people who compose the
class challenging the validity of the statute.' a6 The "general rule;" i.e.,
the rational basis test, is that state statutes are presumed constitutional
if the statute furthers a legitimate state interest and the means chosen
are rationally related to the goal of the state.137 The exception to the
general rule is when the state legislation interferes with the rights of a
"suspect class" or infringes on fundamental rights under the Constitu-
tion. In such cases, "strict" scrutiny is applied.138
In recognition of homosexuals suspect class status, a strict scrutiny
analysis must be used to determine the validity of the Florida adoption
statute.139 The circuit court in Seebol had to establish whether: the
state had a compelling interest; the means-ends relationship was nar-
rowly tailored; and if the means chosen advanced this interest in the
least intrusive manner." 0 As previously mentioned in the discussion of
the child's best interest, the court in Seebol decided that Florida's de-
sire to protect and to procure a permanent family life for adoptive chil-
105, at 817-21.
134. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 55 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
135. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S 432, 440-41 (1985).
136. Id.
137. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); see also Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440.
138. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Legislation subjected to strict scrutiny will only
be declared to be valid if there is a compelling state interest; the means-ends relation-
ship is narrowly tailored; and there is no less burdensome alternative in which the state
can accomplish its goal. Id.
139. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 728 (Norris, J., concurring). Affording suspect
class status to homosexuals is long overdue. Florida, as well as the whole United States,
was just sitting back and watching an entire class of people being freely discriminated
against. The discrimination is still being promoted by certain legislation which sends
the message that it is "O.K." to discriminate against homosexuals because they are
"weird" or what they do is "unnatural." The bottom line is that the legislators look to
tradition, noting that society has discriminated against homosexuals in the past, so it
must be permissible to discriminate against them today, right? Wrong. Suspect classifi-
cation, and the subsequent strict scrutiny analysis, will force the legislators, as well as
society in general, to stop the arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals.
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dren was a compelling state interest.1 41
However, the court concluded that the means chosen to advance
the stated interest, excluding homosexuals as prospective adoptive par-
ents, was not the least intrusive way to accomplish the state's goal.",
The court asserted that the statute which bars homosexuals from
adopting without considering their parental abilities effectively sub-
limes the state's interest to place adoptive children in a permanent fam-
ily environment because it denies potentially fit parents from even ap-
plying to adopt." 3 Thus, the Florida adoption statue failed the strict
scrutiny analysis.
Furthermore, the court in Seebol determined that even if homo-
sexuals were not afforded suspect class status, the statute would still be
unconstitutional because it fails the rational basis test as not being ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest.14" The child's best interest
is definitely a legitimate state interest; however, it is not advanced by a
statute "which is clearly irrelevant to the promotion of any legitimate
state goal."" 5 In sum, the court in Seebol held that any statute which
"spites its own articulated purpose" will not be able to overcome even
the lowest level of scrutiny, and therefore, the Florida adoption statute,
is "blatantly unconstitutional and must be stricken." 1 "
V. DUE PROCESS: "PER SE" BAR AGAINST HOMOSEXUAL
PARENTS
The final issue examined in Seebol was whether the Florida adop-
tion statute violates the Due Process Clause under the Florida and
United States Constitution." 7 The United States and Florida Due Pro-
cess Clauses state all people have a right to life, liberty and property,
141. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973)); cf. Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989) (Army regulation made homosexuality a
"per se" disqualification).
145. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C55 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
146. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972), which held as
unconstitutional an Illinois statute which stated that when the mother dies children of
unmarried fathers are declared wards of the state).
147. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 56 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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which is free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. "1 8 In order for
the Due Process Clause to apply, there must be a right to life, liberty,
or property. A liberty right includes matters concerning family deci-
sions as noted in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families." 9 In
Smith, a foster parent and the foster parents' organization challenged
the New York procedures for removal of a child from its foster
home. " The Court concluded that personal decisions concerning one's
family are in fact a liberty interest granted protection under due
process. 51
Traditionally, the "family" has been thought of as a relationship
between a "parent and child," but a family can be defined by means
other than a biological relationship.' 52 The emotional bonding between
adults and the children they care for develops a symbiotic relationship
absent any biological connection. 53
In Seebol, the court recognized that an adoptive family is legally
identical to a biological family.15 The Florida adoption statute specifi-
cally states that adoption creates a relationship between the adoptive
parent and the adopted child, as if both the petitioner and the child
were "blood descendant[s].' 5 5 Therefore, adoptive parents have a lib-
erty interest when making decisions concerning family matters which
are afforded protection under due process.'56 Additionally, the prospec-
tive adoptive parents have a liberty interest based on the potential of
adopting a child, which would create a "permanent adoptive
relationship. '' 57
Although the circuit court in Seebol recognized that an adoptive
parent has a liberty interest in matters concerning his adoptive family,
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
149. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
150. Id. at 818-20.
151. Id. at 842 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also determined that one's family life is
afforded protection against governmental interference under both procedural and sub-
stantive due process. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
152. Smith, 431 U.S at 843-44.
153. Id. at 844.
154. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 n.51 (1977)).
155. FLA. STAT. § 63.172(1)(c) (1991); see also 4 ABRAMS, FLORIDA FAMILY
LAW § 91.01, 91-97 (1991) (adoptive relationship treated as the equivalent of biologi-
cal relationship).
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it also stated that this interest may be limited by the state.158 When the
adoptive relationship and the subsequent liberty interest are created
through an agreement with the state, the rights afforded the parent
may be defined by state law. " The Florida adoption statute specifi-
cally states that any person, married or unmarried, has the right to
apply to adopt a child. 60 The court in Seebol held that"this right cre-
ated "a legitimate expectation and entitlement to all citizens."'' Thus,
the court held that in this specific instance the liberty interest conferred
on homosexuals to adopt was created, as opposed to limited, by the
Florida legislature. 62
Since homosexuals do in fact have a liberty interest, the Florida
Circuit Court of Monroe County addressed whether the Florida adop-
tion statute violated procedural due process under the Florida and Fed-
eral Constitutions.' 3 The specific procedure necessary to ensure that
homosexuals are afforded due process is determined by examining the
government's actions in facilitating its interest in relation to the private
interest of the prospective homosexual adoptive parents.'" The state's
intent is to "promote" and "protect" interests of adoptive children and
the adoptive parents, by procuring the children a "permanent family
life."' 65 The state outlines a procedure by which to protect the adoptees
and prospective adoptive parents within the statute. 6 6 Therefore, the
court in Seebol held that the state's interest to protect both parties by
effectuating the statute was legitimate.'67 However, the circuit court
stated that if the state's interest is to protect the welfare of the child,
its actions do not advance this interest. 68 Quite the contrary, the
state's actions deny adoptees a potential permanent family life by
prohibiting "'an entire group of individuals historically shown to be fit
158. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (citing Speilman, 873 F.2d at 1384); see
also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977).
159. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845-46. As in Seebol v. Farie, where the state is consid-
ered a "partner" in the adoption relationship, then the state has the authority to define
the party's "expectations" and "entitlements." See id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(2)(a)-(d) (1991).
161. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 845).
162. Id.
163. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
164. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972).
165. FLA. STAT. § 63.022 (1991).
166. Id.
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and capable parents"' from participating in the evaluation procedure
to determine their "suitability" as prospective adoptive parents.169
Since the Florida adoption statute incorporates this "irrebuttable"
presumption against homosexuals from participating in any evaluation
procedure of parental suitability, it violates procedural due process. 171
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than indi-
vidualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure fore-
closes the determinative issues of competence and care, when it ex-
plicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.1 7 1
The Florida adoption statute which bars homosexuals solely on the
basis of their sexual orientation sacrifices their rights under the Consti-
tution for the sake of the state's own "convenience."'7 2 The state pur-
posefully denies adoptees acceptable permanent family life, and by do-
ing so " 'spites its own articulated goals.' 1'"3 Florida has the ability to
use a procedure to determine parental suitability, therefore the pre-
sumption certainly cannot withstand constitutional analysis because the
state has a "reasonable alternative" to determine if the applicant is
suitable.17 4 When considering the best interests of the child in adoption
proceedings, the prospective adoptive "parent's sexual orientation
should be one of many factors considered" if it is shown to have ad-
verse effects on the child. 75 The Florida adoption statute irrebuttably
presumes that homosexuals are unfit to be adoptive parents, for the
169. Id. (citing Green, supra note 50, at 696; Comment, supra note 52, at 882;
Note, supra note 118, at 860).
170. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972); see also Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (Connecticut statute violated due process because of
an irrebuttable presumption that students whose address was outside the state at the
time of application to college were considered out of state students for the duration of
their academic career, and were required to pay higher fees than those who resided in
the state); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (Texas statute imposing per se
bar against servicemen stationed in Texas to vote, who at the time of enlistment in the
army were living outside the state).
171. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58).
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972)).
174. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973).
175. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (citing In re Adoption of Charles B., 552
N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990)).
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mere fact that it is easier to presume rather than prove an irrational
conclusion which has no factual basis. 176
Furthermore, there is an additional hardship on the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services in placing "special needs
child[ren).'1  Special needs children may never be fortunate enough to
be adopted and, therefore, would spend most of their lives in state insti-
tutions. 717 The state would actually be protecting the welfare of the
child by placing the adoptee with a homosexual parent, instead of
"confining" the child to a sterile institution. 79 The government proce-
dure involved does not advance the state's interest to protect the wel-
fare of the child. Thus, the Florida adoption statute is unconstitutional
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Florida and United
States Constitutions. 80 Finally, the court in Seebol held that the sub-
stantive and procedural due process rights of the homosexual parents
were violated, and declared the Florida adoption statute's irrebuttable
presumption against homosexuals unconstitutional. 18
VI. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Homophobia is defined as "unreasoning fear of or antipathy to-
ward homosexuals and homosexuality."' 82 The Florida adoption statute
expressly states that "[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.1' 1 3 This legislation prohibits
an entire class of people from adopting not because they have been
shown to be unfit parents, but simply because they find it appropriate
to seek companionship with someone of the same sex. Unfortunately,
this legislation is a classic case of homophobia.
Obviously, the Florida legislature and society are adverse to
change, which is evidenced by existing presumptions that homosexual-
ity is "bad" or "unnatural." The court in Seebol v. Farie stood up to
society's prejudices, and stated as a matter of law that this type of
176. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56 (citing Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645,
658 (1972)).
177. Id.
178. In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 884-85 (Ohio 1990).
179. Id. at 889.
180. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C56.
181. Id.
182. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 916 (2d ed.
1987).
183. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1991).
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discrimination, based solely on fear and ignorance, will no longer be
tolerated.184 The most important decision the court made was to award
suspect class status to homosexuals, thereby subjecting the statute to
strict scrutiny. 8"
To discriminate against an entire class for absolutely no apparent
reason is intolerable, but when that discrimination hinders the life of an
adoptive child, it is reprehensible. Homosexuals have been proven to be
fit parents.' 86 The reality is that placing adoptees in loving "perma-
nent" families is difficult, but attempting to place a special needs child
is almost an impossible task. 87
The Florida adoption statute explicitly states that its intent is to
protect the welfare of the child as well as the prospective adoptive par-
ents. 188 If this is actually the case, then the Florida legislature should
heed the advice of Seebol v. Farie and its own agency, the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to strike the per se bar against
adoption by homosexuals. 89 In determining the suitability of homosex-
uals as prospective adoptive parents it is essential to remember that
"[t]he proper focus of judicial inquiry lies not with 'who loves whom'
but with whether there is any love at all"'19 for the child.
Because the state of Florida did not appeal the decision in Seebol
v. Farie, the decision is not binding on any other jurisdiction in the
state other than Monroe County. Therefore, every homosexual who
wants to adopt a child outside of Monroe County will have to relitigate
this exact issue. This is already occurring within the state of Florida,
and the volume of such cases will only increase in the immediate fu-
ture."' Sooner or later, hopefully sooner, the Florida legislature will
184. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 57 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
185. Id. at C55.
186. Green, supra note 50, at 696. In a study of thirty-seven children whose
primary caretaker was a homosexual or transsexual, thirty-six of the children exhibited
typical "psychosexual development." Id.
187. In re Adoption of Charles B., 522 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
188. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(1) (1991).
189. Seebol, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at C53-57. After the holding in Seebol, the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services requested the legislature to abolish the
prohibition against adoption by homosexuals. The legislature however, decided to keep
the unconstitutional provision within the Florida statute. Telephone interview with
Lynn Waxman, Attorney for plaintiff, Seebol (June 28, 1991).
190. Philip Kraft, Recent Developments, Lesbian Child Custody, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 192 (1983).
191. State Law Prohibiting Adoption by Homosexuals Challenged, SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Aug. 11, 1991, at A14. James W. Cox and Rodney M. Jackman, Sarasota resi-
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have to recognize that the prohibition against homosexuals adopting is
unconstitutional, and it is in the child's best interest to eradicate this
provision.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida adoption statute which prohibits homosexuals from
adopting is unconstitutional because it violates the right of privacy
under the Florida Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and Due
Process Clauses under the Florida and United States Constitutions. Al-
though the State of Florida does have a compelling state interest to
protect the welfare of the child, this provision does not, in any way,
facilitate the state achieving its goal. This legislative regulation gives a
governmental "stamp of approval" to the discrimination of homosexu-
als, and entirely neglects the best interests of the child because it de-
clares homosexuals immediately ineligible based on the application,
without examining their parental ability. Ultimately, it victimizes the
very people the state is supposed to be protecting, the children and
their potential adoptive parents. The Florida adoption statute should be
amended by obliterating the section which arbitrarily prohibits homo-
sexuals from adopting, following the lead of the Florida Circuit Court
of Monroe County by declaring the statute unconstitutional.19 The re-
sult will be a much-needed affirmative step towards eradicating dis-
crimination against homosexuals and at the same time advancing the
child's best interest.
Camille L. Worsnop
dents, were denied the right to adopt a child by the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, based solely on the fact that they are homosexual companions. Id.
The two men filed separate law suits, seeking injunctive relief to stop the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services from prohibiting them the opportunity to adopt a
child, based on the case of Seebol v. Farie. Id. Attorneys for the state and plaintiffs
stated that the issue of homosexual adoption will soon be adjudicated by the Supreme
Court of Florida. Id.
192. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52, 57 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991).
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